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S. Hrg. 108-241, Pt. 4
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR
APPROPRIATIONS FOR HSCAL YEAR 2004
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S.HRG.108-241/PT.4
108-1 Hearings: Department of D
jnHiAKiNGS
BEFORE THE
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UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
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TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2004 FOR MILITARY
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STRUCTION, AND FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
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MARCH 12; APRIL 3, 2003
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UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
JOHN WARNER, Virginia, Chairman
JOHN McCain, Arizona
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
PAT ROBERTS, Kansas
WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado
JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
JAMES M. TALENT, Missouri
SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina
ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina
JOHN CORNYN, Texas
CARL LEVIN, Michigan
EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut
JACK REED, Rhode Island
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
BILL NELSON, Florida
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska
MARK DAYTON, Minnesota
EVAN BAYH, Indiana
HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York
MARK PRYOR, Arkansas
Judith A. Ansley, Staff Director
Richard D. DeBobes, Democratic Staff Director
Subcommittee on Airland
JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama, Chairman
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut
JAMES M, INHOFE, Oklahoma DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
PAT ROBERTS, Kansas MARK DAYTON, Minnesota
JAMES M. TALENT, Missouri EVAN BAYH, Indiana
SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York
ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina MARK PRYOR, Arkansas
(II)
CONTENTS
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
Army Transformation
MARCH 12, 2003
Page
Brownlee, Hon. Les, Under Secretary of the Army 5
Keane, Gen. John M., USA, Vice Chief of Staff, United States Army 8
Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force Aviation and Air-Launched Weapons
Programs
APRIL 3, 2003
Young, Hon. John J., Jr., Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research,
Development, and Acquisition 64
Nathman, Vice Adm. John B., Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Warfare
Requirements and Programs 72
Hough, Lt. Gen. Michael A., USMC, Deputy Commandant for Aviation 73
(III)
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION
FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2004
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 12, 2003
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Airland,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
ARMY TRANSFORMATION
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:03 p.m., in room
SR-232A, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Jeff Sessions
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Sessions, Inhofe,
Lieberman, Akaka, Bayh, Clinton, and Pryor.
Majority staff members present: Ambrose R. Hock, professional
staff member; Gregory T. Kiley, professional staff member; and
Thomas L. MacKenzie, professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: Daniel J. Cox, Jr., professional
staff member; Creighton Greene, professional staff member; and
Peter K. Levine, minority counsel.
Staff assistants present: Andrew Kent and Nicholas W. West.
Committee members' assistants present: John A. Bonsell, assist-
ant to Senator Inhofe; Darren Dick, assistant to Senator Roberts;
Arch Galloway II, assistant to Senator Sessions; Lindsey R. Neas,
assistant to Senator Talent; Henry J. Steenstra, assistant to Sen-
ator Dole; Frederick M. Downey, assistant to Senator Lieberman;
Davelyn Noelani Kalipi, assistant to Senator Akaka; Todd
Rosenblum and Rashid Hallaway, assistants to Senator Bayh; An-
drew Shapiro, assistant to Senator Clinton; and Terri Glaze, assist-
ant to Senator Pryor.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JEFF SESSIONS,
CHAIRMAN
Senator Sessions. All right. Let us begin. But before I make my
opening comments as Chairman of the Airland Subcommittee, I
would like to express our sjonpathies to the families of the soldiers
lost at Fort Drum, New York, in the training mishap. Too often,
we forget that training itself puts our soldiers, sailors, marines,
and airmen in harm's way. This country owes our all to them and
their families, and a debt of gratitude for their selfless dedication
to this country.
(1)
I would note that in recent weeks, I have had the opportunity to
talk to a young staff sergeant from the National Guard in Ala-
bama, Mr. Secretary, a distant relative of Congressman Robert
Aderholt from Alabama, and he was wounded in an ambush in Af-
ghanistan within the last couple of months. Then a few days ago,
I talked to the wife of a young soldier who is part of a Decatur,
Alabama National Guard unit in the same area, Special Forces,
and her husband lost the lower part of his leg when the vehicle he
was in hit a mine.
So we do have soldiers out there right now — as. General Keane,
I know you know — and we ought never to forget that and to re-
member them and know that they are at great risk every day.
The Airland Subcommittee convenes today to receive testimony
from the Under Secretary of the Army, Les Brownlee, and the Vice
Chief of Staff of the Army, General John Keane, to explore Army
transformation and modernization issues and initiatives.
I would really like to thank Senator Lieberman for his tremen-
dous leadership on this subcommittee over the past 2 years. During
that time, the Army made significant progress in its transformation
as a result of his leadership and this subcommittee's work. So I am
looking forward to working with him, and I will continue to main-
tain a bipartisan approach to national military issues.
I would like to welcome Senators Inhofe, Roberts, Akaka, and
Dayton back to the subcommittee, and also our new members. Sen-
ators McCain, Talent, Chambliss, Dole, Bayh, Clinton, and Pryor.
I look forward to working with them in a bipartisan manner as we
have in the past on this panel.
This subcommittee is responsible for the procurement and re-
search and development (R&D) accounts in all the Services as they
are applied to Army ground systems and air platforms and the
Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force tactical aviation programs. As
we understand, our decisions directly impact the future readiness
of our Armed Forces. As we meet this afternoon, our Armed Forces
are fighting the war on terror and preparing for a potential conflict
with Iraq, while simultaneously maintaining forward presence in
many parts of the world.
The Army, like our other Services, is busy, and I have no doubt
about our military's ability to fight and win a war. However, we
are concerned with the tremendous burdens these missions place
on our citizen soldiers and the employers who support them. I hope
that we do not take these soldiers or any of the soldiers, sailors,
marines, and airmen in the Active and Reserve Forces for granted.
That is why I am particularly sensitive to the resources allocated
to the Services to perform their primary mission, to defend this Na-
tion.
The Army request of $93.9 billion for fiscal year 2004 represents
a $3 billion increase over 2003 appropriated levels, including $10.8
billion for procurement, a 15-percent reduction in real terms over
fiscal year 2003, and $9.1 billion for research and development, a
20-percent increase over 2003.
Clearly, the Army has taken a risk with their procurement ac-
counts to fund their research and development accounts — the nec-
essary investments to transform. I support your approach to this
and a balanced approach to your budget and we will be talking
about that as we go forward.
Consistent with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)
transformation goals, the Army request applies funding to the Fu-
ture Combat Systems (FCS), precision munitions, sensor and com-
munications technology, science and technology (S&T), and missile
and air defense programs. In order to fund these initiatives, the
Army, again, used Legacy Force systems to finance the trans-
formation.
In fiscal year 2004, the Army terminated 24 programs and re-
structured 24 others for $22.5 billion over the Future Years De-
fense Program (FYDP), $7.1 billion in fiscal year 2004, which was
reallocated for transformation.
So long as the Army continues to make progress with fielding of
the Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (SECT) and successfully transi-
tions FCS technologies into reality, the risk to the Legacy Force is
acceptable.
Over the past several years, the Airland Subcommittee has asked
the Army how they would prioritize among the Objective, Interim,
and Legacy Forces. With 77 program terminations and/or restruc-
tures in the Legacy Force, it is clear that the Army has set its pri-
orities. I applaud and support your willingness to make these
tough decisions, and we will talk about them in some detail.
We will explore a wide range of issues related to the Army's
transformation and modernization accounts. Secretary Brownlee,
General Keane, we look forward to discussing with you the Army's
priorities regarding the funding of its three axes of transformation
strategy, the Objective Force, the Interim Force, and the Legacy
Force.
The subcommittee is interested in hearing your views on the cur-
rent status of Objective Force systems, particularly the FCS and its
upcoming Milestone B review, the SBCTs, especially the Army's ap-
proach to the Deputy Secretary of Defense's directions to modify
the 5th and 6th SBCTs, and the progress the Army has made, or
has not made, regarding the funding of the Army Aviation Mod-
ernization Plan, specifically the Comanche helicopter program re-
structure and the impact of the Department's decision to restruc-
ture the CH-47 Chinook helicopter program to support Special Op-
erations Command requirements.
We are particularly interested in hearing your rationale for ter-
minating and restructuring a number of Legacy Force programs in
order to fund the Objective Force, and the attendant risk associ-
ated with these decisions.
The Airland Subcommittee has been a strong supporter of the
Army's effort to transform since the fiscal year 2001 budget re-
quest, the first submitted after the Chief of Staff of the Army an-
nounced his transformation initiative in October 1999.
The subcommittee understands the Army's need to transform
and, over fiscal years 2001 to 2003, authorized the addition of over
$1.7 billion to the Army's procurement and R&D accounts to sup-
port Army transformation priorities.
Gentlemen, we welcome you and thank you both for appearing
before the Airland Subcommittee today.
Before we hear your opening statements, I would like to recog-
nize Senator Lieberman for any opening comments he might have.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOSEPH LIEBERMAN
Senator Lieberman. Well, thanks very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thanks for your very good opening statement and for your kind
words about my service on the subcommittee.
I joined you — in absentia. Senator Pryor, you were welcomed to
the subcommittee, and I am glad to do it in person now.
This is actually my fifth year in the leadership of this Airland
Subcommittee, first as a ranking member for 2 years, then as
chairman, now as ranking member again. I wanted very much to
come back on this subcommittee because I believe that the sub-
stantive issues that are dealt with here, namely the subject of the
hearing today, Army transformation, are among the most impor-
tant affecting our national security for the decades ahead.
I also appreciate the high degree of bipartisanship that has al-
ways been the hallmark of this subcommittee. I appreciate. Senator
Sessions, your statement in support of that tradition and carrying
it on, and I pledge in turn to you my own full cooperation. I look
forward to working with you on this important effort to modernize
our ground and air forces.
Secretary Brownlee and General Keane, it is a pleasure to wel-
come you back to this hearing room, and to this topic. The sub-
committee has been — as Senator Sessions said — a strong supporter
of the Army's effort to transform, and I am proud of that record.
However, it has been a struggle for both the Army and the sub-
committee. I am going to ask, Mr. Chairman, if the rest of my
statement could be entered into the record. It is in part a recitation
of the history of the last 4 years on this subject. I am just going
to draw from a few points of it.
Over those 4 years, the leadership of the subcommittee, recogniz-
ing that the Army could not afford with the funds that it was being
given to fully support its programs across the Objective, Interim,
and Legacy Forces, urged the leadership of the Army to set definite
priorities.
This budget that you have given us does just that. Army prior-
ities as presented are the Objective, Interim, and Legacy Forces in
that order. The Army has chosen to fund those forces at the ex-
pense of the Legacy Force at a cost of restricting modernization
and recapitalization to only two divisions in the counter-attack
corps.
I know that some will argue with that prioritization, and I am
sure we will discuss it today at this hearing, but I, for one, want
to join the chairman in giving the Army leadership credit for mak-
ing some hard decisions in that regard.
The subcommittee has also seen transformation to the Objective
Force as the highest priority and has targeted additional resources
for that endeavor.
The Army according to this budget intends to accelerate the de-
velopment and fielding of the Objective Force for an initial oper-
ational capacity (IOC) by fiscal year 2010, and I totally support
that effort. However, I do want to raise questions as to whether the
level of R&D funding will allow that to happen. I note that once
again the Army has submitted an Objective Force S&T unfunded
requirement, this time $40 milhon.
I would also question whether the maturity of the relevant tech-
nologies will allow the 2010 IOC date, and if not, whether the risk
we have taken with respect to the Legacy Force then becomes ex-
cessive. Those are difficult questions and I look forward to your
reasoned answers to them.
Finally with regard to the Legacy Force, I remember asking last
year at a similar hearing whether the Army could afford to recapi-
talize three divisions and the armored cavalry regiment of the
counter-attack corps. The answer, I take it, was ultimately no, as
the Army now intends to do only the two divisions.
I think this year perhaps the question that we should discuss is
whether the Army today and in this environment can afford not to
recapitalize at least the armored cavalry regiment of that corps,
which is so vital for reconnaissance and security missions.
So those are some of the issues that, Mr. Chairman, I know that
our subcommittee will consider as we evaluate the fiscal 2004
budget request and mark up the defense authorization bill. I am
confident that our witnesses today, two men who have served their
country so honorably and ably and effectively in different capac-
ities, can give us very helpful insight to guide us in our work.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator SESSIONS. Thank you. It is good to see Secretary
Brownlee on the other side of the table there.
Senator Inhofe or Senator Pryor, do you have any comments that
you would like to make before we get started?
Senator Inhofe. No, not from me. Thank you.
Senator SESSIONS. Let me just start off then with a general ques-
tion. As we noted, the Army's $94 billion fiscal year 2004 budget —
I forgot. The good staff of Secretary Brownlee is always helpful.
Secretary Brownlee. Yes, sir. They are very well trained, sir.
[Laughter.]
