Jump to content

1991 Ukrainian independence referendum

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

1991 Ukrainian independence referendum
1 December 1991
Do you support the Act of Declaration of Independence of Ukraine?
The result of the referendum in a bulletin.
Results
Choice
 Votes %
Yes 28,804,071 92.26%
No 2,417,554 7.74%
Valid votes 31,221,625 97.90%
Invalid or blank votes 670,117 2.10%
Total votes 31,891,742 100.00%
Registered voters/turnout 37,885,555 84.18%
Results by region
Yes:

A referendum on the Act of Declaration of Independence was held in Ukraine on 1 December 1991.[1] An overwhelming majority of 92% of voters approved the declaration of independence made by the Verkhovna Rada on 24 August 1991. The public vote was held in response to the failed August coup and the New Union Treaty not being signed.

Voters were asked "Do you confirm the Act of Declaration of Independence of Ukraine?"[2] The text of the Declaration was included as a preamble to the question. The referendum was called by the Parliament of Ukraine to confirm the Act of Independence, which was adopted by the Parliament on 24 August 1991.[3] Citizens of Ukraine expressed overwhelming support for independence. In the referendum, 31,891,742 registered voters (or 84.18% of the electorate) took part, and among them 28,804,071 (or 92.3%) voted "Yes".[2]

On the same day, a presidential election took place. In the month up to the presidential election, all six candidates campaigned across Ukraine in favour of independence from the Soviet Union, and a "Yes" vote in the referendum. Leonid Kravchuk, the parliament chairman and de facto head of state, was elected to serve as the first President of Ukraine.[4]

From 2 December 1991 onwards, Ukraine was globally recognized by other countries as an independent state.[5][6][7] Also on 2 December, the President of the Russian SFSR Boris Yeltsin recognized Ukraine as independent.[8][9][10][11] In a telegram of congratulations Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev sent to Kravchuk soon after the referendum, Gorbachev included his hopes for close Ukrainian cooperation and understanding in "the formation of a union of sovereign states".[12]

Ukraine was the second-most powerful republic in the Soviet Union both economically and politically (behind Russia), and its secession ended any realistic chance of Gorbachev keeping the USSR together. By December 1991 all former Soviet Republics except the RSFSR[13] and the Kazakh SSR[13] had formally seceded from the Union.[14] A week after his election, Kravchuk joined with Yeltsin and Belarusian leader Stanislav Shushkevich in signing the Belavezha Accords, which declared that the Soviet Union had ceased to exist.[15] The USSR officially dissolved on 26 December.[16]

Results

[edit]
The ballot paper used in the referendum, with the text of the Declaration of Independence printed on it.
Yes-vote in % per Ukrainian Oblast
No-vote in % per Ukrainian Oblast

Ukrainian media had converted en masse to the independence ideal.

Polls showed 63% support for the "Yes" campaign in September 1991; that grew to 77% in the first week of October 1991 and 88% by mid-November 1991.[17]

55% of the ethnic Russians in Ukraine voted for independence.[18]

ChoiceVotes%
For28,804,07192.26
Against2,417,5547.74
Total31,221,625100.00
Valid votes31,221,62597.90
Invalid/blank votes670,1172.10
Total votes31,891,742100.00
Registered voters/turnout37,885,55584.18
Source: Nohlen & Stöver

By region

[edit]

The Act of Independence was supported by a majority of participating voters in each of the 27 administrative regions of Ukraine: 24 oblasts, 1 autonomous republic, and 2 special municipalities (Kyiv City and Sevastopol City).[4] Voter turnout was lowest in Eastern and Southern Ukraine.[17] The six regions with the lowest percentage of "yes" votes were Kharkiv, Luhansk, Donetsk, and Odesa Oblasts, Crimea, and Sevastopol; all of those regions still had a majority of registered voters marking their ballots "yes", except for Crimea and Sevastopol.

