Contents
Contents 3
Maps 6
Order of Battles 7
Tables 8
Chapter 1: Introduction 11
Archibald Frank Becke (1871-1947) 14
Acknowledgements 14
Chapter 2: Napoleon’s return from Elba
by Major A. F. Becke (1936) 15
Congress of Vienna 18
Preparations for War 19
Murat and the Kingdom of Naples 21
France without Allies 23
Chapter 3: The Waterloo Campaign, 1815: ‘Commentaires de Napoleon 1er
Plan De Campagne, 1815.’
by Napoleon Bonaparte translated by Captain A. F. Becke in 1908 24
Introductory Note. 24
Part I: Plan of Operations. 26
Part II: May 1815 27
Part III: The Second Plan 29
Part IV: June 1815 30
Chapter 4: The Low Countries
by Dr. Stephen Summerfield (2018) 33
Spanish Netherlands (1556-1714) 33
Austrian Netherlands (1714-1797) 34
Holland (1581-1795) 35
Batavian Republic (1795-1806) 37
Kingdom of Holland (1806-1810) 37
The Netherlands (1813-39) 38
Chapter 5: Topography of France and the Low Countries
by Dr. Stephen Summerfield (2018) 40
Communications 44
Fortresses and Fortified Towns 47
Ferraris Maps (c1771-78) 51
Chapter 6: Introduction to Military Logistics
by Dr Stephen Summerfield (2018) 54
Supplying the Army 54
Civilian Command of the British 55
Administration of the British Army 56
Board of Ordnance 58
Horses 60
Water 60
Rations 61
~3~
Infantry Loads 64
British Camp Equipment 66
Chapter 7: Waterloo Campaign: An Appreciation of the Situation from the
Point of View of a French Staff Officer, on 1 June 1815
by Captain A. F. Becke (1909) 67
Part I. Allies. 69
Part II. France. 71
Part III: The Plan of the Coalition 75
Part IV. Considerations Affecting the Strategy and Grand Tactics, with
Special Reference to Belgium. 76
V. Summary of the Situation as Already Disclosed. 78
Part VI: Our Plan 79
Chapter 8: Armée du Nord-(June, 1815)
by Captain A. F. Becke (1914) 83
The Imperial Guard 87
French Infantry Corps 88
French Cavalry Corps 90
Chapter 9: The Allied Plans for 1815
by Captain A. F. Becke (1914) 94
Anglo-Dutch Army Disposition 98
Blücher’s Prussian Army 111
Chapter 10 Artillery in the Waterloo Campaign
by Dr Stephen Summerfield (2018) 121
Royal Horse Artillery Re-equipped [Becke (1914)] 121
Anglo-Dutch Artillery 122
Prussian Artillery 127
French Artillery 129
Artillery projectiles 129
Mobility of the Ordnance 130
Artillery Tactics according to Hamley (1890) 133
Chapter 11: Battlefields of Quatre Bras and Ligny
by Captain A. F. Becke (1914) 135
Battlefield of Quatre Bras 135
Battlefield of Ligny 140
Chapter 12: The Application of the Strategic Advanced Guard in the
Waterloo Campaign, 14-17 June 1815
by Captain A. F. Becke (1909) 149
6-14 June 1815 153
14 June 1815 156
15 June 1815 158
16 June 1815 166
17 June 1815 193
Conclusion 195
~4~
Chapter 13: Allies Retire to Waterloo and Wavre
by Captain A. F. Becke (1907) 197
Prussian Movements on 17 June 1815 197
Night of 18 June 1815 200
Chapter 14: The Prussian Plans for 18 June 1815
by Major A. F. Becke (1936) 202
Chapter 15: Battlefield of Waterloo
by Captain A. F. Becke (1914) 207
Wellington’s Detachment at Hal and Tubize 215
Claimants for the first shot from Wellington’s Position 215
Wellington’s Position 216
Opening Fire of the Grande Batterie 224
Napoleon’s Position 225
Chapter 16: Battle of Waterloo
by Captain A. F. Becke (1907) 228
18 June 1815 – Initial Dispositions 228
18 June 1815 – Battle of Waterloo 236
Chapter 17: Marshal Grouchy and the Prussians
by Major A. F. Becke (1936) 249
Marshal Grouchy on the 17 June 1815 249
18 June – Marshal Grouchy search for the Prussians 253
Chapter 18: Action of Wavre
by Captain A. F. Becke (1914) 259
Battlefield of Wavre 259
18 June 1815 – Action of Wavre 267
Darkness 274
19 June 1815: The Conclusion of the Action of Wavre 275
Grouchy orders the retreat 281
Chapter 19: Marshal Grouchy’s Retreat to France via Namur
by Major A. F. Becke (1936) 282
20 June 1815 285
21 June 1815 286
Chapter 20: Allied advance on Paris and the end of the Hundred Days by
Major A. F. Becke (1936) 287
Chapter 21: Investigation of Incidents
by Captain A. F. Becke (1907) 293
More important features 294
Reviewing the Campaign 296
Tactics 297
Causes of Napoleon’s ultimate defeat 298
Chapter 22: Tricks of the Trade
by Dr Stephen Summerfield (2018) 300
Operating by Several Roads at Once 300
Time and Space 301
~5~
March Rates 302
Charges 305
Visibility 306
Sunrise and sunset Times for Waterloo Campaign 307
Languages 307
Weights and Measures 307
Bibliography 308
Books consulted and used by Becke 308
Official Maps and Survey 310
Other References 310
Maps
Map 1: Island of Elba (c. 1814) 15
Map 2: Napoleon’s formation for the advance of the Armée du Nord for the Invasion of
Belgium, June 1815 [Becke, 1914]. 25
Map 3: The Netherlands, c1568 32
Map 4: The Austrian Netherlands, 1792. 34
Map 5: North Eastern Frontier of France. 41
Map 6: The boundaries of France and the adjoining countries. [Robinson, 1906] 43
Map 7: Map of the border of France and Belgium [Robinson, 1906]. 48
Map 8: The Ferraris and Capitaine Maps of 1797. 52
Map 9: French Border [Becke, 1909]. 68
Map 10: The concentration of the Armée du Nord, 7-14 June 1815. [Becke, 1914] 84
Map 11: Area of Operation, 14-20 June 1815. 93
Map 12: Wellington’s Cantonments and Couverture, June 1815 [Becke, 1936]. 97
Map 13: Wellington’s Orders for assembly sent at 5pm, 15 June 1815. [Becke, 1936] 101
Map 14: Wellington’s Orders sent at 10 pm/midnight, 15 June 1815. [Becke, 1936] 110
Map 15: Bivouacs on the night of 14-15 June 1815. [Becke, 1914] 112
Map 16: Cantonments in mid June 1815 [Becke, 1908]. 114
Map 17: Map showing the movements of the RHA Troops (black) and RA Brigades (grey)
according to the accounts. [© David Wright 2012] 123
Map 18: Sections of the ground over which the French passed to attack the right centre of the
Allies, 4-8 pm, 18 June 1815. [Wood, 1895] 125
Map 19: Position of British RHA and Field Batteries about 7 pm. [Becke, 1936] 125
Map 20: Quatre Bras. Ferraris, 1777. 134
Map 21: Battle of Quatre Bras [Becke, 1914] 136
Map 22: Fleurus – Ligny – Sombreffe. 141
Map 23: Battle of Ligny (2:30 pm), 16 June 1815 [Becke, 1914] 142
Map 24: Fleurus, St Amand, Wagnes, and Ligny. [Ferraris, 1777]. 147
Map 25: Theatre of Operations, 1815 [Becke, 1909]. 150
