UN-4044 [FEAT] Agent-KV extraction engine — public API, schema compiler and hardened code sandbox by vishnuszipstack · Pull Request #2309 · Zipstack/unstract

vishnuszipstack · 2026-10-01T08:46:52Z

What

The Agent-KV extraction engine's OSS half: the agent_kv Django app (public API, auth, dispatch, storage, rate limiting, job lifecycle), the unstract-agent-kv-schema workspace package, the hardened code sandbox worker, and the compose/test wiring for both.

Built by @Arun; merged up to current main and raised as part of taking the work forward. Pairs with the cloud half — see Related.

Why

Agent-KV is a multi-stage key/value extraction engine. Agentic Prompt Studio v2 already declares it as the Multi-Stage Extractor — MULTI_STAGE → executor="agentic_kv", operation="kv_extract" is on main today with available=False. Merging this is what lets that flag flip; without it, M2 would have to rebuild the same pipeline as a fourth copy of an engine that already exists.

Reference: Agent-KV — Architecture Review (UN-4044).

How

Size: 116 files, ~16.1k lines, including the agent_kv app, its 16 test modules, and the schema-compiler package.

Security posture — generated Python runs behind five independent layers, and the AST gate is deliberately not the boundary (layers 2–5 are). With no transport configured the engine errors rather than executing locally; there is no fallback path:

AST gate — 9-module allowlist; closes aliasing, attribute-reference binding, from sys import, dunder subscripts
Scrubbed subprocess — empty env, python -I -S -E, start_new_session, five rlimits, CPU backstop above the wall clock
Hardened pod — non-root, read-only rootfs, all caps dropped, RuntimeDefault seccomp, no service-account token
NetworkPolicy — ingress []; egress only broker, db-proxy, DNS
No secrets — only its own transport credential; never the platform ENCRYPTION_KEY; no tenant id reaches the pod

The accepted v1 residual is narrow: generated code can open() a world-readable file in its own pod and return it to the caller who submitted the job. pathlib, os, socket and urllib are outside the allowlist, so there is no path to a secret, a cross-tenant read, or exfiltration. Layers 4–5 are what make that true and must not be relaxed — weakening either turns a local file read into an exfiltration path.

Review findings — state at this head

The architecture review (6 Sep) raised four. Re-verified against this branch, post-merge:

#	Finding	Severity	State
1	Executor queue has no consumer — jobs hang in `DISPATCHED` silently	Blocking	Fixed — `celery_executor_agentic_kv` is in the executor role's queue list; `tests/test_queue_consumer_wiring.py` (13 tests) guards it
2	Test compose overrides three services `main` deleted	Blocking	Fixed — all 9 overridden services resolve; `worker-sandbox` is defined by this branch
3	Public wire format is single-extractor	Freeze risk	Open — deliberately deferred, see below
4	Sandbox consumes over the retired RabbitMQ broker	Operational	Fixed — now `pg-sandbox` on `WORKER_PG_QUEUE_CONSUMER_QUEUE: sandbox_codegen`, with fleet-guard wiring

Finding 3 is knowingly out of scope here

The review recommends moving the KV knobs under extractors: [{name, options}], keying the result document by extractor, and promoting usage_summary to per-extractor, with today's flat fields kept as a deprecated alias. An extractors field exists (execution_serializers.py:209) but qa / challenge / extraction_mode / calculations are still top-level.

Shipping first is deliberate: nothing consumes this API yet, APS v2 keeps Multi-Stage dark behind available=False, and a wire-format redesign tangled into a 16k-line PR is harder to review than either change alone. The review's own step 4 is "fix findings 1–2 during the rebase; open both PRs" — 1, 2 and 4 are done.

Note the review's ordering constraint ("must precede M0/M0b merging") is already moot: M0/M0b merged on 30 Sep, and did so having already adopted the review's §5.3 recommendation — the registry points at agentic_kv, not at a rebuilt pipeline.

Can this PR break any existing features. If yes, please list possible items. If no, please explain why. (PS: Admins do not merge the PR without this section filled)

Low. The work is additive — a new Django app, a new workspace package, a new worker and its compose/test entries. No existing endpoint changes shape and no existing model is altered.

Two things a reviewer should check rather than take on trust:

Compose bring-up. Finding 2 was a platform-wide break: an override for a non-existent service makes compose reject the whole project, not just Agent-KV. Verified here — every overridden service is defined — but it is the failure worth re-confirming in CI.
Queue consumption. Finding 1's failure mode is silent: the producer's enqueue succeeds and rows sit unconsumed forever, with no error. test_queue_consumer_wiring.py is the guard.

Database Migrations

New agent_kv app migrations (new tables only; no alterations to existing tables).

Env Config

AGENT_KV_STORAGE_DIR_PREFIX (defaults to unstract/agent_kv)
AGENT_KV_CALCULATIONS_ENABLED — defaults false on absence, so OSS/on-prem installs stay flag-off

Notes on Testing

cd backend && pytest agent_kv/tests --no-migrations — 165 passed
cd workers && pytest tests/test_queue_consumer_wiring.py — 13 passed
Compose bring-up with tests/compose/docker-compose.test.yaml

Checklist

I have read and understood the Contribution Guidelines.

🤖 Generated with Claude Code

Design for productizing the unstract-agentic-table KV extractor as a metered async API: OSS scaffold (app, keys, jobs, dispatch, metering seams) + cloud executor plugin (engine port, codegen sandbox worker). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TMcuErLyV8mGTdcawbYuBM

Corrects the spec to the platform's real mechanisms: executor-RPC dispatch_with_callback (single UUID task_id) instead of workflow transport rules; backend capability-probe gating instead of executor registry introspection; schema compiler carved into OSS as single source of truth; real usage-reporting paths (v1/usage/batch + cloud extras attribution); periodic-job scheduling homes; precise cancel semantics; webhook SSRF controls; rate-limiter scoping; pdfplumber for page counting. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TMcuErLyV8mGTdcawbYuBM

Schema-compiler package, filesystem type, app+models with terminal write guard, key management, public mount+auth, submit serializer, limiters, dispatch glue, job endpoints, validate, internal APIs, callbacks, SSRF-guarded webhooks, sweeps, docs. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TMcuErLyV8mGTdcawbYuBM

