Published online by Cambridge University Press: 06 April 2017
At some time around August 324 b.c., Antipater, the regent of Macedonia received orders from Alexander the Great that he was to be replaced with another eminent officer in the Macedonian court, Craterus. In addition to his removal from office, Antipater was ordered by Alexander to leave Macedonia for the East, bringing with him fresh levies to replenish those that comprised Craterus' own contingent of veterans from Opis. Though Craterus left Alexander's court shortly thereafter, neither man can be said to have made the journey speedily or directly. A range of reasons has been given to explain Craterus' slow advancement, including the construction of infrastructure to allow the transportation of military resources from east to west, the poor state of his health, and the need to recruit more men. By the time of Alexander's death in June of 323, Craterus and his forces had only reached the province of Cilicia in southeastern Anatolia. Antipater's immediate reaction to his new role is not recorded, but what is known is that he remained steadfast in Macedonia, seemingly in defiance of Alexander's orders. It is the purpose of this paper to evaluate Antipater's refusal to depart from Macedonia, to explore whether tensions between Antipater and his replacement could account for Craterus' sluggish advance and to highlight the impact that Greek domestic politics had on Antipater's position in Macedonia.
1 Arr. Anab. 7.12.4; Just. Epit. 12.12.9; Ashton, N., ‘Craterus revisited’, in Wheatley, P. and Baynham, E. (edd.), East and West in the World Empire of Alexander (Oxford, 2015), 107–16, at 108Google Scholar. For a helpful overview of possible factors contributing to Craterus' selection, see Ashton, N., ‘Craterus from 324 to 321 b.c. ’, Makedonia 5 (1993), 125–31, at 126–7; Ashton (this note [2015]), 108–9Google Scholar.
2 Bosworth, A.B., ‘The death of Alexander the Great: rumour and propaganda’, CQ 21 (1971), 112–36CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Bosworth, A.B., ‘Alexander and the Iranians’, JHS 100 (1980), 1–21, at 20CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Heckel, W., The Marshals of Alexander's Empire (New York, 1992), 126–7Google Scholar; Heckel, W., Who's Who in the Age of Alexander the Great: Prosopography of Alexander's Empire (Oxford, 2006), 95, 98CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
3 Arr. Anab. 7.12.4; Just. Epit. 12.12.9.
4 For a concise overview of the scholarship on Craterus' slow progression, see Anson, E.M., ‘The Macedonian patriot: the diadoch Craterus’, AHB 26 (2012), 49–58, at 51 and 53Google Scholar.
5 Badian, E., ‘Harpalus’, JHS 81 (1961), 16–43, at 37CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
6 Arr. Anab. 7.12.3-4.
7 Arr. Anab. 7.12.5-7.
8 Diod. Sic. 18.4.1.
9 Just. Epit. 12.12.9.
10 Curt. 10.10.15, 10.10.18.
11 This is part of a far-larger discussion on Antipater's portrayal within the sources. For discussion, see Walsh, J., ‘Antipater and early Hellenistic literature’, AHB 26 (2012), 149–62, esp. 154–9Google Scholar.
12 See for example: Badian (n. 5), 37; Heckel (n. 2 [1992]), 45–6, 125–7; Ashton (n. 1 [1993]), 126–9; Carney, E., Olympias: The Mother of Alexander the Great (New York, 2006), 59 Google Scholar; Heckel (n. 2 [2006]), 36–8, 98–9; Poddighe, E., ‘Propaganda strategies and political documents’, in Troncoso, V. Alonso and Anson, E.M. (edd.), After Alexander: The Time of the Diadochi (323–281 b.c.), (Oxford, 2013), 225–40Google Scholar; Ashton (n. 1 [2015]), 107–16.