Map 26: Area of Operation [Becke. 1909]. 154
Map 27: Cantonment of Armée du Nord on the night of 15-16 June 1815. The Armée du
Nord formed two wings and a Reserve [Beck, 1914]. 164
Map 28: Quatre Bras, Fleurus and Ligny. 167
Map 29: Anglo-Dutch Army Concentration: the move to Quatre Bras. [Becke, 1936]. 169
~6~
Map 30: The Action of Quatre Bras (2 pm) and the Battle of Ligny (2:30 pm), 16 June
1815. [Becke, 1914] 171
Map 31: Quatre Bras and Ligny, 16 June 1815 [James, 1908] 176
Map 32: Ligny (16 June 1815) [Rothenburg, 1848]. 178
Map 33: Battle of Ligny [Hooper, 1862]. 180
Map 34: Quatre Bras between 4-5 p.m. [Hooper, 1862] 183
Map 35: Quatre Bras (16 June 1815) [Rothenburg, 1848] 184
Map 36: Quatre Bras, 9 p.m. [Fortescue, 1910] 186
Map 37: Battle of Ligny, 16 June 1815. [Woer (1857) map] 188
Map 38: Mont St Jean, Hougoumont, Waterloo and Smouhen. [Ferraris, 1777] 208
Map 39: Farm of La Haye Saint defended by the 2nd KGL Light Bn [Becke (1914)] 210
Map 40: La Haye Sainte [Beck, 1914 after W.B. Craan’s Map] 211
Map 41: Hougoumont [Ferraris Map, 1777]. 217
Map 42: Hougoumont [Siborne]. 217
Map 43: Hougoumont [Becke (1914) after W.B Craan] 218
Map 44: Section through Mont St. Jean, La Haye Sainte, La Belle Alliance, Rossomme,
La Caillou [Becke, 1914]. 224
Map 45: The Battle of Waterloo, 18 June 1815. [Becke, 1914] 226
Map 46: Battle of Waterloo at 11:30 a.m. [Becke, 1907] 230
Map 47: Battle of Waterloo, 18 June 1815, [W. B. Craan, 1816]. 234
Map 48: Formation of the 3rd Division at Waterloo. [Becke, 1914] 236
Map 49: Battle of Waterloo at 5:30 p.m., 18 June 1815. [Hooper, 1862] 238
Map 50: Showing the Prussian attacks at Waterloo. [Rothenburg (1848)] 240
Map 51: Battle of Waterloo at 8 pm, 18 June 1815. [Cotton, 1846] 242
Map 52: Plancenoit about 7 p.m., 18 June 1815. 245
Map 53: The Prussian advance to Waterloo, 18 June 1815. 256
Map 54: Battle of Wavre, 18 June 1815. 257
Map 55: Limale and Wavre. [Ferraris, 1777] 262
Map 56: Movement of the Prussian Corps from Wavre, 18 June 1815 [Becke, 1914]. 264
Map 57: The Action at Wavre, 4 pm, 18 June 1815. [Becke, 1914] 268
Map 58: Battle of Wavre at daybreak of 19 June 1815 [Hyde Kelly, 1905]. 276
Map 59: Battle of Wavre on 18-19 June 1815 [Rothenburg, 1848]. 278
Map 60: Grouch’s retreat from Namur, 20-28 June 1815. [Hyde Kelly, 1905] 288
Order of Battles
OOB 1: The Army of the Kingdom Holland incorporated into the French Army in 1810. 37
OOB 2: Allied armies in Belgium. 69
OOB 3: The remaining armies in the first line. 69
OOB 4: Allied Armies in the second line. 70
OOB 5: The General Staff of the Armée du Nord in Belgium in 1815. 86
OOB 6: The Imperial Guard: Marshal Mortier, Duke of Treviso. 87
OOB 7: French Infantry Corps. 88
OOB 8: Cavalry Reserve: Marshal Comte de Grouchy. 90
OOB 9: 1st Corps of the Anglo-Dutch Army, 14 June 1815. 98
OOB 10: 2nd Corps of the Anglo-Dutch Army, 14 June 1815. 99
OOB 11: Anglo-Dutch Reserve, Cavalry and Artillery, 14 June 1815. 100
~7~
OOB 12: Anglo Dutch Army Staff. 102
OOB 13: 1st Corps: Prince Willem of Orange (wounded at Waterloo). 102
OOB 14: The 2nd and 3rd (Netherlands) Divisions of 1st Corps. 103
OOB 15: 2nd Corps of Lt-Gen Lord Hill with 5 ADCs. 104
OOB 16: The Reserve under the Duke of Wellington. 105
OOB 17: British Cavalry: Lt-Gen Earl of Uxbridge with 5 ADCs 106
OOB 18: British Royal Horse Artillery attached to the cavalry. 106
OOB 19: Hanoverian and Brunswick cavalry. 107
OOB 20: Netherlands Cavalry Division: GL Baron de Collaert 107
OOB 21: Garrison Troops 108
OOB 22: Netherlands Reserve Army: GL Baron Ralph Dundas Tindal 109
OOB 23: Prussian Staff 115
OOB 24: I Corps of GL Hans-Ernst-Karl, Graf von Zieten 116
OOB 25: II Corps: GL von Pirch I 117
OOB 26: III Corps: GL Frhr von Thielemann. 118
OOB 27: IV Corps: GL Bülow von Dennewitz. 119
OOB 28: Command of the British Artillery 122
OOB 29: Royal Horse Artillery. 122
OOB 30: Royal Artillery 124
OOB 31: Other Royal Artillery Detachments 124
OOB 32: Brunswick Artillery 124
OOB 33: KGL and Hanoverian Artillery 126
OOB 34: Netherlands Artillery 126
OOB 35: Prussian Artillery Batteries operating with I and II Corps 127
OOB 36: Prussian Artillery Batteries operating with III and IV Corps 128
OOB 37: Prussian Artillery Batteries operating with IV Corps 128
OOB 38: Disposition of the French Army, 14 June 1815. 157
OOB 39: French dispositions on 15 June 1815. 162
OOB 40: Anglo-Dutch dispositions at 11 a.m. on 18 June 1815. 229
OOB 41: Napoleon’s force disposition at 11 a.m. on 18 June 1815. 232
Tables
Table 1: The Spanish Netherlands in 1581 33
Table 2: French acquisitions in the Netherlands, 1659-97 34
Table 3: The Kingdom of the Netherlands (1815-39). 39
Table 4: Transporting supplies to the British Army in the field in 1815. 54
Table 5: Political and military command of the British Army and Royal Navy in 1815. 55
Table 6: Wellington’s headquarter staff. 56
Table 7: Administration of the British Land forces in 1815. 57
Table 8: Board of Ordnance. 58
Table 9: Field Train Department in the Netherlands, June 1815. 59
Table 10: Daily Rations for mules of for the British Army. 60
Table 11: British daily rations. 62
Table 12: French daily rations according to Crowdy (2015). 63
Table 13: Loads carried by soldiers according to Bardin Manual excluding camping
equipment (pots and mess tins), additional ammunition and personal properties. 64
~8~
Table 14: Loads of a British line infantryman and rifleman. 65
Table 15: Articles of camp equipment for the British Army in 1815. 66
Table 16: The French initial orders on the evening 14 June 1815. 91
Table 17: Build-up of British and KGL forces from 1 April to 14 June 1815. 95
Table 18: Wellington’s Infantry Strength. 95
Table 19: Wellington’s Orders to 1st Corps on 15 June 1815. 103
Table 20: Wellington’s Orders to 2nd Corps on 15 June 1815. 104
Table 21: Wellington’s Orders to the Reserve Corps on 15 June 1815. 106
Table 22: Orders to the Cavalry (Earl of Uxbridge) at 7pm on 15th June 1815. 107
Table 23: British and Hanoverian garrison troops on 15 June 1815. 108
Table 24: Prussian Army dispositions in mid-June 1815. 111
Table 25: Blücher’s Orders on the night of 14-15 June 1815. 120
Table 26: Comparison of Horse Artillery weights. 130