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TMcuErLyV8mGTdcawbYuBM

Two failure-path defects found in review, both inherited from the task-8 brief's own provisional code: 1. Concurrency slot leak: stage_input()/job.save() ran unguarded after check_and_acquire() succeeded, so an object-store or DB error left the slot stuck for up to the 6h TTL and returned an unhandled 500. Now wrapped in try/except: always release the slot, mark_terminal(FAILED) only when the row was actually persisted, and return a safe "Job could not be accepted; nothing was billed." 500. 2. dispatch_job's ExecutionContext construction and the platform-key lookup ran outside its try block, so a raw (non-DispatchError) exception there skipped mark_terminal, slot release, and the safe 500 entirely. Widened dispatch.py's try to cover the full fallible body (frozen executor_params/callback contract unchanged), and added a belt-and-braces except Exception in execution_views.py with identical cleanup to except DispatchError, via a shared _fail_job_response helper. The 300s sync-timeout polling loop (a third review finding) is intentionally untouched per controller ruling. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TMcuErLyV8mGTdcawbYuBM

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TMcuErLyV8mGTdcawbYuBM

Add /internal/v1/agent-kv/jobs/<job_id>/stage/ and .../finalize/, mounted via a new agent_kv/internal_urls.py included in internal_base_urls.py. Auth is ambient (InternalAPIAuthMiddleware); both views take empty auth/permission classes and require org_id in the body (400 without it). StageReportView merges one stage's progress into job.stages, flipping PENDING/DISPATCHED -> RUNNING on first report only. It is the sole write gate for job.stages: only {status, seconds?, ...counters} is persisted, so unexpected top-level body keys never leak into a stored entry (carried constraint from task 9's status-endpoint review). A late report against an already-terminal job is a 200 no-op via the TERMINAL-excluding update queryset. FinalizeView writes the result then calls mark_terminal on success, or calls mark_terminal(FAILED, error=...) on failure; the concurrency slot is always released in a finally. It pre-checks the job's terminal state so a duplicate/late finalize call returns finalized:false without ever rewriting an already-written result. Response is {finalized, webhook_url, status} -- built out now so task 12 doesn't need to reopen this file. 79 previous agent_kv tests + 13 new all pass (80 total). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TMcuErLyV8mGTdcawbYuBM

…body 400s Controller-authorized fixes from task-11 review (3 Important issues): 1. Stage-merge lost-update race: replace the Python read-modify-write (dict(job.stages or {}) -> merge -> full-column .update(stages=...)) with a DB-side jsonb `||` concatenation expression (_stage_merge_expression), so .update() only ever merges the reported stage's single-entry dict at the database level. Two concurrent reports for different stages can no longer clobber each other. The earlier read is kept only for the RUNNING-flip decision and the terminal no-op check, both re-guarded at update time by job_qs's existing TERMINAL exclusion. 2. counters bypassing the write gate: add _sanitize_counters(), which drops any counter key colliding with the reserved {"status", "seconds"} fields and any non-scalar (dict/list) value, before merging into the stage entry. Closes the task-9-review write-gate constraint against counters clobbering reserved fields or admitting nested structures. 3. Malformed bodies: StageReportView now 400s on missing `stage` or a `status` that isn't exactly "running"/"done"; FinalizeView now 400s unless `success` is a strict bool (isinstance check, not truthy/ falsy) -- a malformed finalize call no longer silently persists a FAILED job with an empty error. Both 400 paths return before the concurrency slot could be touched, so no release() call happens on them (nothing was finalized). test_internal_views.py: 13 -> 23 tests (10 new: expression-builder unit tests, counters-sanitization tests, and the three new 400 cases). 90 passed in agent_kv/tests/ (67 pre-existing outside this file + 23 here). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TMcuErLyV8mGTdcawbYuBM

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TMcuErLyV8mGTdcawbYuBM

…k call Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TMcuErLyV8mGTdcawbYuBM

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TMcuErLyV8mGTdcawbYuBM

…ow_http paths Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TMcuErLyV8mGTdcawbYuBM

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TMcuErLyV8mGTdcawbYuBM

Recording is built and wired (LLM usage_records -> v1/usage/batch, page usage -> platform-service subscription hook, per-job usage_summary); the fail-closed pre-dispatch admission/quota reserve and Stripe invoicing are deferred to the billing sub-project. Correct the now-stale branch state. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TMcuErLyV8mGTdcawbYuBM

…allowlist The architecture review flagged that §8a overstated the accepted residual. Confirmed against workers/sandbox/gate.py: the import allowlist is exactly {json, math, statistics, decimal, datetime, re, collections, itertools, functools, sys}; pathlib, os, io, socket and urllib are all outside it. The residual is real (open() is a builtin and cannot be denylisted without breaking the runner stub contract) but narrower than documented: a single read of a known path, not directory traversal and not exfiltration. Corrected in the sandbox design §8a, the architecture overview, and the API reference §12. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TMcuErLyV8mGTdcawbYuBM

# Conflicts: # docker/docker-compose.yaml # tests/compose/docker-compose.test.yaml # tests/groups.yaml

… PG transport UN-4046 made the Postgres task transport unconditional and disabled the Celery executor. Two Agent-KV queues were left wired to the broker-era config, and both fail SILENTLY: a PG queue with no consumer still accepts work (enqueue succeeds, rows sit in pg_queue_message), so jobs hang in DISPATCHED with no error at the producer. Finding 1 - celery_executor_agentic_kv had no consumer. Three sites: * docker-compose.yaml: add it to worker-pg-executor's WORKER_PG_QUEUE_CONSUMER_QUEUE. * run-worker.sh: add it to the pg-executor role's queue list, for host-run fleets. * tests/compose: the e2e override set CELERY_QUEUES_EXECUTOR, which is read only by workers/executor/worker.py -- the disabled Celery worker. Re-pointed at WORKER_PG_QUEUE_CONSUMER_QUEUE, the variable the running pg-queue-consumer actually reads. The cloud chart already wired workerPgExecutor correctly (2abc96c4); no change needed there. Finding 4 - the sandbox consumed sandbox_codegen over the retired broker. Added a pg-sandbox PG_CONSUMER_ROLES role ("sandbox;sandbox_codegen") and switched the compose service to pg-queue-consumer, dropping the rabbitmq dependency. It loads the same workers/sandbox/tasks.py via WORKER_PG_QUEUE_CONSUMER_WORKER_TYPE, so every spec §6.3 layer is enforced identically -- only the transport changed. All hardening is preserved: read-only rootfs, cap_drop ALL, no-new-privileges, tmpfs /tmp, no published ports, no host_gateway. Adds workers/tests/test_queue_consumer_wiring.py: the OSS analogue of the chart's validate-pg-worker-fleet guard. It asserts both queues have a consumer in the variable the live consumer reads, that the dead Celery variable is not reused, and that the sandbox's pod hardening survives -- _pg-worker.tpl cannot express any of it, so a future move onto the shared template would otherwise drop it unnoticed. Each assertion was verified to fail against the pre-fix state. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TMcuErLyV8mGTdcawbYuBM