Senator SESSIONS. How about an opening statement? We would
love to hear from both of you. [Laughter.]
STATEMENT OF HON. LES BROWNLEE, UNDER SECRETARY OF
THE ARMY
Secretary Brownlee. Thank you, sir. Sir, first of all, let me
thank you for your very kind words about our soldiers, those who
have been wounded and those who have lost their lives, and par-
ticularly those who lost their lives yesterday in training at Fort
Drum. We appreciate those words very much from you to the sol-
diers who really belong to all of us, and to their families and loved
ones, who I am sure are now mourning their loss along with us.
Thank you very much, sir.
Senator SESSIONS. Yes.
Secretary BROWNLEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator
Lieberman, distinguished members of the Airland Subcommittee.
First, I would like to tell you how grateful General Keane and
I are to have this opportunity to speak to you today about Army
transformation.
I am grateful also to have had the opportunity to meet with some
of the Members and their staffs, and I just would like to state if
there are any Members with whom I was not able to meet who
would like to meet with me for any reason, I would be very happy
to arrange those meetings in accordance with your convenience.
At this time, General Keane and I would like to request that our
joint witness statement be entered into the record.
Senator SESSIONS. Without objection.
Secretary Brownlee. Sir, as I begin my second year as the
Under Secretary of the Army, I am again honored to come here and
testify before this distinguished subcommittee and while I thor-
oughly enjoy serving in my current capacity, I have to admit that
I miss very much the work of this wonderful committee where truly
bipartisanship is not just a word, but it is a common way of doing
business, and it is recognized everywhere that I know.
But I do miss the people, both Members and the wonderful staff
members, and I will always be proud to say that I was a member
of the staff of this very important committee, and particularly this
subcommittee where I was the lead staffer for several years before
I was honored to become a staff director. In fact, I suggested the
name, which it still bears, so anyway — [Laughter.]
If you would be kind enough to indulge me, Mr. Chairman, for
just a few moments, I would like to say a few words about the man
sitting next to me. General Jack Keane.
When I was the staff director of this committee, I had the oppor-
tunity to observe him on many occasions. Since I have been the
Under Secretary, I have had the privilege of working closely with
him on a daily basis. Over these past months. General Keane has
only added to the very high degree of respect and admiration that
I have for him. His management capabilities, dedication, loyalty,
and, most important of all, the leadership that he brings to the
Army is invaluable.
The Army and the American people are fortunate that General
Keane serves the Army in the marvelous way that he does. I am
honored to work alongside him and to accompany him here today
to testify to this subcommittee on the subject of Army trans-
formation.
John Keane and I would also like to thank you for your contin-
ued support of the Army. The 2003 budget has allowed us to make
significant improvements in many key areas. We have structured
our budget priorities for 2004 to reflect the same priorities as 2003:
people, readiness, and transformation.
In the last year, I have had the opportunity and the privilege to
visit our wonderful soldiers who are forward deployed around the
world. I have visited soldiers in Korea and the Philippines, includ-
ing our special forces on Basilan Island. I had the privilege of
spending Thanksgiving with soldiers in Bosnia, Kosovo, Kuwait,
and Afghanistan, and returned to Kuwait and Afghanistan in Jan-
uary.
Visiting these soldiers, as I know many of you have also, leads
you to only one conclusion, that they are ready for whatever comes.
Unquestionably, we have the best Army in the world. Our sol-
diers are well-led, well-trained, and well-equipped. They are deter-
mined and committed. They are disciplined and professional. I have
no doubt they will accomplish any mission they are given.
As I testified in last year's hearings, today's threats to our Na-
tion's interests are more complex and diverse than at any time in
our history. In order to fill our non-negotiable contract with the
American people, to decisively fight and win our Nation's wars, the
Army must change the way it fights and the way it deploys in the
future.
It must be able to get to the fight quickly. The Army must be
able to support and sustain rapid combat power efficiently by re-
ducing its operational and tactical logistics footprint.
This is clearly a different world than the one that existed when
I joined the staff of this committee in early 1984 during the height
of the Cold War. Recent operations in Kuwait, Bosnia, Kosovo, and
Afghanistan have illustrated the need to transform our Army.
Our heavy forces are the best in the world, very survivable and
extremely lethal. But they are slow to deploy and difficult to sus-
tain.
On the other hand, while our light forces are rapidly deployable,
they lack the protection, lethality, and tactical mobility we need
across the full spectrum of military operations.
Transforming our Army to meet these new requirements is not
without risk. Balancing this risk is the key to successful trans-
formation.
The most important challenge we face is to maintain a strong
and lethal current force, while we are transforming. We have ac-
cepted risk in selective modernization and recapitalization. We con-
tinue to assess these risks as we balance current readiness, the
well-being of our people, transformation, the global war on terror-
ism, and new operational commitments.
Although we are working to field the Objective Force, we also un-
derstand that the current force is the force at war today and the
force that will continue to serve us for several more years.
Through the selective modernization and recapitalization I spoke
of earlier, it is the current force that will guarantee our Army's
near-term warfighting readiness throughout the transformation
process.
The Army 2004 to 2009 Program Objective Memorandum makes
a clear statement about our priorities and our risk management.
We are committed to transforming the Army and have allocated
funds to complete the fielding of our six Stryker Brigades, the Co-
manche, the Future Combat System, and other key transformation-
related programs.
The Army appreciates Congress authorizing and appropriating
funding for the complete fielding of the six Stryker Brigades. We
have had to make some tough decisions with existing programs,
terminating some and restructuring others, in order to provide the
funds necessary for transformation.
These decisions have allowed us to generate billions of dollars
worth of savings — savings that can be reallocated to resource es-
sential Objective Force, R&D, and eventually procurement.
The Comanche helicopter is an example of how we restructured
some of our programs. We have restructured this program using
evolutionary development and an acquisition strategy that delivers
capabilities in blocks. We have added time and funding to decrease
program risk and to enhance the probability of success.
8
Ultimately, we will field a mix of manned helicopters and un-
manned aerial vehicles that will give us the optimum set of capa-
bilities.
The continued support of this Congress remains essential to the
success of the Department of Defense. In that regard, you will re-
ceive soon a package of legislative proposals for the Department.
These will include proposals on the management of civilian person-
nel, acquisition, and other key management initiatives.
I urge you to support this package and we would appreciate also
very much your support and favorable consideration of the Army's
budget.
Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the subcommittee,
I thank you again for this opportunity to appear before you and
discuss these critical issues.
I yield the floor to my dear friend and colleague, and I look for-
ward to your questions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Secretary Brownlee. I appreciate
those remarks.
General Keane.
STATEMENT OF GEN. JOHN M. KEANE, USA, VICE CHIEF OF
STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY
General Keane. Mr. Chairman, Senator Lieberman, Senator
Inhofe, Senator Pryor, thank you. I appreciate the opportunity to
be here with you this afternoon to talk about Army issues.
I am certainly honored to be here with Secretary Brownlee. He
is a real joy to work with. We truly appreciate the leadership that
he has brought to our Department.
I want to thank you up front for the support that you provided
to us in the 2003 budget. We appreciate very much your support
for Army readiness, for the pay compensation for our soldiers, for
our civilians, and also for Army transformation.
Today, we are a Nation at war. I cannot recall a time in our his-
tory, not since World War 11, when our Army has been engaged in
more places than it is today. Your Army is in Kuwait, Kosovo, Bos-
nia, Sinai, Korea, Honduras, the Philippines, and Europe.
We have more than 240,000 troops deployed in forward stations
in 120 countries around the world. To support our efforts, we have
mobilized 130,000 Reserve component soldiers.
We are preparing for a war in Iraq, and we are already fighting
a war in Afghanistan. I will tell you on a personal note, I do believe
there is something different about this war in Afghanistan. I have
been there four times in the last year and a half, and the difference
is in the attitude of our soldiers.
Upon reflection, I realized that we have not deployed our soldiers
on behalf of the American people since World War II. Every deploy-
ment that we have been on since World War II has been to help
a beleaguered nation where some thug has imposed his will on his
people or somebody else's people.
The war in Afghanistan is all about the American people. Our
soldiers get it. You can see it in the intensity of their attitude and
this dogged determination that they have to succeed. I asked a
company commander from the 82nd Airborne Division a routine
question I normally ask which is, "What is your most significant
challenge?" His immediate response was, "Sir, my most significant
challenge is when we get into a fight here to control the amount
of physical bravery that my soldiers display." He said, "This is the
first time I have ever been in combat."
I asked my sergeants have they ever experienced anything like
this before — those who had more combat experience — and the ser-
geants said, "No. We have never seen an54;hing quite like it in
terms of the scale, the magnitude of the bravery of our soldiers."
They are also inspired in their openness and directness about why
they are there, and how willing they are to give up everything that
they care about in life to protect America, its people, and our way
of life. It is inspirational to be around them and, frankly, most of
us are actually moved to tears being around them.
So there is really something special that has taken place there,
and I know you are very proud of them. But we have a wonderful
opportunity to visit them a little bit more than you do. I just want-
ed to share some of that with you.
I also wanted to share with you some lessons that we have
learned in Afghanistan, just to note a few of them very briefly to
you. Our Special Forces teams have excellent long-range commu-
nications, target designation, and the ability to transmit that infor-
mation to all kinds of strike platforms.
Just 4V2 years ago in Kosovo, we used one strike platform to
drop GPS-guided munitions and that was a B2. In Afghanistan, we
are using every strike aircraft we have from all Services, dropping
GPS-guided munitions to include the B52 at 45,000 feet, and our
Special Forces teams are communicating directly with each aircraft
usually in the digital mode with no voice communication whatso-
ever.
It is a remarkable achievement and is a testimony to what is
happening to us in joint warfighting, as we move down the vertical
access, and where you are having organizations at lower levels hav-
ing an enormous amount of combat power available to them that
heretofore was not even imagined.
The other thing is our training strategy. Our training strategy
has always been "train as you fight," and it is a buzzword in a
sense, but it has been a theology to us for 14 years. We have been
dealing with asymmetric scenarios at the Joint Readiness Training
Center, initially at Fort Chafee, and for the last number of years
at Fort Polk.
Those asymmetric scenarios trained our Special Operations
Forces and our light forces and our air forces to deal with asym-
metric threats like we are facing in Afghanistan.
While the war against the al Qaeda had a strategic level, because
we were fighting a network, it is obviously different because it does
not represent a nation or an Army at the tactical level. We had
been preparing our soldiers for that kind of war for over a decade.
That is one of the reasons why they have responded so well to it.
Marksmanship, our ability to hit what we shoot at, has been ex-
cellent, and again our physical conditioning paid off in Operation
Anaconda, where we operated routinely at 8,000 to 10,000 feet, and
our soldiers were able to bear up under those altitudes and the
stress of that fight.
10
Afghanistan has a higher density of mines than any country in
the world. We have extracted over a milhon mines from that coun-
try. It has paid a price. I have three soldiers at Walter Reed right
now who have all lost their limbs to it, and we have had two pre-
vious limb injuries as well.
But it is a remarkable achievement, the amount of mines that we
have taken out of there, and the technology that we are using in
some cases is still primitive, but nonetheless we have made some
real progress.
The care and treatment of our wounded, at the point of injury,
is very responsive care, designed to preserve, to treat for shock, to
stop bleeding. We were able to do that — all of our soldiers have ad-
vanced combat lifesaver techniques that are beyond the first aid
that we heretofore were aware of. Very rapid evacuation to a for-
ward surgical team — not a hospital — that is just at the higher level
command post. So within minutes, we have a soldier in the hands
of a skilled surgeon. It has preserved the lives of many of our sol-
diers.
Now, the Interceptor body armor that you helped fund for us pro-
tects our soldiers against 7.62 millimeter rifle shot. We have a
number of them who actually have the bullets in them and, of
course, they will be trophies for life, I am sure. We would be more
than happy to let them keep them. But the armor has been very
significant in protecting the torsos of our soldiers.
The Apache helicopter is most notably in Operation Anaconda.
We had nine helicopters in that fight. Virtually all of them were
shot at, and they all had bullet holes. Twenty-seven of the 28 ro-
tors all had bullet holes in them, and not a single one of those
Apaches went down.
They were damaged to be sure, and it was just remarkable how
they stayed in the fight. The soldiers, if they were here, would tell
you that in the daytime the Apache helicopter provided the best
close air support that they had. At night, it was the AC-130
gunship.
The CH-47 helicopter, which you have also funded for us, was
the only United States military aircraft that could operate at
10,000 feet with a load. If we did not have the aircraft, we never
could have taken the fight directly to the al Qaeda, as we did in
Operation Anaconda, because nothing else could get up at that alti-
tude with a heavy load. We were blessed to have it.
