The Oxford Handbook of EpistemologyPaul K. Moser The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology contains 19 previously unpublished chapters by today's leading figures in the field. These chapters function not only as a survey of key areas, but as original scholarship on a range of vital topics. Written accessibly for advanced undergraduates, graduate students, and professional philosophers, the Handbook explains the main ideas and problems of contemporary epistemology while avoiding overly technical detail. |
Contents
CONTRIBUTORS | |
PAUL K MOSER | 3 |
CONDITIONS AND ANALYSES OF KNOWING ROBERT K SHOPE | 25 |
THE SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE ROBERT AUDI | 71 |
A PRIORI KNOWLEDGE ALBERT CASULLO | 95 |
THE SCIENCES AND EPISTEMOLOGY ALVIN I GOLDMAN | 144 |
CONCEPTUAL DIVERSITY IN EPISTEMOLOGY RICHARD FOLEY | 177 |
THEORIES OF JUSTIFICATION RICHARD FUMERTON | 204 |
SKEPTICISM PETER KLEIN | 336 |
EPISTEMOLOGICAL DUTIES RICHARD FELDMAN | 362 |
SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE PHILIP KITCHER | 385 |
EXPLANATION AND EPISTEMOLOGY WILLIAM G LYCAN | 408 |
DECISION THEORY AND EPISTEMOLOGY MARK KAPLAN | 434 |
EMBODIMENT AND EPISTEMOLOGY LOUISE M ANTONY | 463 |
EPISTEMOLOGY AND ETHICS NOAH LEMOS | 479 |
EPISTEMOLOGY IN PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION PHILIP L QUINN | 513 |
INTERNALISM AND EXTERNALISM LAURENCE BONJOUR | 234 |
TRACKING COMPETENCE AND KNOWLEDGE ERNEST SOSA | 264 |
VIRTUES IN EPISTEMOLOGY JOHN GRECO | 287 |
MIND AND KNOWLEDGE JOHN HEIL | 316 |
FORMAL PROBLEMS ABOUT KNOWLEDGE ROY SORENSEN | 539 |
| 569 | |
| 587 | |
Other editions - View all
Common terms and phrases
Academic Skepticism accept Alvin Goldman analysis argues argument assert basic sources Bayesian Cambridge causal claim cognitive coherence coherentism concept concerning conclusion Consider cosmological argument defeat degree of confidence depend Descartes entails epistemic justification epistemic perspective epistemic status epistemically rational epistemological duties epistemology Ernest Sosa evidence example explanation explanatory fact false feminist foundationalism foundationalist Gettier goal Goldman hypothesis inference intellectual virtues internalist intuitions justified belief justified in believing kind knower Laurence BonJour logical mathematical moral beliefs Nogot noninferential notion objection Oxford perception person perspective philosophers Plantinga plausible possible pragmatic premises principle priori justification priori knowledge problem proof properly basic properties proposition question rational belief reason reflective equilibrium relevant reliabilism reliabilist reliable requirement S's belief scientific seems sense simply skeptical sort Sosa suppose Swampman theistic belief theories of justification things thought true belief truth University Press warrant
References to this book
Reading Epistemology: Selected Texts with Interactive Commentary Sven Bernecker No preview available - 2006 |
Reading Epistemology: Selected Texts with Interactive Commentary Sven Bernecker No preview available - 2006 |