IOC-Champa

PO CEI BREI FLED TO CAMBODIA IN 1795-1796 TO FIND SUPPORT

Details

Written by Dr. Mark Phoeun and Translated by Musa Porome

Musa Porome

From the second to the tenth centuries, Champa was a prosperous kingdom stretching from Hoanh Son in the north to Dong Nai in the south (present-day central Vietnam). After breaking away from Chinese domination in 993, Dai Viet could not expand northward, as it shared that border with China. Therefore, its rulers had to find a way to expand southward.

The Dai Viet king started to provoke his nearest neighbor, Champa, and in 993 a bloody war broke out between the two countries, each of which had a totally different civilization. Dai Viet’s civilization had always been heavily influenced by Confucian China, whereas the source of inspiration for Champa had always been Hindu India. Toward the end of the tenth century, Champa could no longer defend itself against Dai Viet’s aggression and so was forced to move its border further south. This marked the beginning of Dai Viet’s expansion southward. Based on documentation found in steles, it was declared that in the year 1000, in order to avoid conflict with Dai Viet and live in prosperity, Champa had to move its capital of Indrapura (now Tra Kieu) further south and establish a new capital, named Vijaya (now in Binh Dinh province), because of Dai Viet’s continuing military pressure. Each time there was a conflict, Champa had to sacrifice some of its northern lands to the Vietnamese. But this conflict never ended, because Dai Viet continued its aggression toward Champa to acquire more of its land.

No longer willing to stand aside patiently when faced with Dai Viet’s continuous aggression and invasions, the Cham king, Che Bong Nga sent troops to punish the country and capture its Thang Long palace during 1360-1390. Unfortunately, he was killed on the battlefield. King Le Thanh Tong of Dai Viet, taking advantage of the situation, ordered his army to attack and capture Vijaya in 1471. After he accomplished this goal, he punished and killed without restraint all of the Cham who had been loyal to Che Bong Nga, destroyed the kingdom’s imperial palace and temples, and incorporated Vijaya into Dai Viet. This event marks the decline of Indian civilizational influence on the north. According to Cambodian documents, the Cham started migrating to Cambodia because of Dai Viet’s harsh policies toward them and because they could not stand living under oppression.

Although Vijaya was lost, Champa’s remaining two states in the south, Kauthara and Panduranga, remained independent. Regrettably,  civil war broke out between Chua Trinh and Chua Nguyen, the two rival kings of Dai Viet. how could this country have two kings? In 1471, the two small states of Champa fell victim to Chua Nguyen’s policy of southern expansion. are chua tring and chua nguyen dynasties? See the first sentence in the next paragraph.

Chua Nguyen invaded Champa until 1692. In 1693, the Cham suddenly rose up and forced him to agree to withdraw his troops in 1694. However, he left behind a palace? in Phu Binh Thuan to represent Dai Viet inside Champa (Panduranga-Champa?), opened the border, and called upon his people to migrate freely to Champa’s northern state and even deeper to Panduranga, the last Cham state. From that point on, Champa began to grow smaller and weaker. The governor of Phu Binh Thuan ordered the Vietnamese who were living among the Cham as illegal immigrants. This continuing trend led to the beginning of Panduranga’s fall.

Po Cei Brei ascended the throne of Panduranga in 1783-1786. By this time, Panduranga-Champa? had become a battlefield used by two brothers dynastic families?, the Nguyen Anh and the Tay Son, who fought each other from 1771-1802 to determine who would rule the Vietnamese. Po Cei Brei found this familial war on Cham land unacceptable. Unable to withstand the yoke of tyranny any longer, he and his family, along with the royal court, fled to Kampong Cham (Cambodia). For a while, he moved back to Rong Damrei (Tay Ninh) in 1812, where he lived until his death, according to the Cham documents found in Cam-37 and Cam-39 (38).^[1]

The rise of the Tay Son caused great change within Dai Viet’s political realm. North of Dai Viet, most of the kings who took over the throne from the Le and the Trinh dynasties were assassinated, and the Tay Son were threatening the Nguyen dynasty in the south. If the Tay Son somehow unified Dai Viet, this could only have a negative repercussion on the two neighboring countries of Panduranga-Champa and Cambodia.

At this time, people were aware of the fact that Panduranga-Champa was a small land playing host, against its will, to a terrifying and bloody civil war between the Nguyen Anh and the Tay Son, and that it was becoming destabilized. Suddenly, the Nguyen Anh and then the Tay Son invaded. This engulfed the nation in chaos, even though it had not caused this war that had brought only great suffering to its people.

Despite the Tay Son’s rise, Cambodia could not prevent the Nguyen’s land invasions along the Mekong River. Thus, this area became a safe haven for Vietnamese fighters. At the end of the war, they settled in the region and showed no intention of returning to their homeland. Meanwhile, Cambodia was being oppressed and threatened by Thailand in the west and the Nguyen in the east. Unfortunately, Cambodia fell into a war with Panduranga-Champa. Taking advantage of this situation, in 1785 the Nguyen appropriated a Cambodian island, Xiemla Bay?, to resettle many Vietnamese. Eventually, the Nguyen claimed the island as its own. During this intra-Vietnamese conflict, both Panduranga-Champa and Cambodia lost land.

After nine years of hiding in Dong Nai Thuong, Po Cei Brei, his family, and his royal court were forced to seek refugee in Cambodia in 1795-1796 at Roka Po Pram, Thbang Khmum province (now Kompong Cham). Upon his arrival, he met all of the Cham who had migrated there during the war. This was not the first Cham migration to Cambodia; they had migrated in 1471 and 1692. The people of Champa-Panduranga started migrating there in 1835.

After seventeen years, Po Cei Brei, his family, and the royal court found peace? in Cambodia. Unfortunately, The Xiem (who is he?)wanted to invade Cambodia and acquire Battambang, Angkor, and Kampong Svay provinces. This created a conflict between the dynastic families in Ondong and Bangkok. King Ang Chan of Cambodia (1797-1834) hailed? the throne in Bangkok, but had to find a way to break free of Xiem by establishing a connection with Hue’s rulers. At the beginning of 1812, King Ang Chan’s brother, Ang Snguon, left the capital of Ondong and went to Pursat to form an army that would fight the Xiem-La. Hearing about this, Bangkok sent its expeditionary forces to Cambodia. In response, King Gia Long of Dai Viet sent his royal forces to help the king of Cambodia. In April 1812, Xiem La’s forces moved deep into Cambodia, attacked its army, and captured Ondong’s capital. Ang Chan was forced to flee Ondong and hide in Deng Eth. Ondong’s capture not only forced Ang Chan to flee, but also caused Po Cei Brei of Panduranga-Champa and his people to flee back to Roka Po Pram to take shelter in Rong Damrei (Tay Ninh) province. He remained there until his death.