As we fight the global war on terrorism, we are also preparing
for this war in Iraq, and much has changed in the last 12 years
since we last dealt with Saddam Hussein. This time around, in this
fight, we will bring with us the A3 Bradley, which has an enhanced
armor and second generation Forward-Looking Infrared Radar
(FLIR), and also the M1A2 Abrams tank that has an improved fire
control system, and the second generation FLIR.
We have already deployed the PAC3 Patriot missile. We will
have the Apache Longbow, a D model aircraft with its modern fire
control system, which can detect and track and prioritize 72 of
those targets at one time. It is a quantum leap over the A model
Apache.
We have equipped our light force soldiers who are in Kuwait pre-
paring for war in the recent months with new equipment such as
11
the advanced combat helmet; a binocular laser rangefinder, which
was used in Afghanistan — it was called the Viper; and a long range
sniper rifle. We have a shoot-around-the-corner sight now, pretty
remarkable technology. We have brought them some robotics to
help clear bunkers and buildings when we work in urban areas. We
have used them very successfully in Afghanistan.
We have equipped our soldiers with the best chemical and bio-
logical protection equipment that is available in the world today.
All of our soldiers have it. For the first time in our Army history,
we will have unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) that operate at the
brigade and the corps levels.
UAVs and Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System
(JSTARS) are linked directly to our command posts today. We also
have the Army Battle Command System, which integrates com-
mand and control systems found at each echelon, from the ground
force component commanders at the theater, joint task force level
all the way down to our individual soldiers and weapons platforms.
That is a first in combat for us. We have Common Ground Sta-
tions and we have Blue Force Tracking Systems that are in place
and that will provide our soldiers with unprecedented situational
awareness.
So it is evident that we have not remained static for the last 12
years. Our Army remains the dominant land force in the world,
and we thank you for the support that you have been providing to
us.
Our Army in Kuwait and in the other countries in the surround-
ing area, stand there today. They are well-trained; they are well-
led; and they are well-equipped. They are ready to answer the
President's call if he desires.
What much of this discussion today is about is our need to
change, and even to this day, some people still ask us, "Why
change? You are such a formidable Army that we see out there.
There is no other force like you in the world. Why do you have to
change?"
Our answer is simple. The world has changed, and the Army
must adapt. We have two fundamental challenges. First, along
with our sister services, the Air Force and the Navy, we know we
must maintain a decisive edge and overmatch, to deter other ar-
mies, armies that are usually large and defensive in nature with
some limited offensive capability that they use within their region.
If our Army is to deter these armies, it must have an offensive
global reach. Then upon arrival, our combat power must be credi-
ble.
A second challenge is we must have a capability to meet a wide
array of asymmetric threats — non-state actors, terrorism, weapons
of mass destruction (WMD). Recognition of these two challenges
has led to some conclusions. First, the tools that won the Cold War
and Operation Desert Storm will not suffice for the new challenges.
That is the reality.
The strategic environment is no longer relatively static. We no
longer have the luxury of positioning forces and equipment every-
where they are needed to serve their purpose of deterrence. It is
not going to work.
12
Second, we cannot hope to overmatch our adversaries by sheer
quantity. The Air Force and the Navy are the largest air force and
navies in the world and also the best. The Army, the standing
Army, is the sixth largest in the world. We are outnumbered by
China, India, North Korea, South Korea, and Pakistan and other
armies that are growing.
Our superiority must come from quality rather than quantity. So,
third, to achieve that qualitative superiority, we must fight in new
ways characterized by simultaneous, distributed, and non-linear
operations.
We have made a commitment to move our operations built on a
principle of mass and attrition warfare. These are the qualities we
are building into the Objective Force, a force that is built around
the FCS, I know we will discuss today, which is a system of sys-
tems that is qualitatively superior, rapidly deployable, and versa-
tile to be effective against the threats I have discussed.
This budget, the 2004 budget, supports the development of FCS
capabilities by investing almost $2 billion in our RDT&E. Ninety
eight percent of our science and technology efforts that are dedi-
cated to the Objective Force.
We intend to begin fielding the Objective Force this decade, with
the first FCS-equipped unit in 2008, and its IOC is in 2010.
As we develop concepts and technologies for the Objective Force,
we are fielding a Stryker Brigade, and we appreciate the commit-
tee's support of the Stryker Brigade to meet the near-term require-
ments and bridge the operational gap between our heavy and light
forces.
The first of our six SBCTs will achieve IOC this spring. We are
excited about that prospect, and we are looking forward to deploy-
ing that organization in the fall.
The third SECT is fully funded in the 2003 budget that we are
executing. The 2004 budget funds the Stryker Brigades that you
have before you.
So we are also selectively modernizing and recapitalizing the ex-
isting systems as you pointed out, Mr. Chairman, to guarantee the
Army's near-term warfighting readiness throughout the trans-
formation process.
So in conclusion, let me say that maintaining a trained and
ready Army now and in the future is a shared responsibility. We
appreciate the help that you provided us in doing this and we look
forward to your continued support and also your continued discus-
sion on these important issues.
Thank you for your support as well, and I look forward to your
questions.
[The joint prepared statement of Secretary Brownlee and Gen-
eral Keane follows:]
Joint Prepared Statement by Hon. Les Brownlee and Gen. John M. Keane,
USA
Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the subcommittee, we thank you for
this opportunity to report to you again this year on the status of Army trans-
formation.
We would first Hke to thank this subcommittee, and Congress as a whole, for your
tremendous support of the fiscal year 2003 budget. With your help the Army re-
ceived a 4.1 percent average pay increase for our soldiers and our civilian work
force. Increased funding for housing allowances have reduced soldiers' out-of-pocket
13
expenses from 11.3 percent to 7.5 percent. The fiscal year 2003 budget also funds
significant Army initiatives to retain and recruit quality soldiers, provides for up-
graded single-soldier baiTacks, and expands many programs that improve the qual-
ity of life for our soldiers and their families.
We also appreciate your continued support of our Army's Transformation goals.
With your help the fiscal year 2003 budget fully funds our third SECT, provides an
additional $105 million for the Army's Future Combat Systems, $173 miUion for the
development of an FCS non-line of sight cannon, and also funds $874 million for
the Comanche helicopter system.
Across the board, the fiscal year 2003 budget sends a strong message of congres-
sional support for our soldiers, civilians, and families — and clearly indicates your re-
solve to help sustain the readiness of our Army as we transform for the future.
THE AEMY AT WAR
Today our Army is engaged throughout the world — fighting the global war on ter-
rorism, providing peace and stability to regions throughout the world, and preparing
for a potential war in Iraq. Our simultaneous commitment to these operations, and
the successes we have achieved, clearly indicate our military capabihty and state
of readiness. Our soldiers demonstrate every day that they are trained and ready
to respond to these requirements — to fight and win the Nation's wars. With the sup-
port of Congress and the administration, the Army will continue to fulfill its role
in the war on terrorism, maintain our near-term readiness, and rapidly transform
to fight and win our future conflicts.
OPERATIONAL LESSONS
Operations throughout this past year have reinforced the value of joint operations,
precision weapons, and the necessity for coordinated air-ground integration. We
demonstrated that by compelling an enemy to mass, ground maneuver forces maxi-
mize the effectiveness of America's tremendous airpower. We also effectively incor-
porated the leading edge of our emerging technologies to maximize our battlefield
advantage — demonstrating future concepts and validating General Shinseki's vision
of a transformed Army and the fielding of the Objective Force beginning in this dec-
ade.
THE NEED TO TRANSFORM
The global environment has changed and the Army must change with it. Our mili-
tary has demonstrated time and again that it is the finest force ever assembled. As
a result, our adversaries understand that they cannot face our capabilities head-on.
They are therefore changing and evolving in an attempt to exploit our
vulnerabilities.
In view of these factors, and our non-negotiable obligation to defend the American
people against all threats, the Army must change the way it fights and the way it
deploys. Our Army must be able to rapidly deploy and sustain itself in distant anti-
access and area denial environments. We must be able to rapidly find the enemy
and deny them sanctuary by providing persistent surveillance, tracking, and rapid
engagement. We must leverage technologies and innovative concepts to develop
inter-operable joint command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, sur-
veillance, and reconnaissance, or C^ISR, and information networks that will provide
our forces with unparalleled situational awareness and the ability to network joint
fires. We must be able to maintain information systems in the face of attack and
conduct effective information operations.
Developments in technology and our pursuit of network-centric warfare will allow
the Army to break our ties with the Cold War formations that relied on the prin-
ciple of mass and the build-up of large forces. We will possess unprecedented situa-
tional awareness that will enable Army formations to maneuver with greater preci-
sion and dispersion. We will know where the enemy is and where our own people
are, and we will be able to impose our will on the enemy at the time and place of
our choosing. We will exploit vertical envelopment to avoid large movements along
predictable lines of communication and focus our efforts on the enemy's strategic
centers of gravity. We will transform to a more strategically responsive force that
is dominant across the full spectrum of military operations. With changes to doc-
trine, training, leader development, organization, materiel acquisition strategies,
and soldier systems, the Army is taking a holistic approach to its Transformation.
The result will be a different Army, not just a modernized version of the current
Army.
Readiness remains our constant imperative. Therefore, transformation consists of
three interrelated elements — the Objective Force, SBCTs, and the Current Force.
14
We will develop concepts and technologies for the Objective Force while fielding
SBCTs to meet near-term requirements and bridge the operational gap between our
heavy and light forces. Simultaneously, we will selectively modernize and recapital-
ize existing systems in the Current Force to provide enhanced capabilities that will
guarantee our readiness throughout the transformation process.
THE OBJECTIVE FORCE
Built around the FCS, the Army's Objective Force is the future joint, interagency,
and multinational precision maneuver instrument for this Nation. Comprised of
modular, scalable, flexible organizations for prompt and sustained land operations,
it will be more lethal, more agile, and more rapidly deployable.
By focusing much of its investment in science and technology, the Army will cre-
ate a new family of ground systems called the Future Combat Systems. In the fiscal
year 2004 budget alone, we are investing $1.79 billion in research, development,
test, and evaluation (RDT&E) to design and develop Objective Force and enabling
technologies — technologies that will take us to the system development and dem-
onstration phase for the Future Combat Systems (FCS).
FCS is an integrated system-of-systems that reflects a paradigm shift from surviv-
ing a first round hit to avoiding a first round hit. FCS development includes low-
observable stealth technologies, smaller caliber rounds, indirect fires systems and
direct fire weapons with greater range and increased lethality, and integrated com-
mand and control that provides our forces with a common situational awareness.
In May of this year, we are confident that FCS Milestone B will transition the FCS
program from Concept and Technology Development into Systems Development and
Demonstration (SDD). The Army will begin fielding the Objective Force in this dec-
ade with the first FCS combat maneuver force equipped in 2008 — Initial Operating
Capability (IOC) for this unit is expected in 2010.
The Comanche helicopter is the centerpiece of the Aviation Modernization Plan
and will be the first new system to reach IOC within the Army's Objective Force.
The Comanche will correct the Army's most critical battlefield deficiency — aerial
armed reconnaissance — with a capable, survivable, and sustainable aircraft. Contin-
ued development of the Comanche helicopter is projected to provide an initial train-
ing capability in December 2006 and IOC by September 2009.
FCS and Comanche are essential to Army transformation, but transformation is
more than hardware. We cannot truly transform the Army without transforming the
way we do business — from transformation of logistics and acquisition, to personnel
and installation transformation. Revolutionizing Army business management prac-
tices achieves the best value for taxpayers' dollars; conserves limited resources for
investment in people, readiness, and transformation; enhances management of per-
sonnel systems, installations and contracting; and augments our potential to accel-
erate the arrival of the Objective Force. Changing the Army is first about changing
the way we think, and better business practices represent practical application of
common sense initiatives that best serve the Army and our Nation.
We will harmonize our transformation efforts with our sister services, business
and industry, and our science and technology partners to provide the best force pos-
sible that will allow us to arrive early to dissuade or deter conflict or, as required,
swiftly defeat an adversary. We will be better able to See First, Understand First,
Act First, and Finish Decisively.
STRYKER BRIGADE COMBAT TEAMS
Stryker Brigades fill a capabilities gap between our lethal, survivable, but slow-
to-deploy heavy forces and our rapidly deployable light forces that lack the protec-
tion, lethality, and tactical mobility that we seek. They respond to Combatant Com-
mander requirements across the spectrum of military operations and provide the in-
creased operational and tactical flexibility to execute fast-paced, distributed, non-
contiguous operations. SBCTs also provide an invaluable means of spearheading
Transformation. The SBCT trains junior officers and noncommissioned officers — to-
morrow's commanders and command sergeants major — in the tactics, techniques,
and procedures that we are developing for employment of the Objective Force. They
will help to identify the soldier-leader skills required in the Objective Force and as-
sess our current ability to cultivate those skills.
