The Continent of International LawEvery year, states negotiate, conclude, sign, and give effect to hundreds of new international agreements. Koremenos argues that the detailed design provisions of such agreements matter for phenomena that scholars, policymakers, and the public care about: when and how international cooperation occurs and is maintained. Theoretically, Koremenos develops hypotheses regarding how cooperation problems like incentives to cheat can be confronted and moderated through law's detailed design provisions. Empirically, she exploits her data set composed of a random sample of international agreements in economics, the environment, human rights and security. Her theory and testing lead to a consequential discovery: considering the vagaries of international politics, international cooperation looks more law-like than anarchical, with the detailed provisions of international law chosen in ways that increase the prospects and robustness of cooperation. This nuanced and sophisticated 'continent of international law' can speak to scholars in any discipline where institutions, and thus institutional design, matter. |
Contents
Rediscovering the continent | 1 |
theory and data | 23 |
The COIL sample | 64 |
Flexibility provisions in the design | 99 |
Escape clauses and withdrawal clauses | 124 |
Centralization scope and control provisions | 193 |
Dispute resolution provisions | 199 |
Punishment provisions | 226 |
Monitoring provisions | 261 |
Asymmetric design rules voting and power | 293 |
Conclusion | 320 |
Coding rules | 371 |
Selection issues in international cooperation | 377 |
| 407 | |
| 426 | |
Other editions - View all
The Continent of International Law: Explaining Agreement Design Barbara Koremenos Limited preview - 2016 |
The Continent of International Law: Explaining Agreement Design Barbara Koremenos No preview available - 2016 |
Common terms and phrases
actors agreement design analysis argue bilateral body Chapter coding COIL sample Commitment problems compliance conjecture constituting an agreement Convention cooperative endeavor Coordination problems delegated monitoring dependent variable descriptive statistics design provisions dispute resolution provisions dispute settlement Distribution problems domestic duration provisions economic empirical Environment environmental agreements escape clauses example finite duration flexibility Government human rights agreements IAEA IGOs incentives to defect incorporated informal punishment institutional design international agreements international cooperation international law issue area issue area percentage Koremenos Last accessed ments misclassified agreements monitoring provisions Moon Treaty Multilateral negotiations NGO monitoring norms North Korea notice period nuclear nuclear weapons Number observed population parties percent political population of interest predicted probabilities Preference Heterogeneity Probit punishment provisions Rational Design renegotiation reservations solve sub-issue area substantive Table theoretical theory tion treaty Uncertainty about Behavior underlying cooperation problems underlying Enforcement problem United UNSC UNTS voting rules withdrawal clauses World