13 Bosworth (n. 2 [1971]), 112–36; Bosworth, A.B., Conquest and Empire: The Reign of Alexander the Great (Cambridge, 1988)Google Scholar; Bosworth, A.B., The Legacy of Alexander: Politics, Warfare and Propaganda under the Successors (Oxford, 2002)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
14 Anson (n. 4), 49–58; Anson, E.M., Alexander's Heirs: The Age of the Successors (Chichester, 2014)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
15 Heckel (n. 2 [2006]), 98; Anson (n. 14 [2014]), 14; Ashton (n. 1 [2015]), 108; Arr. Anab. 7.12.4; Diod. Sic. 18.4.1, 18.12.1. Craterus' slow progress becomes more evident when the approximate travel time to Cilicia is considered. The journey to Cilicia from Opis is estimated to have taken a maximum of three months: see Anson, E.M., ‘Diodorus and the date of triparadeisus’, AJPh 107 (1986), 208–17, at 214Google Scholar; Engels, D.W., Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army (Los Angeles, 1976), 154–5Google Scholar; Ashton (n. 1 [1993]), 127; Ashton (n. 1 [2015]), 108.
16 Anson (n. 4), 49–58.
17 Of particular worth to this study is the concise summary of potential causes for Craterus' maintained position in Cilicia during 323 b.c. See Anson (n. 14), 23.
18 Bosworth (n. 2 [1971], 125 n. 9) stated that significant desertions afflicted Craterus' journey, necessitating a replenishment of forces. This comes from discrepancies between the numbers of troops dispatched from Opis and those still with Craterus in Cilicia (cf. Arr. Anab. 7.12.1-2; Diod. Sic. 18.16.4). However, no sources record such desertions, and this claim has never gained significant traction. Craterus may have received orders from the king to begin constructing infrastructure and a fleet, paving the way for the transition of Macedonian military strength from the eastern regions of the empire to the Mediterranean (Bosworth [n. 13 (1988)], 161; Bosworth [n. 13 (2002)], 6). Diodorus' account does imply that Craterus was dispatched directly to Cilicia where, once Alexander's task for him was completed, he would continue on to Macedonia assuming the regency from Antipater; see Diod. Sic. 18.12.1: … οὖτος γὰρ προαπεσταλμένος εἰς Κιλικίαν … ; Bosworth, A.B., From Arrian to Alexander: Studies in Historical Interpretations (Oxford, 1988), 209 Google Scholar; Bosworth (n. 13 [2002]), 6. Cilicia was a suitable location for Craterus' preparations, owing to the nearby location of the treasury at Cynida that could provide ample financial support (cf. Diod. Sic. 18.58.1; Plut. Eum. 13.1-2; Anson, E.M., Eumenes of Cardia: A Greek Among Macedonians [Boston, 2004], 85)Google Scholar. While an explicit reference to Alexander's plans beyond 323 b.c. and his military machinations for Cilicia as a launching point for further expansion for the Macedonian Empire is absent from Diodorus, the notion is certainly plausible. With Alexander's death, all plans for a military expansion of the empire came to an abrupt end, which would account for the omission of Craterus' venture from the ancient evidence. (For further discussion of Alexander's plans regarding Cilicia in 324, see Bosworth [this note (1988)], 208–11.) For Craterus, following Alexander's orders would have delayed any movement out of Cilicia to Macedonia with his forces. Cilicia was also in a state of unrest after the death of its satrap towards the end of Alexander's life. Balacrus, the son of Nicanor, was killed while fighting Pisidian forces (Diod. Sic. 18.22.1; cf. Berve, H., Das Alexanderreich auf prosopographischer Grundlage (Munich, 1926), 1.257-8Google Scholar; Heckel (n. 2 [1992]), 261; Carney, E., Women and Monarchy in Macedonia (Oklahoma, 2000), 165 Google Scholar; Yardley, J.C., Wheatley, P. and Heckel, W., Justin: Epitome of the Philippic History of Pompeius Trogus Volume II Books 13–15: The Successors of Alexander the Great (Oxford, 2011), 92 Google Scholar. The region would remain without a satrap until the Partition of Babylon in 323, when Philotas was appointed to the position (Curt. 10.10.2; Diod. Sic. 18.3.1; Arr. Succ. 1.6; Dexippus, FGrHist 100 F8 §2; Just. Epit. 13.4.12; Heckel [n. 2 (2006)], 219; Yardley, Wheatley and Heckel [this note], 92). Unrest in Cilicia continued into 322, as Perdiccas, along with the royal Macedonian army, ventured into the region against the Lanrandians and Isurians (Diod. Sic. 18.22.1-2). Both played a role in the uprising that resulted in Balacrus' death, eventuating Perdiccas' destruction of both cities (Diod. Sic. 18.22.1; Heckel [n. 2 (1992)], 155–6; Heckel [n. 2 (2006)], 200). Since hostile forces existed in Cilicia in 322, it is highly likely that Craterus required time to quell any unrest he encountered before continuing west.
