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Avoid using unsafe realpath #42400

Description

@misa
mannequin
BPO 1298813
Nosy @pitrou, @vstinner, @tiran, @devdanzin, @matejcik
Files
  • python-canonicalize.patch: Patch to make Python use canonicalize_file_name if available
  • Note: these values reflect the state of the issue at the time it was migrated and might not reflect the current state.

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    GitHub fields:

    assignee = None
    closed_at = None
    created_at = <Date 2005-09-22.14:54:06.000>
    labels = ['type-security', 'interpreter-core']
    title = 'sysmodule.c: realpath() is unsafe'
    updated_at = <Date 2016-09-08.23:49:28.131>
    user = 'https://bugs.python.org/misa'

    bugs.python.org fields:

    activity = <Date 2016-09-08.23:49:28.131>
    actor = 'christian.heimes'
    assignee = 'none'
    closed = False
    closed_date = None
    closer = None
    components = ['Interpreter Core']
    creation = <Date 2005-09-22.14:54:06.000>
    creator = 'misa'
    dependencies = []
    files = ['6791']
    hgrepos = []
    issue_num = 1298813
    keywords = ['patch']
    message_count = 13.0
    messages = ['48753', '48754', '48755', '48756', '48757', '86585', '87090', '87446', '114627', '142586', '142664', '142927', '275217']
    nosy_count = 10.0
    nosy_names = ['misa', 'spektrum', 'pitrou', 'vstinner', 'christian.heimes', 'ajaksu2', 'pjones', 'matejcik', 'Arfrever', 'mibanescu']
    pr_nums = []
    priority = 'normal'
    resolution = None
    stage = 'needs patch'
    status = 'pending'
    superseder = None
    type = 'security'
    url = 'https://bugs.python.org/issue1298813'
    versions = ['Python 2.7', 'Python 3.2', 'Python 3.3', 'Python 3.4']

    Linked PRs

    Activity

    1. misa commented on Sep 22, 2005

      misamannequin
      MannequinAuthor

      realpath() will dereference all symlinks and resolve
      references to /./ and /../ (and so on). realpath
      accepts a source buffer and a destination buffer to
      copy the resolved path into. On certain systems
      PATH_MAX can be of arbitrary size, while the buffer
      passed in would be of a limiited size.

      There is no way to specify how long your "resolved"
      buffer is, therefore it is possible for one to overflow it.

      According to the man page:

      BUGS
              Never  use this function. It is broken by design since it is impossible
              to determine a suitable size for the output buffer.  According to POSIX
              a  buffer of size PATH_MAX suffices, but PATH_MAX need not be a defined
              constant, and may have to be obtained  using  pathconf().   And  asking
              pathconf() does not really help, since on the one hand POSIX warns that
              the result of pathconf() may be huge and unsuitable for mallocing  mem-
              ory.  And  on  the  other hand pathconf() may return -1 to signify that
              PATH_MAX is not bounded.
      

      glibc has certain extensions to avoid the buffer
      overflow. One option is to use
      canonicalize_file_name(), another is to specify a NULL
      as the second argument to realpath() (which essentially
      makes it behave like canonicalize_file_name(). Relevant
      documentation:

      info libc
      http://www.delorie.com/gnu/docs/glibc/libc_279.html

      Attached is a patch to use canonicalize_file_name if
      available.

    2. spektrum commented on Sep 26, 2005

      spektrummannequin
      Mannequin

      Logged In: YES
      user_id=631694

      there are two bugs in the patch: one is explained on
      https://bugzilla.redhat.com/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=169046
      the other one is that with this patch, the value of n
      (length to be copied) stays zero all the time, so no copy
      occurs and various things happen.

      i have a patch, but don't know how to attach it - should i
      mail it to you?

    3. pjones commented on Sep 26, 2005

      pjonesmannequin
      Mannequin

      Logged In: YES
      user_id=27350

      There are actually a few more, very subtle problems with the
      new patch as well. I'll get misa to update a patch once
      I've worked through them.

      In general, regarding Red Hat's bz# 169046, there's no
      reason to do readlink() or realpath() if you've got
      canonicalize_file_name; it should provide both sets of
      functionality just fine.