By leveraging platform commonality, enhancing logistics practices and enablers,
and reorganizing logistics formations, the SBCT is more deployable and sustainable
than our heavy forces, while significantly increasing combat power generating capa-
bilities. Augmented for sustained operations, the SBCT requires 37 percent fewer
combat service support personnel than a digitized heavy brigade.
15
The Army began fielding the first SBCT just 2^2 years after announcing our in-
tent to field such a force. In the spring of 2003 we will achieve IOC with the first
SBCT at Fort Lewis, Washington. IOC for the remaining five SBCTs will occur each
year thereafter through 2008.
The transformation of four Active component brigades to SBCTs provides a rota-
tional base with three of the SBCTs focused on the Pacific theater. One of the two
SBCTs fielded at Fort Lewis will be forward-based in Europe not later than 2007.
The Stryker Cavalry Regiment will support the XVIII Airborne Corps' critical need
for robust, armed reconnaissance. The conversion of a Reserve component brigade
to an SBCT will enhance our Strategic Reserve and support the global war on ter-
rorism, smaller scale contingencies, and homeland defense missions. SBCT station-
ing also provides rapid, strategic responsiveness through power projection platforms
capable of supporting four critical regions described in the 1—4-2-1 defense con-
struct.
The Army has resourced six SBCTs in concert with the 1-4—2-1 defense construct
and national security requirements. However, at this time the Secretary of Defense
has only authorized the procurement of the first four brigades pending the Army's
plan for potential modifications to Stryker Brigades five and six. We intend to work
with the Secretary of Defense and this Congress to assure that all six Stryker Bri-
gades are fielded with the force structure and capabilities they need to possess.
THE CURRENT FORCE
The Current Force is the force at war today. Through selective modernization and
recapitalization, it is the force that will guarantee our Army's near-term warfighting
readiness throughout the transformation process.
Because the Army bypassed a procurement generation during the 1990s, the
Ai'my's combat support and combat service support systems now exceed their 20-
year expected life cycle, and 75 percent of our critical combat systems exceed their
expected half-life cycle. To maintain operational readiness while preserving re-
sources for transformation, the AiTny is recapitalizing and selectively modernizing
a portion of the current force. The modernization program addresses the critical
issue of Active component and Reserve component interoperability and serves as a
bridge to mesh these two components seamlessly.
In general, the Army increased funding for programs that are clearly trans-
formational and support the defense transformation goals, sustained funding for
high-priority systems that will transition to the Objective Force, and reduced fund-
ing for systems not essential to Army transformation. The Army remains committed
to its 17-system recapitalization program, but we have reduced the prioritized re-
capitalization program from three-and-one-third divisions to two divisions in order
to invest in transformation.
FUNDING TRANSFORMATION
The Army continues to make the difficult choices necessary to generate resources
to fund transformation while sustaining acceptable risk to current readiness. In the
previous three President's budgets submitted to Congress, the Army terminated or
restructured 29 research, development, and acquisition (RDA) programs worth $12.7
billion. In the 2004 President's budget, the Army accelerates its efforts to realize
the Objective Force this decade by terminating 24 RDA programs and restructuring
24 others to generate $22.5 billion for transformation. These cost savings, in concert
with congressional and Office of the Secretary of Defense funding increases, enable
the Army to fund our key transformation priorities — the fielding of six SBCTs, Fu-
ture Combat System science and technology and system development, and our
prioritized modernization and recapitalization program.
RECAPITALIZATION AND MODERNIZATION
Recapitalization is the cornerstone of the Army's strategy to sustain its
warfighting capability throughout the fielding of the Objective Force. We are com-
mitted to the recapitalization of two divisions in the Counter Attack Corps and
Army aviation modernization and restructuring. Our strategy is to selectively re-
build or upgrade systems that will remain in the inventory for the next 15 to 20
years and achieve an average fleet age of no more than half of a system's expected
service life. These systems include the Ml Abrams tank,M2/M3 Bradley Fighting
Vehicle, AH-64 Apache, UH-60 Black Hawk, and CH-47 Chinook. This investment
in future readiness will sustain warfighting capabilities, reduce the cost of owner-
ship, and extend the service life of systems until the Objective Force is fielded
throughout the Army.
16
Aviation transformation further demonstrates the Army's hard choices in bal-
ancing risk to resource transformation. Our interim plan — now in progress — elimi-
nates Vietnam era aircraft from the force, lowers operating and sustainment costs,
and postures aviation for arrival of the Objective Force by 2010. Apache moderniza-
tion is an integral part of the Army Aviation Transformation Plan. The AH-64D
Longbow heavy attack team will enhance domination of the maneuver battlespace
and provide the ground commander with a versatile, long-range weapon system
against a range of fixed and moving targets. The UH-60 Black Hawk continues to
be the assault workhorse of Army aviation, executing over 40 percent of the Army's
annual flying hours. We are extending the life of the UH-60 while providing it with
capabilities required of the future battlespace. Similarly, the Army is fully commit-
ted to the CH-47F Chinook program. Its heavy-lift capability is invaluable to trans-
forming the Army. As we restructure and standardize attack and lift formations
across the force, we will also adjust the stationing and alignment of Reserve compo-
nent aviation units to mitigate the near-term risk.
CONCLUSION
For nearly 228 years, the Army has kept its covenant with the American people
to fight and win our Nation's wars. In all that time, we have never failed them, and
we never will. The war on terrorism, the requirement to secure the homeland, and
the need to maintain readiness for possible near-term contingencies have validated
the need for a new kind of Army — a capabilities-based ground force that can fight
and win battles across the full spectrum of military operations.
Building and maintaining an Army is a shared responsibility between Congress,
the administration, those in uniform, and the American people. Working with Con-
gress, we will keep the Army ready to meet today's challenges and continue to make
significant strides toward the fielding of our Objective Force.
Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the subcommittee, we thank you
once again for this opportunity to report to you today on the state of your Army.
We look forward to discussing these issues with you.
Senator Sessions. Thank you very much.
Those are good reports. We are indeed stressing our forces and
the Army much more than anyone else while we expect the Serv-
ices to transform. At the same time you are not given a lot of extra
money, very little extra money, a $3 billion increase over last year's
budget for the Army, which is what? A little less than 4 percent,
a little over 3 percent is all, which is only slightly above the infla-
tion rate.
So we are asking you to do a lot of important things simulta-
neously. My impression is that this Congress appreciates your ef-
forts and is pleased that you are making as much progress as you
are.
General Keane, thank you for that good report about the morale
of your soldiers. That is what I am feeling as I talk to them. I have
been with three different Guard and Reserve units who have been
activated from Alabama. They were motivated.
I talked to several of the guys after Operation Anaconda that
were in Walter Reed. One had shown me where a bullet hit him.
He was shot in the leg and the arm, but that vest saved his life,
and that is the kind of advancement in combat that you are to be
commended for.
The Army's $94 billion fiscal year 2004 budget request included
$10.8 for procurement and $9.1 billion for research and develop-
ment. In order to make these significant changes to your invest-
ment accounts, the Army made some very difficult choices. Would
you explain. Secretary Brownlee first and then General Keane,
your comments would also be welcome — would you explain the dif-
ficulties you went through the choices and difficult challenges you
faced as you had to develop this budget?
17
Secretary Brownlee. Mr. Chairman, first of all, when you talk
about the difficulties, I have to recognize my good friend here
again, because before I even came to the Pentagon, General Keane
had headed up a task force to do an analysis of the recapitalization
of the current Army force. Shortly after I got down, I received that
briefing, and it is one of the finest I have ever received. It is one
of the finest studies I have ever seen the Army do.
The important point here is that the analysis was so thorough
for each piece of equipment in the current force that is key, it is
almost like putting a dollar at a time on these systems to ensure
that they last as long as they have to, but no more. The good thing
about that is we are not wasting money on things we should not.
But the other good point is that we have a good feel for what we
are buying and how long it is going to last.
Having said that, the difficulty is in making the hard decisions
and the tradeoffs, because as I have indicated and General Keane
has indicated, the current force that we have is one that we are
going to war with tomorrow if we must. It is the one that will have
to last us for several years, because as you well know, the first unit
of the Objective Force would not have an initial operating capabil-
ity until 2010, and the world supply would consist of one unit of
action at that time, or roughly one brigade size.
So we are going to have this current force with us for some time.
We have taken very seriously what is required to recapitalize and
modernize that force. As we have gotten deeper into the Future
Combat System and what is required to develop these very critical
technologies and to bring them to fruition in a way that allows this
very complex system of systems to come together in the right way,
it is very costly.
So we have had to make tradeoffs. The tradeoffs involve risk. My
view of this is that the most serious thing that we face every day
is the decisions we make on those kinds of tradeoffs.
I believe that we are making the right decisions. They are not
easy, as I said, but they have certainly been analyzed thoroughly.
You mentioned the three and a third divisions in the counter-at-
tack force, we are still going to have three and a third divisions in
the counter-attack force, but only two of them will be fully modern-
ized.
So we are still examining other things that we can do to hold the
other parts of that up and make sure that it is still capable.
General Keane. This became a crucible for us, and we were at
a crossroads in coming to the decisions to make that. First of all,
the fact that we were recapping and modernizing the heavy corps
at Fort Hood, which in broad definition was three divisions and a
third armored cavalry regiment (ACR), was a wise decision.
What was driving that decision is that our operation and support
costs were increasing at 10 percent per year. So in the 3 years that
we were looking at it, it had gone up 30 percent. You just cannot
run a business that way.
We were just getting ourselves in a hole, because much of our
equipment has passed its average life of 20 years, and that is why
those operational support costs are as high as they are.
So that drove us initially to the analysis that Secretary Brownlee
referred to and the recapitalization and modernization program
18
itself. We made a decision for a three and a third as a hedge
against the uncertainty of the future and to keep that modernized.
Then as we started to look at the Objective Force and to try to
field that force in 2008 and in 2010, and to meet the financial obli-
gations to do that, we had to revisit this decision. It was the tough-
est decision I had been involved with in 4 years here. We took all
of our systems, the 24 systems
Senator SESSIONS. Precisely, what was the toughest call? What
were you deciding?
General E[eane. The toughest decision was to take money out of
the recap and modernization program for the third division and the
ACR and to take that money and put it into the FCS Objective
Force. That was a tough decision.
Also, commensurate with that was the program kills of the 24
systems. In the previous 3 years, as this committee knows, we
killed 29 systems. Added to that were these 24.
The challenge we have is that we know that we have to do this
within the amount of money the Army has allocated, that when we
look down the hallway at the Department of Defense, nobody is
going to give us extra money to do this. So we have to go into our
own accounts and figure out how best to provide a current force
that is capable for a number of years to come, and also field a fu-
ture force to meet the emerging threats that we have and trying
to find the balance to do that is really the issue.
It takes our collective judgment and our wisdom to find that bal-
ance. It is not easy. Now, we have talked about it quite a bit and
discussed it and analyzed it.
In the 24 systems that we terminated, which was another tough
decision, we put them through some analysis. We wanted to know
did those systems support Army transformation? Did the systems
satisfy essentially core requirements for the Legacy Force against
the emerging crisis and adversaries that we are going to deal with
in the next decade?
What was the operational risk if the system was killed? Was the
requirement baselined to contribute to the Objective Force? Could
the industrial base accelerate to a rapid fielding option if needed
in response to short notice operational contingencies?
Then we looked at it from a warfighting analysis. We looked at
it from a business case, as well. We wanted to consider the return
on investment, to assess how much operational enhancement was
realized compared to affordability.
We looked at its impact on the industrial base, which is not
something that we take lightly. Could material meet the required
schedule? What was the technology risk of the material solution?
That was the kind of analysis that we put ourselves through in ter-
minating those 24 programs and restructuring the others.
So I think what we are saying to you, Mr. Chairman, is that we
made a very difficult decision. If we had more money, we would not
have made this decision. Without any more money, we believe that
we have balanced the risk, and that this is an acceptable, prudent
risk to do what we are doing.
Senator Sessions. We thank you for that. We will do a 6-minute
round and next will be Senator Lieberman, followed by Senator
Inhofe and Senator Pryor.
19
Senator Lieberman.
Senator LlEBERMAN. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Brownlee, General Keane, thanks for very good open-
ing statements.
General Keane, you talked some about lessons learned from Af-
ghanistan. I want to go back to Operation Anaconda, in which, as
we know, tragically several Special Operations Command soldiers
were killed.
The commander of the Army forces in that battle was critical of
the time it took to acquire close air support when needed. There
have been recent indications that the Air Force and Navy have
subsequently refined their close air support procedures, so as we
meet here today, obviously, there is a sense of imminence about
military action in Iraq.
I wanted to ask you, with that in mind, are you more confident
from an Army point of view of a timely close air support being pro-
vided, should ground forces be called upon to invade Iraq?
General Keane. Thank you for the question. Senator. You are
right. We did have close air support challenges in that operation.