19 Arr. Anab. 7.12.4.
20 Arr. Anab. 7.12.4. The wounds and illnesses that Craterus suffered throughout Alexander's campaigns do receive occasional mention in the sources; see e.g. Arr. Anab. 4.3.3, where he received an arrow wound, and Plut. Alex. 41.3-4, in which he was injured while hunting and subsequently fell sick.
21 Heckel (n. 2 [1992]), 126–7; Heckel (n. 2 [2006]), 95, 98.
22 Though Ptolemy's lost history is a likely suspect. Bosworth (n. 2 [1980]), 16–17; cf. Arr. Anab. 1.1-2.
23 Arr. Anab. 7.12.3; Plut. Alex. 47.10; Craterus was in general seen as a popular figure amongst his contemporaries; see e.g. Plut. Demetr. 14.2, Eum. 6.2; Heckel (n. 2 [1992]), 107; Anson (n. 4), 49.
24 As does Heckel, in his encyclopaedia entry on Craterus (n. 2 [2006], 95–9).
25 Griffith, G.T., ‘Alexander and Antipater in 323 b.c. ’, Proceedings of the African Classical Associations 8 (1965), 12–17 Google Scholar.
26 Griffith (n. 25), 14. Griffith here relies on the issue raised by Badian, namely that the relationship between Alexander and Antipater had broken down considerably, and that the king may now have suspected the loyalty of his regent in Macedonia; see Badian (n. 5), 36–7.
27 Walsh (n. 11), 155.
28 Arr. Anab. 7.12.5-7. According to Arrian, Olympias and Antipater attacked each other in their letters to Alexander. He described her tendencies towards anger and meddling, while she claimed that Antipater was rising above his station, claiming to be the pre-eminent man in Greece and Macedonia.
29 Carney (n. 12), 59. Carney's faith in Olympias' ability to affect her son's decision-making process may be unfounded. She says here that Alexander trusted his mother more than he trusted Antipater. However, Arrian gives no indication of any particularly strong influence. He does say that Olympias' reports tended to hold more weight with Alexander than Antipater's, but also says that Alexander's behaviour did not change as a result of this (Arr. Anab. 7.12.7). For the Alexander-Olympias-Antipater relationship, see also Diod. Sic. 17.118.1. Carney ([n. 12], 59) also further emphasizes the rift between the two men with Antipater's delay in leaving.
30 Griffith (n. 25), 14.
31 Bosworth (n. 13 [1988]), 148, 161–2.
32 It appears that Antipater was still willing to follow Alexander's wishes, even after his replacement in 324. This is found in Antipater's implementation of the potentially problematic Exiles Decree in 324 despite his dismissal as regent in favour of Craterus ( Dmitriev, S., The Greek Slogan of Freedom and Early Roman Politics in Greece [Oxford, 2011], 423–5CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Poddighe [n. 12], 231; Worthington, I., ‘From east to west: Alexander and the Exiles Decree’, in Wheatley, P. and Baynham, E. [edd.], East and West in the World Empire of Alexander [Oxford, 2015], 93–106, at 93–5Google Scholar).
33 For the dispatch of Cassander in Antipater's place to Babylon, see Just. Epit. 12.14.5-9. This section also contains Justin's accusations that Antipater sent Cassander to Babylon to take part in the plot to poison Alexander, which, if true, renders this point false. However, this theory is widely discredited, even in the ancient sources. For accounts in the ancient sources pertaining to the plot to assassinate Alexander, see Arr. Anab. 7.27; Plut. Alex. 77.2-3; Curt. 10.10.19; Diod. Sic. 17.118.2. See also Bosworth (n. 2 [1971]), 113–16.
