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South Korean nationalism

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The flag of South Korea; The flag of Korea is seen by South Koreans as a representation of the Korean identity and historical legitimacy.

South Korean nationalism is a form of state nationalism that stands out in the South Korea. In the 20th century, South Korean nationalism was hardly distinguished from anti-communist Korean nationalism, but South Korean nationalism in the 21st century has relatively weakened the ethno-nationalism of "Korean minjok" (한민족; lit. 'Korean ethnicity') and the state identity of "Republic of Korea" (대한민국) is more prominent among the some youth.

Among South Korean nationalists, opinions on Korean reunification are divided: some of them oppose reunification; other some support anti-communist "absorption unification" (흡수통일) centered on the Republic of Korea.[1]

South Korea is a highly homogeneous society, but has in recent decades become home to a number of foreign residents (4.9%). A number of its foreign residents are ethnic Koreans ("Overseas Koreans") with foreign citizenship. Many residents from China, post-Soviet states, the United States and Japan who may meet criteria for expedited acquisition of South Korean citizenship.[2][3] In recent decades, discussions have continued to be held both abroad and in Korea on the topics of race and multi-culturalism.[4][3]

Notation

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South Korean nationalism is written in English and Korean language as follows:

  • "Statism" (국가주의; 國家主義; kukkajuŭi)[5][6]
  • "State nationalism" (국민주의; 國民主義; kungminjuŭi)[7]
  • "Patriotism" (애국주의; 愛國主義; aegukchuŭi / 애국심; 愛國心; aeguksim)[5]
  • "South Korean nationalism" (대한민국주의; 大韓民國主義; Taehanmin'gukchuŭi)[8]
  • "Republic of Korea nationalism" (대한민국 내셔널리즘; Taehanmin'guk naesyŏnŏllijŭm)[9]

History

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Today, South Korea–based state nationalism is advocated by some conservative forces, including the New Right Movement, while left-leaning forces are more inclined to anti-imperialistic ethnic nationalism.[10][11][12] Examples of ethno-nationalism can be seen in Korean history, such as the anti-Japanese resistance independence movement in Japanese colonial era and the anti-American/anti-dictatorship democracy movement in the 1980s.[13] However, an example of state nationalism can also be seen in South Korea, such as Park Chung Hee's authoritarian politics, which was similar to the Japanese Shōwa statism.[14]

20th century

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In 1945, Korea was liberated from Japanese colonial rule, the northern Korea was occupied by the Soviet Union, and the southern Korea was occupied by the United States. by the United States. Northern Korea was quickly taken over by the communists, with Kim Il Sung as the focal point, so from early in 1947, Rhee insisted on establishing a "separate government in South Korea" (남한 단독 정부), acknowledging the difficulties in establishing a unified Korean government. Rhee's stance faced opposition from many pan-Korean nationalists.[15][16][17][18]

In 1949, the Rhee government adopted Ilminism, which combined the state identity of the Republic of Korea with ethnic-based ultranationalism. This ideology was abandoned after 1952, but Rhee never gave up on some elements of Ilminism: the bukjin tongil (북진통일) of the Korean Peninsula by force of South Korea until he resigned as president.[19]

Park Chung-hee, who became president in 1961, began to put more emphasis on South Korea's economy than Rhee's alleged military Korean reunification by South Korea, insisting on "development first, unification later" (선경제 후통일).[20] However, he took advantage of the ethnic nationalist sentiment to promote economic growth and maintain authoritarian power; in 1972, he took the initiative to enact the Pledge of Allegiance to the Flag. Modern South Korean nationalist and patriotic sentiments are deeply related to Park's legacy.[21]

21th century

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Taegukgi rallies in 2019

The South Korean nationality law is based on jus sanguinis instead of jus solis, which is a territorial principle that takes into account the place of birth when bestowing nationality.[22][needs update] In 2005, the opposition Grand National Party suggested a revision of the current South Korean nationality law to allow South Korean nationality to be bestowed to people who are born in South Korea regardless of the nationalities of their parents but it was discarded due to unfavorable public opinion against such a measure.[3]