According to the Cham documents Cam-37 and Cam-39 (38), Po Cei Brei’s seeking refugee in Cambodia helps explain Indochinese history. Each nation’s literary history usually describes the same significant events, but only in a way designed to favor itself. Therefore, researchers have to be careful when searching for the truth based on what, where, and which document is being used.

Cam-37 and Cam-29 (38) are the only documents that clearly recount the story of Po Cei Brei, a king whose nation was in the process of being extinguished. He struggled and sought refuge in Cambodia at a time when his people were suffering. These two documents relate why he migrated to Cambodia, why and how the people Champa-Panduranga began to migrate to Cambodia, and how Rong Damrei (Tay Ninh) became Vietnamese land. In addition, Ang Chan’s presence in Rong Damrei and his month-long stay in Saigon tell us that in 1823-1824 or 1835-1836 that the residents of Rong Damrei rose up against the Vietnamese.

THE REVOLUTION OF TUEN PHAOW IN 1796-1797

By Dr. Nicolas Weber (INALCO, Paris)

                                     Translated by Musa Porome

The revolution led by Tuen Phaow in 1796-1797 has led researchers to study his life based on the Ariya Tuen Phaow (hereinafter Ariya). This document, which contains Cham letters (which is written in Cham?), deals with Panduranga-Champa’s historic struggle and eventual defeat? of its Vietnamese enemy. Panduranga-Champa’s boundaries extend from Mount Hoanh Son to Bien Hoa.^[2]

The Ariya purports to describe this revolution, which was led by marquise (What is this in English?) Tuen Phaow (known in Vietnamese as Tuan Phu).^[3] He came from present-day Malaysia to help stop the Vietnamese invasion of Panduranga-Champa. In addition, it helps us prove that the Cham rebelled against the Vietnamese and supplies us with the best narrative of the political crisis that engulfed them toward the end of the eighteenth century.

This document was found in a Cham manuscript and was conserved catalogued? by the Vien Dong School, France (EFEO), under the notation “CAM-58a.” In addition, it is present in Paul Mus’ research book (give book’s title). It measures about 155mm x 230mm and consists of 35 pages. The Ariya’s contents are indicated on pages E11-E23,^[4] and pages E10 and E24 indicate the name of the person who rewrote this document and renamed it Tajaong.

The Ariya exists in a variety of copies. Some were copied onto microfilm under the label “CAM-MICROFILM 16,”^[5] “CAM-MICROFILM 66,”^[6] and “CAM-MICROFILM 56.”^[7] Another copy is kept at the Asian Society in France, Paris (Societe asiatique de Paris), under the label “CM-25.”^[8] Finally, two other copies were found at the Foreign Missionary Association, Paris (Missions Etrangeres de Paris), under the label “MEP, VOL. 1189/4 and 1190/1.”^[9]

In 1987 and 1993, Po Dharma was briefed on Tuen Phaow’s history.^[10] Inrasara^[11] also used it as a reference for his research book on poems?, which was published in Latin letters and translated into Vietnamese in 1996.^[12] Inrasara also worked in Cham letters, but the meaning seems to be slightly different from the book written in Latin letters. We use Inrasara for reference purposes in this article.^[13]

THE POLITICAL SITUATION BEFORE TUEN PHAOW

In the eighteenth century, Panduranga-Champa’s political situation was chaotic due to the power struggle between the Tay Son^[14] and the Nguyen Anh.^[15] In 1786, the Nguyen Anh king was defeated and forced to hide in Gia Dinh. In his secret resistance zone, he hoped that he would regain his throne one day. Unfortunately, Panduranga-Champa was being dragged into this conflict that had nothing to do with it, for both the Tay Son and the Nguyen Anh believed that conquering it and then using it as a military base would enable them to win the war once and for all. Panduranga-Champa had no choice but to join the side from which it could benefit the most. This reality led Panduranga-Champa into a political crisis. According to Po Dharma, it had a very small chance of becoming independent because the situation was completely one-sided and either party could end up determining its future prosperity or destruction.^[16]

When war broke out in 1771 you’ve been talking about 1786 above. Is this date correct?, Panduranga-Champa was ruled by King Tisuntiraydapaghoh (34^th dynasty according to the Cham calendar). dynastic records? What does a calendar have to do with a dynasty?^[17] A direct relative descendant? of the famous King Po Rome (1627-1653) of the Churu tribe, he ascended the throne in 1768.^[18] After his death in 1780, the Nguyen Anh immediately abolished the treaty guaranteeing his dynasty’s continuation (according to Cham tradition)^[19] and installed Po Tisuntiraydaparan (35^th dynasty) on the throne. Regrettably, he was not related to the former king at all and thus was considered a usurper. One year later, the Tay Son invaded Panduranga-Champa, overthrew Po Tisuntiraydapuran, and forced him to relinquish his throne to them.^[20] In 1783, they offered to make Prince Po Cei Brei (36^th dynasty), the son of Po Tisuntiraydapaghoh (34^th dynasty), the new king of Panduranga-Champa.

Even though Panduranga-Champa was under the Tay Son’s protection, the Nguyen Anh in the southern region continued to attack it. Po Cei Brei, who could no longer tolerate this constant military pressure, decided to secretly move his family and army the Dong Nai Thuong zone, where they would rearm and prepare to rise up against the foreign occupation.^[21]  In his absence, Nguyen Nhac of the Tay Son offered the throne back to Po Tisuntiraydapuran (35^th dynasty), a king who had previously come to power with the help of the Nguyen Anh and eventually had surrendered to the Tay Son in 1781. His acceptance of this arrangement forced Po Cei Brei to sign a treaty with the Nguyen Anh to resolve his country’s political crisis. To keep the treaty alive and show their support for it, the Nguyen Anh made Po Cei Brei a chuong co (attorney general) in 1790.^[22] Unfortunately, this treaty soon led Panduranga-Champa into a harsh civil war between Po Cei Brei (supported by the Nguyen Anh) and Po Tisuntiraydapuran (supported by the Tay Son).

According to the history of Panduranga, (a book, oral history?)^[23] after Po Tisuntiraydapuran’s death in 1793, the Nguyen Anh offered Po Lanhuanpaghoh^[24] the position of chuong co with full power to govern Panduranga-Champa (Tran Thuan Thanh what is this?).^[25] It is easy to understand this choice, because this man had previously held several important positions in the region controlled by the Nguyen Anh during their whose? uprising against the Tay Son. He had also served as governor of Phan Ri in 1790 while Phan Rang was still occupied by the Tay Son,^[26] particularly during their whose? participation in the war against the Tay Son.^[27] In the eyes of Po Cei Brei, choosing Po Lahuanpaghoh signaled treachery, and so he vowed to launch another war against the Nguyen Anh. According to the two Cham documents^[28] and Vietnamese historical records,^[29] the ensuing war caused Tuen Phaow to go to Panduranga-Champa in 1796-1797.