    4. pjones commented on Sep 26, 2005

      pjonesmannequin
      Mannequin

      Logged In: YES
      user_id=27350

      ... but I see you meant the condition different than I
      parsed your explanation. Anyway, I'll get misa to upload a
      new patch once I've figured out what's going wrong entirely.

    5. spektrum commented on Sep 1, 2006

      spektrummannequin
      Mannequin

      Logged In: YES
      user_id=631694

      if I may kindly remind you that this is a good time to
      implement some kind of a patch ;e) now that python 2.5 is
      nearing completion, and there's even a security advisory
      (http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2006-1542)...

      I have a working patch, applicable against 2.5c1, at
      http://users.suse.cz/~jmatejek/python-2.4.2-canonicalize2.patch
      (note the version number - the affected function didn't
      change since 2.4.2)

    6. devdanzin commented on Apr 26, 2009

      devdanzinmannequin
      Mannequin
    7. vstinner commented on May 4, 2009

      @vstinner
      Member

      The patch introduces a memory leak, canonicalize_file_name() returns a
      new allocated string which is not freed later.

    8. mibanescu commented on May 8, 2009

      mibanescumannequin
      Mannequin

      Disclaimer: this bug is more than 3 years old, I don't remember all the
      details.

      Victor, solely reading the patch I see:

      +#ifdef HAVE_CANONICALIZE_FILE_NAME
      +		free(argv0);
      +#endif /* HAVE_CANONICALIZE_FILE_NAME */

      so argv0 (the string where the results of canonicalize_file_name() is
      stored) should be freed.

      Is there another branch that does not hit this code, that would create
      the memory leak?

    9. BreamoreBoy commented on Aug 22, 2010

      BreamoreBoymannequin
      Mannequin

      Surely this security issue should be addressed?

    10. pitrou commented on Aug 20, 2011

      @pitrou
      Member

      The latest POSIX versions (*) allow NULL to be passed for the target memory area, meaning that realpath() will allocate as much memory as necessary by itself. This essentially does the same thing as canonicalize_file_name(), but in a standard way rather than by relying on a GNU extension.

      I suppose that possibility could be checked at configure time.

      (*) http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/realpath.html

    11. mibanescu commented on Aug 22, 2011

      mibanescumannequin
      Mannequin

      It's a real shame the original patch was not applied before py3k was branched, the code is now different.

      Antoine, my autoconf knowledge is limited, I don't know how you'd test for realpath accepting a NULL argument (and doing the right thing) at compile time.

      My involvement with this bug is fairly limited at this point, I would like to see it fixed, but having seen no movement on it for almost 6 years now, maybe it's not as critical as I thought it was.

    12. 2 remaining items

    13. transferred this issue fromon Apr 9, 2022
    14. JelleZijlstra commented on Oct 5, 2022

      @JelleZijlstra
      Member

      We do still use realpath(3), now inside the _Py_wrealpath function in fileutils.c, so I think the original issue still applies.

    15. changed the title [-]sysmodule.c: realpath() is unsafe[/-] [+]Avoid using unsafe `realpath`[/+] on May 20, 2025
    16. ashm-dev commented on Nov 13, 2025

      @ashm-dev
      Contributor

      Ping. Is this issue still relevant?

    17. vstinner commented on Nov 13, 2025

      @vstinner
      Member

      _Py_wrealpath() calls realpath().

      getpath_realpath() in Modules/getpath.c (if HAVE_READLINK macro is not defined) and _PyPathConfig_ComputeSysPath0() in Python/pathconfig.c still call _Py_wrealpath().

      So yeah, this issue is still relevant.

      By the way, "Ping. Is this issue still relevant?" doesn't bring much value to the issue. You should investigate by yourself to check if an issue is still relevant.

    18. ashm-dev commented on Nov 13, 2025

      @ashm-dev
      Contributor

      By the way, "Ping. Is this issue still relevant?" doesn't bring much value to the issue. You should investigate by yourself to check if an issue is still relevant.

      Thanks for the note. I’ll avoid noise in the future and only comment when I have something concrete.
      I checked the current main branch, and the issue is still present. I’m preparing a PR with a fix.

    19. added 5 commits that reference this issue on Nov 13, 2025
    20. added a commit that references this issue on Nov 18, 2025
    21. added a commit that references this issue on Dec 6, 2025
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