…ments are A submit dispatches paid work (LLM tokens + OCR pages) but had no billing gate: the pre-dispatch guards were capability probe (501), per-key rate (429), schema caps and concurrency (429). An organization whose trial had expired, or whose subscription was inactive, could keep submitting. Cloud gates API deployments with SubscriptionMiddleware, which resolves the org from the URL (/deployment/api/{org_name}/...). Agent-KV cannot be gated by it as-is: its URL carries no org segment -- the org lives in the Bearer AgentKVKey, which only the view validates -- so the middleware's UserSessionUtils.get_organization_id returns None for these requests, get_subscription(None) finds no row, and verify_subscription reads that as "nothing to enforce" and admits every one of them. SubmitView therefore calls the cloud plugin's gate straight after key validation, where the org IS known. The policy is NOT restated: the gate calls the same SubscriptionHelper.get_subscription + verify_subscription the middleware calls, so the two paths cannot drift and the 402 bodies are identical. Absent service_class (a cloud build predating the gate) degrades to previous behaviour; OSS-only deployments 501 at the capability probe before reaching it. The identifier is the subtle part and has its own test: `agent_kv_key.organization.organization_id` -- the org SLUG that the CharField Subscription.organization_id is keyed on, and what the deployment URL supplies as org_name -- NOT `agent_kv_key.organization_id`, the Organization FK primary key. The pk matches no row, which the policy reads as "no subscription" and admits, leaving a gate that never fires while looking correctly wired. Both that and "denial is returned verbatim" were verified to fail when the respective mistake is reintroduced. Scope, recorded in design §6.6: this follows what Unstract actually does rather than that section's original fail-closed spend reserve. There is no budget reservation (the platform has none anywhere), and an org with no subscription row is admitted -- matching the middleware exactly, and differing from validate_etl_run which denies. Both are properties of the shared policy; tightening them should tighten every caller at once. Also corrects the submit example's "status": the view returns job.status.lower(), so it is "dispatched", not "DISPATCHED". Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TMcuErLyV8mGTdcawbYuBM

…,options}] BREAKING: the flat submit shape is removed with no alias. The v1 contract put everything at top level. That was fine with one extractor, but `qa`, `challenge`, `extraction_mode`, `structured_output`, `calculations`, `document_class` and `key_notes` are KV-extractor knobs -- meaningless to any other extractor -- and there was no way to express "run these extractors over this document". One result blob and one usage_summary could not say what each extractor produced or cost. The architecture review (UN-4044) called this a freeze risk: cheap now, a v2 endpoint once anyone codes against it. Submit now carries `extractors: [{name, keys, options}]`; only fields describing the REQUEST stay top level. page_start/page_end are deliberately job-level: the range drives the shared OCR pass and the §6.1 page cap, so it cannot differ between extractors reading the same document. Status and result are keyed by extractor, and usage gains `by_extractor` alongside the authoritative `total`. `status` stays top level -- it is the job's, and a job is not done until every extractor is. Scope is the FORMAT only. `kv` is the sole accepted name and a second entry is a 400: accepting two and running one would bill a caller for a job that ignored half the request. Unknown options are a 400 too rather than DRF's default silent drop, so a knob aimed at the wrong extractor fails loudly. No cloud change is required. OSS unpacks the entry into the frozen executor_params contract (`schema` + `options`) with exactly the option names the engine already receives, and the result/status namespacing is applied at the API edge -- read-time for results, so already-stored blobs are untouched. Deliberate divergence from APS v2, decided by Arun and recorded in spec §7.0: that spec composes IN THE SCHEMA (one mandatory PRIMARY plus SPECIALIZED agents substituted into a placeholder in one shared project-level schema); this API treats extractors as peers, each with its own schema and result, because it has no project and every call is standalone. APS v2 is NOT being changed to match. The cost -- two composition models, and a caller wanting a table folded into an invoice record must stitch it -- is stated in §7.0 rather than discovered later. No alias for the old shape: the API has no consumers (no PR merged, no customers), so a dual path would cost two validation routes, precedence rules and tests for all of it, to protect nobody. Tests: 144 pass. Serializer, view, status and result suites converted, plus new coverage for unknown extractor, multiple extractors, non-list/empty `extractors`, unknown options, and that the old flat form is rejected. The e2e lane is converted (submit building and result unwrapping centralised in its conftest) but NOT executed -- it needs the Docker stack, which is torn down. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TMcuErLyV8mGTdcawbYuBM

…ge moves Every existing submit-view test patches SubmitSerializer and feeds the view a `validated_data` built by this file's own helper, while the serializer suite validates payloads and never runs a view. Both suites pass even when the two disagree about the shape that crosses between them -- and that shape is exactly what the extractor-scoped format (§7.0) changed. 144 green tests said nothing about it. Adds two integration tests that build a real multipart upload and run it through the real serializer AND the real view, asserting what arrives at dispatch_job (the frozen OSS<->cloud contract on the far side): the extractor's own schema, its options with defaults filled in, and the job-level page range folded into options where the engine reads it from. The second asserts the hard switch end-to-end -- a caller still sending the pre-§7.0 flat shape gets a 400 from the real stack, not a job that quietly ran with defaults. Verified to have teeth: the first fails if the view reads the wrong key off the entry, and again if it forgets to fold the page range into options; the unknown-option test fails if the serializer goes back to DRF's silent drop. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TMcuErLyV8mGTdcawbYuBM

Both were invisible to 146 passing tests and made the branch non-functional. 1. The subscription gate dereferenced `agent_kv_key.organization`, which is NULLABLE on the model (DefaultOrganizationMixin fills it from UserContext at save time). Every submit against a key without one raised AttributeError and returned 500. The code this replaced used `agent_kv_key.organization_id` and never dereferenced, so the crash path was new. Refused once at the auth boundary instead: every downstream use of a key is org-scoped -- the gate, the concurrency limiter, the storage prefix, every job lookup -- so a key with no organization is not usable and should not reach a view at all. Adds tests/_factories.py::kv_key() because the guard invalidates the bare `AgentKVKey(name=...)` fixture 32 tests used: that key is one the auth layer would reject, so anything asserted past it was unreachable in production anyway. 2. `dispatch.py` called `get_executor_dispatcher(celery_app=...)`, but UN-4046 removed that parameter when the routing dispatcher's Celery branch went with the pg_queue_enabled flag -- its docstring notes that keeping an ignored parameter is what previously "left a `headers=` argument at three call sites and broke every extraction". Every submit raised TypeError inside dispatch_job and failed the job. The architecture review checked PgExecutionDispatcher's signature and cleared it; this is a different function, and the mismatch is invisible to a mocked dispatcher. The guard for it patches the real factory with autospec=True, so our call site is asserted against the live signature rather than a permissive Mock -- verified to fail when the kwarg is put back. 147 tests pass. Found by building the stack and driving POST /agent-kv/ with curl; neither is reachable through the suite as it was written. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TMcuErLyV8mGTdcawbYuBM