Table 27: Comparison of Foot Artillery equipment weights. 131
Table 28: Horse Artillery Caisson weights. 132
Table 29: Caisson weights for foot artillery of various nations. 132
Table 30: The situation on 14 June 1815. 156
Table 31: The situation on 15 June 1815. 160
Table 32: The situation on 16 June 1815. 166
Table 33: The Situation on 17 June 1815. 194
Table 34: The Situation on 18 June 1815. 199
Table 35: British losses in the Waterloo Campaign. 244
Table 36: KGL and Netherlands Casualties in the Waterloo Campaign. 244
Table 37: French estimated Casualties in the Waterloo Campaign. 244
Table 38: Prussian Strengths increasing during the Afternoon. 245
Table 39: The Situation on 19 June 1815. 275
Table 40: Space allowed the various arms in column of route. 301
Table 41: Column length of 1000 men. 301
Table 42: Width of a 600 strong battalion of infantry. 301
Table 43: Infantry and cavalry movement rates in the field. 302
Table 44: Comparison of British, Prussian and French march rates. 302
Table 45: March speeds. 303
Table 46: Average distance marched in a day. 304
Table 47: Rates of march on a level road including short halts. 304
Table 48: The effects of slopes upon troop mobility. 305
Table 49: British experiments determining the number of rounds fired against charging
targets in Jersey (1802) and Hyde Park (1805). 305
Table 50: Distances observed by the naked eye. 306
Table 51: Landscape Features discerned at the following distances. 306
Table 52: Sunrise and sunset times for the Waterloo Campaign. 307
Table 53: Imperial and metric measures. 307
Table 54: Metric, Imperial, Prussian and French measures. 307
~9~
Chapter 1:
Introduction
So much of Archibald Frank Becke’s writing dealt with the science of logistics,
which can be defined as being concerned with all matters pertaining to the
movement, quartering, maintenance and supply of the forces both home and
abroad. Antoine-Henri Jomini (1779-1869) was the first person who gave the
first definition of logistics in his (1838) The Art of War in his chapter entitled
“Logistics or the practical art of moving armies.”1 This encompassed the whole
range of functions involved in moving and sustaining military forces such as
planning, administration, supply, billeting and encampments, bridge and road
building, reconnaissance and intelligence insofar as they were related to
manoeuvre off the battlefield. NATO2 define Logistics as
“The science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces. In its
most comprehensive sense, those aspects of military operations, which deal with:
1. Design and development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution,
maintenance, evacuation, and disposition of materiel
2. Transport of personnel
3. Acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition of
facilities
4. Acquisition or furnishing of services and
5. Medical and health service support.”
In late March 2017, I told my publisher Richard Brown of Ken Trotman that I
was going on the Waterloo Association’s May tour “The Prussian Perspective
Battlefield Tour.” During a visit, he handed me a small bound volume of the
collected papers by Major Archibald Frank Becke (1871-1947) of journal articles
from the Journal of Royal Artillery and United Services Magazine that had been owned
and annotated by the author.3 Within a few weeks, I had transcribed the papers
and extracts from his other writings dealing with the Prussians. They were of
considerable interest to my colleagues on the tour, which was ably guided by Paul
Brunyee and John Morewood of the Waterloo Association and assisted by the
experienced Roger Ansell.
1 Jomini, Baron Antoine Henri de (1862 reprinted 1992) The Art if War, Greenhill Books, p252.
2 NATO (1996) NATO Logistics Handbook, 3rd Edition.
3 Becke, Captain A. F. (Oct 1908) “The Waterloo Campaign, 1815: ‘Commentaires de Napoleon 1 er. Plan De
Campagne, 1815.’” United Services Magazine, Volume 35, pp55-62.
Becke, Captain A. F. (1909) “Waterloo Campaign: An Appreciation of the Situation from the Point of View of
a French Staff Officer, on 1 June 1815,” Journal of the Royal Artillery, Vol 36, pp 508-523.
Becke, Captain A. F. (1907-08) “The British Artillery at Waterloo, June 18 1815,” Journal of the Royal Artillery,
Volume 34, pp 313-328.
Becke, Captain A. F. (1909) “The Application of the Strategic Advanced Guard in the Waterloo Campaign, 14-
17 June 1815,” Journal of the Royal Artillery, Vol 36, pp 305-324.
~ 11 ~
Captain Archibald Frank Becke wrote in 1907:
The campaign of Waterloo is so well known, and the accounts and criticisms so numerous,
that it is not proposed here to do more than give a brief outline of its principal incidents
with a view to deducing there from some of the more important lessons that they convey.
The Emperor had returned to France with the “violets in the spring” of 1815. Reaching
Paris on March 20, he at once reconstructed the official machinery of the Empire, and set
about reconstituting and raising as numerous an army as possible in such time as the
Allies left him before they struck. His position was very different from that of former
years, for in 1815 he had no ally; and it was long before he dared let fall the odious word
“conscription,” for Louis XVIII’s most popular act had been its abolition.
By the end of May 1815 Napoleon found the whole of Europe in arms against him. By
strenuous exertions, he was able to place 200,000 men in the field, but, as he himself
admits, 800,000 would have been required to oppose the allied forces once they effected
concentration. By October 1, the Emperor reckoned he would have 800,000 men under
arms, and with such numbers massed around his eagles anything might be possible. But
the Allies did not give him the necessary time to make himself secure.
This book contains 28 maps by Archibald Frank Becke (1871-1947) that have
come from these papers and his three books (1907, 1914 and 1936) dealing with
the Waterloo Campaign4 that have been described as “A must for the specialist, but
equally of value for the general reader seeking reputable military history.”5 These have been
supplemented by 31 maps from Ferraris (1777) that were used by both sides, W.