Subdivision Percentage voting for independence
Of votes cast[4] Of electorate[19]
Cherkasy Oblast96.0387
Chernihiv Oblast93.7485
Chernivtsi Oblast92.7881
Dnipropetrovsk Oblast90.3674
Donetsk Oblast83.9064
Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast98.4294
Kharkiv Oblast86.3365
Kherson Oblast90.1375
Khmelnytskyi Oblast96.3090
Kirovohrad Oblast93.8883
Kyiv Oblast95.5284
Luhansk Oblast83.8668
Lviv Oblast97.4693
Mykolayiv Oblast89.4575
Odesa Oblast85.3864
Poltava Oblast94.9387
Rivne Oblast95.9689
Sumy Oblast92.6182
Ternopil Oblast98.6796
Transcarpathia Oblast92.5977
Vinnytsia Oblast95.4387
Volyn Oblast96.3290
Zaporizhzhia Oblast90.6673
Zhytomyr Oblast95.0686
Crimean ASSR54.1937[20]
Kyiv City92.8775
Sevastopol City57.0736[20]
National total90.3276[21]

Reactions

[edit]

Preliminary results

[edit]

Although counting was ongoing throughout the night, by 2 December afternoon, exitpolls and early results were already indicating about a 75% lead in favour of independence, according to both electoral officials and leaders of the pro-independence People's Movement of Ukraine (Rukh).[22] Preliminary results published by the Central Election Commission of Ukraine even indicated about 85% support for "Yes".[23][24] Later that day, in his role as President of the Verkhovna Rada, Kravchuk announced that about 90% of the Ukrainian population had chosen an independent state.[25] Shortly thereafter, preliminary results also indicated that Kravchuk had won the presidential election, although with a smaller majority of about 60%.[25] His main opponent Chornovil had scored above 25%, especially in Western Ukraine (77% in Lviv Oblast, his home region), more than the 15% which opinion polls had predicted he would receive.[23] Commentators suggested that this would compel Kravchuk to take the demands of Chornovil's supporters and Rukh's platform of a clean political and economic break from the Soviet Union more seriously than the more moderate approach Kravchuk himself had campaigned for.[23]

Gorbachev, Kravchuk and Yeltsin

[edit]

Ahead of the vote, Mikhail Gorbachev frequently argued that Ukraine leaving the Soviet Union without signing the New Union Treaty and joining his envisioned Union of Sovereign States would be a disaster for the whole country, for Europe and the whole world.[22][24] In TASS, he spoke of 'self-determination with the union', and that 'a breakup would cost us dearly' and 'spill over in into territorial disputes'.[22] However, in a later phone call to U.S. president Bush sr., Gorbachev argued that he would not view Ukraine voting for independence as necessarily breaking away from the (new) union.[22][23]

In response to the preliminary results announced in the latter half of 2 December, Kravchuk (now the likely President-elect of Ukraine) repeated his earlier statement that he would not sign Gorbachev's New Union Treaty; he no longer trusted such vertical partnerships, only horizontal partnerships 'like the European Community'.[22][24]

Ukraine has become an independent state. That means that the process to form a new union has come to an end.

— Leonid Kravchuk, 2 December 1991[25]

While Gorbachev's spokesperson suggested on 2 December that Ukraine's new-found independence might make it even easier to join a renewed union,[25] and Gorbachev was one of the first to congratulate Kravchuk on winning the presidential election that same day, in the morning of 3 December, he warned that the secession of Ukraine might lead to war and "a catastrophe for the world".[24]

Boris Yeltsin, who was still negotiating with Gorbachev and other Soviet leaders about the New Union Treaty,[23] indicated before the referendum that he could not envision a new union without Ukraine.[22] He said repeatedly it would be regrettable if Ukraine quit the union, but in an interview in Izvestiya in the week before the referendum, Yeltsin announced that if it did, Russia would not sign the New Union Treaty either.[25] If Ukraine would also reject any economic agreements with the other (post-)Soviet republics, as advocated by Chornovil, Yeltsin stated he would henceforth calculate oil and gas deliveries to Ukraine in U.S. dollars instead of the cheaper Soviet ruble as a countermeasure.[23] Unlike Chornovil, Kravchuk still found it important to conclude an economic agreement (perhaps similar to the European Community) with the other (post-)Soviet republics, particularly Russia and Belarus, as long as it was headquartered in Kyiv or Minsk, not in Moscow.[25] Vermont-based Russian nationalist writer Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn was advocating for partitioning Ukraine along voting lines, saying districts with a majority of "No" voters (presumably with a Russian-speaking majority) should be transferred to the Russian Federation instead.[24] This idea lost realistic credibility as soon as it became clear that the majority of all oblasts, including with Russian-speaking majorities in some cities, had voted overwhelmingly in favour of independence, even with a slight majority in Crimea.[24] Yeltsin immediately recognised Ukraine's independence in a statement on 2 December 1991, saying he was going to seek out how Russia could establish diplomatic ties with Ukraine as soon as possible.[24]