A poll by the Asan Institute for Policy Studies in 2015 found that only 5.4% of South Koreans in their twenties saw North Koreans as people sharing the same bloodline with them. The poll also found that only 11% of South Koreans associated North Korea with Koreans, with most people associating them with words like military, war or nuclear weapons. It also found that most South Koreans expressed deeper feelings of "closeness" with Americans and Chinese than with North Koreans.[23] According to a December 2017 survey released by the Korea Institute for National Unification, 72.1% of South Koreans in their 20s believe reunification is unnecessary.[24] At the same time, Steven Denney from the University of Toronto said that, "Younger South Koreans feel closer to North Korean migrants than, say, foreign workers, but they will feel closer to a native born child of non-Korean ethnicity than a former resident of North Korea."[25]

According to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, ethnicity-based nationalism has been decreasing among younger generations of South Koreans, who have taken more in pride from the country's democratic system, technological innovation, and cultural soft power. According to Hanwool Jeong's research from the 2020 Korean Identity Survey, while national identification rose to 90%, ethnic affinity has declined to 64%, with a larger drop among younger people.[26]

According to a survey of 56 countries conducted by the Sinophone Borderlands project between 2020 and 2022, South Koreans have the world's most negative view of China; China's economic sanctions—including the Hallyu ban following South Korea's THAAD deployment by South Korea—intensified anti-China (including both anti-Chinese and anti-PRC) sentiment in South Korea, which led to the rise of South Korean nationalism.[27][28] When Yoon Suk Yeol was impeached after the 2024 martial law crisis, anti-China conspiracy theories quickly spread among his ultraconservative supporters.[29] Also, anti-China sentiment was linked to right-wing to far-right People Power Party's populism.[30][31]

New Right movement

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The New Right (뉴라이트) movement in South Korean politics is a school of political thought which developed as a reaction against the traditional divide between conservatives (the "old right") and progressives. they oppose the main elements of Korean nationalism (including anti-Japanese sentiment), and value the history of "Republic of Korea" (which was founded after 1948), more than the history of the Korean independence movement.

Gukppong

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Gukppong (국뽕) is a derogatory Korean word that is used to pejoratively describe a South Korean nationalist. The word is made up of the Korean word guk (국), which means country or state, and ppong (뽕) which is believed to have originated from the word philopon (覚醒剤), which is a Japanese slang for the drug methamphetamine. As a result, the word literally means "intoxicated with nationalism".[32]

'Foundation Day' controversy

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In South Korea, there is no consensus on when the Republic of Korea was founded.[33][34]

Those who support "Korean nationalism" believe that it was founded in 1919: the Constitution of the Republic of Korea regards 1919, the year in which the March First Movement took place and the Provisional Government was established, as the year of the founding.[n 1] Proponents of this view cite the examples of the United States and the Republic of China: the United States commemorates 1776, the year the Declaration of Independence was issued ("Independence Day"), rather than 1781, the year the Confederation was established, and the Republic of China commemorates 1911, the year the Xinhai Revolution was declared ("Double Ten Day"), rather than 1912, the year its first government was established.[35][36]

However, those who support "South Korean nationalism" argue that 15 August 1948, when the government of the Republic of Korea was established, should be designated as the "Foundation Day" (건국절). They argue that the claim that the Republic of Korea was established in 1919 is historical revisionism. Internationally, South Korea is regarded as the same as the Republic of Korea and is believed to have been established in 1948.[34][37]

Geopolitics

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South Korean nationalism is often characterized by strong anti–North Korean and sometimes combined with anti-Chinese sentiment.[38][39][40] Pro-Americanism and Christian nationalism also often combines with South Korean nationalism.[38][41]