Most of them revolved around the length it took to respond to a re-
quest from a battlefield commander.
We were in close combat with an enemy which was within, in
most cases, a football field length away. In one of the cases where
we were really asking for close air support, we were out-
numbered— the enemy had about 350 soldiers, and we had 60. We
were outnumbered and fought against them for 12 hours.
Miraculously, due to the bravery of the battalion commander, we
won that fight. We had 30 soldiers wounded. This battalion com-
mander from the 10th Mountain Division took the 30 other sol-
diers, some of whom were his staff officers and staff NCOs, and
some infantry, and he physically led two assaults against the posi-
tions that were at a higher altitude and fortified.
Obviously we have decorated him for heroism. He killed 60 when
he did that and then the al Qaeda left the field. It was the skill
of our soldiers and their will that brought about that victory, but
during that day, during those 12 hours, he suffered from a lack of
what the Air Force and the Army both would consider adequate
close air support.
So as a result of that, my counterpart in the Air Force, Doc
Foglesong, and I have met with the leaders of the Army and Air
Force, and brought to a conference room like this, all the battlefield
commanders who were there, that battalion commander, the other
battalion commanders, the Air Force wing commander, squadron
commanders, all the people who were controlling the airplanes
from all the Services and all the ground people into one room. We
looked at what was wrong and what happened.
I wish all of you could have just listened to the honesty that was
in that room that day, as we tried to solve a problem, knowing full
well that we could get soldiers or marines hurt if we did not solve
this problem. The people were not interested in protecting their pa-
rochial service or prerogatives. They were just interested in solving
the problem.
Solve the problem, we did. We had a series of meetings to do it,
and our problem is one that our cultures, we let them drift a little
20
bit apart from Operation Desert Storm with the advent of preci-
sion-guided munitions.
As a result of that, we have to make some procedural changes,
which we are making, and have made. We have to make equipment
changes, so that our special forces and our infantry soldiers have
the same equipment that the trained air/ground team has. The Air
Force provides that equipment to our organizations. We have to
make some doctrinal changes, as well.
So as a result of all of this, we think we have all of those changes
in place, and we took it very seriously, the criticism that came from
our subordinates, who said this was not right. The leadership took
it on to do something about it. We think we have done that.
Senator Lieberman. Sir, that is very reassuring. Those changes
are in place now as we contemplate action in Iraq?
General Keane. With the impending nature of what was taking
place with the potential war with Iraq, we knew we had to get this
fixed. We did not have a lot of time to study it.
Senator LlEBERMAN. Yes.
General Keane. We had to do it quickly.
Senator LlEBERMAN. I appreciate the answer. Let me ask one of
the questions that I raised in my opening statement as to whether
the level of research and development funding will enable you to
reach the IOC of 2010 for the Objective Force, and if it does not,
whether the risks — and obviously we all acknowledge that there is
not enough to go around, so there is some risk — that we have taken
with respect to the Legacy Force then may become excessive? Sec-
retary Brownlee?
Secretary BROWNLEE. Yes, sir. This is the question we contin-
ually ask ourselves.
Senator Lieberman. Sure.
Secretary BROWNLEE. If we take money out of the current force
and the FCS, the Future Combat Systems does not show up on
time, we are left holding the sack here. So this is not something
that we have just left to chance.
We have studied very carefully these critical technologies that
will enable us to field Future Combat Systems. All the indications
are that the studies of an outside group we asked to come in and
look at this indicate that these technologies should enable us to do
that.
The question you posed, I think, is if there are not enough funds
available.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
Secretary BROWNLEE. The affordability of FCS and the produce-
ability of FCS on the schedule that we have outlined is something
we still do not know for certain. It will probably be a year or two
before we know better — before we know well enough to make that
decision.
So we are in the process of establishing some metrics that will
allow us to continually monitor where we are and what we are
doing, and again, thanks to this great analysis that Jack and his
team did on recapitalization, we believe that we will be capable if
we are able to make the decision at the right time to revisit some
of the recapitalization, modernization, if we have to, so that we
would be able to go back and say, "Okay. This is not going to show
21
up on time," or, "We cannot afford it on the schedule we are on,
therefore we are going to have to reinvest and maintain the current
force for so much longer."
Senator Lieberman. General Keane, what about the unfunded
requirement of $40 million for Objective Force science and tech-
nology? Should we be concerned about that? Should we be pushing
to see if we can fund it for you?
General Keane. We would take any assistance that you would be
willing to provide.
Senator Lieberman. It has been your traditional strong position
on those issues.
General Keane. As I said before, we put $1.79 billion into that
and we reduced our procurement account, so that we could actually
put more money into R&D, which is what we thought the appro-
priate priority would be for the Objective Force. The procurement
account this year actually has gone down when compared to pre-
vious years, which I know may be of concern.
But the reason for that is so that we could put those monies into
the R&D program. We just were not able to put everything that we
wanted to do in it.
Senator Lieberman. My time is up. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, both.
Senator SESSIONS. The numbers I have and see, if they are cor-
rect, show that you cut $10.8 billion from procurement, which was
a 15-percent reduction in real terms over 2003.
Secretary Brownlee. That is correct.
Senator Sessions. A $9.1 billion increase for research and devel-
opment, which was a 20 percent increase over
Secretary BROWNLEE. Correct. Those numbers are correct, sir.
Senator Sessions. Obviously you needed every dollar, or you
would not have — if you need more, we need to know, I guess.
Secretary BROWNLEE. What you just said, Mr. Chairman, reflects
exactly what we set out to do, to spend more money, to develop
these systems for the future at the expense of those we currently
have, while at the same time, ensuring those that we currently
have are ready enough to do what they have to do.
That is not something that is easy to do. I know General Keane
takes it very seriously, as does the Chief and the Secretary, and
the Secretary of Defense as well.
Senator SESSIONS. Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, let me
echo what both of you said about our troops and about the spirit
that is out there.
I spent some time at Landstuhl and talked to a lot of these peo-
ple who are coming back. In fact, the downed CH-47 helicopter
crew was there. I remember — although it was not your service; it
was the Navy. I remember so well, because this young lady's name
was Tennes and she was on the U.S.S. Tennes. It is the accident
you all are aware of where she, during a refueling operation, got
tangled up in the hose, and it took her down free falling, crushing
her lungs and all of that.
I talked to her in the hospital, and her only concern was getting
back to the unit and making a career of the Navy. I got the same
response from everyone we talked to there. So clearly that is it.
22
But I feel guilty because I do not think we are giving them the
best support that they need. Now, Senator Lieberman was talking
about close air support and the deficiencies in Operation Anaconda.
General Keane, it seems to me that at one of our hearings I
asked the question that if we had had a competitive, more sophisti-
cated artillery system, such as the Crusader, which was cancelled,
could you have used it at that time? I think you said, "Yes, even
though it is heavy and hard to get up." It had the range and the
rapid fire to give you better support. Does my memory serve me
right?
General Keane. That is correct. That is my own opinion obvi-
ously, and I am not the combatant commander.
Senator Inhofe. Yes, I understand that.
General Keane. I am not the ground commander.
Senator Inhofe. But when that was cancelled — and I can under-
stand what we all went through in trying to get to the FCS, trying
to get it to a lighter, more efficient system. We have come up with,
of course, the Non-Line of Sight (NLOS) cannon, and that is one
that could have been taken up there, in terms of the size and the
maneuverability and how it can be transported.
I am a little concerned. Last year, when we had the NLOS can-
non in as a part of the FCS, Secretary Brownlee, it was on two dif-
ferent program elements (PE).
Secretary Brownlee. Yes.
Senator Inhofe. This year it is coming back on one.
Secretary BROWNLEE. Yes.
Senator iNHOFE. Now, if there is a slippage in the FCS, my con-
cern is that that portion of the FCS stay with its deployment date
of 2008. What are your feelings about that?
Secretary BROWNLEE. Sir, our intent is to field the FCS cannon
in the year we have indicated, 2008. That is our intent. That is
what the Army intends to do. That is the way we are fiinded to do
it. Hopefully, the rest of FCS will come along with that.
Senator Inhofe. Yet
Secretary BROWNLEE. Our intent with the FCS cannon, because
of the urgent need for it, is to field it during that time period.
Senator Inhofe. Although I disagreed with the decision of termi-
nation at the time and everyone is aware of that, I will say some-
thing good has come from that, because there is awareness — ^you
guys were aware of it, but a lot of us on this side were not — as to
the deficiency we have in our artillery capability. The Paladin — I
will not mention names — but when I talked to some of our own
Senators that are on this committee, and said, "Are you aware that
you have to swab the breech after every shot?" — almost reminiscent
of the Civil War — and, of course, this is 1950s' technology. They
were not aware of it. Now that awareness has come up.
That is the reason that I feel that even though — yes, I want it
to be compatible as far as the chassis is concerned, as far as the
weight, and the characteristics with the FCS, in the event that
there is slippage, I want to do everything I can to be sure that that
part of it does not slip, because I believe that is a deficiency that
we have that we need to correct.
Any comments on that?
23
Secretary Brownlee. Senator, as you indicate, there is a clear
advantage to having the common chassis for this whole family.
Senator INHOFE. Yes.
Secretary BROWNLEE. But the need to have the improvements in
those kinds of artillery, fire power pieces that we need on the bat-
tlefield has caused us to commit to the fielding of the FCS cannon,
NLOS, as you referred to it, by 2008.
Senator iNHOFE. Good.
Secretary BROWNLEE. That is certainly our intent. I just really —
that is long on time, but-
Senator iNHOFE. Yes. No, I understand. That is
Secretary BROWNLEE. That is our intent to
Senator Inhofe. Do you generally agree with that, General
Keane?
General Keai>je. I do, and I
Senator iNHOFE. Okay.
General Keane. The NLOS cannon — I mean, obviously we have
a problem with overmatch of artillery by our adversaries. There are
a number of countries that clearly outrange us and outgun us. That
has been our concern from the beginning.
That concern is resident today. The NLOS cannon will solve that
overmatch problem. Certainly while that schedule is ambitious, we
clearly want that to happen. What we will do in the Army leader-
ship is make sure that we are not going to let any of those funds
drift away on us to other priorities, because it enjoys such a high
priority with
Senator Inhofe. I know it does. That is the point I am trying to
make. While FCS is very significant and we want to get to the Ob-
jective Force, there are some deficiencies we have today that can
be met by the early deployment of parts of that, which should have
priorities.
I hear over and over again that we have the best Army in the
world and all this — I know we do — and the fact that, yes, we are
ready. Unfortunately, a lot of people misinterpret that as every-
thing can go as it has been going, and everything is going to stay
as ready as it is today. I do not believe that.
Now, when you look at the budget since the 1990s, we have had
a 34 percent cut, while undergoing a 300 percent increase in mis-
sion rates — now this is a real serious problem. While, yes, we are
ready today, these Senators over here and I spend a lot of time
talking to our Guard and Reserve — the Reserve component of all
Services, but mostly the Army.
Many of the critical Military Occupational Specialties (MOS) are
disappearing. We are not able to do this and so I do not know how
long we can continue down this road. So I would like to have you
talk in terms of what we are going to have to do in the future?
Let us look at the number of divisions. We went from 18 down
to 10. Some people are saying now, "Well, the Army is not impor-
tant," or, "The ground effort is not important. We can get by with
six divisions."
Right now, in your professional judgment, faced with the type of
challenges we have, what would you think would be ideal if you
could have it today, as opposed to what we have today? Numbers
of divisions, let us start there.
24
Secretary Brownlee. Senator, first of all, let me just say how
much I share your high regard for our Reserve component forces.
They are serving with great distinction all over the world, and ev-
erywhere you go and talk to them, and the sacrifices they and their
families are making, I just have to take a minute to mention — we
all know Tom Brokaw wrote a book called. The Greatest Genera-
tion. There is another great generation out there now that deserves
another book. Some of them — many of them are these Reserve com-
ponent soldiers. But to directly address your question, sir, clearly
the Army we have today, as Jack indicated, is deployed all over the
world. Sometimes, I think every single soldier we have in the Army
is on the move somewhere right now today.
So these commitments that we are meeting today are taking
most of not just the combat power of the Army, but the combat
support and service support parts of the Army to support these
missions.
We are able to do what we are doing now today, but how long
we can do it is a question.
Senator INHOFE. Yes. I think we need to talk about that, because
if we had a 1989 deployment at that time of 261,000 or whatever
it was, that used, as I recall about 53 percent of our deployable end
strength. That same thing today would be 86 percent.
Secretary Brownlee. Yes.
Senator Inhofe. Then you get into the Reserve and the Guard
component. I think every time we talk about how we are ready to —
yes, we have the best Army in the world, we should be very honest
and say, "We cannot sustain this state of readiness without some
changes," and then talk about this.