TUEN PHAOW IN PANDURANGA

According to a document contained within CM-33, when the Nguyen Anh sent their army to occupy Panduranga-Champa and overthrow Po Tisuntiraydapuran, an alliance with the Tay Son^[30] in 1793 occurred between who?. As a result, Tuen Phaow entered Panduranga-Champa through the Dong Nai Thuong zone. The announcement of his presence caused the Tay Son invaders to call upon the Vietnamese living in Panduranga-Champa to capture him so that he could be executed for illegally seizing power and stealing the people’s property while their former (and legitimate) king was hiding in the western mountainous region (Dong Nai Thuong). Surely this was a baseless, not to mention a rather awkward, accusation.

Tuen Phaow’s presence raised a number of questions among the Cham, given that Po Cei Brei and his royal army were hiding in the same region. One question immediately comes to mind: Was there a connection between them and the operations carried out to defeat the occupying army and the Cham traitors on either side? This seems to be a preemptive strategy launched by Tuen Phaow to liberate Panduranga-Champa. The fact that both men were hiding near each other did not come as a surprise to many Cham.

TUEN PHAOW’S REVOLUTION

Before he came to Panduranga-Champa, Tuen Phaow knew what was going on in the region and that the Vietnamese were looking down on the Cham. He concluded that they would soon be wiped out in their own land if he did not intervene in a timely manner to defend Panduranga-Champa. Thus, he arrived at the head of a strong revolutionary army that included some of the Cham from Cambodia (Cham Buruw),^[31] Java Kur, and some (cham or khmer?) officers of the Cambodian army. This army was divided in to two groups: the first group wore white uniforms,^[32] and the second wore black uniforms and black turbans. The local Cham could easily identify from where they had come.

To implement his plan, Tuen Phaow also recruited local men and women from among the Churu, Roglai, and Kahaow see spellings below peoples (the “highland” Cham) in western Panduranga-Champa.^[33] In order to train the new army, he designated an army zone around his residential palace and carefully selected and trained new the recruits, thereby showing his strategic and militant military? intelligence.

Being solely concerned about the local Cham who supported his plan, he called upon the people of Panduranga-Champa to unite so they could rise up against the foreign occupation. Psychologically, he knew what they wanted and so initiated psychological warfare campaign. For example, immediately after his arrival, he announced that he was a bhradhik (just a leader a just leader?) coming from Makkah (Kelantan), the Malay kingdom.^[34] To reaffirm his original loyalty to the cham?, he started building his own palace in Kayaon (eastern Phan Thiet).

He made extensive use of Islam, even going so far as to compare himself to Prophet Muhammad and/or the warrior Ali ibn Abu Talib. He also claimed that he had received direct orders from Allah to liberate Panduranga-Champa. Despite his use of Islam, however, he never intended to convert the people and then lead them in a holy war. Rather, he tried to educate them about the importance of feeling pride and love for one’s homeland so that they could distinguish between the foreign occupiers and the local residents and construct guidelines for each group.

After strenuous and careful recruitment and training, he was ready to attack. In July 1796, the Year of the Dragon, he ordered the army to attack Phan Ri.^[35] The Vietnamese king ordered the king of Panduranga-Champa, Po Lahuanpaghoh (known to them as Nguyen Van Hao), to crush this revolution. However, he was unable to do, and within a few months Tuen Phaow’s army conquered Phan Thiet and took control of the Central Highlands. After liberating Phan Ri, he decided to move north to liberate Phan Rang. However, he was injured during the battle and had to move some of his army back to a mountain base for treatment. Even though he was injured, he urged the army to continue fighting and not to falter just because he was no longer among them. He ordered them to fight bravely until the Vietnamese occupiers were defeated and withdrew completely from Cham land.

Since the enemy had doubled its forces and acquired more advanced weapons, Tuen Phaow decided to go back to Makkah (Kelantan) to ask for help. He also considered asking France for help. Before he left, he told the army to continue the fight during his absence. Unfortunately, the Vietnamese found out that Tuen Phaow was leaving the country. Along with the help of insiders, they attacked aggressively and defeated Tuen Phaow’s army in December 1787, the Year of the Snake.

Based on the sources that were documented, important news about Tuen Phaow’s revolution was found, showing that it had had a strong support system and that there had been a strong relationship between Panduranga-Champa and Kelantan. In addition, it also reveals that some of the strongest unity was between the Cham from Cambodia and the Churu, Raglai, and Koho peoples living in the Dong Nai Thuong region.

REFERENCE BOOKS

Cham Documents locations needed

            Cam 58 (3)

            Cam Microfilm 16 (1)

            Cam Microfilm 66 (1)

            Cam Microfilm 56 (8)

            Mep 1189/4 (4)

            Mep 1190/1 (9)

            CM 25 (4)

            CM 33

            Cam 112 (1)

Vietnamese Documents (Vietnam Bien nien Su)

Dai Nam Chinh Bien Liet Truyen (The Tay-son), Phu Quoc Vu Khanh Dac Trach Van Hoa, Saigon 1970.

Dainam Nhut Thong Chi (Tinh Binh-Thuan), Bo Van Hoa Giao Duc Saigon 1965.

Dainam thuc Luc Chinh Bien, Part II, De Nhut Ky I:The To cao Hoang-De (1778-1801), nha xuat ban Khoa hoc xa hoi Hanoi 1963.

Hoang Le Nhut Thong Chi, Nha khoa hoc xa hoi Hanoi 1970.

Published Documents

Aymonier, E. 1889 Grammaire de la langue Chame, Imprimerie Coloniale Saigon.

Aymonier, E and Cabaton, A. 1906 Dictionnaire Cam-Francais Publications EFEO VII, Paris.

Bui Quang Trung. 1963 “Tables Synoptiques de chronologie Vietnamienne” BEFEO LI, P.1-77.

Coedes, G. 1964 Histoire ancienne des Etats hindouises d’indochine et d’indonesie, de Boccard, Paris.

Dominique Nguyen. 2003 Tu Vung Hroi-Viet theo bang chep tay CAM 182 and CAM 183 by Vien Vien Dong France, Champaka 3, 2003.

Gay, B. 1988 “Vue nouvelle sur la composition ethnique du Campa” actes du Seminaire sur la Campa organize a l’Universite de Copenhague le 23 mai 1987, Travaux du CHCPI, Paris, P-49-58.

Inrasara. 1993 “Ariya Twon Phauw” Van hoc Cham,Khai Luan-Van Tuyen.Part 1,Nha xuat ban Dan Toc, PP 228-236.