B. Craan (1816), Cotton (1846), Prussian Maps of Rothenburg (1848), Woer
(1857), Siborne (Hooper (1862), Major-General C. W. Robinson (1906), W. Hyde
Kelly (1906), James (1908), and Fortescue (1910). In addition, David Wright gave
his permission to reproduce his map from his fine article in (2012) Waterloo
Artillery: British French and Prussian, Smoothbore Ordnance Journal SOJ-5 on the use of
the Royal Horse Artillery as a tactical reserve.
Chapter 2 outlines the situation from Napoleon’s return to France. Chapter 3 is
Becke’s translation of Napoleon’s lucid reasoning dictated on St Helana of the
situation that faced him in 1815 from the chapter entitled “Plan de Campaign de
1815” given in his (1867) Commentaires. The importance and topography of the
Low Countries of Belgium and the Netherlands (Chapters 4 and 5).
In order to enhance the theme of logistics, the editor has written chapters on the
supplying of the armies greatly influenced how they were deployed, the complex
story of supply to the British Army, the Board of Ordnance, water, rations,
British camp equipment and infantry loads in Chapter 6. The Tricks of the Trade
(Chapter 22) explains the time and space required for troops, visibility and what
could be seen at sunrise and sunset times during the Waterloo Campaign.
Archibald Becke gives an appreciation of the situation from the point of view of
a French staff officer before the campaign started on 1 June 1815 (Chapter 7).
4 Donaldson. and Becke (1907): Becke. (1914) in Two Volumes: Becke (1936).
5 Captain Wheelwright’s review in the Journal of the Royal Artillery in 1936.
~ 12 ~
The organisations and the initial orders for the Armée du Nord (Chapter 8), the
Anglo-Dutch Army of Wellington and the Prussian Army of Blücher (Chapter
9) are described. Becke’s notes upon the re-equipping of the Royal Horse
Artillery with 9-pdrs and their final positions at 7pm on 18 June 1815 is
incorporated in Chapter 10.
Becke demonstrated his eye for the battlefields in Quatre Bras and Ligny
(Chapter 11), the application of the strategic advanced guard for the 14-17 June
(Chapter 12) and then the Prussian Movements on 17 June 1815 the movements
in the night of 18 June 1815 (Chapter 13) and Prussian Plans for 18 June 1815
(Chapter 14). Becke expertly examines in Chapter 15, the battlefield of Waterloo,
the reason for Wellington’s Detachment at Hal and Tubize, claimants for the first
shot from Wellington’s Position, Wellington’s Position, opening fire of the
Grande Batterie and Napoleon’s position. Chapter 16 on the Battle of Waterloo
is succinctly explained from the initial dispositions, and the Prussian attacks upon
Plancenoit. Chapters 17-20 follows the fortunes of Marshal Grouchy to and from
Wavre. Chapter 21 is a Becke’s masterful summary of the incidents, features and
causes of Napoleon’s ultimate defeat.
•
Notes
The editor has attempted to keep the names and nomenclature consistent
but as the reader must realise that the chapters have come from different
sources. Examples of Becke’s spelling being corrected include; Sombref to
•
Sombreffe, Schwartzenberg to Schwarzenberg and Bylandt to Bijlandt.
Troop strengths throughout the pages are given as they were written and in
•
approximate round numbers. Exact agreement is not possible.
British Ranks: [Lt], Major [Maj], Lieutenant Colonel [Lt-Col], Colonel [Col],
•
Major-General [MG or Maj-Gen], Lieutenant-General [LG or Lt-Gen].
Dutch and Prussian ranks:. Lieutenant [Lt], Major [Maj], Oberst-Lieutenant
•
[Oberst-Lt], General-major [GM], General-Lieutenant [GL].
•
French General de Brigade [GdB], General de Division [GdD].
•
Ligne and Légère refer to French line and light infantry respectively.
•
Battalions and squadrons are designated by Roman numerals (I, II, III, IV).
Battalion [Bn], Dragoon Regiment [DR], Hussar Regiment [HR], Infantry
Regiments [IR], Landwehr Infantry Regiment [LWIR], Landwehr Cavalry
•
Regiment [LKR], Ulan Regiment [UL].
•
Anglo-Dutch formations are denoted by 1st Corps, 2nd Division, 3rd Brigade.
•
French formations are denoted by 1e Corps, 2e Division, and 3e Brigade.
Prussian Corps are denoted by Roman numerals (I, II, III and IV Corps),
The brigades that equated to divisions in other countries, regiments and
batteries are in Arabic numerals with a full stop (e.g. 15. Brigade, 14. 6-pdr
Battery, 3. Silesian LWIR).
~ 13 ~
Archibald Frank Becke (1871-1947)
Archibald Frank Becke was born on 22 September 1871 to Captain Becke of the
Bombay Army and was baptised at St Thomas Cathedral Bombay on the 15th
November 1871. He joined the Royal Artillery with the rank of 2nd Lieutenant
on 1 January 1892 from the Royal Artillery Militia. He was promoted to 1 st
Lieutenant on 27th January 1895. He served in the Sierra Leon Protectorate
Expedition (1898-99) that put down the Hut Tax Rebellion. On his return from
East Africa in the summer of 1899, he married Maude Elizabeth Sarah Becke (b.
1873) in Abingdon, Oxfordshire. They had a daughter Helen Margaret Theobald
Becke (b. 1904) and a son Justice Becke (b. 1906). The latter later became an
accountant.
He received the East African Medal and clasp. He served in the Anglo Boer War
(1899-1902) as Captain and Adjutant Royal Field Artillery receiving the Queens
Medal with two clasps for Orange Free State (Feb-May 1900) and Cape Colony
south of the Orange River. He retired in 1911 with the rank of Captain and
became a self-employed army tutor. He wrote a number of books and articles
already mention including one on tactics6 and contributed to the 1911
Encyclopaedia Britannica.7 During the First World War, Major Becke was
attached to the Historical Section (Military Branch) of the Committee of Imperial
Defence (Est. 1914) and had access to the War diaries. From 1919, he was the
official cartographer and compiler of orders of battle for the Official History of the
Great War8 with a salary of £500 per year. He lived at 33 Hazlewell Road in Putney
and died on the 30 October 1947 in Wandsworth.
Acknowledgements
My thanks for the patient editorial comments by Richard Brown of Ken Trotman
Publishing. The encouragement of Gareth Glover, Jurriën de Jong, Susan Law
of the Shorncliffe Trust, Marc Moerman, Erwin Muilwijk, Alasdair White, Rob
Wolters and the members of the Waterloo Association has been greatly
appreciated. Terry Crowdy, Anthony L. Dawson, Yves Martin and especially
Marc Middleton who provided information and understanding of the French
Army rations.
Dr Stephen Summerfield
Loughborough University
7 February 2018
6 Becke, Captain A. F. (1909), An Introduction to the History of Tactics, 1740-1905, Hugh Rees, Ltd.
7 Becke, A .F. (1911) “The Waterloo Campaign, 1815,” Encyclopaedia Britannica, 11th Ed.
8 Becke, Major A. F. (1919), The Royal Regiment of Artillery at Le Cateau, Wednesday, 26th August 1914, The Royal
Artillery Institution, Woolwich
Becke, Major A. F. (1922-1947) was cartographer for most of the 109 Volumes of The History of the Great War
Based on Official Documents by Direction of the Committee of Imperial Defence, Macmillan of London.