While 20th-century South Korean nationalists, including Syngman Rhee, were both pro-American and anti-Japanese, but some 21st-century South Korean nationalists—including New Right activists—are pro-Japanese.[n 2] These diplomatic views should be distinguished from anti-Japanese Korean ethnic nationalism (minjok).[41][43]

Views

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According to Korea scholar Brian Reynolds Myers, a professor at Dongseo University, South Koreans tend to see the "Korean minjok" and their (South Korean) state differently.[44] According to Myers, the South Korean flag is often seen by South Koreans as representing the "Korean ethnicity" rather than merely South Korea itself.[45][46] The prioritization of ethno nationalism was also reflected in the pre-2011 South Korean military oath and pre-2007 pledge of allegiance, both of which pledged allegiance to the "Korean minjok".[47][48][49]

Emma Campbell from the Australian National University argues that the conceptions of South Korean nationalism are evolving among young people and that a new form is emerging that has globalised cultural characteristics.[50] According to Campbell's study, for which she interviewed 150 South Koreans in their twenties, the desire for reunification is declining. However, these who are in favor of a Korean unification state reasons different from ethnic nationalism. The respondents stated that they only wanted unification if it would not disrupt life in the South or if North Korea achieves economic parity with the South. A small number of respondents further mentioned that they support a "unification on the condition that it did not take place in their lifetime."[50] Campbell argued that her interviews showed that many young South Koreans have no problems to accepting foreigners as part of uri nara (우리나라).[50]: 492 

South Korean [state] nationalism is strongly rejected by left-wing Korean [ethnic] nationalists,[51][52] because it is partly influenced by Japan's para-fascist kokkashugi and legacy of radical anti-communist after 1945 (which manifested as political authoritarianism and mass killings).[53][54][55] They claim that this ideology is "violent and exclusive".[56]

List of nationalist groups

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This list enumerates South Korea-centric nationalist groups within South Korea that are not pan-Korean (minjok) nationalist.[n 3]

See also

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Notes

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  1. ↑ See Legitimacy Theory of the Provisional Government
  2. ↑ According to a poll in conducted in late 2025 by the Japanese Public Interest Incorporated Newspaper and the Communications Research Association, 56.4% of South Koreans had a favorable view of Japan, with favorability especially high in those in their 20s and 30s.[42]
  3. ↑ In the 20th century, anti-communist dictatorial ruling parties such as the Liberal Party, the Democratic Republican Party, and the Democratic Justice Party exhibited both South Korean [state] nationalism (kukka) and Korean [ethnic] nationalism (minjok).