1996 Ariya Twon Phauw” Van hoc Cham II. Truong Ca, nha xuat ban Van Hoa dan Toc, P 195-208.

La Font P. -B., Po Dharma, and Nara Vija. 1977 Catalogue des manusscrits Cam des bibliotheques francaises. Publications EFEO CXIV, Paris.

1991 “Les grandes dates de L’histoire du Campa” Le Campa et le Monde Malais, Publications CHCPI, Paris.

Le-Thanh-Khoi. 1955 Le Vietnam. Histoire et civilizations, Editions de Minuit, Paris.

Lombard, D. 1990 Le Carrefour javanais. Essai d’histoire globale: III.L’heritage des royaumes concentriques, Editions de I’EHESS, Paris.

Mak Phoeun. 1988 “La communaute Cam au Cambodge du XVe au XIXe siecle. Historique de son implantation et son role dans la vie politique Khmer” Actes du seminaire sur le Campa organise a l’Universite de Conpenhague le 23 mai 1987, Travaux du CHPCI, Paris, P.83-93.

1990 “La communaute malaise musulman Ramadhipati ler” Le monde Indochinois et la Peninsule Malaise, Travaux du CHPCI, Kaula Lumpur, P.47-68.

1995 Histoire du Cambodge de la fin du XVIe siecle au debut du XVIIIe. Siecle, Presses de l’EFEO, Monographies, N0#176, Paris.

Maspero, G. 1988 Le royaume de Champa, Reimpressions EFEP, Paris.

Moussay, G. 1971 Dictionaire Cam-Vietnamien-Francais (tu dien Cham-Viet-Phap), Cham culture center, Phanrang.

Muhammad Zain bin Musa. 1990 Contribution a l’histoire du Panduranga (Campa) (La fruited u Po Ci Bri), These EPHE, Paris.

Nguyen-khac-Vien. 1974 Histoire du Vietnam, Editions Sociales, Paris.

Po Dharma. 1978 Chroniques du Panduranga, These EPHE, Paris.

1981 “Notes sur les Cam au cambodge”, Seksa Khmer 3-4, P.161-163.

1983 “Etudes Cam V. A Propos de l’exil d’un roi cam au Cambodge” BEFEO LXXII, P.253-266.

1987 Le Panduranga (Campa) 1802-1835. Ses rapports avec le Vietnam (I,II), Publications EFEO CXLIX, Paris.

1999 quatre lexiques malais-Cam anciens rediges au Campa, Presses de l’EFEO, Paris.

Sharifah Mawnah Syed Omar. 1993 Myths and the Malay ruling Class, Times academic Press, Singapore.

Ta-Chi-Dai-Truong. 1973 Lich su noi chien o Vietnam fr. 1771-1802, van su hoc, Saigon.

Thien-Sanh-canh. 1974 “Bien nien su cac doi vua Chiem-Thanh fr. 1000-1810” Noi san Panrang 8, 05-1974, P. 15-21.

Tran-Trong-Kim. 1971 Vietnam su luoc (I, II) Bo giao duc trung tam hoc lieu xuat ban, Saigon.

*-*

THE FULRO UPRISING IN BUON SARPA ON DECEMBER 20, 1964

Dominique Nguyen (International Program on Malay-Indochinese noun is missing)

Translated by Musa Porome

During 1964-1975, a powerful army played an important political role in Indochina: FULRO (the Front Unifie de Lutte des Races Opprimees [United Front for the Liberation of Oppressed Races]).^[36] This army of the various Champa peoples (the Cham, Jarai, Bahnar, Sedang, Churu, Raglai, Koho, Rhade, Stieng, Maa, and others^[37]) rose to the occasion after more than ten years (1964-1975) of continuous struggle against Vietnamese occupation. Since its activities had changed the political realities of Indochina during these years, It became a hot international topic when Saigon fell on 30 April 30 1975. The year 2004 marked the fortieth anniversary of its uprising in Buon Sarpa, a fairly important issue that is discussed below.

Two sources of documentation exist for this event: one from FULRO itself and the other based on some published documents. “The History of Bajaraka-Fulro” by Dr. Po Dharma, who will soon publish Champaka 5, was used as a main resource. I take this opportunity to thank him for supporting and supplying the scientific documentary authoritative documents? for this research. Without his support, this story would neither be accurate nor complete.

CENTRAL VIETNAM BEFORE 1954

History records Champa’s presence in central Vietnam since the second century CE. Over the years, it expanded from the Central Highlands to the lowlands, from Quang Binh in the north to the border of Saigon in the south (present-day central Vietnam). This ethnically diverse kingdom was composed of Austronesians (the Jarai, Rhade, Churu, Raglai, Hroi, and Cham peoples) and the Austroasiatics (the Bahnar, Sedang, Stieng, Maa,^[38] and other related peoples). Even though Champa is gone, its people remain. More than 800,000 of them still live peacefully in the Central Highlands, and about 100,000 more live in the lowlands of central Vietnam. These latter areas are known as Phan Rang and Phan Ri. More than 500,000 of them also live along the Mekong River in the Vietnamese provinces of Chau Doc and Tay Ninh, and in neighboring Cambodia.^[39]

Fifty years after Champa-Panduranga fell completely under Vietnamese rule (1832), the French colonial power and the Hue court signed, on 25 August 1883, a treaty that all Champa people living along the Binh Thuan and the Dong Nai Thuong zone would henceforth enjoy the protection of Cochinchina (Basse Cochinchine), a French colony, and enjoy a special harmand status.^[40] (Give a fuller explanation of this status)The transitions? and communication were to be written in Cham and French, instead of han tu (Chinese characters). This special status lasted until the generation of Mr. Duong Tan Phat, a well-known elder among the Cham communities in 1954.^[41] After Champa-Panduranga fell in 1832, Highland Champa (are “highland champa” and the “central highlands” the same? I’ve assumed in this article that they are. Maybe a footnote should be added to clarify this)(Gialai, Kontum, Darlac and Lamdong provinces Gia Lai, Kon Tum, Dar Lac, Lam Dong?) became a no-man’s land, meaning that they were considered as belonging to the highland Cham tribal groups who lived there.