A job ran to success in the executor and then sat in RUNNING forever. The executor enqueues its terminal continuation onto `agent_kv_callback` -- that callback is what persists the result, deletes the staged input, releases the concurrency slot and fires the webhook -- and nothing drained the queue, so the row sat in pg_queue_message with no error at the producer. Same shape as the executor-queue finding, one queue over: the Celery ide_callback worker has carried both queues since the callbacks landed, and the cloud chart wires its PG twin correctly (workerPgIdeCallback: "ide_callback,agent_kv_callback"), but the OSS dev compose and run-worker.sh's pg-ide-callback role listed only `ide_callback`. So only the OSS stacks were affected -- which is precisely why no chart test caught it. Extends the wiring guard to the callback queue at both sites. Found by running a real job end to end; the job's own success is what makes this invisible otherwise, since everything up to finalize behaves normally. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TMcuErLyV8mGTdcawbYuBM

Self-review of the wire-format change: the serializer's accepted-name tuple and the constant the status/result documents key their payloads by were two separate literals spelling "kv". Changing one would let the serializer accept a name the responses file under something else -- the two would disagree with nothing failing. Derived from the single constant instead. 148 tests pass. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TMcuErLyV8mGTdcawbYuBM

Self-review of the e2e conversion (the one part of this change that cannot be executed here without the stack): with `keys=None` the helper omits `extractors` entirely, so any per-extractor options the caller passed had nowhere to go and were silently discarded. No call site does this today, but such a test would look like it exercised a knob it never sent -- and would still pass, since these submits are expected to fail on the missing field. Asserts instead, naming the offending fields and both ways out. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TMcuErLyV8mGTdcawbYuBM

An automated review of the unpushed range found five real issues, all in the parts the unit suites structurally cannot see -- the e2e lane and the response contract. Contract: - The COMPLETED result payload had lost its top-level `success`/`status` (they moved inside `extractors.kv`), while FAILED and CANCELLED kept them. A client could no longer branch on one key: on success `body["success"]` was a KeyError, on failure it was False. Restored at top level on every terminal payload -- they describe the JOB, and each extractor keeps its own `success` inside its own block. This also hit the sync-`timeout` submit response, where the caller has no status document to disambiguate with. Validation: - `ExtractorSerializer` rejected unknown keys inside `options` but not on the entry itself, so `"option"` (or `"Options"`) for `"options"` was dropped whole by DRF: `options` defaulted to {}, and the job ran with qa=True/challenge=True -- roughly double the LLM spend asked for, returned as a 202 with no sign anything was ignored. Now rejected, like the options block one level down. - The per-extractor schema cap measured `json.dumps(spec)` with the default ensure_ascii=True, counting a CJK character as a 6-byte \uXXXX escape rather than its 3-byte UTF-8 form. A non-ASCII schema could clear the outer `extractors` raw-byte cap and then be rejected by the inner one as "too large". Both caps now measure the same bytes. e2e lane (converted but not executable here, so these were live-only failures): - Two sites read `status_doc["stages"]`, which moved under `extractors.kv`; added a `kv_stages()` helper beside `kv_result_body()`. - The re-read stability assertion compared the full wrapped payload against the unwrapped kv body -- introduced by this branch, which changed the first side and not the second. Now compares like for like. - The sync-wait test read the engine's `record` off the wrapped payload. (Its `success` check, and the calculations test's, work again via the top-level restoration above.) Docs: - `result_payload`'s docstring still claimed COMPLETED returns the stored engine result "unchanged", which the wrapping directly contradicts -- in the module that declares itself the source of truth for the result shape. - Spec §7.3 and API reference §5 updated for the top-level fields. 150 tests pass. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TMcuErLyV8mGTdcawbYuBM

The wire format already carried per-extractor entries; this makes the name mean something. Adds the table options/keys serializers, an EXTRACTOR_ROUTES table dispatch reads instead of hardcoding one executor/operation pair, and an `extractor` column so status and result key by what actually ran -- they were keyed by the hardcoded `kv` name, which would have filed a table job's output under the wrong extractor. Stage names become per-extractor too: StageReportView persists any name the executor sends, but the status document filtered through the KV-only list, so table stages would have been recorded and then silently dropped. Also updates test_dispatch.py's five dispatch_job callers to pass extractor=V1_EXTRACTOR_NAME (no default was added to the parameter, by design), and fixes two pre-existing tests that assumed `table` was an unknown extractor / that used a kv keys fixture whose own schema failure was masking what the test intended to check. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TMcuErLyV8mGTdcawbYuBM

1. The drift guard for the three per-extractor lookup tables (EXTRACTOR_ROUTES, STAGE_NAMES_BY_EXTRACTOR, _OPTIONS_SERIALIZERS) only asserted two of the three, while the comment claimed all three were kept in step. Forgetting an options serializer for a future extractor would have stayed green until a real submit hit an uncaught KeyError instead of a validation error. Added the missing assertion and renamed the test to describe what it now checks. 2. Added a submit-to-dispatch join test for the table path (test_real_serializer_through_real_view_reaches_dispatch_intact_for_table), mirroring the existing kv-path version. This guards the exact contract that already broke once in this project: a consumer reading `target_table` off the top level while the producer nested it under `schema` -- internally consistent on both sides, so unit tests on either side alone would not have caught it. Verified the new test is load-bearing by temporarily breaking the join and confirming it fails. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TMcuErLyV8mGTdcawbYuBM

The table queue now carries paid API work as well as IDE prompts, so it joins the consumer-wiring guard -- an unwired queue accepts work and drains nothing, with no error at the producer. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TMcuErLyV8mGTdcawbYuBM

…I doc The doc is this API's contract, and it still described a kv-only service: a caller reading it concluded the table extractor did not exist. §7.1's name row said "Currently `kv` only; anything else => 400", the §4 stage list omitted `table_extraction`, there was no `table` options table beside the `kv` one, and nothing documented the table result shape. Worst of it: nothing documented that `enable_header_mapping` changes `output.tables` from a list of rows to `{"header_mapping": ..., "rows": [...]}`. That is a breaking shape change between two settings of one option, and it was recorded only in a serializer docstring, where no API consumer would ever see it. Also corrects §7 (Cancel), which claimed a running job "continues to completion in the worker ... No mid-run abort". That was already stale for `kv` -- its node listener raises `JobCancelled` and stops the run -- and is now stale for `table` too, which gained the same cooperative stop in the cloud repo. Both extractors are described as what they are: stopped cooperatively at their engine's progress points, with work already done still billed. `_status_document` also stops subscripting `STAGE_NAMES_BY_EXTRACTOR`. No row can hold an out-of-dict value today, but a retired extractor name with surviving rows would 500 every `GET status` for those jobs while `GET result` kept working, since the result payload keys by `job.extractor` without consulting that table. It degrades to an empty stage array and a warning instead. agent_kv 164 -> 165. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TMcuErLyV8mGTdcawbYuBM

CLAassistant · 2026-10-01T08:47:00Z

Thank you for your submission! We really appreciate it. Like many open source projects, we ask that you all sign our Contributor License Agreement before we can accept your contribution.
1 out of 2 committers have signed the CLA.