References

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  1. ↑ "Full text: Yoon's speech on 'freedom-based unification' with North Korea". NK PRO. 15 August 2024. Retrieved 6 August 2026. South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol delivered a major speech on Thursday announcing a new roadmap for "freedom-based unification" with North Korea, revising a decades-old policy by embracing efforts to bring about a "unified Republic of Korea." The new doctrine outlines three key tasks to realize what amounts to unification by absorption.
  2. ↑ Jessie Yeung; Jake Kwon (15 May 2023). "They left South Korea for the American Dream. Now their children are moving back". CNN. Retrieved 4 December 2023.
  3. 1 2 3 Park, Chung-a (14 August 2006). "Myth of Pure-Blood Nationalism Blocks Multi-Ethnic Society". The Korea Times. Archived from the original on 25 July 2011. Retrieved 25 July 2011.
  4. ↑ Kim, Nadia Y. (2008). Imperial citizens: Koreans and race from Seoul to LA. Stanford University Press. p. 24. ISBN 978-0-8047-5887-1. Koreans' beloved trope of tanil minjok—'the single ethnic nation'— would soon come into its own (see Shin 1998). The centrality of "blood" has been revived in more current times as well.
  5. 1 2 Myers, Brian Reynolds (September 6, 2017). "On Experts and Exegetes". Sthele Press. Archived from the original on January 5, 2022. Anglophones tend to use the words nation and state more or less interchangeably, but when one nation is divided into two states, it's important to stick to the [South] Koreans' own practice of distinguishing clearly between nationalism (minjokjuŭi) and patriotism / state spirit (aeguksim, kukka chŏngsin, kukkajuŭi, etc).
  6. ↑ Hankwon Kim (2022). Cultural and State Nationalism: South Korean and Japanese Relations with China. American University.
  7. ↑ 진태원 / Tae-Won Jin (2011). 어떤 상상의 공동체? 민족, 국민 그리고 그 너머 [Which Imagined Community? Ethnie, Nation and Beyond]. vol., no.96, pp. 169-201 (33 pages)
  8. ↑ 정율성·홍범도 논쟁? '관심 없다'는 청년들 [임명묵의 MZ학 개론]. 시사저널. 4 September 2023. Retrieved 25 July 2026.
  9. ↑ 박명규 (2008). 한국 내셔널 담론의 의미구조와 정치적 지향 (PDF). SNU Open Repository and Archive. Retrieved 25 July 2026. 다시 말해 대한민국이라는 정치공동체에 대한 충성심, 귀속감, 소속감을 강조. 하고 그 국가의 발전과 위신을 중시하는 일종의 '대한민국 내셔널리즘'의 강화가 예상된다.
  10. ↑ "[Column] Distorting nation". The Hankyoreh. 2 April 2008. The booklet titled An Alternative Textbook of Modern and Contemporary Korean History (Daean Gyogwaseo Hanguk Geun-Hyeondae Sa) demonstrates something about that civil war. The publication adopts in full the historical interpretations of the book "Looking Again at History Around the Time of Liberation" ("Haebang Jeonju Sa-ui Jae Insik"), published two years ago by "New Right" scholars and received with much fanfare by conservative newspapers. The authors of these two publications reject minjok, the Korean people, and believe in gukga, the state.
  11. ↑ Cloudy forecast for Moon's 'Sunshine Policy 2.0' Archived 31 October 2023 at the Wayback Machine East Asia Forum (2017. 07. 20).
  12. ↑ 건국절 논란, 국가주의 vs 민족주의 사이에서. 뉴스워치. 3 August 2018. Retrieved 7 September 2024.
  13. ↑ Sang-hoon Jang (20 January 2020). A Representation of Nationhood in the Museum. Taylor & Francis. ISBN 978-0-429-75396-1. Korean ethnic nationalism which tended to be against authoritarian regimes and foreign powers
  14. ↑ Post-War Korean Conservatism, Japanese Statism, and the Legacy of President Park Chung-hee in South Korea. The Korean Journal of International. Studies 16-1 (April 2018), 57-76.
  15. ↑ 김인식 / kim In sik (2009). 대한민국 정부수립과 안재홍: 정부수립주체론을 중심으로 [The Establishment of the Republic of Korea and An Jae-Hong: An Analysis of the Theory of Leadership for the New Government]. vol.8, no.1, pp. 5-25. "남한단독정부수립이 현실화하는 상황에서, 안재홍은'순정우익'의 개념으로 중간우파의 이념지표를 제시하며 이들을 정치세력화하려 하였다." [The establishment of a separate government in South Korea was becoming a reality and under such circumstances An Jae-Hong attempted to organize the moderate right into a political power by presenting 'Pure Rightists'(Sunj˘ong Uik) as their ideological principle.].