The French colonialists were the first to step on this land in 1891. When they realized that it was not ruled by the Hue court, they immediately took it over and began developing it according to the traditional guidelines (of the tribes, the French colonialists, the Vietnamese?). In 1945, after the Second World War, the Central Highlands acquired a strategic military importance for both the French and the Viet Minh. To guarantee that this region would continue to enjoy peace and development, on 27 May 27 1946 the French signed a treaty to transform it into an independent region, the “Pays Montagnard du Sud Indochinois” (The Montagnard Country of Southern Indochina), and placed it under direct French protection. The people were also placed under French law.^[42]

This “country” was granted a traditional (whose traditions?) court with new rules for administration in order to educate and train the local tribal peoples to eventually take over this country and  defend and govern themselves effectively. At this time, the French encouraged and admitted many highland and lowland Champa peoples into their high school in Banmethuot (Ban Me Thuot?) and the Yersin junior high school in Dalat (Da Lat?). By the time of their graduation from high school, they had received enough education to realize who they were and to what nation they belonged, and were better aware of their history. As regards political matters, they were capable of regrouping and arming themselves to fight the Vietnamese, who constantly subjected them to psychological and ethnic abuse.^[43]

The French also invested in the region’s economy and transportation. Within a few years, this “country” had become rich (how? Minerals, crops?)and peaceful. As a result, King Bao Dai of Vietnam worried that the French would eventually join it to Cochinchina?. Thus, he worked to convince them that the Central Highlands still belonged to the Hue court. With no other choice (why was there no other choice? What could hue do if france joined the highlands to cochinchina?), the French signed a treaty on 21 May 1951 that reclassified the region as a domain de la couronne (a crown domain) belonging to the Hue court. In other words, no one could sell any land in this region without Bao Dai’s agreement. Thus, the area became an autonomous land under French control. The French had to protect it and rule out the fact there will be no Vietnamese migrating to the highland.? In fact, only 35,000 Vietnamese lived in the region at that time, and all of them worked for the French administration.^[44]

THE 1954 TREATY OF GENEVA AND ITS RESULTS

For more than eighteen centuries under the Kingdom of Champa, and then for another sixty years or so under the French colonial protectorate, the highland Champa peoples (what about those in the lowlands?)lived separately and peacefully, following the guidelines of their traditional cultures. They did not interact with the Vietnamese, did not learn their language, and knew them only as yuon or yavana (a foreigner who did not share their culture). After the Geneva treaty of 21 July 1954 partitioned Vietnam into the communist north and the republican south, all of this changed.

Ngo Dinh Diem, now the president of South Vietnam, immediately abolished the two French treaties with the Hue court (hoang trieu cuong tho treaty names or translation of hue court?) concerning the Central Highlands as well as the special harmand status enjoyed by the highland and lowland Champa peoples, without consulting his administrators. Considering these two regions to be under Saigon’s control, he called its people “the people of the Central Highlands” (dong bao thuong) and grouped the Cham, Chinese, and Cambodians together as “minority peoples” (nguoi sac toc thieu so).^[45] He also started to move more than 900,000 Vietnamese into the highlands as well as Phan Rang and Phan Ri. This large migration opened up a new chapter in Indochinese history,^[46] for it marked the end of the Champa peoples’ rights of ownership over their homeland. Their future was now completely dependent on the new ruler of South Vietnam, a man who considered them “savage” and “uncivilized” people^[47] just because they were not Vietnamese.

Vice President Nguyen Ngoc Tho vowed to separate the Champa highlands placing the Champa in the lowlands (highland and the lowland Champa peoples?) so that the Vietnamese could easily rule them and strip them of their culture, all in the name of assimilation. Ngo Dinh Diem knew that the Cham Rhade (and not the others?)would be very sensitive to this type of transformation and that it could have a severe impact on his own administration.^[48] After the French left in 1954 and he became the president of South Vietnam, he placed new – and oppressive – rules on the region’s people, considered them inferior, took away their rights, and discriminated against them. For these and other reasons, the Champa peoples established FULRO to fight for their rights; gain control of their property (homeland?); and preserve their native languages, cultures, and traditions.

THE UPRISING BEGINS

Realizing that all of their rights, ownership, praise?, and national sovereignty had been taken away, a group of Champa peoples met in 1955 to assess their situation. Most of them were graduates of French schools, where they had learned various strategies for dealing with Ngo Dinh Diem’s harsh policies toward the minority peoples. This event marked a starting point for the rise of the Central Highlands’ minority peoples under the leadership of Y Mot Nie Kdam (president) and Y Thih Eban (secretary general).^[49] FULRO was inaugurated shortly thereafter.

In March 1955, Y Thih Eban sent a letter to Ngo Dinh Diem demanding that his government respect the beliefs and traditional cultures of the Champa peoples, treat them equally (namely, the same as the Vietnamese), and return their possessions, including those that had belonged to their forefathers. (what were these? Land, artifacts?) Ngo Dinh Diem, however, ignored the letter and decided to pursue even harsher policies: He denied the Champa people’s ownership of their properties, abolished their traditional courts, forbade the teaching of the Cham language (what about the other tribal languages?), and moved thousands of Vietnamese into the Central Highlands to take over the Champa peoples’ land and other possessions.^[50]

Seeing no other solution, the Champa peoples resorted to violence. Taking advantage of a presentation that Ngo Dinh Diem was giving at a conference in Banmethuot on 22 February 1957, an officer from the Champa Highlands Revolutionary Front (this group has not been mentioned before. some background info is necessary – when it was set up, who belonged to it, where it was located, purpose etc….)secretly carried in a gun into the room to assassinate him. Fortunately for the president, the bullet hit and killed his deputy. As a result of this assassination attempt, Saigon propagated yet another new and harsher law designed to crush this movement and arrest its leaders. Thousands of members went into hiding and tried to find a better way of dealing with Saigon.^[51]

THE BAJARAKA MOVEMENT

During early 1958, the Champa Highlands Revolutionary Front decided to appoint Y Bhan Enoul as its new president. At first, this movement focused on devising a new strategy to create a network that would persuade all movements having the same purpose to form one group.^[52] During January-May, it renamed itself BAJARAKA, an acronym formed by the first two letters of each tribal participant (namely, the Bahnar, Jarai, Rhade, Kaho peoples). This movement, which was more of a political force than a military force as regards fighting for their rights, had one central goal: getting Ngo Dinh Diem to restore  the  Hoang Trieu Cuong Tho (The Right of Ownership of Land and Properties) treaty. In other words, they wanted Saigon to return ownership of their homeland and stop oppressing them.^[53]

On 25 July 25 1958, Y Bham Enoul and sixteen colleagues signed and sent an official letter to the United Nations Secretary General, the United States, the United Kingdom, and the French ambassador in Saigon seeking their help in resolving the situation with Ngo Dinh Diem and in securing autonomy for the Central Highlands.^[54] On 8 September 1958 he sent another official letter (delivered by Y Dhon Adrong and Y Mot Nie) to Ngo Dinh Diem asking that his government develop a new policy toward the region’s minority peoples.^[55] After receiving this letter, Ngo Dinh Diem ordered his agents to crack down and arrest Paul Nur, Y Thih Eban, Y Bham Enoul, Y Ju Eban, and Nay Luett. These men were found and imprisoned. Only Y Bih Aleo was released early, because he was not a high-ranking member of the movement.^[56]