Secretary BROWNLEE. Well, it is pretty obvious. Senator, that the
forces we have deployed now, we do not have — without going far
more deeply into the Reserve components — a rotation base to rotate
those forces.
Senator Inhofe. Yes.
Secretary BROWNLEE. Now if we made the decision to do that, we
still have Reserve component units that we have not touched, but
we would have to go much more deeply into those Reserve compo-
nents to do that.
Senator Inhofe. Yes. Mr. Chairman, while there is not time to
get into it, just so they can answer for the record, I have been con-
cerned about the increase in the aviation accidents in all Services.
There are some articles we read — I think — I do not know where it
was — but a couple of days ago, and they talked about the high
tempo of operations (OPTEMPO) in the Marines and the Navy. I
have been over there and you have been over there we have all
been there and have seen this. Perhaps it is a deficiency in mainte-
nance. I would like to have your analysis of this maybe for the
record insofar as the Army is concerned. Because Fort Drum re-
minded us yesterday that that is a very serious problem now.
General Keane. Yes. We are very concerned about it ourselves.
Senator Inhofe. I know you are.
General Keane. This year from last year, we have almost a 29
percent increase in our accident rate, and we have a — when you
compare it to a 3-year average, it is up by 50 percent. So we are
very concerned about it.
25
Senator Inhofe. Thank you. You can do that for the record.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am sorry I went over.
[The information referred to follows:]
Army Aviation Accident Rates
The rate and number of Army Class A aviation accidents in fiscal year 2003 was
28.6 percent higher for number (nine Class A aviation accidents in fiscal year 2003
versus seven in fiscal year 2002) and 28.5 percent higher for rate (2.108 versus 1.64
per 100,000 flight hours) than in the same period of fiscal year 2002. These rates
were also 50 percent higher than the 3-year average for number of accidents and
42 percent higher than the 3-year average for accident rate. While these statistics
are troubling, we are aware that they have been tabulated during a year when the
Army is conducting around-the-clock combat operations in many areas of the world.
Thus, a 3-year trend comparison may be inappropriate to help vmderstand the real
trends in these incidents. A more meaningful assessment may come from a compari-
son of Army fiscal year 2002 and 2003 aviation accident rates against those experi-
enced during other intense Army operational periods (such as in 1989-1990 with
Operation Just Cause and Operation Desert Storm/Shield). We do not yet have this
basis of comparison, but plan to review relevant historical data and make this com-
parison as soon as possible.
Irrespective of aviation accident historic2d trends in appropriate context, we re-
main deeply concerned about the current rate of aircraft accidents and the associ-
ated loss of precious soldier lives. We continue to conduct extensive investigations
of each accident to determine underlying causes and to establish workable ap-
proaches toward curbing these incidents.
Our review of fiscal year 2003 Army aviation accidents presently indicates that
maintenance was not a primary factor. Instead, two common factors seem to have
been at play: human error within the crew and environmental factors like intense
dust and darkness. Individual human en'or has been determined as an underlying
factor in 100 percent of the accidents for which a cause has been determined. Within
this category, aircraft crew coordination breakdowns and incomplete crew duties ac-
count for 50 percent of these human errors. The environment has been determined
as a factor in 62.5 percent of these aviation accidents, with 66 percent occurring at
night.
Informed with these insights, the Army has been pushing lessons learned and rec-
ommendations for additional crew training and aviation soldier briefings to com-
manders in the field. We will continue to provide this kind of feedback to aviation
field commanders and safety monitors as ongoing accident investigations are com-
pleted. We are also looking closely for all equipment modifications and updates that
might prove helpful to limiting aviation accidents or limiting accident casualties. As
we identify any of these equipment possibilities, we will aggressively pursue acquisi-
tion and fielding of them for use in the Army aviation community.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Senator Inhofe, for your excellent
series of questions.
The vote has started. Senator Bayh, why do we not do your ques-
tioning now? Then we will take a recess and come back.
Senator Bayh. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do not think my
questions will take too long, but if they do, we can come on back.
Thank you, gentlemen, very much for your service to our country
and for your courtesy in being here today. I appreciate it.
Secretary Brownlee, I have a couple of questions for you, and
they relate to the changes you are trying to make to modernize the
force going forward and so forth. My questions have to do with how
we maintain the industrial base necessary to produce the next gen-
eration of vehicles, and maintain the current systems in place
while we are cancelling these various systems. For example, I think
the Abrams tank is in its last year of production. You have decided
the Ml 13 armored personnel carrier for not to go forward with the
upgrade program. I am concerned that there might be a gap there.
I mean, many of these companies who produce things like trans-
26
missions and other things, they are going to have to make a deci-
sion about just going out of the business.
Then we come back with the Arm/s Future Combat Systems,
which are going to be good, but there is going to be a period of
years where there is perhaps a gap.
How are we going to produce the next generation of vehicles if
these companies get out of the business? How are we going to sup-
ply the current generation of vehicles, if they are not making spare
parts and things like that?
Secretary Brownlee. Senator, you have hit on a key question
that both General Keane and I talk about all the time. We are con-
tinually seeking ways to mitigate those things to get work into
those plants that are most threatened by these cutbacks.
Clearly because we are not producing the numbers of Ml tanks
or Bradley Fighting Vehicles as we once were in great numbers,
there is a lot of excess capacity in that industry that is going to
be taken down. Some of it is already taken down.
I mean, you go to some of these places now, and they are operat-
ing at 20 and 30 percent of what they were only a few years ago.
So it is a very serious question, and related to that directly are the
work forces that are trained and can do this kind of work, and we
cannot afford to lose it all.
Then there is, of course, the design expertise that rests within
some of those firms, and we recognize the critical importance of
this, and that is why we have continually looked at upgrading Na-
tional Guard equipment, as well as the active component, as seek-
ing all the ways we can to get it to work, and get it into those
places, as well as continuing to recapitalize and modernize what we
have in ways that help them.
But as you all know, it is very difficult to do when you simply
do not have the capacity or the resources to do that. You have hit
on one of the things that troubles us the most. Because there will
be in some of these segments of the industry very serious gap prob-
lems that are going to come.
Senator Bayh. The marketplace today is brutal. I mean, they de-
mand that inefficiencies be eliminated immediately.
Secretary BROWNLEE. Yes.
Senator Bayh. So if there is a gap there of 2, 3 years, they are
going to face no choice but to take out their capacity. Then what
do we do? It is hard to ramp back up overnight.
So I am glad you focused on this problem. Part of our responsibil-
ity is to make sure you do have the resources necessary to, at least,
keep the infrastructure in place so that when the new generation
comes along, we are in a position to go with that.
General Keane. Senator, I would like to add to what Les said.
Where we are today is a little different than even the months prior,
when we made this decision, when we discussed this with industry,
because the effect the economy has had.
So we recognize that, and maintaining this great Army is a part-
nership, and we know that. We cannot do it without the support
of American industry, and there are only certain companies out
there that make the kind of things that we need. So it is in our
interest to maintain that industrial base. We recognize it.
27
I think what we have in front of us is we have to work with our
partners, because some of the things that have changed in just the
last number of months, I know you have some information on and
so do we.
They have made some recommendations to us, and we want to
seriously look at all of that, see how we can mitigate the risk.
Senator Bayh. Gentlemen, I appreciate your attention to this
issue, and I hope you will let us know what we can do to help you
resolve it.
Secretary Brownlee. I wish I could tell you we have solved it
all, sir. We have not. But we are working hard on it, especially in
those critical areas where we can already see that there are prob-
lems that exist.
Senator Bayh. Mr. Chairman, if we had a witness who could tell
us he had solved every problem, that would be a first in my experi-
ence, but it is certainly a standard to aspire to. Thank you, gentle-
men.
Secretary Brownlee. Thank you.
Senator Sessions. Thank you. Senator Bayh.
Due to the vote, we will take a recess and be right back. [Recess. 1
All right. Here we go. It is strange to go from voting on Roe ver-
sus Wade — I thought the Supreme Court had already settled that
one, but we voted on it, as if somebody wanted to know what our
sense was of it. [Laughter.] But here we are back at this matter,
and that is just life in the Senate.
I would note for the record on this that we are having a budget
today, and several questions related to the funding for the Depart-
ment of Defense. I have been looking at the numbers, and in 1993,
the defense budget was $334 bilhon. In the mid-1990s, it had
dropped to $278 billion — not adjusted for inflation, as I recall.
Those are actual numbers.
Then just last year we hit the $330 billion level — the year before
last maybe, the $330 billion level. So we have really left the De-
fense Department with a real problem, and I think the real prob-
lem is that we should have been recapitalizing all along, a steady
process of recapitalization over a long period of time. Then we
would not be facing the bow wave of unmet needs, in addition to
being in a conflict situation, and trying to deal with this with an
economy that is hurting at the same time. So I think it is a good
lesson to us.
Now, the President's budget calls for a solid increase this year,
plus presumably we will be having a supplemental, and then about
a $20 billion a year increase for the next 4 years. If we sustain
that, I think we can keep you on the level of transformation that
we need to. If we come in, again, and start cutting that and not
giving the Defense Department the funds it needs, then we are not
going to be able to meet our requirements.
Let me run a few questions by you. I might submit some for the
record, and I will see when any of our other members get back
from the vote.
Now, I understand that the Department of Defense has asked
the Army to evaluate the SBCT capabilities and to make rec-
ommendations regarding areas where the Army can improve the
capabihties of the fifth and sixth Stryker Brigades. The report is
28
due July 2003. Can you provide some insights into what capabiH-
ties will be added, and do you see a need to increase organic avia-
tion assets?
General Keane. I will do it. Yes, sir. That is true. We have been
asked to look at the fifth and sixth brigades, primarily in the area
of intelligence, air defense, precision munitions, and also in terms
of aviation. We have that under study right now, and we will be
providing some feedback to Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul
Wolfowitz on that issue.
I also want to use that to inform us and inform them as to poten-
tial changes in the first four brigades, if those changes merit that.
We would go back and make adjustments to the first four brigades,
so this — there are two parts to that. One is to take a look at five
and six with some additional capabilities, and then also make some
judgments about making those kind of improvements also to the
first four brigades.
Senator SESSIONS. Can you share any, or do you think it is pre-
mature to share
General Keane. Right now, we think it is. Yes, sir.
Senator Sessions. Because of the $1.7 billion increase in R&D
costs, the Army restructured the Comanche helicopter program, the
sixth restructuring in as many years. Last October, the Depart-
ment approved the Comanche program restructure and an acquisi-
tion milestone of 650 aircraft, down from the 819 Comanches the
Army said were required for an active component of the Objective
Force.
The approved program does not reflect requirements for the Ob-
jective Force unit of employment currently being designed, nor does
it reflect potential additions of Comanches to the Stryker Brigade
Combat Teams. Because the authorization committee felt that the
Comanche helicopter program required increased oversight, the
2003 Defense Authorization Bill required quarterly Comanche pro-
gram updates to the defense committees.
Question, would you provide us with the progress the Army has
made to date in the Comanche program and any emerging results
from the unit of employment design effort?
General Keane. Senator, yes, thank you for that question, be-
cause it is my belief that the Army finally came to grips with the
Comanche program.
Everybody here who has looked at the record of that would agree
that it has been a troubled program over the years. I think when
the Army restructured the program, we literally doubled the
amount of money in the development program and we extended the
program out by 2 years and 9 months — I think exactly.
But the good thing is that we mitigated a lot of the risk in the
program, and I believe the Army has now set the stage for a suc-
cessful program here. We are certainly looking to the contractor to
perform well in this regard, and we will be watching that very
closely. But I think this time, thanks to the people on this commit-
tee who seem to have agreed with what we did with the program,
it now appears to be on a far more sound footing. It is a much bet-
ter program with much better chances of success.
But as I said, we are watching very closely the performance of
the contractor and we are going to continue to do that.
29
Senator SESSIONS. It is an important program, and I hope
things
General Keane. It has been a troubled program for years. We
had restructured it before, and we moved money around to pay for
other programs. One of them was the Crusader, ironically enough.
But Secretary Brownlee, one of the things that he did here so we
could get a grip on that program, was to set up an independent re-
view panel, headed up by former Chief of Staff of the Air Force,
Larry Welch, and brought together a lot of other notables from a
national security influence area, and looked very hard at the pro-
gram.
We had a big question mark around the program, and they came
in and helped us re-baseline and restructure it, and they thought
it was a very transformational program. With the strategy that
they had recommended to us, they thought it was a very viable pro-
gram. That is where we are today. We have a lot of confidence in
it.
We also had two contractors who were butting heads here, Boe-
ing and Sikorsky. We had to fix the management oversight that
they were providing to the program as well. I think we have done
that by getting the attention of the leadership of both of those orga-
nizations.
Senator Sessions. Good.
Senator Clinton, we are glad to have you here, and if you are
ready, I have been going on past my limit, so I would be glad to
recognize you at this time.