34 Griffith (n. 25), 16. His logic is that were Antipater planning any kind of move against Alexander, he would hardly have handed over his own son over to him while relations between the two men were so bad, lest he be used as a hostage.
35 What entailed was something of a struggle between Alexander and his troops over a wide variety of issues, including their long-stated wish to return to Greece. For the breakdown between Alexander and his troops, see e.g. Just. Epit. 12.11.4-9, 12.5-7; Arr. Anab. 7.8-12; Diod. Sic. 17.109.
36 Griffith ([n. 25], 14) does mention another possible potential cause for such an order. Alexander may have wished to keep the two armies separate, to ensure that his new troops were not disillusioned by stories of him that they may hear from the returning veterans. This is a reasonable fear for Alexander, especially given the difficulty that he had experienced with his troops over the previous few years. But to make that statement as proof that Alexander gave the order to Craterus to remain in Cilicia until Antipater had passed is far too speculative, because the existence of such an order is still unattested in the sources.
37 Badian makes reference towards Craterus wishing to avoid direct confrontation between himself and Antipater, although this seems to be based more around their respective military strengths than around any conflict of personality; see Badian (n. 5), 37.
38 Alexander's sudden death left the empire in a state of uncertainty; for discussion, see Errington, R.M., ‘From Babylon to Triparadeisos: 323–320 b.c. ’ JHS 90 (1970), 49–70 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Anson, E.M., ‘Craterus and the prostasia’, CPh 87 (1992), 38–43 Google Scholar; Bosworth (n. 13 [2002]), 29–63. For Craterus, it meant a cancellation of Alexander's orders to replace Antipater as regent, leaving him in a state of political limbo until the future of the empire could be decided upon; see Diod. Sic. 18.4.1; Heckel (n. 2 [2006]), 98; A. Meeus, ‘The power struggle of the diadochoi in Babylon 323 b.c.’, AncSoc 38 (2008), 39–82, at 76–9; cf. Badian, E., ‘A king's notebooks’, HSPh 72 (1968), 183–204, at 201–4Google Scholar. However, this period was short and Craterus would receive his appointment to the command of Europe alongside Antipater (Arr. Succ. 1.3. Cf. Meeus [this note], 80; Anson [n. 4], 51).
39 Diod. Sic. 18.12.1.
40 Diod. Sic. 18.16.4.
41 See Bosworth (n. 2 [1971]), 125 n. 8; Anson (n. 18), 74; Heckel (n. 2 [2006]), 98.
42 Anson (n. 4), 53 n. 10. Additionally, here Anson also provides several logistical reasons that can concisely explain Craterus' slow progress in coming to Antipater's aid.
43 Diod. Sic. 18.16.5.
44 See, for example, their joint ventures against Thessaly: Diod. Sic. 18.17.6-8; Baynham, E.J., ‘Antipater, manager of kings’, in Worthington, I. (ed.), Ventures into Greek History (Oxford, 1994), 331–56, at 349Google Scholar.
45 Diod. Sic. 18.18.7. Carney (n. 18), 165.
46 See Wheatley, P.V., ‘Problems in analysing source documents in ancient history: the case of Philip, advisor to Demetrius Poliorcetes, 314–312 b.c., and IG II2 561’, Limina 3 (1997), 61–70 Google Scholar; Meeus, A., ‘What we do not know about the age of the diadochi: the methodological consequences of the gaps in the evidence’, in Troncoso, V. Alonso and Anson, E.M. (edd.), After Alexander: The Time Of The Diadochi (323–281 b.c.) (Oxford, 2013), 84–98 Google Scholar.
47 Baynham (n. 44), 345.
48 For his death, see Arr. Succ. 1.27; Diod. Sic. 18.30.5; Plut. Eum. 7.3-4; Nep. Eum. 4.3-4. For the timeline of these events and the final years of his life, see e.g. Billows, R.A., Antigonus the One-Eyed and the Creation of the Hellenistic State (Berkeley, 1990), 396 Google Scholar; Heckel (n. 2 [2006]), 98–9.