Becke, Major A. F. (1935-45). Order of Battle of Divisions: History of the Great War Based on Official Documents by order
of the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence. Parts 1-4, HMSO, London.
~ 14 ~
Chapter 3:
The Waterloo Campaign, 1815:
‘Commentaires de Napoleon 1er
Plan De Campagne, 1815.’
by Napoleon Bonaparte translated by Captain A. F. Becke in 190813
Introductory Note.
Inasmuch as the Waterloo Campaign has especially interested many officers
during the past six months, I thought that the plan of campaign as given by the
Emperor in his own book might repay study. Unfortunately the “Commentaires”
are over-bulky for a travelling library, and are consequently not read as frequently
as they deserve to be. The clearness and force of the whole work are only equalled
by their compression; for instance, as Carlyle says, the summary of Frederick’s
Campaigns (contained in the “Commentaires ») and the brief criticisms are pleasant
reading, and do credit to Napoleon, perhaps even still more· than to Frederick.
Those who judge Napoleon’s literary work solely by his bulletins, proclamations,
and extracts from his voluminous correspondence, are often led away by the
somewhat flamboyant expressions, and do not realise fully enough that he rarely
read over what his secretaries wrote; for he was almost always hurried. When
time sufficed – and the “Commentaires” were produced when time hung heavy on
the ex-Emperor’s hands – Napoleon had a power and clearness of expression
that did ample justice to the unrivalled genius of the critic.
The chapter entitled “Plan de Campagne” I have reproduced exactly as it stood-
save for what it loses in translation. This appreciation of the situation for such,
indeed, it is – commences with a brief statement of current events; proceeds to
set forth several suggested plans and the arguments for and against them with a
terseness and lucidity that are unanswerable; and the whole ends with an
inspiriting proclamation to the French people, which the Emperor hoped would
bind one and all to his cause. And, indeed, such a result was needed if Napoleon
was to be given a chance against united Europe in arms. But France did not
recognise in time and with sufficient clearness that if Napoleon was overthrown
the country was absolutely at the mercy of the Coalition.
13Captain A. F. Becke translated Napoleon’s lucid reasoning of the situation that faced him in 1815 from the
chapter entitled “Plan de Campaign de 1815” given in the (1867) Commentaires de Napoleon 1er, Tome V, pp113-
122 in the October 1908 of United Services Magazine, Volume 38, pp55-62.
~ 24 ~
Chapter 5:
Topography of France and
the Low Countries
by Dr. Stephen Summerfield (2018)
France in 1815 was bordered by the Pyrenees and Spain in the southwest, the
Bay of Biscay and the English Channel in the west and northwest, in the
northeast, from Dunkirk to the Rhine, by Belgium (Flanders), Prussia, or
German Territory, in the east by Germany, Switzerland, and Italy, and by the
Mediterranean to the south. The main watershed of France runs chiefly along the
high ground close to the eastern and southern frontiers. From this the great rivers
flow on the west towards the English Channel and the Bay of Biscay, for instance
the Seine), the Loire, and the Garonne; and on the east to the Rhine and the
Mediterranean, for instance, the Meuse, the Moselle, and the Rhone. Thus to the
west or northwest lay the sea; to the east and south, the difficult, and
comparatively defensible, country of the Vosges Mountains towards Germany,
the Jura towards Switzerland, the Alps towards Italy, and the Pyrenees towards
Spain; while on the east flowed also the broad River Rhine and the Rhone.
Therefore France was most open to attack on the northeastern frontier,
particularly the River Meuse, because to the east of that river lay the broken hilly
district of the Ardennes. Fortresses and walled towns protected the open country
between Namur on the Meuse and the sea to the west. Paris was close to this
frontier. England (a naval Power) already occupied most of Belgium where
Ostend and Antwerp afforded convenient ports from which British troops could
co-operate with the Army of the Lower Rhine. The armies of Wellington and
Blücher were the nearest to Paris, and thus threatened it the most directly. It
would be much to the advantage of Napoleon if he could defeat them before the
armies of the Upper Rhine, Russia, or of other Powers, could arrive; while on the
other hand, he could scarcely march against these latter and more distant armies,
leaving his capital exposed to Wellington and Blücher.
The frontier of France and Belgium between the Sambre and the sea was divided
into three zones by the Lys and the Scheldt, the most important, through which
the direct road to Paris ran, being situated between the two rivers being about 50
miles apart. It was along this axis that Wellington expected to be attacked.
Northern France and Belgium have a good and temperate climate, although
occasionally hot during the active part of campaigning in the summer. The
marching of heavily laden troops was exhausting in the sultry and dry weather.
The roads were choked with dust between 14 and 17 June followed by heavy
thunderstorms of the afternoon of the 17 June over the low-lying deep country.
The western portion of Belgium was the most fertile part where wheat, oats, rye,
potatoes, and various root crops were freely cultivated. Cattle were numerous,
~ 40 ~
Chapter 6:
Introduction to Military Logistics
by Dr Stephen Summerfield (2018)
Supplying the Army
There were two methods of supply of victuals to an army. Either using a central
magazine or depots, or by soldiers foraging for their own sustenance as used by
the French Army. All armies used foraging when even the most efficient supply
systems failed under the strain of campaign where units did not receive rations
for many days.
Only the Anglo-Dutch Army started the campaign well fed. The Anglo-Dutch
Army of Wellington did not have these problems. The British, King’s German
Legion and the Hanoverians obtained their supplies from Britain and paid with
cash for their billets. The Netherlands government supplied the Netherlands and
the Nassau troops. Only the Brunswickers who arrived in mid-May had any
problems. The Prussian Armies suffered from a lack of provisions and the
distances that it had to march due to its dispersed dispositions. The French Army
after the series of forced marches was already suffering from mal-nutrition.
Table 4: Transporting supplies to the British Army in the field in 1815.26
Army Ordnance Units
Weapons, ammunition, greatcoats Ordnance Field Train Ordnance Field Train
Hospital stores Storekeeper General Ordnance Field Train
Camp equipment Storekeeper General Ordnance Field Train
Food, fuel and forage Commissariat Commissariat
Horse, draught and pack animals Commissariat Commissariat
Pay and allowances Commissariat Ordnance Field Train
Clothing Regimental colonels Ordnance Field Train
The limitations of supply influenced the deployment of the Allied Armies. In
particular this affected the Prussian Army, regarded as unwelcome guests who
did not have the money to pay for supplies and had territorial claims in the region.
Their dispersed deployment hindered rapid concentration and was in part
responsible for Bülow’s IV Corps’ inability to arrive in time at Ligny on 16 June.