Europe and North America

[edit]

Most individual countries in Europe and around the world were quick to respond positively to the preliminary results of the referendum, with Poland and Canada immediately recognising Ukraine's independence diplomatically, and Sweden and Czechoslovakia announcing that they were planning to.[26] For their part, the Foreign Ministers of the European Community, who were gathered in Brussels on 2 December, called on Ukraine to continue to abide by all OSCE obligations which the Soviet Union had previously committed to, including arms control, non-proliferation, and foreign debt.[26] If the Ukrainian government could clarify its future policies, recognition could be discussed, the European Community stated.[25] Bush sr. congratulated Kravchuk with his victory, as well as the "free and fair" manner in which the referendum was held.[26] He would send his assistant Thomas M. T. Niles to establish diplomatic ties with Ukraine, and discuss with the Ukrainian government how to handle human rights, minority rights, and Ukraine's responsibility in conventional and nuclear arms control.[26] Similar to Europe's cautious approach, America's attitude towards Ukrainian independence was to first clarify Kyiv's policies in these domains before Washington could proceed to diplomatic recognition.[25]

Public opinion

[edit]

On referendum day, a journalist of De Volkskrant could not find anyone in Kyiv ("apart from one Russian soldier") who was opposed to Ukrainian independence: "Young and old, Russian, Ukrainian, Jew, they wholeheartedly agree with the idea that Ukraine secedes from the Union, and liberates itself from Moscow's urge to boss people about."[27] Unlike in the three Baltic republics, where independence was framed as a national struggle and achieving it was hailed with euphoria, national pride was a secondary motivation for Ukrainian independence, with most people citing economic arguments as their primary reasons for voting "Yes".[27] There were no large-scale celebrations, but people found that they were making the rational choice under the circumstances, and were glad that it was done.[27] Above all, they favoured good, normal, and equal relations with Russia outside the Union, rather than paying Moscow and not receiving anything in return (not even Western food and medicine disaster relief for the Chornobyl disaster), and having to undergo the Russification of Ukraine and the suppression of the Ukrainian language for no good reason.[27]

Analysis

[edit]

The political and especially economic consequences of Ukraine's secession are difficult to assess at this stage. But it is clear that the idea of a new confederation of Soviet republics, each with maximum sovereignty and held together by a virtually symbolic overarching centre, is hardly viable without the important Ukraine. In that sense, Sunday's referendum has drawn a line under the history of the Soviet Union.

— NRC Handelsblad (3 December 1991)[28]

Some experts claim that the 1991 Ukrainian independence referendum was the most immediate event that led to the collapse of the Soviet Union. According to Brian D. Taylor, in the aftermath of the failed 1991 Soviet coup attempt, most of the Soviet republics adopted declarations of independence, the most important of which was that of Ukraine. By the end of September, eight republics had declared independence: Belarus, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Georgia, Tajikistan and Armenia. These declarations of independence were largely symbolic and did not mean withdrawal from the union. Negotiations on the union continued for several months, but in the end, in the 1991 Ukrainian independence referendum, more than 90 per cent of Ukrainians voted for independence. Almost all observers agreed that serious federal discussions were impossible without Ukraine's participation.[29] On 6 December, shortly after Ukraine's independence referendum, the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine adopted a new military oath pledging loyalty to Ukraine. On 13 December, Leonid Kravchuk proclaimed himself Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and declared that the Ukrainian Armed Forces would be formed from Soviet troops stationed in Ukraine.[29]