On 26 November 1958, hearing a rumor that the movement’s members would attack the prison in an attempt to rescue their leaders, Ngo Dinh Diem immediately ordered Y Bham Enoul’s transfer to another facility in Hue; the rest were to be transferred to a higher security facility in Saigon. All of the minority peoples who worked for the Saigon government and were suspected of belonging to BAJARAKA were transferred away from the Central Highlands to work in other provinces.^[57]

TWO LIBERATION FRONTS IN CAMBODIA

In order to benefit from this ongoing political crisis in Vietnam, the Khmer Krom (the Cambodian minority population) in southern Vietnam and the Champa peoples in Cambodia came together to reclaim their stolen land. They formed two liberation fronts: the Kampuchea Krom Liberation Front, which sought to regain the lands once ruled by Cambodia (land stretching from Saigon to Camau Ca Mau?), and the Champa Liberation Front, led by Les Qasem, a general in the Cambodian army.^[58]

The growing numbers of patriotic Kampuchea Krom and Champa peoples in South Vietnam and Cambodia pushed the Ethnic Minorities Liberation Front (first time this is mentioned – explanation/description needed)to organize a conference of the twenty-three former leaders (of what?)as well as BAJARAKA members to establish the Ethnic Committee for an Autonomous Central Highlands. This organization would be led by Y Bih Aleo, a former BAJARAKA member from the Rhade tribe.^[59] This new group, which received support from Hanoi, thus entered a new era.

Les Qasem, who did not want his liberation front to fall into the same category as the aforementioned intellectuality (those groups who talked but undertook no military actions?), urged the Central Highlanders to join his Champa Liberation Front. He further proposed that they find a way to rescue Y Bham Enoul from prison and bring him to Cambodia. On 16 February 1962, he contacted Y Bih Aleo to learn about Y Bham Enoul’s actual condition.^[60] On 1 May 1962 Y Thih Eban, who was still in prison, wrote to the American ambassador to South Vietnam with a request that Saigon free all BAJARAKA members. Ngo Dinh Diem agreed to free only Y Thih Eban, Nay Luett, Toneh Yoh, Siu Sipp, and Y Ju Eban; Y Bham Enoul and Paul Nur would remain behind bars.^[61]

In July 1963, Y Thih Eban joined the American Special Forces located in Buon Sarpa. All of its military men were former BAJARAKA members. Still hoping to rescue Y Bham Enoul, Y Thih Eban took this opportunity to appoint (in secret) Y Nam Eban second lieutenant in charge of the force and Y Klong Nie a liaison worker entrusted with contacting Cham leaders in Cambodia, particularly Les Qasem. During their meeting in Phnom Penh, Les Qasem promised Y Klong Nie that he would welcome Y Bham Enoul and his colleagues to Cambodia after they had been rescued.^[62]

At the same time, Major General Nguyen Khanh, a commander-in-chief stationed in the Central Highlands, sent Y Sen Nie Kdam (a Rhade) to Cambodia. In his capacity as a security agent, Y Sen Nie Kdam was to meet Les Qasem to find out what had happened to Colonel Nguyen Chanh Thi, a F-15 pilot who had bombed the presidential palace in 1960 and had then sought asylum in Phnom Penh under Les Qasem’s protection.^[63] Les Qasem informed Nguyen Khanh that if he could secure Y Bham Enoul’s freedom, in return he would guarantee Nguyen Chanh Thi’s life while he was in Phnom Penh.^[64]

On 27 August 1963, King Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia severed diplomatic relations with South Vietnam on the ground that its government was unjust and willfully killing the Khmer Krom.^[65] He told Les Qasem to form and then lead a resistance committee to fight South Vietnam, which he would fund covertly. As a result of this decision, Les Qasem acquired more power. But instead of doing as Sihanouk requested, he began to recruit more armed men for his own Champa Liberation Front.^[66] (this makes him seem like a rather untrustworthy person.)

On 1 November 1963 Duong Van Minh, Tran Van Don, Le Van Kim, Tran Thien Khiem, and Ton That Dinh, all of whom were South Vietnamese generals and Les Qasem’s friends and academic peers, attended the same training camp in France during the uprising against Ngo Dinh Diem’s regime. Taking advantage of this political crisis, some officers of the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces merged with the Cham to form FULRO. This new organization was a coalition of three other fronts: the Kampuchea Krom Liberation Front, the Northern Kampuchea Liberation Front (based in Laos’ Champassak region, which had long ago been part of Champa) and the Champa Liberation Front.^[67]

After overthrowing Ngo Dinh Diem, General Duong Van Minh assumed the reins of government and immediately called for the release of all BAJARAKA members except Y Bham Enoul, provided that Les Qasem would free the exiled Nguyen Chanh Thi.^[68] Y Bham Enoul could become a hostage in exchange. I don’t understand the text in red.

During the first week of January 1964, Nguyen Khanh sent Y Sen Nie Kdam, one of his security agents, to Cambodia to meet with Les Qasem again about exchanging Nguyen Chanh Thi and Y Bham Enoul. In mid-January, Les Qasem agreed to this proposal.^[69] Arriving in Vietnam two months after his release, Nguyen Chanh Thi cooperated with Tran Thien Khiem and Nguyen Khanh to overthrow Duong Van Minh on 29 January 1964. Nguyen Khanh emerged as the country’s prime minister.^[70] I found him on the net as both president and prime minister. Was he both, did both posts exist, or did Saigon move from a president to a prime minister? 

Although Nguyen Chanh Thi had been released, Y Bham Enoul remained in jail. Right after Nguyen Khanh took office in February 1964, Les Qasem asked him to free Y Bham Enoul immediately to fulfill their agreement; he did so on 1 February 1964.^[71] The following month, Les Qasem urged Y Bahm Enoul to come to Cambodia through a mediator (a former BAJARAKA member) to continue the mission of liberating the Champa peoples.^[72]

During the first week of March 1964, Y Bham Enoul sent Y Klong Nie to Cambodia to meet with Les Qasem at the Dam River, located on the Cambodian-Vietnamese border. At this meeting, Y Klong Nie asked Les Qasem to guarantee the lives of BAJARAKA’s members if Saigon began to threaten or arrest them again. After the meeting, Les Qasem asked Y Klong Nie to deliver some official mail to Y Bham Enoul. In a letter, Les Qasem described his respect and admiration for Y Bham Enoul’s work and sacrifice, saying that he had always looked up to him and held him in high respect as a Champa elder. Les Qasem promised to help and protect all BAJARAKA members by offering them political asylum in Cambodia if it became necessary for them to leave South Vietnam.^[73]

In June 1964, Y Dhon Adrong, Y Nhuin Hmok, and Y Nham Eban, all of whom were BAJARAKA delegates and officers of the American Special Forces unit based in Buon Sarpa, arrived in Camp Le Rolland (a military training camp in Cambodia’s Mondulkiri province) to meet Les Qasem and Um Savuth, a Khmer Krom leader.^[74] At this meeting, Les Qasem explained that liberating the Champa peoples from Saigon’s control and securing external help and assistance required them to base their request on historical facts. If BAJARAKA only sought to liberate the Central Highlands and focused solely on negotiations with Saigon to solve their problems, then no third party would be willing to support them.

