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fix: Python 3.10-compatible add_note pollution test; drop em dashes from 3.2.1 notes (#642)
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‎docs/io/security.md‎

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@@ -201,17 +201,17 @@ every format (SCXML, JSON and YAML).
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A set of follow-up advisories hardened the restricted mode further and prompted the
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confidentiality/integrity vs availability framing above:
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- [GHSA-fj3w-533r-fvf6](https://github.com/fgmacedo/python-statemachine/security/advisories/GHSA-fj3w-533r-fvf6)
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— `<data src="file:…">` and `<invoke src="…">` read local files during loading, regardless of
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- [GHSA-fj3w-533r-fvf6](https://github.com/fgmacedo/python-statemachine/security/advisories/GHSA-fj3w-533r-fvf6):
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`<data src="file:…">` and `<invoke src="…">` read local files during loading, regardless of
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`trusted`. Loading now rejects external `src` references unless `trusted=True`, and refuses
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`<!DOCTYPE>`/DTD to block XML entity-expansion bombs.
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- [GHSA-v3qq-3xvg-m77g](https://github.com/fgmacedo/python-statemachine/security/advisories/GHSA-v3qq-3xvg-m77g)
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/ [GHSA-4857-ggqc-p3jc](https://github.com/fgmacedo/python-statemachine/security/advisories/GHSA-4857-ggqc-p3jc)
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— a document could write to a dunder/private/protected attribute (notably traversing
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/ [GHSA-4857-ggqc-p3jc](https://github.com/fgmacedo/python-statemachine/security/advisories/GHSA-4857-ggqc-p3jc):
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a document could write to a dunder/private/protected attribute (notably traversing
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`__class__`) and corrupt the shared model class process-wide. Write targets are now confined
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to public model attributes on every path segment.
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- [GHSA-r8gj-366q-cgvj](https://github.com/fgmacedo/python-statemachine/security/advisories/GHSA-r8gj-366q-cgvj)
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— `**`/`*` in the restricted evaluator had no magnitude bound, so a tiny expression could
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- [GHSA-r8gj-366q-cgvj](https://github.com/fgmacedo/python-statemachine/security/advisories/GHSA-r8gj-366q-cgvj):
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`**`/`*` in the restricted evaluator had no magnitude bound, so a tiny expression could
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exhaust CPU or memory. They are now magnitude-capped.
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These were released together in 3.2.1.

‎docs/releases/3.2.1.md‎

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@@ -15,9 +15,9 @@ See [](../io/security.md).
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```{note}
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**Am I affected?**
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- **Yes** — if you load documents you did **not** author (via `statemachine.io.load(...)` /
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- **Yes**, if you load documents you did **not** author (via `statemachine.io.load(...)` /
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`build_processor(...)` / `SCXMLProcessor`) with the default `trusted=False`.
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- **No** — if you define machines in Python, only load documents you wrote yourself, or already
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- **No**, if you define machines in Python, only load documents you wrote yourself, or already
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load with `trusted=True` for fully controlled documents.
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**Affected versions:** `>= 3.2.0, < 3.2.1` (this attack surface shipped with the

‎statemachine/spec_parser.py‎

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@@ -289,7 +289,7 @@ def recurse(child):
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op_type = type(node.op)
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if op_type not in binary_operators:
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# e.g. bitwise ``^``/``|``/``<<`` are outside the allowlist. (``**`` and ``*``
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# are allowed but magnitude-capped — see ``binary_operators``.)
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# are allowed but magnitude-capped, see ``binary_operators``.)
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raise ValueError(f"Binary operator '{op_type.__name__}' is not allowed")
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return build_binop(binary_operators[op_type], recurse(node.left), recurse(node.right))
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case ast.List(elts=elts) if allow_value_nodes:

‎tests/io/test_security.py‎

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@@ -551,11 +551,14 @@ def test_shared_exception_class_not_corrupted(self, fmt):
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try:
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sm = _run_exec(scxml, native, fmt)
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assert "failed" in _config(sm)
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# The shared class is intact: add_note is still the inherited method, not int 1,
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# and a normal exception still constructs and carries a note.
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assert callable(TransitionNotAllowed.add_note)
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err = TransitionNotAllowed(None, set())
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err.add_note("still works")
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# The shared class is intact: the exploit did not inject ``add_note = 1`` onto it.
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# ``BaseException.add_note`` only exists on Python 3.11+, so assert on the injection
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# site (the class ``__dict__``) rather than the inherited method, to stay
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# version-agnostic.
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assert "add_note" not in TransitionNotAllowed.__dict__
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assert getattr(TransitionNotAllowed, "add_note", None) != 1
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# A normal exception still constructs.
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TransitionNotAllowed(None, set())
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finally:
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# Defensive: if a regression ever mutated the shared class, restore it so the
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# rest of the suite is not corrupted.

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