✅ vishnuszipstack
❌ arunvenkataswamy
_{You have signed the CLA already but the status is still pending? Let us recheck it.}

for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci

greptile-apps · 2026-10-01T08:53:20Z

via Greptile

Confidence Score: 4/5

[Critical risk] Adds public API, database schema, and executor dispatch for a new extraction engine.

The PR does not appear safe to merge until failed file deletions can make progress under sustained TTL cleanup load.

Findings

Failed deletions can starve ▶
Index cannot serve cleanup order ▶

Fix with agent prompt

### Issue 1
backend/agent_kv/maintenance.py:167
If at least 500 never-attempted jobs expire between cleanup runs, they fill every batch because rows with no failure timestamp sort first. Jobs whose file deletion failed are then never retried, so their retained files can remain in storage indefinitely. Reserve some cleanup capacity for retries even when new expirations keep arriving.

### Issue 2
backend/agent_kv/models.py:101
The new index uses PostgreSQL’s default ascending null order, but cleanup requests `cleanup_failed_at ASC NULLS FIRST`. PostgreSQL therefore cannot use this index to return rows in cleanup order and must sort the matching expired jobs before applying the 500-row limit. That adds growing work to each cleanup run when there is a large backlog.

Note: If this suggestion doesn't match your team's coding style, reply to this and let me know. I'll remember it for next time!

---

For each issue above, determine whether it is valid and should be fixed. If so, fix it directly.

Summary

The PR adds the Agent-KV API, schema compiler, sandbox worker, and deployment wiring. Since the previous review, it adds a timestamp-based ordering intended to stop failed deletions from blocking newer TTL cleanup. That ordering makes progress for fresh jobs but can starve retries under sustained load, and its new index does not match the requested null ordering.

Diagram

%%{init: {'theme': 'neutral'}}%%
flowchart LR
  E[Expired jobs with file references] --> O[Order by cleanup failure time, NULLS FIRST]
  O --> L[Select up to 500]
  L --> D[Attempt file deletion]
  D -->|Failure| R[Keep reference and stamp failure time]
  R --> O
  D -->|Success| C[Clear references]

_{Reviews (4) · Last reviewed commit: "UN-4044 [FIX] Stop failed TTL cleanups f..."}

Four findings, all verified against the code before changing anything. 1. Periodic tasks were unregistered (P1). pre-commit.ci's auto-fix in a79e9d6 deleted BOTH side-effect imports from scheduler/tasks.py -- including the pre-existing dashboard-metrics one, live since UN-3796. Reproduced locally: ruff 0.3.4's isort merges the two `from scheduler import ...` statements into one parenthesised statement, which relocates each `# noqa: F401` onto a MEMBER line where it no longer suppresses the statement-level F401; pycln (`all = true`) then removes both. Re-adding them with `# noqa` would be deleted again on the next run, so they are now genuinely referenced via `_PERIODIC_TASK_MODULES`. Verified by re-running both hooks over the fixed file. The test written to catch exactly this (test_scheduler_registers_the_metrics_proxies_under_their_wire_names) imported `scheduler.dashboard_metrics_tasks` directly, which registers the tasks by itself -- so it passed regardless of what scheduler/tasks.py contained, and it passed straight through this regression. Replaced with one that goes through `scheduler.tasks`, what a booting worker loads, and asserts the Celery registry. Mutation-checked against a79e9d6's exact diff: [] vs the 5 expected names. 2. DELETE leaked a concurrency slot (P1). JobStatusView.delete terminalized an in-flight job without releasing its slot, where JobCancelView does -- and the sweep's phase-1 only targets PENDING, never CANCELLED, so nothing reclaimed it until the 6h TTL. Enough deletes exhaust the org's allowance and start rejecting new submits. Released on the `won` branch only, so a lost terminal-state race does not hand a slot back twice. 3. A failed file delete lost its retry handle (P1). delete_job_files logs and continues, but both callers blanked the refs unconditionally -- and TTL cleanup selects candidates by `input_ref > "" OR result_ref > ""`, so a blanked row drops out of the candidate set permanently and the object is orphaned in the bucket. delete_job_files now returns the ref fields confirmed to point at nothing (already-blank and FileNotFoundError count as clear; any other error does not), and both callers blank only those. run_ttl_cleanup also reports `retained`, so a backlog that will never drain is visible instead of silently counting as cleaned. Note test (7) in test_sweeps.py already asserted this invariant in its comment -- "a delete failure must not blank a ref pointing at a file that's still there" -- while only pinning call ORDER, which is irrelevant when the update blanks both refs regardless. Now actually covered, at both the storage layer and both call sites. 4. Webhook egress moved onto the shared guard (unstract.core.network.ssrf), the single place that decides whether a tenant-supplied URL may be dialled, retiring this sink's own `_host_is_public` and the hardcoded CGNAT range SonarCloud flagged. The review's specific claim does not hold and is not what this fixes: on the 3.12 runtime these workers use, `ipaddress` reports is_reserved for 64:ff9b::/96, so the local guard already refused the NAT64 loopback example (checked on 3.12.9). What it got WRONG was the other direction -- it refused 64:ff9b::5db8:d822 too, which embeds a public IPv4 and is a legitimate destination, because is_reserved cannot tell the two apart. The shared guard re-checks the embedded IPv4, and brings rules this sink never had (*.localhost without a resolver, credentials-in-URL, the urlparse/urllib3 host disagreement). The old refusal was also incidental to a version-dependent flag that nothing recorded a dependency on. Not fixed here, deliberately: the compose sandbox's lack of an egress boundary (P2). docker-compose `command:` is CMD, appended to the image ENTRYPOINT, so that service is correct as written; the containment control for the sandbox is the k8s NetworkPolicy, tightened in the cloud PR. The real issue underneath it is that the sandbox holds credentials the generated code can read -- the scrubbed subprocess env does not prevent that, since the child shares the parent's UID and /proc/<ppid>/environ is readable. Needs a least-privilege role, not a compose change. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