49 Bosworth (n. 2 [1971]), 125.
50 Anson (n. 4), 53.
51 Bosworth (n. 2 [1971]), 125 n. 8. Bosworth here points out another whom Antipater had approached for help: cf. Diod. Sic. 18.12.1, 14.4-5; Just. Epit. 13.5.14; Heckel (n. 2 [2006]), 150; Errington, R.M., A History of the Hellenistic World 323–30 b.c. (Oxford, 2008), 16 Google Scholar. As the satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia since 323 (Curt. 10.10.2; Diod. Sic. 18.3.1; Just. Epit. 13.4.16), Leonnatus occupied a geographically more immediate position to come to Antipater's aid than the Cilician-based Craterus (Errington [this note], 16). When word reached Leonnatus, he crossed the Hellespont, bolstering the Macedonian military footprint in Europe. Shortly after his arrival into Europe, at the siege of Lamia, Leonnatus was killed during the fighting (Diod. Sic. 18.15.3; Just. Epit. 13.5.14; Plut. Phoc. 25.3). It was only after Leonnatus' death that Craterus is said to have arrived; see Diod. Sic. 18.14.5-18.15.4, 18.16.4. Moreover, the fact that Leonnatus reacted first and came to Antipater's aid may provide a reason for Craterus' delay. Until Leonnatus' death, Antipater had the help that he requested. Only afterwards was Craterus required.
52 Errington (n. 51), 16.
53 Diod. Sic. 17.17.5, 18.12.1.
54 Diod. Sic. 17.17.3-5; Just. Epit. 11.6.2; Plut. Alex. 15.1; Hammond, N.G.L., ‘Casualties and reinforcements of citizen soldiers in Greece and Macedonia’, JHS 109 (1989), 56–68, at 62–4CrossRefGoogle Scholar. The discrepancy in the size of Alexander's army and its composition by the various source accounts does not concern this study, other than to demonstrate that these troops were unable to engage with unrest within Macedonia proper. For the size and composition of Alexander's army, see Bosworth (n. 13 [1988]), 35. The forces from which Antipater could draw upon were considerably smaller, totally around 13,500 (Diod. Sic. 17.17.5). For further discussion on the limited resources at Antipater's disposal and the requirements of Alexander during the Persian Campaign, see Adams, W.L., ‘Antipater and Cassander: generalship on restricted resources in the fourth century’, AncW 10 (1984), 79–88 Google Scholar, and Blackwell, C.W., In the Absence of Alexander: Harpalus and the Failure of Macedonian Authority (New York, 1999), 65–9Google Scholar.
55 Indeed, this willingness was evident even before Alexander's entry into Asia Minor, where in 335 the city of Thebes took up arms after a rumour of Alexander's death had spread (Arr. Anab. 1.7.6; Blackwell [n. 54], 52).
56 For mentions of the Macedonian garrisons in Greece, see e.g. Just. Epit. 11.2.9; Diod. Sic. 17.3.3-4, 17.8.3, 17.8.7, 17.12.5.
57 Diod. Sic. 17.62.6. See Bosworth (n. 13 [1988]), 201.
58 Arr. Anab. 2.13.6; Bosworth (n. 13 [1988]), 199.
59 Diod. Sic. 17.62.6; Bosworth (n. 13 [1988]), 201; Dmitriev (n. 32), 93; Worthington (n. 32), 99.
60 Diod. Sic. 17.63.1-2; Bosworth (n. 13 [1988]), 201–3; Baynham (n. 44), 339–41; Blackwell (n. 54), 55–6; Heckel (n. 2 [2006]), 36.
61 Diod. Sic. 17.63.4. For Antipater's treatment of the defeated Spartans, see Diod. Sic. 17.73.5.
62 At the time of the war with Agis, Athens was on the cusp of joining Sparta and its Peloponnesian allies (cf. Aeschin. In Ctes. 165; Curt. 6.1.20; Diod. Sic. 17.62.7; Din. In Dem. 34), but chose instead to avoid the conflict (Blackwell [n. 54], 62; cf. Aeschin. In Ctes. 234 for Demosthenes' reported opposition to Athenian involvement in the war).