According to Mark Kramer, Boris Yeltsin often expressed his willingness to accept the independence of the Baltic states and Georgia and Moldova, but wanted to preserve the Union. What deprived Yeltsin of this option was the surge of independence sentiment in Ukraine after the coup attempt. Following the successful independence referendum, Yeltsin's only way to preserve the Soviet Union would have been to use massive force against Ukraine. However, Yeltsin chose not to and instead recognised the dissolution of the Soviet Union,[30] and joined the Belovezha Accords and the Alma-Ata Protocol.[31]

According to Adrian Karatnycky, although Yeltsin thwarted the coup and brought down the Soviet Communist Party, it was Kravchuk and Ukraine that ultimately brought down the Soviet Union. Ukraine's rejection of Mikhail Gorbachev's Union Treaty led to the immediate collapse of the Soviet Union.[32]

According to Peter J. Potichnyj, Yeltsin and Gorbachev consistently sabotaged Ukraine's independence. However, because the referendum was conducted in an open and democratic manner, it convinced Russia and world leaders that the Soviet system was no longer viable or sustainable.[33]

According to Laura Blaj, the Ukrainian Communist Party rejected the Soviet reforms of Gorbachev and Yeltsin. This was a decisive factor in Ukraine's overwhelmingly positive vote. The Communist conservatives were allied with Ukrainian nationalists and the result of the Ukrainian referendum therefore led directly to the collapse of the Soviet Union.[34]

See also

[edit]