Senator Clinton. I would be happy to wait if you are not fin-
ished with your questions.
Senator SESSIONS. I just had a couple more questions.
Senator Clinton. I would be happy to wait.
Senator SESSIONS. I will ask one more then.
The heavy counterattack corps remains the highest priority for
Legacy Force recapitalization and selected modernization. However,
the Army funded the Objective Force by reallocating funding from
the counterattack corps, reducing the recapitalization and selected
modernization program from three divisions and an armored cav-
alry regiment, as funded in the fiscal year 2003 budget request, to
two only divisions.
With 48 program terminations and restructures, the Army has
again taken risk in the current Legacy Force. Over the last several
years, the subcommittee has asked the Army leadership how they
would prioritize among Objective and Interim and Legacy Forces.
With 77 program terminations and/or restructures in the Legacy
Force, it is clear that you have set priorities and are willing to take
risk in the current force.
What are the implications for reconnaissance and security mis-
sions of not modernizing the counterattack corps, armored cavalry
regiment?
Please include in your response what you can plan to do to that
unit to enable it to fight alongside the division in the corps. How
much would it cost to modernize the ACR?
General Keane. Okay. As we have said before, Mr. Chairman,
that was a very difficult decision for us. The most difficult one I
have dealt with in the last 4 years and very challenging.
30
We think the risk is acceptable to begin with. Also if we had
more money, we would put it right back into those programs as a
top priority; first with the Third ACR, and then with the Third In-
fantry Division.
The Third Infantry Division's recapitalization program was not
going to take place until 2007 in any event. So there are still some
things that we could do with that division if we are able to gen-
erate more financial support between now and then.
Then in terms of how it would fight, all of the organizations in
the Army would be digitized. By that, I mean, they would have
similar situational awareness and they would be able to talk to one
another, even though the basic tank may be a little different, or the
fighting vehicle itself is not as modernized as another one.
We are digitizing the entire III Corps, so that there is commonal-
ity there in terms of the situational awareness they have of where
they are and also the information we are going to provide to them
in terms of where the enemy is.
We know we have to have that kind of commonality. If we did
not establish that, then we would have a problem. The fact that
they are operating side by side with another division
Senator SESSIONS. I understood that was not going to be one of
the problems of modernization.
General Keane. That will not be a problem.
Senator SESSIONS. You can solve that.
General Keane. We have solved that problem. We have kept
those funds to make certain that that happens. The fact that one
division will have a more modern tank than another division will
not cause us a problem in terms of those organizations working to-
gether.
Senator Sessions. Thank you.
Senator Clinton.
Senator Clinton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
First, I want to thank the Secretary and the General for being
here to give us this update. I particularly want to extend publicly
my regret and sympathy about the crash of the Black Hawk yester-
day up at Fort Drum.
I have had the opportunity to speak to General Hagenbeck, and
I know how difficult this is for everyone involved directly or indi-
rectly. It is a great loss for us with these young soldiers getting
trained, and I certainly extend my sympathy as well to the fami-
lies.
I hope that we are able to continue this conversation about trans-
formation as it goes forward, because just listening to the few ques-
tions I heard from the Chairman, this is such a huge undertaking,
and it is such a dramatic departure from traditional or legacy un-
derstanding of what the mission has been and how to fulfill it.
It is the case that I am sure there will be lots of fits and starts
along the way, but I am committed to ensuring that the Army con-
tinues to play the central role that it always has in our military,
because I do not see any other way to create an effective fighting
force without the Army being right at the center.
So while we are transforming, we do not want to lose sight or
undercut the capacity to provide the forces and resources that are
needed for every kind of mission. Now, with that in mind, I am in-
31
terested in the — this may have been asked to some extent before
I came — the budget increases for the Interim Combat Systems, in-
cluding the Stryker Brigades and the FCS, and the way that we
have cut the amounts spent on the Legacy Force. In your written
testimony, you express your beliefs that in May, the Future Com-
bat System will meet its Milestone B deadline, and therefore will
transition the FCS program from concept and technology develop-
ment into systems development and demonstration.
What would be the consequences to the budget if the FCS does
not meet its Milestone B deadline, and how soon would we know
that? Would we have time to take appropriate actions within the
budgetary framework to be able to continue the work that you are
doing? Mr. Secretary.
Secretary Brownlee. We would know in May, ma'am, if it did
not make the Milestone B deadline.
Senator CLINTON. That is a firm deadline in your opinion?
Secretary Brownlee. It is a firm deadline as far as that mile-
stone. I should add, because this is a different kind of procurement
or procurement acquisition strategy that we have developed for
this, as you have described so well, this very complex and huge un-
dertaking that we have, it is a system of systems. It is right now
24 different requests for proposals with 19 for the FCS and other
related ones, and trying to bring all those together in a way that
will create this kind of new force with very new and distinct capa-
bilities.
It would have impact on the budget, but probably not to the de-
gree in the near term that it might, because we would still be using
developmental funds if we were — if this was a milestone where we
were going from development into procurement, then yes, we would
have the problem we face so often of having to transition or convert
procurement funds back into R&D or something like that.
But the reason I wanted to describe the difference is because I
think people going into this very important milestone decision also
have to recognize that we have to look at this differently. Some of
the things we are doing, using elite system integrator as a very im-
portant part of this strategy is different for the Army. Outside of
the missile defense area, it is different for everyone.
So it is just a different thing, and we are going to have to all rec-
ognize that. Going from concept development to systems develop-
ment is a very important step, but in my mind, it is more impor-
tant about what it says about Milestone C.
If we do not make Milestone B, what does that say about the
next one, which would be in 2006.
Senator CLINTON. Yes.
Secretary Brownlee. So I do not think it is a catastrophe if we
do not make it. While some of us might have been pretty worried
a few months ago about our ability to make it, some of the things
that have happened recently are very encouraging.
I mentioned earlier the evaluation of the critical technologies
that we have identified. We started off looking at about 3,000 and
gradually narrowed it down to a list of 31 that are considered criti-
cal. Those have all met or nearly met the technology readiness lev-
els that they should have in order to proceed.
32
We also — to help assure ourselves — asked an independent group
to come in and evaluate those. They also gave a very encouraging
report about that.
So, yes, it would be greatly disappointing not to make that mile-
stone. I do not think it is catastrophic, because this is a very ambi-
tious schedule, and I think everybody has to recognize that.
I have asked myself is it too ambitious? Then the question comes
back, we are taking money out of the current force in order to fund
this very ambitious program, and there is a lot of money we are
putting into R&D. There is $13.5 billion worth of R&D in this plan,
this 5-year plan or 6-year plan it is.
Senator Clinton. Yes.
Secretary Brownlee. So, yes, it would be disappointing. I do not
think it would be devastating. I think we could still proceed. When
I ask myself what is the alternative, the alternative is to have a
less ambitious schedule, and we have opted not to do that.
Senator CLINTON. I really appreciate that explanation. I do not
know that that is the alternative, I guess, is the point of my ques-
tion. I think we are falling into a lot of either/or thinking around
here, not just with respect on this specific issue but on a range of
other concerns as well.
So I am hoping that the drive for transformation does not blind
us to the need to continue to support the existing force, and to en-
sure that for the next 4 to 6 years, or however long this process
is, that we are not hollowing out what we currently have in order
to try to meet deadlines and pursue some worthy goals that I think
we agree with. It should not be an either/or approach. I think many
of us will watch that and work with you.
Secretary Brownlee. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Clinton. Has the procurement system undergone a
similar transformational initiative?
Secretary Brownlee. It is in the process of undergoing some-
thing similar and as I said the acquisition strategy that we have
adopted for this is new and different for the Army.
Senator Clinton. What kinds of conflicts of interest proposals
are you putting in place with respect to all of these contracts that
are being undertaken?
We are embarking on an enormous undertaking that involves
multiple billions of dollars, and some recent news reports have
been highly concerning to me about what, if any, conflicts of inter-
ests and other kinds of rules are in place as to who bids on con-
tracts, who has information, and who does not have information,
and I would like additional detail about what it is we are doing to
safeguard anyone taking advantage of these situations by virtue of
being insiders or in any other way undermining the transparency
insofar as possible of the procurement and bidding and contracting
process.
Secretary BROWNLEE. I share your concern, and I have voiced
that several times. I think we have to continually work those
issues.
We have put in place around the Lead Systems Integrator cer-
tain firewalls that we believe will protect against the kinds of
things you mention.
33
I cannot tell you that in my mind right now I am totally assured
they are all foolproof, but we are looking at it very closely.
In order to make this work, the Lead Systems Integrator has to
have some authority within the source selection process, but one of
the things that I insisted on when I came there a year ago was that
the Army acquisition authority always had the final word.
Senator Clinton. I appreciate that, Mr. Secretary. I know you
have a distinguished career on this side of the Government as well
and I would appreciate your conveying the concerns many of us on
this committee have that in our efforts to discharge our public re-
sponsibilities, we are not able to obtain information in direct ques-
tion and answer sessions with officials from the Pentagon; whereas
it appears the contractors are.
Secretary Brownlee. Yes.
Senator Clinton. I find that somewhat disturbing. When, in a
comparable hearing, we asked repeatedly — in fact, the Chairman
was there — Secretary Feith and others, "What is happening? When
is it happening? How much it is going to cost?" We were told it was
unknowable.
Then we pick up the newspaper and find out the contracts are
being let for the unknowable. I am not making any judgment about
the substance of the contract or the persons or institutions to
whom it was awarded, but we have an obligation here in the Sen-
ate and on the other side of the Hill to be kept informed about
these matters.
Ultimately, we are the ones who have to appropriate the money
and answer to the taxpayers.
Secretary Brownlee. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Clinton. General Keane, I am very concerned also about
what you might call the manufacturing base of the Legacy Army.
We have Watervliet in New York. I visited the arsenal last week.
It is troubling to me that we might lose the capacity as we have
in other areas of necessary equipment to not only private contrac-
tors, but offshore or Government contractors. Certainly when you
look at the Watervliet arsenal and the fact that it is the only re-
maining Army manufacturing facility making cannon and howitzer
tubes and the like, it is a cautionary note that we do not want to
give up the ability to quickly turn out heavy equipment even if we
are transforming, because I still believe, and I may be at a minor-
ity, that you have to hold ground and you may need heavy equip-
ment to help you do that.
Do you have any comments about the need for continuing that
kind of manufacturing within the Army itself as opposed to con-
tracting it out?
General Keane. Yes. Thanks for the question. Senator. I appre-
ciate your condolences for our soldiers and their family members
and also we really appreciate the interest that you have shown in
Fort Drum and the number of times that you have been up there
around family members. I thank you for all of that and your con-
tinued support of our Army.
You put your finger right on that issue. It is the only place truly
in America that does that kind of work, so it is of great value to
the Army.
34
Our problem is we have a work capacity problem there, in terms
of the amount of production and work that we are providing to that
institution. But there is a lot of work coming in the future with
NLOS cannon, which will be the new artillery system for the Army
after the cancellation of the Crusader program.
So we are optimistic. Obviously like every other program it will
get reviewed by the BRAC Commission, and judgments will be
made about it. But it is the only one of its kind in America. So we
have a lot of confidence in what it has done for us.
Senator Clinton. I appreciate that and I would hope that you
and the Secretary and the Chairman or others might possibly come
up and visit there, because I remember very well when the U.S.S.
Cole was attacked and that terrible gaping hole was blown into the
hull, and there was, at that time, only one place left in the entire
United States where you could get armored steel. That was Beth-
lehem Steel, which has since, of course, gone into bankruptcy.
As we are looking at transformation, I think we do not want to
be reliant on Chinese steel companies or Russian steel companies,
or anybody else in the world for the kind of nuts and bolts equip-
ment that is absolutely needed. Whether you are transformational
or non-transformational, you have to produce some of that heavy-
duty equipment. So I think that is going to be an issue for us.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Sessions. Thank you. You raise a very important point.
The Barry amendment, we have some problems with that. I think
the Defense Department is back on track about that.
But it is true that steel is a good example. It is a security issue.
The total collapse of the steel industry in America does leave us
vulnerable strategically, I think, at least in the economic pain from
it.
General Keane, I would just like to say we have been talking
about transformation and we have been pushing the Defense De-
partment to do that. Most large organizations are bureaucratic and
slow to change. Maybe ours is too, but I want to say without any
doubt that our military is more open to change, more willing to
change, more focused on the future than, I am sure, any in the
world.
You talk about the Operation Anaconda review, the honesty that
was there and the commitment to figure out how we can do it bet-
ter in the future without worrying about our parochial interests, I
think, is a good commentary. We need to keep that and keep this
momentum going and hopefully we can achieve the goals that we
would like to achieve. Do you generally feel optimistic? You have
worn the uniform a long time.