63 There may have been no better or more experienced man for the job. For Antipater's prior experience, see Kanatsulis, D., ‘Antipatros als Feldherr und Staatsmann in der Zeit Philipps und Alexanders des Grossen’, Hellenika 16 (1958/1959), 16–64 Google Scholar and Baynham (n. 44), 331–56.
64 Diod. Sic. 18.8.3-4; Just. Epit. 13.5.2-4; Heckel, W., The Conquests of Alexander the Great (Cambridge, 2008), 146, 189 n. 12Google Scholar; Dmitriev (n. 32), 423; Worthington (n. 32), 93.
65 Explicitly not those by the Macedonian regime (cf. Diod. Sic. 18.8.4.)
66 Blackwell (n. 54), 146; also, Heckel (n. 64), 147.
67 Diod. Sic. 18.8.4 clearly asserts that Antipater would be given the power to see that the orders were completed. Cf. Worthington (n. 32), 98. See also Baynham (n. 44), 346.
68 Diod. Sic. 18.8.6. cf. Bosworth (n. 13 [1988]), 221.
69 The arrival of Alexander's treasurer Harpalus at roughly the same time as Nicanor's proclamation further compounded the political unrest, particularly in Athens: see Curt. 10.2.1; Diod. Sic. 17.108.6; Plut. Dem. 25.3; Badian (n. 5), 31–2; Blackwell (n. 54), 134; Heckel (n. 2 [2006]), 130; cf. Just. Epit. 13.5.9. Despite Harpalus' desire to escape Alexander, Athens was unsure of the Macedonian's intentions for the city (cf. Din. In Arist. 4; Plut. Dem. 25.3; Blackwell [n. 54], 135). Because of this, Harpalus was imprisoned, and his money was confiscated (Plut. Dem. 25.1-3; Blackwell [n. 54], 135; Heckel [n. 2 (2006)], 131). This episode reveals how dire the relationship between Athens and Macedon had become by 324, prior to the death of Alexander and the outbreak of the Lamian War (indeed, Harpalus' funds were used in part to fund the war (cf. Diod. Sic. 18.9.1; Heckel [n. 2 (2006)], 131). Harpalus' arrival to Greece is significant for a number of reasons. First, it demonstrates how strained the political situation in Greece had become prior to Antipater's replacement with Craterus. Second, the supplementation of Harpalus' funds, now in Athenian hands, would strengthen the Athenian war-effort. This further enforces the Greek destabilization facing Antipater in 324, and the regent's inability to depart east (for a full discussion on Harpalus' impact upon the Lamian War, see Ashton, N., ‘The Lamian War – a false start?’ Antichthon 17 [1984], 47–63 CrossRefGoogle Scholar).
70 Diod. Sic. 18.8.6-7; Heckel (n. 64), 147; O'Sullivan, L., The Regime of Demetrius of Phalerum in Athens, 317–307 b.c.e.: A Philosopher in Politics (Leiden, 2009), 22 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
71 Diod. Sic. 18.8.7; cf. Plut. Phoc. 22.3-4, when news of Alexander's death had arrived in Athens prior to the initiation of the Lamian War.
72 Blackwell (n. 54), 148; Worthington (n. 32), 95, 99.
73 Boiy, T., Between High and Low: A Chronology of the Early Hellenistic Period (Frankfurt, 2007), 45 Google Scholar; Anson (n. 4), 55; cf. Diod. Sic. 18.12.1; Gattinoni, F. Landucci, Diodoro Siculo Biblioteca storica: Libro XVIII (Milan, 2008), 77 Google Scholar suggests that, by 323 and the arrival of the news that Alexander was dead, Antipater was convinced that war with the Greek cities was likely. No doubt that the events of the previous year must have been a significant factor for him to take this position.
74 Marm. Par. FGrHist 239 B9; Heckel (n. 2 [2006]), 87–8; Anson (n. 4), 54.