`workers/shared/enums/tests/` is local-only development scaffolding and does not belong in this PR. It was swept in by a `git add -A workers/shared` while staging the webhook-guard changes in eba836f — note the giveaway duplicate `tests/tests/` nesting, which is not a layout anything would use deliberately. Untracked only; the files stay on disk. Nothing in the PR referenced them, so no behaviour changes. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

Greptile re-review on the previous commit, and a fair hit: retaining the ref of a file whose delete failed is what makes a retry possible, but under the plain oldest-first ordering those same rows refill the 500-row batch on every tick. A persistent object-store fault on 500 expired jobs stalled cleanup outright, and every later expired job kept its files past TTL. I had spotted this while writing that fix and settled for documenting it in a comment plus a `retained` counter. That was the wrong call, and inconsistently so: on the cloud PR I argued in the same review round that a documented blast radius is not a control. Same standard applies here. Candidates are now ordered (cleanup_failed_at NULLS FIRST, expires_at): a job that has never failed is always processed ahead of one that has, so failures cannot block fresh work, and they are still retried once the backlog clears. The stamp is refreshed on every failed attempt, so among failures the oldest failure goes first and they rotate rather than one row absorbing every retry. Cleared on recovery so the column means "currently failing", not "failed once". The stamp also has to be written when NOTHING was deleted — skipping that write would leave the column NULL, and NULL sorts first, so the row would hold the head of every batch forever. Covered by its own test. New field + composite index in 0003. A plain AddIndex is correct here, not the CONCURRENT builds used elsewhere in this codebase: agent_kv_job is created by this app's own 0001_initial and has never been deployed, so the table is empty when this runs. `makemigrations --check` reports no drift. The migration itself is exercised by CI's migrate step, not locally — there is no Postgres on this machine right now, and these tests mock the ORM. Ordering and both stamping paths mutation-checked against the previous behaviour: 3 tests fail without them. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

sonarqubecloud · 2026-10-01T10:41:02Z

Quality Gate passed

Issues
36 New issues
0 Accepted issues

Measures
0 Security Hotspots
0.0% Coverage on New Code
0.0% Duplication on New Code

See analysis details on SonarQube Cloud

greptile-apps · 2026-10-01T10:43:19Z

+    candidates = (
+        AgentKVJob.objects.filter(expires_at__lt=timezone.now())
+        .filter(Q(input_ref__gt="") | Q(result_ref__gt=""))
+        .order_by(F("cleanup_failed_at").asc(nulls_first=True), "expires_at")[


Failed deletions can starve

If at least 500 never-attempted jobs expire between cleanup runs, they fill every batch because rows with no failure timestamp sort first. Jobs whose file deletion failed are then never retried, so their retained files can remain in storage indefinitely. Reserve some cleanup capacity for retries even when new expirations keep arriving.

Prompt To Fix With AI

This is a comment left during a code review. Path: backend/agent_kv/maintenance.py Line: 167 Comment: **Failed deletions can starve** If at least 500 never-attempted jobs expire between cleanup runs, they fill every batch because rows with no failure timestamp sort first. Jobs whose file deletion failed are then never retried, so their retained files can remain in storage indefinitely. Reserve some cleanup capacity for retries even when new expirations keep arriving. --- For each issue above, determine whether it is valid and should be fixed. If so, fix it directly.

greptile-apps · 2026-10-01T10:43:20Z

+            # TTL cleanup's candidate ordering is (cleanup_failed_at NULLS
+            # FIRST, expires_at); without this the sort is a filesort over
+            # every expired row each tick.
+            models.Index(fields=["cleanup_failed_at", "expires_at"]),


Index cannot serve cleanup order

The new index uses PostgreSQL’s default ascending null order, but cleanup requests cleanup_failed_at ASC NULLS FIRST. PostgreSQL therefore cannot use this index to return rows in cleanup order and must sort the matching expired jobs before applying the 500-row limit. That adds growing work to each cleanup run when there is a large backlog.

Prompt To Fix With AI

This is a comment left during a code review. Path: backend/agent_kv/models.py Line: 101 Comment: **Index cannot serve cleanup order** The new index uses PostgreSQL’s default ascending null order, but cleanup requests `cleanup_failed_at ASC NULLS FIRST`. PostgreSQL therefore cannot use this index to return rows in cleanup order and must sort the matching expired jobs before applying the 500-row limit. That adds growing work to each cleanup run when there is a large backlog. --- For each issue above, determine whether it is valid and should be fixed. If so, fix it directly.

Note: If this suggestion doesn't match your team's coding style, reply to this and let me know. I'll remember it for next time!

github-actions · 2026-10-01T10:48:30Z

Unstract test results

Per-group results

Status	Group	Tier	Passed	Failed	Skipped	Duration (s)
⚪	`e2e-agent-kv`	e2e	0	0	1	0.1
✅	`e2e-api-deployment`	e2e	3	0	0	16.3
✅	`e2e-coowners`	e2e	1	0	0	1.2
✅	`e2e-etl`	e2e	1	0	0	14.4
✅	`e2e-login`	e2e	2	0	0	1.2
✅	`e2e-prompt-studio`	e2e	1	0	0	7.4
✅	`e2e-smoke`	e2e	2	0	0	1.1
✅	`e2e-workflow`	e2e	1	0	0	12.2
✅	`frontend`	unit	620	0	0	18.8
✅	`integration-backend`	integration	602	0	27	49.7
✅	`integration-connectors`	integration	1	0	7	6.6
✅	`integration-workers`	integration	164	0	1	33.7
❌	`ui`	e2e	0	1	0	0.0
✅	`unit-backend`	unit	1595	0	1	52.6
✅	`unit-connectors`	unit	72	0	0	10.4
✅	`unit-core`	unit	276	0	0	3.3
✅	`unit-platform-service`	unit	15	0	0	2.8
✅	`unit-rig`	unit	120	0	0	4.7
✅	`unit-runner`	unit	10	0	0	3.1
✅	`unit-sdk1`	unit	718	0	0	34.1
✅	`unit-workers`	unit	1506	0	1	131.7
	TOTAL		5710	1	38	405.4

Critical paths

⚠️ Critical paths not yet covered

workflow-execution-fan-out — Multi-file workflow execution fans out to file-processing workers and rejoins. (declared coverage: no groups declared)

✅ Covered critical paths

auth-login — covered by e2e-login
adapter-register-llm — covered by integration-backend
workflow-author — covered by integration-backend
co-owner-manage — covered by integration-backend, e2e-coowners
workflow-create-execute — covered by e2e-workflow
api-deployment-provision — covered by integration-backend
api-deployment-auth — covered by integration-backend
api-deployment-run — covered by e2e-api-deployment
mcp-server-auth — covered by integration-backend
mcp-platform-auth — covered by integration-backend
platform-key-whoami — covered by integration-backend
prompt-studio-author — covered by integration-backend
prompt-studio-fetch-response — covered by e2e-prompt-studio
connector-register-test — covered by integration-backend
pipeline-etl-execute — covered by e2e-etl
usage-aggregate-read — covered by integration-backend
usage-token-tracking — covered by e2e-api-deployment
callback-result-delivery — covered by e2e-api-deployment

vishnuszipstack

Automated multi-agent review — findings

This review was produced by a multi-agent code review of #2309 and its cloud counterpart Zipstack/unstract-cloud#1816. Each finding below was re-verified against the code (several by execution). Grouped as must-fix before merge, should-fix, and suggestions. Tenant isolation, mark_terminal CAS, the subscription gate, the TTL-starvation fix (cb6f7f2), and the no-local-execution-fallback property were all checked and confirmed correct — not repeated here.

