The concept of person holds a pivotal role in contemporary ethical, legal, and philosophical debates, yet its meaning has become increasingly fragmented. A notable feature of this fragmentation is the conceptual separation between “human being” and “person,” particularly in bioethical and legal contexts, where personhood is often defined in functionalist or psychological terms—such as self-awareness, autonomy, or relational capacity. These redefinitions resonate with broader cultural currents, including posthumanist tendencies that challenge the boundaries and identity of the human itself. This article argues that such views reflect a deeper philosophical rupture: the weakening of realist ontological accounts of the person. As a result, dignity is no longer viewed as intrinsic, but as contingent and variable, undermining moral protections for the most vulnerable human beings. In response, this study advocates a return to an ontologically grounded account of the person. Building upon the classical tradition of Boethius and Thomas Aquinas, and enriched by Leonardo Polo’s notion of the personal act of being, it proposes a framework in which personhood is understood as a subsistent reality rooted in being—not in capacities or social recognition. Polo’s metaphysical approach deepens the classical view by highlighting the structural link between being, freedom, and transcendence. The article defends the thesis that human dignity presupposes being: personhood is grounded in what a human being is rather than in what a human being is capable of doing. It argues that a realist metaphysical anthropology offers a stable and inclusive foundation for human dignity in contemporary bioethical discourse.
- Patrícia Frantz
- Francisca Rego
- Stela Barbas