  16. ↑ Lee Sang-Hoon. "Syngman Rhee's Vision and Reality: The Establishment of the Nation and Thereafter" (PDF). 국가 오픈액세스 플랫폼. p. 28. Retrieved 11 July 2026. ... These criticisms can be summarized as follows. First, while the scope of the state was clearly defined in the Constitution as including the entire Korean peninsula, Syngman Rhee pushed ahead with the establishment of a separate government in South Korea only, thus passing the burden of the national division into two Koreas onto ensuing generations following the foundation of the country ...
  17. ↑ Civil Affairs Division (1948). U.S. Army Forces in Korea, South Korean Interim Government Activities, U.S. Army Military Government in Korea. p. 170. Dr. Rhee is too great a patriot to advocate, or to contemplate, the eternal division of Korea. But, as a realist, he feels that, in view of the adamant attitude of the Soviet authorities, the unification of Korea is impossible in the foreseeable future and that, for the present, it can only be achieved by the setting up of a separate government in South Korea , which should be recognized by the United Nations as the national government of Korea In one word, Dr. Rhee and his followers stand for a national government in South Korea.
  18. ↑ James I. Matray (April 18, 2016). Crisis in a Divided Korea: A Chronology and Reference Guide. Bloomsbury Publishing. p. April 18, 2016. Early in 1947, Rhee went to Washington to lobby for a policy creating a separate government in South Korea , arguing that the Soviet Union never would permit a free government for all of Korea.
  19. ↑ Qingming Huang. North Korea and South Korea: Monopolizing Nationalism in a Divided Peninsula. February 5, 2026. p. 79–90.
  20. ↑ Frederick Betz (January 2013). Prime-movers in a commodity industry. p. 303.
  21. ↑ Brandon L. Santos (2018). "South Korean Nationalism and the Legacy of Park Chung Hee" (PDF). Retrieved 11 July 2026.
  22. ↑ Shin, Gi-Wook (2 August 2006). "Korea's ethnic nationalism is a source of both pride and prejudice". aparc.fsi.stanford.edu. Retrieved 16 January 2024.
  23. ↑ Cheng, Jonathan (26 January 2015). "In South Korea, Reunification Call Misses the Jackpot". WSJ. Retrieved 31 July 2019.
  24. ↑ "As Olympics open door to reunification, young Koreans are tuning out".
  25. ↑ Work, Clint. "What Do Younger South Koreans Think of North Korea?". The Diplomat. Retrieved 29 July 2019.
  26. ↑ Draudt-Véjares, Darcie (2025-05-29). "The Transformation of South Korean Progressive Foreign Policy". Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Retrieved 2026-02-27.
  27. ↑ "America Should Pay Attention to Anti-China Sentiment in South Korea". Foreign Policy Research Institute. 19 July 2023. Retrieved 25 July 2026.
  28. ↑ Lee Byung-jong (20 January 2026). "Anti-China sentiment in South Korea". Asia News Network. Retrieved 25 July 2026. The surge in anti-China sentiment is alarming because it reflects a broader nativist and nationalist undercurrent, the writer argues.
  29. ↑ "How anti-China disinformation shaped South Korea's year of crisis". France 24. 3 December 2022. Retrieved 2026-07-26.
  30. ↑ "The Role of Populism, Nationalism, and Xenophobia in South Korea's 22nd General Election in 2024". European Center for Populism Studies. Retrieved 12 May 2026.
  31. ↑ "What Happens When a Conservative Movement Continues on Without a Leader?". Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Retrieved 12 May 2026.