He also claimed that all highland and lowland Champa peoples were brothers and sisters and that they should unite under the following name: the Champa-FULRO Liberation Front.^[75] His suggestion sounded both reasonable and logical, so the three delegates complied with his request.^[76] Les Qasem, Um Savuth, and the BAJARAKA leaders started to devise a new FULRO flag that would contain three colors (green, red, and white), three stars and a crescent on a white background (representing the three nations of Kampuchea Krom, Northern Kampuchea, and Champa), and three red stripes (representing the three revolutionary fronts).^[77] To commemorate this event, Les Qasem and his counterparts (Y Dhon Adrong, Y Nhuin Hmok, and Y Nham Eban from BAJARAKA, and Um Savuth from the Khmer Krom), attacked the Vietnamese military base in Buon Sarpa all the way to the Banmethuot I don’t understand the text in red, on 20 September 1964 to rescue Y Bham Enoul and bring him to Cambodia.^[78]

THE BUON SARPA UPRISING AND AFTERMATH

From Camp Le Rolland, across the border in Cambodia, Les Qasem and Um Savuth, with the cooperation of Y Dhon Adrong and Y Nhuin, ordered FULRO’s army to raise its flag. This operation had been planned long ago by General Lon Nol, the Cambodian prime minister at the time. (need more info about his involvement and his overthrow of sihanouk)

In Buon Sarpa, Les Qasem ordered his army men officers? to meet with the American lieutenant Charles Darnell, a Sarpa division commander, to inform him of the upcoming military uprising and that it would not affect the nearby American military base. Right after 1:00 a.m. on 19 September 1964, about 3,000 FULRO soldiers attacked and destroyed all Vietnamese military bases in the area. After a few hours of combat, FULRO announced its victory over the Central Highlands. Six American soldiers (among them Lt. Darnell) were taken hostage, and thousands of Vietnamese weapons were captured.

Y Dhon Adrong raised the FULRO flag to announce their victory and declare the operation’s purpose: to liberate the Central Highlands and Kampuchea Krom from the Vietnamese occupiers. This declaration was signed by the Chau Dara (leader of the Kampuchea Krom Revolutionary Front), Y Bham Enoul (representing the Central Highlands), and Po Nagar (namely, Les Qasem, representing the Cham). At the same time, FULRO attacked other Vietnamese military stations in Bu Rang, Ban Don, Buon Mi Ga, Buon Brieng, and other locations. (were they victorious there as well?)

After its victory over Buon Sarpa at 7:00 a.m. on 20 September 1964, FULRO split into two groups. One moved toward Darlac province, where its soldiers attacked Banmethuot and occupied the radio station; the other group headed toward Y Bham Enuol’s residence to remove him from the Buon Sarpa base and bring him to Cambodia. Once there, he was to meet Les Qasem, who was commanding another FULRO force at a Cambodian military training camp. According to General Vinh Loc and Nguyen Trac Di’s sources, FULRO’s soldiers killed all of the Vietnamese soldiers they could find after taking over the Vietnamese military base in Buon Sarpa.

After seizing the Banmethout radio station, FULRO troops distributed leaflets signed by Y Bham Enoul, Les Qasem, and Chau Dara, the three leaders of the FULRO front. In it, they demanded that Saigon allow minority representatives to be present in Parliament, stop drafting minority people to serve in the armed forces, stop discriminating between the minority people and Vietnamese who serve in the military by enforcing equal treatment and ranking, and return all of the minority peoples’ land and belongings that the Vietnamese had acquired illegally.

THE AMERICAN ROLE

George Tanham, an agent CIA? with the Rand Corporation, met with Ambassador Maxwell Taylor, in the presence of General William Westmoreland, to discuss why American hostages had been taken during the recent upheaval.

On 21 September 1964, a day after Banmethuot’s capture, nobody could be found on the streets and the Vietnamese were living in fear. That same day, John Freund, an American adviser to the South Vietnamese Army in the II Division region, was told to go to Buon Sarpa and find way to negotiate with FULRO’s leader. Upon arrival,  he was taken hostage. From Camp Le Rolland in Cambodia, Les Qasem secretly found ways to meet with him to let him know that FULRO would withdraw only if the Vietnamese settlers would leave the Central Highlands. Otherwise, FULRO would keep the hostages until its demands were met. Freund did not consider this to be a simple matter, and he had no authority to meet FULRO’s demands.

The leaders in Saigon were very upset with FULRO’s capture of Banmethuot. Prime Minister Nguyen Khanh, the first one to blame America for getting involved in this matter, threatened to bomb and destroy the regions currently occupied by FULRO if it did withdraw its troops from the Central Highlands. Les Qasem urged his colleagues and FULRO’s soldiers not to become discouraged, but to remain ready to fight. He further declared that if Saigon bombed them, they would have the right to defend themselves by any means necessary. Hearing this news, Lieutenant General Westmoreland (in an earlier paragraph, he’s a “general”)ordered Major General Ben Stenberg to fly to the Central Highlands and ask Major General Nguyen Huu Co not to use military force, for he thought that such an action would be harmful to the American hostages.

On 22 September 1964, Ambassador Taylor called for a special meeting  with Westmorland and some high-ranking American officers to study FULRO’s demands. The Americans thought that these demands could be met easily. However, some Vietnamese general officers in the II Division region, particularly Major (in the last paragraph, he’s a “major general”)Nguyen Huu Co, accused America of closing its eyes and allowing FULRO to take over the Central Highlands. He claimed that the Americans were no different from the French colonists, for all of them were white men who favored the Central Highland peoples because the considered the whites to be divine beings.? He was not hesitant about ordering his air force to be ready to strike at any time.

SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS

On 22 September 1964, Les Qasem, still at Camp Le Rolland, suggested to Nguyen Khanh that Major General Le Van Kim and Ton That Dinh, both members of the Saigon government, could reach a peaceful with Les Qasem, for he trusted them. Regrettably, however, they were arrested in their homes in Dalat for attempting to overthrow the government after the attack on 29 January 1964.

