With Washington using coercion as diplomacy, whims as strategy, and hostility as engagement, New Delhi must deepen energy ties with Moscow.
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Reading between the lines of the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026 reveals as much about America as it does about the White House. Critics of US President Donald J. Trump are missing the forest for one loud tree. It is true that Trump has been among the more difficult US presidents for India to deal with, in the mould of Richard Nixon (Republican, 1969-74), whose antipathy towards India is well documented. It is also true that Trump's blunt rhetoric, aimed at friends and foes alike, has left international relations trackers in a tizzy. Many, who had seen the United States as a ‘friend’, find themselves marooned on an island of fast-changing global affairs. From its enduring ties with Pakistan, a state harbouring terrorist groups, to a vicious tariff war against India, Washington has come to resemble a caricature of a new Cold War, into which it has been attempting to draw India.
Although the Act imposes a range of sanctions, tariffs, and prohibitions on Russia, the provision that stands out is its authorisation of tariffs of up to 100 percent on the five largest importers of Russian crude oil or natural gas — a list that includes India. On crude oil, India is Russia's second-largest buyer after China, with Turkey and the European Union (EU) trailing some distance behind, in third and fourth place. On pipeline gas, the EU again leads, followed closely by China and Turkey, with Serbia and Moldova coming next. It remains to be seen how each of these importers responds to Washington's ultimatum.
Further, the US is itself one of the largest buyers of enriched uranium and other nuclear materials from Russia. In 2023, it imported $1.19 billion worth (701,835 kg) — the single largest national buyer that year, ahead of the EU, France, China, South Korea, Kazakhstan, Germany, and Brazil. That volume nearly halved in 2024, the latest year for which full Comtrade data is available, to approximately $624 million (335,000 kg), a decline that preceded the US ban on unwaivered Russian uranium imports, which took effect in August 2024 and closes off imports entirely only from 2028. Uranium is only one line in a much larger import bill: in 2025, the US imported $4.05 billion worth of goods from Russia in total, including fertilisers ($1.8 billion), chemicals ($1.12 billion), precious stones and metals ($733 million), and wood ($92 million). The double standards are open and vulgar, but because they have been part of a consistent pattern, they are no longer shocking.
That a domestic law of the US has the audacity to impose its will on other countries, including on vessels that knowingly transport certain products of Russian origin, shows that the discourse, as expressed in 2025, has shifted from diplomacy and negotiation to coercive assertions by a strategic hegemon that senses its long-planned, hard-earned monopoly on power slipping away, one physical or tariff assault at a time. The world in 2026 faces what might be called the inglorious death of the international rules-based order that the US itself built and led. Few episodes illustrate this better than Washington’s military campaign against Iran, now well into its seventh month, with no clear end in sight. Nothing would consolidate this decline faster than a wholesale breach of the rules-based order in trade as well.
What makes this worse is a White House that is increasingly resembling Zhongnanhai, the seat of Chinese leadership in Beijing, in how it exercises executive authority. Rather than exporting democratic structures grounded in the rule of law, or defending its interests within an international rules-based order, the US is importing the very practices it has long accused its rivals, particularly China and Russia, of. If China's self-styled “democracy with Chinese characteristics” has long drawn scepticism from US intellectuals, the reverse appears to be happening in the US since 20 January 2025: an erosion of institutional checks and a drift towards what might be called “authoritarianism with American characteristics”.
In a single sweep, by acting against Russia and targeting countries that continue to purchase Russian energy, Washington has raised the prospects of friction with the EU, China, and India, which together account for a substantial share of global GDP, growth, and trade.
It is no longer only the whims of the White House that are running US credibility, respect, and even fear aground. Now that Trump has signed the Act into law on 18 September 2026, with several of its key measures due to take effect within 30 days, it reflects a fair degree of bipartisan support in Congress, from the US House of Representatives, which passed it 262-159 after the Senate's 86-11 vote in August, to influential voices in the think-tank community. In a single sweep, by acting against Russia and targeting countries that continue to purchase Russian energy, Washington has raised the prospects of friction with the EU, China, and India, which together account for a substantial share of global GDP, growth, and trade.
As far as New Delhi is concerned, it should treat this law as a tactical contingency that may or may not harden into action. India faces the prospect of giving up Russian oil and receiving nothing from the US in return. The US takes about one-fifth of India's merchandise exports and supplies less than 7 percent of its imports, so losing that market would be a heavy blow. Greater still would be the shock if India could not import Russian oil: a sudden cut-off would bring energy risk into India's growth story. The US has captured Venezuela's president and asserted control over its oil sector, fought a war in West Asia that has disrupted Gulf supply routes, and now threatens buyers of Russian oil with tariffs. As India continues to diversify, suppliers such as the UAE and Nigeria could fill part of the gap, but at higher costs that would cascade through transport and logistics, fertilisers and food prices, all feeding inflation. Higher crude prices would also require more dollars to pay for imports, putting pressure on the rupee.
It does not end with energy or economics. Geopolitically too, India will need to counter this pressure. The law threatens to devalue India's strategic autonomy into a trade and energy security issue, and if India were to stop buying Russian oil under duress, it would be widely read as surrendering a measure of that autonomy. Like George W. Bush before Trump, this pressure marks a return to the “if you are not with us, you are against us” doctrine. In this case, you are either with the US or with Russia, and there are consequences for those who choose the latter.
Greater still would be the shock if India could not import Russian oil: a sudden cut-off would bring energy risk into India's growth story. The US has captured Venezuela's president and asserted control over its oil sector, fought a war in West Asia that has disrupted Gulf supply routes, and now threatens buyers of Russian oil with tariffs.
Further, this law puts China and India on the same footing and may nudge them towards a new alignment. As equally exposed targets, Beijing and New Delhi will need to consider how to safeguard the export side of their economic security. But while the US sees India as a defence partner through a 10-year defence framework, signed in October 2025, with shared priorities, and China remains a rival, that distinction may count for little. If Washington is treating its long-standing allies such as the EU and Canada with contempt and pushing them to join forces, there is little reason to expect room for negotiations with India.
Meanwhile, India-China relations are beginning to ease, and alternatives to a US-dominated world are emerging. In international payments, for instance, BRICS has taken one step forward in the New Delhi Declaration, which tasks the BRICS Payments Task Force with cross-border payment interoperability and local-currency settlement, both works in progress. This is a backup structure for economic security against the vulnerabilities of a dollar-based system and exposure to SWIFT during Western sanctions. Such cooperation can turn into a strong pillar of global growth if China, India, and Russia work together with less political or great-power friction. The onus for that lies with Beijing. Finally, this move by the US could accelerate India's diversification of partners rather than terminate India-Russia ties.
It would be best for India to prepare for the worst, continue to diversify energy sources and export markets, and not give up Russian oil.
On its part, India has made it clear that it remains committed to ensuring its energy security, that it will continue to diversify energy sourcing on the basis of market dynamics, and that it will take all necessary measures to protect its trade and economic interests. It has also said that the US law carries implications not only for the India-US bilateral relationship but also for international energy markets. This mirrors its position on China, where its stance has been, and continues to be, that peace in the border areas is an essential basis for the continued development of bilateral relations. Given that logic, strategic or economic, no longer appears to be a pillar of US foreign policy, it would be best for India to prepare for the worst, continue to diversify energy sources and export markets, and not give up Russian oil.
Gautam Chikermane is Vice President at the Observer Research Foundation.
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Gautam Chikermane is Vice President at Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi. His areas of research are grand strategy, economics, and foreign policy. He speaks to ...
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