  32. ↑ "[The Fountain] The two faces of gukppong (KOR)". JoongAng Daily. 2023-04-18. Retrieved 2026-03-23. Gukppong is a portmanteau of guk (nation) and ppong (slang for drugs), which likens a sense of national pride to an emotionally elated state after using drugs
  33. ↑ 신용인 /Shin, Yong-In (2024). 건국절 논쟁에 관한 고찰 [A Study on the Controversy over National Foundation Day]. vol.16, no.2, pp. 27-59 (33 pages)
  34. 1 2 "'Foundation Day' controversy resurfaces". The Korea Herald. 14 August 2024. Retrieved 29 July 2026.
  35. ↑ "Elder historians say South Korea is in "serious crisis"". The Hankyoreh. 2016-08-23. Retrieved 29 July 2026.
  36. ↑ "July 4, 1776 vs. March 1, 1919". Seoul Economic Daily. 6 July 2026. Retrieved 29 July 2026.
  37. ↑ Myers, Brian Reynolds (7 April 2019). "South Korea's Nationalist-Left Front". Sthele Press. Archived from the original on 12 November 2020. Retrieved 25 June 2019. In closing, let me forestall reductio ad absurdum by again conceding that the left's discourse is by no means uniform. The 'radical' praises the North. The 'moderate' assails those who mistrust it. The one denies the legitimacy of the ROK founded in 1948. The other talks up the ROK-superseding legitimacy of an exile republic said to date back to 1919. But such differences are rhetorical, tactical. The point of the front after all is to appeal to all the constituencies it needs. One of them is the US government.
  38. 1 2 "South Korea's democracy in the shadow of the far-right". East Asia Forum. 21 June 2025. Retrieved October 15, 2025.
  39. ↑ "Conservatives take risky gamble by fueling anti-Chinese sentiment among youth, experts say". The Korea Times. February 18, 2022. Retrieved October 15, 2025.
  40. ↑ "South Korea's 'maverick' new president rides tough-on-China platform to victory". POLITICO. 9 March 2022. Retrieved 23 July 2026. A Korea Institute of National Unification public opinion poll published in January indicated that 70 percent of South Koreans perceived China as their "biggest security threat" apart from North Korea. China further inflamed South Korean nationalist passions when the opening ceremony of the 2022 Beijing Olympics featured a young Chinese woman wearing traditional Korean hanbok garb.
  41. 1 2 HWANG Taejin (31 December 2021). "Seoul's Bando Hotel: A Postwar Space of Americanism and Cold War Internationalism". OAK 국가리포지터리. Korea Journal Volume 61, Issue4, p200~228. doi:10.25024/kj.2021.61.4.200. Retrieved 23 July 2026. Syngman Rhee, a staunch anti-Japanese, anti-communist, and pro-American nationalist, unsurprisingly looked toward the United States as the ideal modernity to aspire to for post-armistice South Korea.
  42. ↑ 안서진 (2026-02-08). "한국인 일본 호감도 56% '역대 최고'…트럼프엔 74%가 "세계에 나쁜 영향"". 매일경제 (in Korean). Retrieved 2026-02-22.
  43. ↑ Lee Ji-yun ed. (2021). Politics of Rhetoric of ‘Nation’ in Korean Conservative Discourse: Focusing on Anti-Japanese Tribalism(2019) and Struggle against Anti-Japanese Tribalism(2020). Korea Institute of Science and Technology Information. "Anti-Japanese Tribalism(2019) and Struggle against Anti-Japanese Tribalism(2020) were criticized by nationalists for completely denying Korean nationalism as tribalism. They mainly criticized the pro-Japanese identity and political intentions of the authors of these books, and identified them with the New Right."
  44. ↑ Myers, Brian Reynolds (September 6, 2017). "On Experts and Exegetes". Sthele Press. Retrieved June 26, 2019.
  45. ↑ O'Carroll, Chad (2014). "BR Myers - Current Issues". YouTube. Retrieved 11 September 2017. [T]he South Korean flag continues to function, at least in South Korea, not as a symbol of the state but as a symbol of the race.
  46. ↑ Marshall, Colin (2017). "How Korea got cool: The continued rise of a country named Hanguk". The Times Literary Supplement. Retrieved 24 June 2019. When people wave the South Korean flag, in other words, they wave the flag not of a country but of a people.