Wellington in his correspondence demonstrated that the Prussians were often in
difficulties, and he viewed it as a matter of paramount military consequence that
the Prussian army should be in close touch with him. The Allied Armies on
Belgian territory were a burden upon the village people so it was desirable not to
make that burden greater than military exigencies clearly demanded. Wellington
arranged that the King of the Netherlands should furnish and pay for the supplies
of the Prussian army, the Prussian Government settling the financial debt later
on, instead of paying for supplies by promissory notes. The Prussians then
26 Sharpe (1993) The Field Train Department of the Board of Ordnance 1793-1859, Privately Published, p6.
~ 54 ~
Chapter 7:
Waterloo Campaign:
An Appreciation of the Situation from
the Point of View of a French Staff
Officer, on 1 June 1815
by Captain A. F. Becke (1909)52
Before it is possible to frame any suggested plan of operations it is necessary to
get a clear idea of the situation as it now appears to his Majesty-that is, to note
the present positions of the various belligerents and of our own forces-for war
against United Europe in arms is now, at last, inevitable. The actual situation to-
day, the 1st June 1815, is briefly as follows:-
Napoleon and his staff
Jean-Louis-Ernest Meissonier, 1868
52 Captain A. F. Becke (1909) Journal of the Royal Artillery, Volume XXXVI, pp 508-523.
~ 67 ~
OOB 25: II Corps: GL von Pirch I92
5. Brigade: GM von Tippelskirch (7,153)
IR2 (1. Pomeranian), IR25 (1. Rhineland)93, 5. Westphalian LWIR,
I-II/HR3 (Brandenburg),
10. 6pdr Foot Battery (6 French AnXI 6-pdrs & 2 Prussian Howitzers)
6. Brigade: GM von Krafft (6,762)
IR9 (Colberg), IR26 (1. Magdeburg)94, 1. Elbe LWIR,
III-IV/HR3 (Brandenburg),
5. 6pdr Foot Battery (8 guns)
7. Brigade: GM von Brause (6,503)
IR14 (3. Pomeranian), IR22 (Upper Silesian), 2. Elbe LWIR,
I & III/Elbe LKR,
34. 6pdr Foot Battery (8 guns)
8. Brigade: GM von Bose (6,584)
IR21 (4. Pomeranian), IR23 (2. Upper Silesian), 3. Elbe LWIR,
II & IV/Elbe LKR,
12. 6pdr Foot Battery (8 guns)
Corps Cavalry: GM von Jürgass (4,471)
1. Brigade: Oberst von Thümen
DR1 (Queen’s), DR6 (Neumark), UL2 (Silesian)
2. Brigade: Oberst-Lt von Sohr
HR5. (Pomeranian), HR11 (2. Westphalian),95
6. Horse Battery (8 guns)
3. Brigade: Oberst von der Schulenburg
4. Kurmark LKR, 5. Kurmark LKR,
Artillery:96 Major von Lehmann of the Brandenburg Artillery Brigade
4. and 8. 12-pdr Foot Battery (8 guns each), 37. 6-pdr Foot Battery (8 guns)
5. Horse Battery and 14. Horse Battery (8 guns each),
7. Pioneer Coy.
92 Known as Pirch I to distinguish him from his younger brother GM Otto-Karl-Lorenz von Pirch who
commanded 2. Brigade of I Corps.
93 Formed 4 March 1815 from the Lützow’s Freikorps infantry plus 3rd & 10th Ersatz Bns from the
Halberstadt, Westphalia. The Feldjäger Coy were armed with 80 rifles and 40 muskets.
94 Formed 4 March 1815 from Elbe IR [I Bn formed by Oberst-Lt von Reuss from “volunteers” from the
Westphalian Army. II Bn from Hessen-Darmstadt Guard and Westphalian Guard. The III/Elbe IR that
became the Füs Bn was formed from mainly new recruits from Pomerania around a cadre of former
Confederation of the Rhine soldiers on 6 October 1813.
95 Hussar Regiment formed from the depot of the Berg Lancers and the Berg Hussars.
96 The additional 12-pdr and howitzer batteries had not arrived.
~ 117 ~
Chapter 10
Artillery in the Waterloo Campaign
by Dr Stephen Summerfield (2018)
Royal Horse Artillery Re-equipped [Becke (1914)]111
What galloping field artillery gained in mobility, they lost in gun-power. Also, one
very important change with reference to the horse artillery armament must be
noted. This was due entirely to the officer commanding the Royal Horse Artillery
– Colonel Sir A. Fraser. He wrote, “The English Horse Artillery did great execution;
and I must be allowed to express my satisfaction, that, contrary to the opinion of most, I ventured
to change (and under discouraging circumstances of partial want of means) the Ordnance of the
Horse Artillery. Had the troops continued with the light guns (6-pdrs), I do not hesitate to say
the day would have been lost.”112 Also on another occasion (three days later), he wrote,
“The more I reflect, the more I bless my stars that I had obstinacy enough to persist in changing
the guns of the Horse Artillery…”113
The new pieces were 9-pdrs (though Bull’s Troop had heavy 5½-inch
Howitzers). Colonel Hime RA informs me “the difference between the case of the 9-pdr
and the 6-pdr was great; the difference between the case of the 24-pdr howitzer (Heavy 5½-inch
howitzer) and the 12-pdr Howitzer114 was marvellous.” As he points out, “it was of course
a question of calibre,” also “the superiority of the 9-pdr shot was very marked.”
Spearman’s British Gunner (2nd Edition) amply bears out this statement. In tables
given on pp 127-129 it is shown that the case of a 24-pdr Howitzer weighed 19
lbs 4 oz and contained 140 balls, that of a 12-pdr howitzer weighed but 11 lbs 13
os and held only 84 balls. Even allowing this was for the new pattern projectiles,
yet the difference between the two was well marked. The difference between the
firepower of the 9-pdr and 6-pdr guns was naturally not so great, but nevertheless
there was a distinct advantage on the side of the heavier gun, as the same table
shows. This being the case full credit must be given to Colonel Sir Augustus
Frazer, commanding RHA, for the change, which he brought about; for it
allowed our Horse Artillery Troops to confront Napoleon with a weapon in
which they could feel real confidence that they would not be outmatched by sheer
weight of metal. Although it is always the gunners, and not the mere weapons
they use, that decide the result, yet lack of confidence in one’s weapon is very apt
to breed undue caution in handling it, which is quite out of place in a big battle.
Colonel A. Frazer RHA showed by his recommendation and his handling of his
guns, on June 18, that he was not only a shrewd observer and most gallant soldier,
but also a great artilleryman.
111 Becke (1914) Volume 1,
112 Frazer, Letters, pp 551-552.
113 Frazer, Letters, p 569.
114 Note by the editor: Colonel Hime is incorrect in the terminology for the howitzers. The 24-pdr Howitzer and
12-pdr Howitzer were introduced in 1825. In 1815, a Heavy 5½-inch howitzer served with the 9-pdrs and a
light 5½-inch howitzer served with the Light 6-pdrs. Both had a calibre of 5.62-inches.
~ 121 ~
Chapter 11:
Battlefields of Quatre Bras and Ligny
by Captain A. F. Becke (1914)
Battlefield of Quatre Bras158
The position was not altogether unfavourable one for defence. It combined
farm-buildings, large woods, thickets, and rolling ground. The small group of
houses comprising the hamlet of Quatre Bras consisted of a large farm, an inn
and a few smaller buildings grouped around the now celebrated crossroads. The
hamlet was situated on the top of a small ridge, which formed the skyline when
viewed from the south.
