Skip to content

About

Hart-Mas-Colell regret matching and fictitious play learning dynamics converging to correlated equilibria

Topics

Resources

Stars

7 stars

Watchers

0 watching

Forks

Latest commit

 

History

8 Commits

Folders and files

Repository files navigation

Regret Matching Learning Dynamics Skill

Hart-Mas-Colell adaptive no-regret learning algorithm converging to the set of correlated equilibria in multi-agent games.

flowchart TD
    Action["Sample Action According to Positive Regret Weights"] --> Play["Observe Realized & Counterfactual Payoffs"]
    Play --> Regret["Accumulate Regrets: R_t(a) = R_{t-1}(a) + u(a) - u(a_t)"]
    Regret --> Prop["Proportional Next Strategy Assignment σ_{t+1}(a) ∝ max(0, R_t(a))"]
    Prop --> Avg["Empirical Time-Average Converges to Correlated Equilibrium"]
Loading

Features

  • 100% Python Standard Library: Online (O(1)) state updates.
  • No-Regret Guarantee: Average external regret approaches 0 almost surely.
  • Correlated Equilibrium Convergence: Decentralized multi-agent coordination.

About

Hart-Mas-Colell regret matching and fictitious play learning dynamics converging to correlated equilibria

Topics

Resources

Stars

7 stars

Watchers

0 watching

Forks

Releases

Packages

Contributors

Languages