[aw] Daily Compiler Threat Spec Optimizer experienced an engine outage #67320

The agentic workflow daily-compiler-threat-spec-optimizer encountered repeated permission denied errors for these commands:
`shell(grep -n -i "copilot" specs/compiler-threat-detection-spec.md | head; grep -n "CTR-029\|CTR-03[0-9]" specs/compiler-threat-detection-spec.md | head -30; sed -n 32,38p specs/compiler-threat-detection-spec.md; sed -n 8,23p specs/compiler-threat-detection-changelog.md | cut -c1-150)`

Please update the workflow prompt so the agent:
1. Uses built-in tools (GitHub API, file read/write) instead of the denied shell commands
2. Or achieves the same goal through alternative approaches that do not require shell permission

engine_driver_failure
Agent finished without emitting a terminal safe output; task completion could not be confirmed.
bash: cd /home/runner/work/gh-aw/gh-aw && sed -n 1,12p specs/compiler-threat-detection-spec.md; sed -n 38,48p specs/compiler-threat-detection-spec.md; sed -n 24,32p specs/compiler-threat-detection-changelog.md; sed -n 218,222p specs/compiler-threat-detection-spec.md; sed -n 940,990p actions/setup/js/check_membership.test.cjs | grep -n "it(\|describe"; cat pkg/constants/version_constants.go 2>/dev/null | head -0; git describe --tags 2>/dev/null: {"content":"---\ntitle: GitHub Actions Compiler Threat Detection Specification\ndescription: Normative requirements for compiler rules that prevent unsafe generated workflows\nsidebar:\n  order: 1001\n---\n\n# GitHub Actions Compiler Threat Detection Specification\n\n**Version**: 1.0.45\n**Status**: Candidate Recommendation  \n**Latest Version**: https://github.com/github/gh-aw/blob/main/specs/compiler-threat-detection-spec.md  \n| `1.0.42` | `v0.87.9` | Audit-only; same-repository bot PR checkout authorization is a runtime trust control governed by the security architecture specification, not a new compiler threat rule. |\n| `1.0.41` | `v0.87.9` | Adds CTR-031; private-to-public flow opt-outs are rejected in strict mode and warned in non-strict mode because they can expose private data through public logs or destinations. |\n| `1.0.40` | `v0.87.9` | Adds CTR-030; activation sparse checkouts use the PR base SHA for pull-request and review events before loading runtime imports or skills. |\n| `1.0.38` | `v0.87.9` | Audit-only; safe-outputs workspace checkout discovery is a runtime trust boundary governed by the safe-outputs and checkout-behavior specifications, not a new CTR rule. |\n| `1.0.37` | `v0.87.9` | Adds CTR-028; PR-triggered agent jobs restore agent configuration from the base branch before any step that installs agent content. |\n| `1.0.36` | `v0.87.9` | Audit-only; Opengrep build-reproducibility findings (non-deterministic `npm`/`uv pip` installs, non-SHA-pinned Dockerfile image) are out of conformance scope per Section 1. |\n| `1.0.35` | `v0.87.9` | Audit-only; #681/#678/#676/#675, #679, #674/#669/#668/#667, #663, #657, #652/#651, and #680 are not new threat classes. |\n| `1.0.34` | `v0.87.9` | Adds CTR-027; allowlisted bot synchronization requires trusted same-repository provenance. |\n| `1.0.33` | `v0.87.9` | Audit-only; no new CTR rule or lock-file schema change. |\n| `1.0.32` | `v0.87.9` | Audit-only; no new CTR rule or lock-file schema change. |\n| `1.0.31` | `v0.87.9` | Audit-only; no new CTR rule or lock-file schema change. |\n| 1.0.40 | Added CTR-030 for PR-base provenance of activation sparse checkout before loading imports or skills; preserves non-PR refs and the `GITHUB_TOKEN` same-repo fallback guard. |\n| 1.0.39 | Added CTR-029 for fail-closed authorization of allowlisted GitHub Apps that send `repository_dispatch`; a conclusive absent collaborator lookup is accepted only for the allowlisted App on that trigger. |\n| 1.0.38 | Audit-only review of the safe-outputs workspace checkout discovery path; the agent-writable workspace trust boundary is a runtime control recorded in the safe-outputs (Threat T7, RCR1–RCR7) and checkout-behavior (§3.5, T-CHK-016) specifications, and is not a new compiler threat class. |\n| 1.0.37 | Added CTR-028 for base-branch agent configuration restore provenance on pull-request triggers; the restore is emitted after the PR checkout and before any step that installs agent content, for every engine. |\n| 1.0.36 | Audit-only review; Opengrep build-reproducibility alerts (`github-actions-npm-install-non-deterministic`, `actions-uv-pip-install-non-deterministic`, `actions-pip-install-inline-no-hash-check`, `github-actions-setup-node-missing-version`, `dockerfile-non-sha-pinned-image`) are external-scanner findings outside conformance scope; no new CTR rule required. |\n| 1.0.35 | Audit-only review; open code-scanning alerts (#681/#678/#676/#675 allocation-overflow, #679 useless-assignment, #674/#669/#668/#667 bad-redirect-check, #663 http-to-file-access, #657 smoke-test dummy, #652/#651 stale GraphQL-injection claim, #680 out-of-context stray commit artifacts) are not new compiler threat classes. |\n| 1.0.34 | Added CTR-027 for trusted same-repository allowlisted bot synchronization and fail-closed confused-deputy handling. |\n| 1.0.33 | Audit-only review; issue #59894's `close_issue.cjs` command-injection claim is a false positive (no `exec`/subprocess call exists in the file). |\n| 1.0.32 | Audit-only review; #675–677 and #667–669/#674 are not new threat classes. |\n| **T-CTR-039** | CTR-025 Framework Self-Prompt Misattribution | Strip only a leading framework `<system>` block before analysis | Strip only a leading framework `<system>` block before analysis. | `CTR-025` |\n| **T-CTR-041** | CTR-026 Generated Job Timeout Expression Injection | Reject non-positive or expression job timeout values | Reject non-positive or expression job timeout values. | `CTR-026` |\n| **T-CTR-042** | CTR-027 Allowlisted Bot Synchronization Provenance | An allowlisted bot synchronizes a PR authored by another actor | Authorize only when the bot, repository provenance, and PR author satisfy all trust requirements; otherwise deny with `confused_deputy` or `bot_not_active`. | `CTR-027` |\n| **T-CTR-043** | CTR-028 Agent Configuration Restore Provenance | A pull-request-triggered workflow generates an agent job that installs agent content through `steps:` or `pre-agent-steps:` | Emit the base-branch restore of the engine's agent configuration folders and root instruction files after the PR checkout and before any agent-content install step and the agent execution step. | `CTR-028` |\n| **T-CTR-044** | CTR-029 Repository Dispatch App Authorization | An allowlisted GitHub App sends `repository_dispatch` and the collaborator lookup reports it absent | Authorize only the allowlisted App on `repository_dispatch`; deny non-allowlisted actors, lookup failures, and all other triggers. | `CTR-029` |\n19:    it(\"should deny a Copilot alias when the collaborator lookup fails transiently\", async () => {\n33:    it(\"should still require an installation check for other Copilot-like actors\", async () => {\n48:    it(\"should return api_error when permission check fails and actor is not in allowed bots list\", async () => {\n(shellId: 4 completed with exit code 128)"}
bash: cd /home/runner/work/gh-aw/gh-aw && grep -n -i "copilot" specs/compiler-threat-detection-spec.md | head; grep -n "CTR-029\|CTR-03[0-9]" specs/compiler-threat-detection-spec.md | head -30; sed -n 32,38p specs/compiler-threat-detection-spec.md; sed -n 8,23p specs/compiler-threat-detection-changelog.md | cut -c1-150: {"message":"The user rejected this tool call. User feedback: Tool invocation is not allowed by workflow tool permissions.","code":"denied"}
bash: cd /home/runner/work/gh-aw/gh-aw && grep -n -i "copilot" specs/compiler-threat-detection-spec.md | head; grep -n "CTR-029" specs/compiler-threat-detection-spec.md | cut -c1-200: {"message":"The user rejected this tool call. User feedback: Tool invocation is not allowed by workflow tool permissions.","code":"denied"}
bash: cd /home/runner/work/gh-aw/gh-aw && grep -o "CTR-0[0-9]*" specs/compiler-threat-detection-spec.md | sort -u | tail -3; grep -n "CTR-031\|T-CTR-0[5-9][0-9]" specs/compiler-threat-detection-spec.md | cut -c1-120 | tail -6; sed -n 1,12p specs/compiler-threat-detection-changelog.md | cut -c1-120; sed -n 940,985p actions/setup/js/check_membership.test.cjs: {"message":"The user rejected this tool call. User feedback: Tool invocation is not allowed by workflow tool permissions.","code":"denied"}
Driver exit code: 1. The engine driver exited before a terminal safe output was recorded.
Failure classification: engine_outage
Last engine error type: unknown
Retry attempts observed: 1

Debug the agentic workflow failure using https://raw.githubusercontent.com/github/gh-aw/main/debug.md

The failed workflow run is at https://github.com/github/gh-aw/actions/runs/38018224701