The crossroads at Quatre Bras, c1940.
The country was open, rich with corn, and with occasional large woods. The
undulating ground was deep, but practically devoid of hedges, except around the
few buildings, or of any obstacle that could seriously impede the movements of
the three arms.159 To the eastward from Quatre Bras, the ground fell for some
two miles very gradually until it reached a long wood, which blocked further view,
and extended far away towards Brussels. Between the wood and the Bossu Wood
was an open plateau about a mile in width. Higher ground, on which was the
Delhutte Wood, lay to the southward. Frasnes, with its church, was clearly visible
from Quatre Bras.160 The Bossu Wood was in parts dense and intricate, but
passable everywhere by light cavalry.161
158 Becke (1914) Volume I, pp181-182. Becke (1914: pp 178-215) account of the Battle of Quatre Bras was
based upon Houssaye 1815, (pp190-222); L. Navez, Champs de bataille de la Belgique (pp 82-113); Colonel
Grouard, Critique de 1815 (pp 69-75); and D’Erlon, Ma vie Militaire (pp 95-96). The positions of troops in
Becke (1914) Map 4 were based on Kausler (Map 120); Siborne (Map 2); Charras (Map 3); Pollio (Map 3); and
De Bas et De Wommersom (plan VII). The groundwork for the map (Map 4, Quatre Bras Section) was taken
from the Belgian Survey, RF, 1/40,000; as no contour below 160 metres can possibly affect the inter-visibility
of the battlefield of Ligny and Quatre Bras; all lower levels being ignored, and only so many contours are
inserted as are required to show the shape of the ground.
159 Fraser (1859) p542.
160 Mercer (1870), Volume I, pp257-259.
161 Sir William Maynard Gomm (1881) Letters and Journals, p353
~ 135 ~
French 12-pdr ball set into the wall
next to the Church in Sombreffe,
opposite the Presbytery.
Stephen Summerfield, 2017
The larger village of Ligny lay some
three quarters of a mile below St
Amand, on the Ligny stream, which
was traversed it from the southwest to
the northeast side. Gardens and
enclosed orchard of bush trees,
separated from one another by strong
hedges, were between the houses, and
many of the latter were very solidly
built. In that part of the large form
buildings. The church was situated in this section of the village, and was
surrounded by a cemetery, which lay higher than the neighbouring ground.
20th century painting of Ligny.
Rene van den Neste (b. 1922)
Just to the east of Sombreffe were the great crossroads, where the Namur-
Nivelles road ran across the Charleroi-Gembloux Road. In 1815, the
continuation of the latter road Tongrenelle was a branch that led to the hamlet
of Point-du-Jour, and only a field-road ran on to Gembloux.
An old Roman road ran northeastward past the western boundary of the
battlefield, and cut obliquely across the Namur Road at Trois Burettes (just
eastward of Marbais); this ancient road (sometimes called the Brünhild Way) ran
towards Liege, via Gembloux. Leading northward from the battlefield were also
field-roads running to Wavre, which joined at Mont St. Guibert – one ran from
~ 144 ~
Chapter 12:
The Application of the Strategic
Advanced Guard in the Waterloo
Campaign, 14-17 June 1815
by Captain A. F. Becke (1909)169
It has been considered that it would help officers to understand the use of a
strategic advanced guard, and the part that it is called upon to perform; if a
Napoleonic, campaign was taken and considered in some brief detail. Practically
anyone of the great campaigns from 1806 and onwards could be taken for this
purpose, but 1815 has been selected for the following reasons:-
Firstly, as this was Napoleon’s last campaign he naturally knew more about his
invention in 1815 than he did in any of the other campaigns. As Colonel
Maude has pointed out in “Jena,” the Emperor in 1806 was then feeling
the way with his new idea, and had not come to repose that implicit
confidence in the “battalion square” that he came to do in after years.
Secondly, 1815 has been perhaps more written about than any other campaign,
but it has never been treated in any detailed history yet published from
this standpoint;170 and this idea must cause us to reconstruct many of
our ideas with reference to this much-read campaign.
Thirdly, as the campaign has recently been the subject set for examination in
Military History, many officers are probably conversant with the details
and also with the general story, hence it can be treated more briefly than
any of the other Napoleonic campaigns.
Fourthly, Napoleon failed, and, therefore, we must realise that even this system-
well-nigh perfect as it is-requires to be applied intelligently, and that mere
automata cannot replace educated officers in war. Let us now consider
1815.171
In 1815, as we know, the Emperor had returned to France in March to find that
Europe at once banded together against him. The time for preparation was short,
and the odds he had to face were enormous. Thrown as he was from the first on
to the defensive -for there was not a mile of neutral territory marching with
France’s long land boundary-yet the immediate character of the war was at his
option.
169 Captain A. F. Becke (1909) Journal of the Royal Artillery, Volume XXXVI, pp 305-324.
170 The present author hopes, however, shortly to publish a history, now nearing completion, of this
campaign dealing with it in this way.
171 In this short study of the campaign all details which have no bearing on the subject in hand will be
ignored. The movements and plans of the Allies will only be noticed sufficiently to explain Napoleon’s
strategic procedure. The campaign will be conducted with the Grand Army.
~ 149 ~
Old Guard attack over the river at Ligny.
Photograph Stephen Summerfield, 2017
~ 190 ~
Chapter 13:
Allies Retire to Waterloo and Wavre
by Captain A. F. Becke (1907)
Prussian Movements on 17 June 1815188
Gneisenau had decided to abandon the Prussian line of communications via
Namur and Liege, preferring to change to Louvain, Maestricht, and Cologne.
This would not necessarily result in abandoning Wellington and all chance of the
Allies combining and crushing Napoleon; because, after concentrating at Wavre,
the Prussians could reopen a new line of communications and also co-operate
with Wellington. Even though Gneisenau thought more about his
communications, yet Blücher and Grolmann always kept before them the duty
of working in conjunction with Wellington. It was their inflexible determination
to combine against Napoleon, which, on the 18th, drove the Prussian masses to
Waterloo, enabling them to deal a deadly blow to the Armée du Nord.
The position where Gneisenau made his decision to retreat upon Wavre.
Photograph by Stephen Summerfield, 2017
The Prussian retirement from Ligny was carried out on a broad front. The two
most shattered Corps (I and II) withdrew more rapidly than the III, which
covered their retreat.
At 10 a.m. Zieten and Pirch I were both clear of Mont. St. Guibert. At noon, the
two Corps concentrated at Wavre, whilst Bülow moved north through Walhain
and Thielemann halted at Gembloux.
By nightfall, Blücher’s Army was concentrated around Wavre with Zieten at
Bierges and Pirch I near Aisément. After Thielemann left Gembloux about 2
p.m., he marched to Wavre, and the III Corps then crossed the Dyle and halted
for the night near La Bavette; and Bülow halted at Dion le Mont to the southeast
of Wavre.