References

[edit]
  1. ↑ Dieter Nohlen & Philip Stöver (2010) Elections in Europe: A data handbook, page 1976 ISBN 9783832956097
  2. 1 2 Nohlen & Stöver, p1985
  3. ↑ Historic vote for independence Archived 2014-03-23 at the Wayback Machine, The Ukrainian Weekly (1 September 1991)
  4. 1 2 3 Independence – over 90% vote yes in referendum; Kravchuk elected president of Ukraine Archived 2017-10-19 at the Wayback Machine, The Ukrainian Weekly (8 December 1991)
  5. ↑ Ukraine and Russia: The Post-Soviet Transition by Roman Solchanyk, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000, ISBN 0742510182 (page 100)
  6. ↑ Canadian Yearbook of International Law, Vol 30, 1992, University of British Columbia Press, 1993, ISBN 9780774804387 (page 371)
  7. ↑ Russia, Ukraine, and the Breakup of the Soviet Union Archived 2024-08-20 at the Wayback Machine by Roman Szporluk, Hoover Institution Press, 2000, ISBN 0817995420 (page 355
  8. ↑ Russia's Revolution from Above, 1985–2000: Reform, Transition, and Revolution in the Fall of the Soviet Communist Regime Archived 2024-08-20 at the Wayback Machine by Gordon M. Hahn, Transaction Publishers, 2001, ISBN 0765800497 (page 482)
  9. ↑ A Guide to the United States' History of Recognition, Diplomatic, and Consular Relations, by Country, since 1776: Ukraine Archived 2009-02-04 at the Wayback Machine, Office of the Historian
  10. ↑ The Limited Partnership: Building a Russian-US Security Community Archived 2024-08-20 at the Wayback Machine by James E. Goodby and Benoit Morel, Oxford University Press, 1993, ISBN 0198291612 (page 48)
  11. ↑ Ukrainian Independence, Worldwide News Ukraine
  12. ↑ NEWSBRIEFS FROM UKRAINE Archived 2020-11-16 at the Wayback Machine, The Ukrainian Weekly (8 December 1991)
  13. 1 2 Russia's New Politics: The Management of a Postcommunist Society by Stephen K. White, Cambridge University Press, 1999, ISBN 0521587379 (page 240)
  14. ↑ Citizens in the Making in Post-Soviet States by Olena Nikolayenko, Routledge, 2001, ISBN 0415596041 (page 101)
  15. ↑ Historical Dictionary of the Russian Federation by Robert A. Saunders & Vlad Strukov, Scarecrow Press, 2010, ISBN 0810854759 (page 75)
  16. ↑ Turning Points – Actual and Alternate Histories: The Reagan Era from the Iran Crisis to Kosovo by Rodney P. Carlisle and J. Geoffrey Golson, ABC-CLIO, 2007, ISBN 1851098852 (page 111)
  17. 1 2 Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s: A Minority Faith by Andrew Wilson, Cambridge University Press, 1996, ISBN 0521574579 (page 128)
  18. ↑ The Return: Russia's Journey from Gorbachev to Medvedev Archived 2024-08-20 at the Wayback Machine by Daniel Treisman, Free Press, 2012, ISBN 1416560726 (page 178)
  19. ↑ Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s: A Minority Faith by Andrew Wilson, Cambridge University Press, 1996, ISBN 0521574579 (page 129)
  20. 1 2 Russians in the Former Soviet Republics Archived 2023-01-13 at the Wayback Machine by Pål Kolstø, Indiana University Press, 1995, ISBN 978-0-253-32917-2 (page 191)
    Ukraine and Russia: Representations of the Past Archived 2023-01-13 at the Wayback Machine by Serhii Plokhy, University of Toronto Press, 2008, ISBN 978-0-8020-9327-1 (page 184)
  21. ↑ Post-Communist Ukraine Archived 2023-12-16 at the Wayback Machine by Bohdan Harasymiw, Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 2002, ISBN 1895571448
  22. 1 2 3 4 5 6 Steele, Jonathan; Dyczok, Marta; Meek, James (1991-12-02). "Ukrainians push USSR to brink". the Guardian. Retrieved 2026-09-01.
  23. 1 2 3 4 5 6 Hubert Smeets (2 December 1991). "85 procent bij referendum voor onafhankelijkheid; Oekraïne kiest zelfstandigheid" [85 per cent vote in favour of independence in referendum; Ukraine opts for self-determination]. NRC (in Dutch). Retrieved 2026-09-01.
  24. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Hubert Smeets (3 December 1991). "Referendum bevestigt stabiele klimaat Oekraïne" [Referendum confirms Ukraine's stable political climate]. NRC (in Dutch). Retrieved 2026-09-01.
  25. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 "Rusland erkent vrij Oekraïne" [Russia recognises free Ukraine]. De Telegraaf (in Dutch). 3 December 1993. Retrieved 2 September 2026.
  26. 1 2 3 4 "Snelle erkenning Oekraïne" [Swift recognition of Ukraine]. NRC (in Dutch). 3 December 1991. Retrieved 2026-09-01.
  27. 1 2 3 4 Hella Rottenberg (2 December 1991). "Oekraïne neemt nuchter afscheid van „bodemloze put" Rusland" [Ukraine bids sober farewell to Russia, the ‘bottomless pit’]. De Volkskrant (in Dutch). Retrieved 2 September 2026.
  28. ↑ "President van Niets" [President of Nothing]. NRC Handelsblad (in Dutch). 3 December 1991. Retrieved 2026-09-01.
  29. 1 2 Brian D. Taylor, "The Soviet Military and the Disintegration of the USSR." Journal of Cold War Studies 5.1 (2003) 56-58. https://doi.org/10.1162/152039703320996713
  30. ↑ Mark Kramer, "The reform of the Soviet system and the demise of the Soviet state." Slavic Review 63.3 (2004) 507. https://doi.org/10.2307/1520339
  31. ↑ Mark Kramer (2022) The Dissolution of the Soviet Union: A Case Study of Discontinuous Change, Journal of Cold War Studies, 24 (1):206, 214. https://doi.org/10.1162/jcws_a_01059
  32. ↑ Adrian Karatnycky, "The Ukrainian Factor", Foreign Affairs, 71.3 (1992), p.90. https://doi.org/10.2307/20045232
  33. ↑ Peter J. Potichnyj, "The Referendum and Presidential Elections in Ukraine", Canadian Slavonic Papers, 33:2, (1991) 123~4, 127, 128~129, 132. https://doi.org/10.1080/00085006.1991.11091956
  34. ↑ Laura Blaj, "Ukraine’s Independence and Its Geostrategic Impact in Eastern Europe", Debatte: Journal of Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe, 21.2-3 (2013) 165. https://doi.org/10.1080/0965156X.2013.841797
[edit]
Retrieved from "https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=1991_Ukrainian_independence_referendum&oldid=1372770838"