  47. ↑ "New Pledge of Allegiance to Reflect Growing Multiculturalism". The Chosun Ilbo. South Korea. 18 April 2011. Archived from the original on 20 April 2011. Retrieved 20 April 2011. The military has decided to omit the word 'minjok,' which refers to the Korean race, from the oath of enlistment for officers and soldiers, and replace it with 'the citizen.' The measure reflects the growing number of foreigners who gain Korean citizenship and of children from mixed marriages entering military service.
  48. ↑ Doolan, Yuri W. (June 2012). Being Amerasian in South Korea: Purebloodness, Multiculturalism, and Living Alongside the U.S. Military Empire (Thesis). The Ohio State University. p. 63. hdl:1811/52015.
  49. ↑ Kelly, Robert E. (4 June 2015). "Why South Korea is So Obsessed with Japan". Real Clear Defense.
  50. 1 2 3 Campbell, Emma (22 June 2015). "The end of ethnic nationalism? Changing conceptions of national identity and belonging among young South Koreans". Nations and Nationalism. 21 (3): 483–502. doi:10.1111/nana.12120.
  51. ↑ 한국의 파시즘은 사라졌나: 일본 극우에 사상적 뿌리둔 박정희의 유산… 무의식에 깔린 잔재마저 청산해야 [Has Korean fascism disappeared?: Park Jeong-hee's legacy is ideologically rooted in the far right of Japan... Even the remnants of unconsciousness must be cleared.]. The Hankyoreh (in Korean). November 18, 1999. Retrieved October 9, 2021.
  52. ↑ 천박한 경제성장론 앞세운 국가주의와 반공주의의 교본 [A textbook of state-nationalism and anti-communism led by vulgar economic growth theory]. Center for Historical Truth and Justice (in Korean). 26 February 2011. Retrieved August 31, 2026.
  53. ↑ Charles R. Kim (June 30, 2017). Youth for Nation: Culture and Protest in Cold War South Korea. University of Hawaii Press. p. 77.
  54. ↑ "Post-War Korean Conservatism, Japanese Statism, and the Legacy of President Park Chung-hee in South Korea". The Korean Journal of International Studies. 16 (1): 57–76. April 2018. doi:10.14731/kjis.2018.04.16.1.57.
  55. ↑ 박민철 /Park, Min Cheol (2020). 국가주의의 철학적 기획- 김두헌의 철학체계를 중심으로 - [Philosophical Planning of [State] Nationalism - Focusing on the Philosophical World of Kim Doohun -]. vol.31, no.3, 통권 92호 pp. 71-107 (37 pages).
  56. ↑ Myers, Brian Reynolds (20 May 2018). "North Korea's state-loyalty advantage". Free Online Library. The pledge to the flag was amended in 2007; schoolchildren now declare loyalty not to the homeland and the race but to a "free and just Republic of Korea." Although the change was inspired by the increase in multiethnic households, not by the drive to bolster state-patriotism per se, the left-wing media objected that the new oath "runs the high risk of calling forth violent and exclusive state-ism [kukkajuui]."
  57. ↑ "세월호, 국가, 미디어: <조선일보>와 <한겨레>의 세월호 의견기사에 나타난 '국가 담론' 분석" [The Sewolho, State, and the Media: Critical Discourse Analysis on the Imaginary of the State Represented in the Opinion Articles of <Chosun-ilbo> and <Hankyoreh>]. DBpia. November 2015. Retrieved 25 July 2026. 조선일보의 담론은 발전주의와 국가주의, 신자유주의를 복잡하게 착종시킨 형태를 띤다. [Discourse of the Chosun Ilbo takes the form of a complex mixture of developmentalism, state nationalism, and neoliberalism.]
  58. ↑ David G. Bromley; Alexa Blonner (November 2012). "From the Unification Church to the Unification Movement and Back". Nova Religio: 16(2):86-95. doi:10.1525/nr.2012.16.2.86.
  59. ↑ Jun-Hyeok Kwak (11 June 2013). "Nationalism and Democracy Revisited" (PDF). Soongsil University. Archived from the original (PDF) on 10 August 2017. Retrieved 26 September 2019.
  60. ↑ "The Role of Populism, Nationalism, and Xenophobia in South Korea's 22nd General Election in 2024". European Center for Populism Studies. Retrieved 12 May 2026.
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