On 23 September 1964, Major General Richard Deputy, the American commander of “Operation Switchback” in the Central Highlands, came to Banmethuot to study the FULRO uprising. According to him, there was nothing to worry about because Y Bham Enoul was now with Les Qasem in Cambodia and was ready to negotiate with Saigon. However, negotiations would proceed only if the following conditions were met: FULRO must agree to let Fruend (check his rank – he was listed as both a colonel and a major general. I’ve deleted both of them, since he was listed as an “advisor” above), one of the American hostages, communicate with an American commander in Banmethuot. In addition, FULRO must release at least one American hostage, transfer him by helicopter to the American base in Banmethuot, and announce that Freund was still alive and well.

The next day, Nguyen Khanh flew a helicopter to Banmethuot to meet the commanders of the II Division region to investigate the ground realities. His presence was also intended to show FULRO that his patience was running thin. In an attempt to answer Les Qasem’s demands, he ordered the release of Le Van Kim and Ton That Dinh on 22 September 1964 but we were talking about 24 sept., and asked them to represent him at the negotiations taking place Banmethout. Late in the afternoon of the same day, Fruend met with Le Van Kim and Ton That Dinh, who subsequently concluded that Saigon must hold a conference in Pleiku that would include minority representatives from the different regions. If this conference did not resolve the issue, then Saigon would use military force to defeat the uprising.

On 26 September 1964, Y Bham Enoul sent a letter written in French to Nguyen Khanh, complaining that Saigon had not met FULRO’s demands, as set forth on 20 September 1964 in Buon Sarpa. In addition, although Saigon had invited the FULRO delegates to the conference in Pleiku, it had not informed them of its date. Y Bham Enoul still wanted to send the delegates, but only after all Vietnamese settlers had left Banmethuot.

Suddenly, Le Van Kim was called back to Dalat and Nguyen Khanh was being flown to Banmethuot to meet with Ton That Dinh. The two (who? Three people are listed)agreed to avoid the American-proposed conference that would soon be convened in Pleiku. Nguyen Khanh announced that Saigon would shut down FULRO by military means if it did not withdraw its forces from the Central Highlands and release the Vietnamese hostages being held in Buon Sarpa or elsewhere in the region. When Les Qasem received this news, he immediately went to see Freund and asked him to call Major General Richard Deputy to let him know that he was still alive and well and to report that Nguyen Khanh had decided to attack FULRO in the near future. Fruend mentioned a remark by Les Qasem that he did not know if the American hostages would survive such an attack.

After communicating with Fruend on 26 September 1964,  Deputy called for another meeting with his colleagues to express his concern over Nguyen Khan’s threat to use military power to shut down FULRO in Buon Sarpa. He said that such an attack would solve nothing; rather, it endanger the hostages, as Les Qasem had stated, and turn the Central Highlands into a new (and bloody) battlefield. Deputy went to Buon Sarpa himself to negotiate with FULRO’s leaders and asked them to free the hostages before 9:00 a.m. the following day. He then phoned Nguyen Khanh to discuss his plans. Nguyen Khanh disagreed with it; Les Qasem welcomed it. At 7:00 a.m. the following day, Deputy and Major Touprong Yaba (a Churu) arrived in Buon Sarpa ready to negotiate. Deputy promised to do his best to pressure Saigon to accept FULRO’s demands. An agreement was reached, and Les Qasem ordered the release of the American hostages and asked all 2,000 of his soldiers (under the command of Y Dhon Adrong) to retire to their base in Mondulkiri, Cambodia.

On 10 February 1964, Nguyen Khanh met with his parliamentary team in Saigon’s Presidential Palace (Dinh Doc Lap) to study what had happened in Buon Sarpa. They ultimately concluded that:

To deal with this sensitive matter, Nguyen Khanh encouraged his administration to find a way to divide the Champa peoples. Saigon soon launched a new propaganda campaign designed to distinguish the peoples of the Central Highlands from the Cham living in the lowlands.? He encouraged all television and radio stations, as well as newspapers, not to use the term Champa, thereby denying the existence of Champa’s highland region (namely, the Central Highlands). Finally, he declared that Saigon would neither reconcile nor deal with the Champa-FULRO Revolutionary Front; rather, it would recognize what it termed the “FULRO Highlands,” named after the movement that had demanded autonomy for that region alone. Nguyen Khanh also stated that Y Bham Enoul was just a chess piece being used by Les Qasem, a Cambodian Cham. This highly successful propaganda campaign caused a division among the Champa peoples that still continues even to this day.

THE FINAL SETTLEMENT

On 5 October 1964, Deputy Secretary of State George W. Ball wrote a top-secret letter to Dean Rusk (Secretary of State), Robert MacNamara (Secretary of Defense), and MacGeorge Bundy (Security Adviser for President Johnson) outlining his concerns about this uprising  and how it had brought about significant changes in Saigon’s political arena.

After all of the American hostages were released on 27 September 1964, the Champa-FULRO Revolutionary Front (still led by Y Bham Enoul), asked Deputy to keep his promise to intervene with Saigon to accept its demands. Due to the subsequent American pressure, Saigon agreed to organize a conference in Pleiku on 15 October 1964. The leaders of Champa-FULRO, along with  eighty other delegates representing the various tribes living in central South Vietnam, were invited to attend. Nguyen Huu Co was appointed chairman. Paul Nur, Nay Luett, Touprong Hiou, Touprong Yaba, Toneh Han Tho, and others attended in their capacity as BAJARAKA leaders.

The conference room featured several posted banners proclaiming “Champa peoples and Vietnamese uniting against the Hanoi regime,” “A policy of mediation,” and  “Preventing foreign interference in Vietnamese matters.” These banners hinted at the Cambodia’s support of the Champa-FULRO Revolutionary Front and the issue that was proposed to the natural state in the Indochinese peninsula by the French. I don’t understand the last part in red At the end of the conference, FULRO presented eight demands:

On 16 October 1964, Nguyen Khanh flew to Pleiku to close the meeting with a promise to meet all but the last two demands. He also decided to release Nha Thuong Vu (what is this, since it’s called “it” later on. Why is this action significant?)from the defense department and put it under the direction of the Office of the Prime Minister. Touprong Yaba was appointed as its director. Nguyen Khanh opened an officer training center and a junior non-commissioned officer school to train minorities, and also granted them priority access to some (e.g., a school of administration and the National Military Academies in Da Lat and Thu Duc).

CHAMPA-FULRO UNDER THE SECOND REPUBLIC

After overthrowing Nguyen Khanh on 15 February 1965, Nguyen Van Thieu became president and Nguyen Cao Ky became vice president. Both men agreed to let FULRO establish a direct? office, the Delegations Speciale et Officielle (DSO-FULRO), which would operate in Buon Ale A, Banmethuot city. The new regime also agreed to the following FULRO demands:

9. Replace the Phu Dac Uy Thuong Vu (translation?) with the Bo Phat Trien Sac Toc (The Minorities’ People Development Department), inaugurated on 12 December 1967.