188 Becke (1936) pp162-164.
~ 197 ~
On the opposite side of the road to La Haye Sainte was the Sandpit, which was
held by three companies of the 95th Rifles. Captains Johnston, Chawner and
Leach commanded the three companies of the 1 /95th Rifles. The remaining
three companies of the 1/95th (Captains Beckwith, Glasse and Lee) formed
behind the Wavre Road just to the east of the crossroads197
Map 40: La Haye Sainte
[Beck, 1914 after W. B. Craan’s Map]
197 Cooper and Caldwell (2015) Rifle Green at Waterloo, Revised Edition, p40.
~ 211 ~
Map 41: Hougoumont [Ferraris Map, 1777].
Map 42: Hougoumont [Siborne].
~ 217 ~
Map 44: Section through Mont St. Jean, La Haye Sainte, La Belle
Alliance, Rossomme, La Caillou [Becke, 1914].
View from Lion Mound from the crossroads across the ridge.
Opening Fire of the Grande Batterie205
The great battery (Grande Batterie) opened fire about midday against
Wellington’s line, and soon a furious cannonade was raging. There is no doubt
that the battery opened about noon, and not as late as 1 pm. The Emperor always
believed in a thorough artillery, and half an hour would have been quite
inadequate for this. Further, Kennedy (p 102) stated, “This attack (on Hougoumont)
was unaccompanied with any other, except that of a general cannonade on the centre of the
Anglo-Dutch line”; and he was speaking of the commencement of the action. Also,
the redoubled roar of a cannonade, which came to Grouchy’s ears about noon
on this eventful day, must not be forgotten; of course this was the great battery
opening fire.206 Gourgard (p 96) also stated; “It was noon when eighty guns opened fire.”
This must have been the big battery settling down to its task.
205 Becke (1914) p54.
206 Becke (1914) p59.
~ 224 ~
Chapter 16:
Battle of Waterloo
by Captain A. F. Becke (1907)207
18 June 1815 – Initial Dispositions
The dispositions of Wellington and Napoleon on the morning of 18 June afford
some contrast. The former, leaving nothing to chance, placed 17,000 men at Hal
and Tubize to guard his right flank. The latter, taking his hypotheses as facts,
leaves his right flank unguarded, except for a detachment made in accordance
with theories that all the information available tended to disprove. On the other
hand, Napoleon, as was his custom, concentrated every available man for the
battle.
It is right here to speak plainly of the strategical error, with which Wellington is
charged, of leaving some 17,000 men, under Prince Frederick of the Netherlands,
at Hal and Tubize (at this latter place, on the way to Hal, Colville’s two brigades
were halted). Ever anxious about his communications with the sea, and fearing
that a French corps might turn his right, he committed the strategic blunder of
sending a body of men on the eve of a great battle to parry an imaginary danger.
The presence in line of battle of Colville’s brigades might well have kept the
British line from that critical hour which occurred before Zieten came up. It is
inconceivable that Wellington should have credited his adversary with a plan of
operations that must, by forcing him into Blücher’s arms, have brought about an
immediate allied concentration, for from the very outset Napoleon had been
evidently manoeuvring to prevent such a junction.
11 a.m.
On the morning of the 18th, after a very wet night, Napoleon did not immediately
attack, but occupied himself until 11 a.m. in making a careful personal
reconnaissance and in
holding his last review.
At that hour the
dispositions of each side,
briefly stated in OOB 39
and OOB 40. These
dispositions throw some
light on the reasons for
Wellington’s retention of
Colville at Hal. They
clearly show that
Wellington regarded his
right as the probable
flank to be attacked.
207 Donaldson and Becke (1907) pp313-321
~ 228 ~
The Church of St Cathérine on the Place de Plancenoit. The fierce fighting
between the Young Guard and the Prussians badly damaged the church.
Stephen Summerfield, 2017
~ 247 ~
Chapter 18:
Action of Wavre218
by Captain A. F. Becke (1914)
Battlefield of Wavre219
The bridges in Wavre were of stone; the remainder, and also the one at Limelette,
were of wood. The River Dyle was a fairly formidable obstacle from Limal to
Basse Wavre and was unfordable below Limelette. The river was about 30 feet
wide at Bierges. A French staff officer, who reconnoitred it on 18 June, likened
it inaptly to “a muddy canal,” on account of its low and parallel banks.
Consequently, the wooden bridges at Limal, Bierges, and Basse Wavre, and the
two stone bridges at Wavre, and the approaches to these bridges, were of
paramount value to an assailant.
Further the low-lying ground of the Dyle Valley was intersected by deep ditches,
and after the heavy and continuous rain they had filled with storm water and they
had become very awkward obstacles to the free movement of all arms, whilst the
ground itself was both soft and treacherous; also the low hills on the right bank
had a distinct command over the ground on the left bank of the Dyle valley.220
River Dyle near the Bierges Mill.
218 The account is based on Marshal Grouchy’s Report; Houssaye, Waterloo 1815,
219 Becke (1914) Volume II, pp175-176.
220 L Navez, Champs de bataille de la Belgique, pp 266-268.
~ 259 ~
Chapter 22:
Tricks of the Trade
by Dr Stephen Summerfield (2018)
Operating by Several Roads at Once228
Declaring war against Napoleon in 1815, the Allies were induced of necessity to
await the attack, because their forces were scattered over an immense space. Only
Wellington’s and Blücher’s armies were ready to meet the first onset. Three great
roads cross the Belgian frontier leading from the French fortresses towards
Brussels. Napoleon might advance his whole army by any of these, screened by
the fortresses; therefore, Wellington and Blücher were forced to guard all these
avenues to Brussels. Only one Prussian Corps was assembled at the point where
Napoleon’s whole force broke in. Under such circumstances, all that the Corps
could do was to take advantage of the fact that only the head of the great French
columns advancing on the roads was available for immediate attack, and to
dispute the advance and then to withdraw with in good order as could be
maintained. In this way, time would be gained for the concentration of the
remainder of the Allies upon the threatened line. Whereas had any line been
entirely neglected, the enemy, might be in Brussels unopposed before any
adequate force could have time to interpose. It is very easy to understand,
therefore, why an army on the defensive is spread over a large front, on lines,
which radiate from the point they seek to cover, like the spokes of a wheel from
a nave.
Napoleon invaded Belgium by three roads instead of one. The reason can be
shown by a simple calculation. In round numbers, 30,000 infantry on the march
extend over about 5 miles of road, adding 25-33% for lengthening out, they
would extend over 7 miles; 60 guns with their attendant carriages occupy 2½
miles; 6,000 cavalry four abreast and allowing 4 yards of space to each horse, fully
4 miles. If Napoleon had entered Belgium by one rather than three roads, it
would have extended as follows irrespective of baggage and stores.
90,000 infantry 21 miles
20,000 cavalry 14 miles
350 guns and carriages 14 miles
Total 49 miles
Using very wide roads that the French termed the double formation, the length
of column would be reduced by 30% to 34 miles. Therefore, at best, on a single
road the head of the column must have been marching two days before the rear
could have quitted the place of rendezvous. In fact, though Napoleon’s columns
moved by three roads, they failed to deploy on the field of Ligny until the
afternoon the following day.
228 Hamley (1890) The Operations of War Explained and Illustrated, 5th Edition, pp25-26.
~ 300 ~