Merge order: this PR must merge before the cloud half; the cloud plugin imports unstract-agent-kv-schema from this branch and its CI is red until this lands.

Inline comments follow.

vishnuszipstack · 2026-10-01T11:48:49Z

+    # row this UPDATE doesn't match is left exactly as the winning writer
+    # left it. `modified_at` is stamped automatically by
+    # BaseModelQuerySet.update() (utils/models/base_model.py).
+    AgentKVJob.objects.filter(id=job.id, status=JobStatus.PENDING).update(


[Must-fix] Stranded-job race no sweep can recover. This guarded UPDATE persists dispatched_at only for a still-PENDING row, but StageReportView (internal_views.py:112) promotes PENDING→RUNNING on the executor's first stage report. If that report wins the race, this UPDATE matches 0 rows and dispatched_at stays NULL. Neither sweep phase can then see the row: phase 1 requires status=PENDING; phase 2 requires dispatched_at__lt=cutoff, and SQL NULL < x is never true. The job reports running forever and GET result 409s for the life of the row. Fix: stamp dispatched_at for any non-terminal row, or add a dispatched_at__isnull=True arm to sweep phase 2.

vishnuszipstack · 2026-10-01T11:48:49Z

+                _SLOT_TTL_SECONDS,
+            )
+            return bool(int(acquired))
+        except Exception:


[Must-fix] Both limiters fail OPEN. check_and_acquire here and check_key_rate (:79) both return True on any Redis error. A Sentinel failover or pool exhaustion removes the concurrency ceiling and the per-key rate ceiling simultaneously, and the API keeps returning 202s for billable LLM work — with only a logger.warning per request. The Lua script itself is correct; it's the catch that's the defect. Fail closed (429), or gate the choice behind a setting so the waiver is deliberate and observable.

vishnuszipstack · 2026-10-01T11:48:49Z

+        return value.strip().casefold() in {e.casefold() for e in spec.enum_values}
+    if fmt == "regex":
+        try:
+            return re.fullmatch(spec.regex_pattern, value.strip()) is not None


[Must-fix] ReDoS via author-supplied regex. compile_schema caps the pattern length (200) but never compiles it, and this runs it with no time budget. Measured on this code: format: "regex:^(a+)+$" (7 chars) takes ~7s on 28 as and ~4x per added char — a 40-char value runs for hours. validate_format runs per key per value in the QA pass, with no timeout/cancellation, and AGENT_KV_CONCURRENT_LIMIT=5 lets one org pin five shared worker slots. Fix: re.compile() at submit (raise SchemaError on re.error) and run user patterns under a hard wall-clock budget (or re2). The length cap is not a mitigation — ReDoS needs ~10 chars.

vishnuszipstack · 2026-10-01T11:48:49Z

+                    # above -- so a cancelled job's input intentionally
+                    # rides the normal TTL sweep instead of being deleted
+                    # here.
+                    delete_input(job)


[Must-fix] Failed input-delete still blanks the ref. delete_input(job) swallows every exception (storage.py), and this update(input_ref="") runs unconditionally. TTL cleanup selects only rows with a non-blank ref, so a transient object-store error here orphans the customer's uploaded document permanently. This is exactly the bug the PR fixed for delete_job_files + its two callers (Greptile #3) — this third site was missed. Make delete_input return a confirmed-cleared signal and blank only on success; log with exc_info=True.

vishnuszipstack · 2026-10-01T11:48:49Z

+sandbox-escape primitives, and the bare name itself can be aliased —
+``x = sys`` — to reach any of that through a different name, so any Load
+reference to ``sys`` other than the immediate ``sys.argv`` attribute access is
+rejected, not just a denylist of attributes) and ``open()`` on the runner's


[Must-fix: correct the stated security posture] The AST gate is fully bypassable. Verified by execution under the production python -I -S -E: statistics.random._os.system('id') ran id; collections._sys is the sys module; collections._sys._getframe(0).f_builtins['__imp'+'ort__']('os').system(...) reaches arbitrary import+exec — all GATE-PASS. Allowlisted modules re-export sys/os as non-dunder attributes the gate never inspects, and the dunder-subscript check only catches constant strings (so '__imp'+'ort__' slips through). This does not by itself break the model (layers 2–5 still contain it), but the module/PR text claiming the gate 'closes aliasing / from-sys-import / dunder subscripts' overstates it to ~zero marginal value. Represent the gate as best-effort and lean the design explicitly on layers 2–5.

vishnuszipstack · 2026-10-01T11:48:49Z

+                text=True,
+                preexec_fn=_limits(cpu_seconds, memory_mb, max_pids, max_output_bytes),
+            )
+            stdout, stderr = proc.communicate(timeout=timeout)


[Should-fix] Unbounded capture can OOM the worker. communicate() buffers the full child stdout+stderr in the parent's memory; the [:_CAPTURE_LIMIT] truncation happens after. RLIMIT_FSIZE doesn't apply to pipes and RLIMIT_AS bounds only the child, so while True: print('A'*100000) (no imports, passes the gate trivially) streams GB into the parent and can OOM the Celery worker before the timeout fires — a gate-agnostic DoS. Cap captured bytes during the read, not after. Also: both broad except blocks here (:164, :229) log nothing, so an OSError/fork-EAGAIN is reported to the engine as a codegen failure.

vishnuszipstack · 2026-10-01T11:48:49Z

+                        f"max is {settings.AGENT_KV_MAX_PAGES} (§6.1)"
+                    }
+                )
+        elif ext in IMAGE_LIKE:


[Must-fix — cross-repo contract] Image uploads are accepted here but extract nothing in the engine. ALLOWED_EXTENSIONS accepts .png/.jpg/.jpeg/.tiff and this sets pages_total=1, so the job dispatches normally. But the cloud engine's _build_agent_graph (agentic_kv kv_extractor.py) only treats .pdf/.xlsx/.xls as a document, and ImageLoader.load_pages has no call site anywhere — so an image returns success:true, every key not-found, 1 page billed. Either drop the image extensions here, or wire images through ImageLoader.load_pages on the engine side. The two repos currently disagree about what file types the product supports, and it fails open (billed empty result).

vishnuszipstack · 2026-10-01T11:48:49Z

    tier: unit
    workdir: workers
-    paths: [tests, shared/tests]
+    paths: [tests, shared/tests, sandbox/tests, shared/infrastructure/config/tests]


[Must-fix] Three new test dirs are in no CI group. This line adds sandbox/tests and shared/infrastructure/config/tests to unit-workers but omits ide_callback/tests (401-line callback suite). Separately, no group covers unstract/agent-kv-schema/tests or unstract/filesystem/tests. So test_compile.py — the regression net for the schema ReDoS/depth findings — and the callback suite run nowhere in CI, and the PR's '165 passed' is a local figure, not CI-verified. Add unit-agent-kv-schema + unit-filesystem groups and append ide_callback/tests here.

vishnuszipstack · 2026-10-01T11:48:49Z

+The sandbox receives only `{record JSON + generated code}` — no document, no schema, no
+tenant identifiers; output is validated JSONL, row- and byte-capped.
+
+**Accepted v1 residual (R12):** generated code legitimately needs the `open()` builtin


[Must-fix before sign-off] The documented risk acceptance is factually wrong. This R12 text describes the residual as 'a single read of a known path … non-sensitive … not an exfiltration path.' Verified false by execution: generated code open()s /proc/<ppid>/environ (child runs as the same UID as the worker) and recovers the worker's full environment incl. DB_PASSWORD; with the sandbox pod mounting the database secret group and the NetworkPolicy allowing egress to db-proxy:5432 (cloud half), that credential is directly usable. So the residual is credential disclosure + DB reach beyond the job, not a benign file read. This is the text an admin signs off against — correcting it is a prerequisite independent of when the hardening (numeric runAsUser / scoped DB role / hidepid) lands. Same paragraph is duplicated in the sandbox design spec.

arunvenkataswamy and others added 30 commits August 28, 2026 16:30

feat(agent-kv): shared keys.json schema compiler package with caps

59228e8

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TMcuErLyV8mGTdcawbYuBM

feat(agent-kv): AGENT_KV file storage type with its own creds env

adc892e

feat(agent-kv): app scaffold, key/job models, terminal write guard

315225e

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TMcuErLyV8mGTdcawbYuBM

test(agent-kv): pin org-scoped filter args in mark_terminal guard test

a7d7118

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TMcuErLyV8mGTdcawbYuBM

feat(agent-kv): org-scoped key management API with rotate

593e45b

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TMcuErLyV8mGTdcawbYuBM

fix(agent-kv): own permission class + org-scoping mechanism test

3ff2d86

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TMcuErLyV8mGTdcawbYuBM

feat(agent-kv): public mount, bearer-key validator, in-view auth

72b446b

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TMcuErLyV8mGTdcawbYuBM

test(agent-kv): pin public URL wiring and decorator application

6f6b68f

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TMcuErLyV8mGTdcawbYuBM

feat(agent-kv): submit serializer enforcing every pre-paid-work cap

9634301

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TMcuErLyV8mGTdcawbYuBM

test(agent-kv): pin unreadable-PDF rejection and stream rewind

06ad601

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TMcuErLyV8mGTdcawbYuBM

feat(agent-kv): own-namespace concurrency limiter + per-key rate limit

9d5b6d0

test(agent-kv): pin limiter key namespaces and call ordering

71c6930

feat(agent-kv): staging, executor dispatch glue, submit view

f3b7558

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TMcuErLyV8mGTdcawbYuBM

feat(agent-kv): status/result/cancel/delete with org-scoped 404s

2b0f1b5

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TMcuErLyV8mGTdcawbYuBM

fix(agent-kv): serve failed/cancelled job results per spec §7.3

9c5c6c5

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TMcuErLyV8mGTdcawbYuBM

feat(agent-kv): free authenticated schema validation endpoint

3e37737

feat(agent-kv): terminal callbacks on a dedicated callback queue

f907337

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TMcuErLyV8mGTdcawbYuBM

fix(agent-kv): ide_callback worker consumes the agent_kv_callback queue

0cca794

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TMcuErLyV8mGTdcawbYuBM

fix(agent-kv): prefer transport-injected error; guard finalize networ…

5497dc4

…k call Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TMcuErLyV8mGTdcawbYuBM

feat(agent-kv): SSRF-guarded webhook sender

bfa3ecc

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TMcuErLyV8mGTdcawbYuBM

test(agent-kv): pin IPv6, empty/multi-record resolution, non-2xx, all…

46f2ca5

…ow_http paths Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TMcuErLyV8mGTdcawbYuBM

feat(agent-kv): undispatched sweep and TTL cleanup internal endpoints

bf0f4b7

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TMcuErLyV8mGTdcawbYuBM

fix(agent-kv): cap the undispatched sweep batch

b3601c7

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TMcuErLyV8mGTdcawbYuBM

docs(agent-kv): API reference, env samples, deploy checklist

d2119a9

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TMcuErLyV8mGTdcawbYuBM

arunvenkataswamy and others added 17 commits September 2, 2026 16:12

Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into Feat/agent-kv-api

0695df5

# Conflicts: # docker/docker-compose.yaml # tests/compose/docker-compose.test.yaml # tests/groups.yaml

Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into agent-kv-api-rebase

2824ab2

[pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks

a79e9d6

for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci

github-advanced-security Bot found potential problems Oct 1, 2026

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Comment thread workers/shared/utils/webhook_notify.py Fixed

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Comment thread backend/agent_kv/execution_views.py Outdated

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Comment thread workers/shared/utils/webhook_notify.py Outdated

Comment thread docker/docker-compose.yaml

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Comment thread backend/agent_kv/maintenance.py Outdated

Comment thread workers/shared/enums/tests/tests/test_worker_enums.py Outdated

vishnuszipstack and others added 2 commits October 1, 2026 16:05

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vishnuszipstack commented Oct 1, 2026

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vishnuszipstack commented Oct 1, 2026 • edited by atlassian Bot Loading Uh oh! There was an error while loading. Please reload this page.

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Finding 3 is knowingly out of scope here

Can this PR break any existing features. If yes, please list possible items. If no, please explain why. (PS: Admins do not merge the PR without this section filled)

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Confidence Score: 4/5

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sonarqubecloud Bot commented Oct 1, 2026

Quality Gate passed

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github-actions Bot commented Oct 1, 2026

Unstract test results

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vishnuszipstack commented Oct 1, 2026 •

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