General Keane. Yes, I am, and most people focus on the plat-
forms that we are changing, and many of the leaders in the Army
do. We cannot help ourselves. We are a platform-centric organiza-
tion, more ground platforms than air platforms get a focus in the
Army. At times, wrongly so, to be honest with you.
But the real change in transformation is a cultural change, and
it occurs in people's heads. That is where the challenge has been.
When you move in any large organization and — most people think
because we have all this rank and we are somewhat of an auto-
35
cratic institution, by issuing orders we will create positive change.
Nothing could be further from the truth.
We have to have an idea, and we have to be persuasive with that
idea. It has to be moving to people in our Army to get them to will-
ingly commit to change. If you do not get them to commit willingly
to it, to believe in it, it is not going where you think it is. Despite
the rank that we have and the orders that we can give, in this bu-
reaucracy that we have — and at times it is that — it can slow and
stop good ideas from taking place if they are not convincing and
persuasive.
So our challenge has always been cultural. We are trying to
change an Army that has fought one way to fight a different way.
We have to be convincing. I mean, it has been a journey, and it has
been a struggle.
At the beginning, it was very hard. We have made some
progress, but we are not completely there yet. It will take more en-
ergy and more conviction to get us there.
Senator SESSIONS. It has been incredible to me the efforts and
success in which the air and the ground have worked together.
General Keane. Yes.
Senator SESSIONS. Where you have the Air Force and sergeants
on the ground working together effectively to direct firepower ex-
actly where it needs to go.
I know Senator Lieberman had asked you about Operation Ana-
conda, and I guess those were some of those same t3T)e issues, how
you coordinate effectively; but it seems to me you are doing very
well at that.
Would you comment on where you are and what your hopes are
for the future?
General Keane. Specifically dealing with air/ground support,
what we learned from Operation Anaconda and the commanders
who were there, both in the air and on the ground — we have spent
considerable effort these last months fixing that. We think we have
done that.
It is not just fixing the procedures and some of the technology.
We have to also talk to our youngsters about it. The Vice Chief of
the Air Force and I both attended his command and staff college
and his war college. We both got up on the stage and we openly
talked to them about the problems we had and what we are doing
about it, because the youngsters out there who were doing this
have to believe as well that we have fixed those issues. We do not
want them going into battle, whether they are in the air or on the
ground, thinking that the Army and the Air Force are not going to
work effectively together.
We do not want any doubt in anybody's mind that the Air Force
is going to be there for Army soldiers when they are in trouble. We
know that the Air Force will be there for us. Now, we do not want
any pilot thinking that somehow procedurally the Army is not
going to be able to communicate with him effectively to help those
soldiers that are in need. So we think we fixed it.
Senator SESSIONS. I know in Afghanistan, that has been stated
as the biggest change, where you actually had ground combat spe-
cial forces directing air munitions.
36
How far are we from having the normal Army combat unit hav-
ing those same capabihties? Is that only special forces or is that
throughout the Army that we have the systems in place to do that?
General Keane. Now, that is a great question. When you look at
warfare, one of the things that is occurring to us and that is ex-
ploding is the ability to integrate our joint warfighting capability
in ways that we have not in the past. The integration we used to
achieve was normally at field commander level, where you would
find a three- or a four-star flag officer. We achieved some oper-
ational integration at his level.
What is happening now, because of the explosion of technology,
our ability to have a common read of the battlefield from the air
as well as the ground, is that everybody is looking at the same
thing at the same time, and we have the capacity to truly commu-
nicate effectively with each other very rapidly, so we have a com-
mon situational awareness of our own forces as well as the enemy's
forces.
What that is enabling us to do is move down the vertical access
of warfare and empower people at lower levels with the capacity to
integrate the combat power across service lines in a way that was
not imaginable even 10 years ago.
In Operation Desert Storm, when we went there in 1991, if we
are honest with ourselves, what we really did is all the Services
were there, but we sort of de-conflicted our operations and stayed
out of each other's way. When we look back at it in the cold reality
of the day, as successful as that operation was — and it was very
successful. It was magnificent as the sailors, soldiers, airmen, and
marines performed, and it was that when we look at it proce-
durally, we could have done much better.
We have been working very hard on that the last 10 or 12 years
to achieve better integration. We are not completely there, but if
we are asked to do something in Iraq, I think you will see there
will be some profound differences along the lines that I have dis-
cussed.
The people at lower levels will be integrating combat capability
across service lines in a way that we have not in the past. You saw
some of that when I gave you the illustration of special forces
teams in Afghanistan controlling the air power of all of our strike
aircraft. Young sergeants who were broken up into groups of threes
and fours doing that because they had the right communications,
they had the right technology to fix the GPS-guided munitions and
to deliver it very accurately. So that is profound change for us.
Senator SESSIONS. It certainly is. That is also the next question,
which is probably a subject for another discussion or maybe a
closed briefing. Are we there enough, and is that transformation
recognizing that incredible technological advancement sufficiently?
General Keane. It is the technological change that is enabling us
to move towards a transformational way, at least for a land force
to fight.
Wliat we have done historically, for 100 years, is we have always
fought principally the same way, we have gathered ourselves in
very large formations. We call them divisions. If you looked at it,
it has been a rectangular box. We put them together in threes or
37
fours, and you had a guy like me, a three- or four-star general, and
put him in charge of them.
He would move into a country on an axis with those divisions,
and very methodically would control terrain, overmatch an adver-
sary, and control the population. Maybe we would be moving on
two or three axes.
As the latter part of the 20th century arrived, because of the
kind of technology and the better systems we had, we were able to
make more dramatic moves with those formations. But the forma-
tions inherently stayed the same. They were in those massive for-
mations, because there was a hedge against the uncertainty of
what an enemy was going to do.
We always had that degree of uncertainty. In the first part of the
20th century, we could not even see over the hills, so we sent guys
over the hill to find out what was going on. At the latter part, we
started to see with satellites and we started to integrate air power
so we could see better, and those formations loosened up. You saw
what Norm Schwarzkopf did in Operation Desert Storm when he
made that big sweep, but the way of fighting really did not change.
It was principally the same.
The technological change that is occurring is that now we have
what I would describe as an unblinking eye over that battlefield,
where you can truly see where an enemy is and what they are
doing. The terrain between you and the enemy is less important to
us than what it has been in the past.
So if you accept that, if you accept that premise and you believe
it, then you can introduce forces dramatically different as opposed
to moving on an axis like this, and you can send them to places
at the same time to defeat what is there, or to take control, to seize
what you are interested in, a capital city, an air field where there
is an enemy formation, highways or railroads that you want to
seize, so the enemy does not use it.
You can do this in six, seven, eight, nine places, and I will call
it just drawing circles around the places you are interested in, dis-
card the long axis, and you go to those places much more rapidly
than we do today. In days and weeks, you can defeat an adversary,
because you will force him to implode on himself.
That is different. Technology is enabling us to do that. I think
what we are doing is recognizing that technology is there.
So these formations that we will have in the future will be much
smaller, and we will not be intimidated by the fact that we are
fighting an adversary that is larger, because while they may have
a larger Army force than we do, we will be integrating all of the
joint fires at a much lower level than we do today, and be able to
address that adversary in ways that we can see today, but we can-
not completely do today.
We think that is pretty transformational, because it is really
changing how an army fights and we have not made as dramatic
a change like this in 100 years, when you really get down to it.
Senator Sessions. I think that is pretty transformational. I
agree. That is a marvelous explanation of where we are headed.
Thank you very much.
Senator Clinton. Mr. Chairman, if I could, I would like to follow
up on what the general just said. I can understand and visualize
38
the description that you just gave us, until you came to the words
"capital city." What I need to understand is what transformational
concept guides our thinking with respect to urban warfare.
General Keane. Yes, that is a great question.
Senator Clinton. Because, when you think about Schwarzkopf
making a sweep, or you think about Afghanistan, you have dif-
ferent kinds of topography, but it is basically an unpopulated, large
expanse in which to operate.
I am confident that we can be successful anywhere, but I am just
having a hard time understanding a kind of heavily urban area
that if I were a determined adversary, I would use to embed my
forces and I would require us to undertake actions that would in-
evitably result in very large civilian casualties, and which under
the circumstances would not be immediately successful, just by the
very nature of the environment in which we found ourselves.
So how does the transformational philosophy go along with what
I view as a very serious continuing threat with respect to our abil-
ity to take on whatever comes our way?
General Keane. Yes, Senator, that is a great question. It is one
that has challenged us intellectually for a number of years.
What we have been doing, for the last 10 to 15 years, is drawing
circles around these major cities and convincing ourselves we were
going to bypass them. Most of our operational plans called for all
of that, to include the ones in Operation Desert Storm.
The reality is our adversaries are very much aware of that. You
saw what Milosevic did, relatively successfully in Kosovo. He had
a 40,000-man force. We put no ground forces into Kosovo and he
was rather successfully able to hide that and shield that force from
a 78-day air war. He did that in population centers and also hiding
the forces in villages and using some camouflage techniques from
us.
So that technique is well known by our adversaries, and we have
had to change. We have the capacity to do it. It takes some crafts-
manship. I do not dispute that. It takes some generalship to do it.
We would go into a major city with the values of the American peo-
ple with us, with the intent that clearly we are not going to harm
people unnecessarily.
If the adversary is crafty, he would hold that population in resi-
dence. He would not let it go. One of the things that we would have
to do is attempt to separate the military targets as best we could
from the population. We have to control the population. We have
to make some pretty interesting decisions early on.
Is one radio and television? We have to take control of radio and
television so we can talk to that population, and have the appro-
priate people talk to them in terms of what our intentions are.
Even while the adversary is there, we have to have the capacity
to take the TV and radio stations away from them and talk to that
population.
We do not necessarily have to use his. We can shut down his and
use our own to do that sort of work. Talking to the people them-
selves is a major issue for us, and we would not want them to
leave. We want them to stay in their homes and know we are not
there to harm them.
39
We may actually have to segment that population, so we do not
want it moving around. An adversary like Saddam Hussein can
probably get 20,000 people to participate in an event, just by call-
ing for it.
Well, if we are segrnenting that population, barricading it, block-
ing it, and we are doing that within the American value, they see
and feel the strength of our forces there, that we are not going to
let them move and participate in an event like that, which will be
covered by CNN and would result probably in the loss of innocent
lives. We are not going to let that happen.
So controlling the population is critical to do that. We have to
have presence to do that. We also have to have a means of commu-
nicating to the people to be able to do that.
The second thing is we have to deal with military targets, and
we would use air as well as ground forces to do that, and we would
do that very surgically. That is an often-used word. What I am say-
ing is it would not necessarily need a lot of force or a lot of pres-
ence to do that.
We would probably use some special operations forces to do it,
as well as we would use air power with GPS-guided munitions to
do that sort of work. We would obviously have to know that that
is a bona fide target and know what it is and make our judgments
about it, just as obviously we would have to do in this upcoming
war.
So the technology is enabling us to see better. We are developing
UAVs to use in cities that we can move down alleyways, over build-
ings and we can watch and see. We are going to have multiple
UAVs to do this, as part of our Objective Force, we need those sen-
sors to have this unblinking eye in a city, so that we know what
is happening.
If we can see it and understand, then we can make the appro-
priate decisions. We would never do what the Russians did in
Chechnya. We would not do that.
Even the problems that the Israelis were facing in Jenin. They
had a significant challenge that they were facing there, and they
found that all the roads and alleys were booby-trapped and mined,
and they had to go through the buildings as the avenue of ap-
proach. In other words, they took bulldozers and moved through
the buildings and did it that way.
We would hope that our technology in the future would give us
the opportunity to avoid doing that kind of work, but it was a chal-
lenge that they were facing certainly. They did the best they could
with that challenge.
So you are right. Senator. I mean, it is a long response. It is chal-
lenging work for us, and I think we put a lot of intellectual energy
into it. We have the values of the American people that are in our
soldiers, and that is the way we operate. I think we can do it with-
out undue harm to the people.
We have to have that capability. If we do not, then our adversar-
ies will just use the people as a shield and try to get the best politi-
cal deal they can out of a stalemate. In many cases, that would
probably be unacceptable to us.
Senator Sessions. That was most interesting. It becomes more
difficult as the adversary is fiercely dedicated to resistance. The de-
40
gree at which that notches down, the lesser degree of loyalty to
their existing government, I think, is a factor in all of this too. If
they will operate like the North Vietnamese did in small groups far
away from a command center, you have a more difficult problem
than if they have to be kept together.
We are just appreciative of your leadership. I will submit a ques-
tion about our pre-positioned material. I understand that some of
the equipment that we had pre-positioned was not as modern as we
would like it to be, and that some units who were actually training
on it and had to down-train to be able to utilize the older equip-
ment. So it would be something that I will submit in writing.
Is there anything else. Senator Clinton, you have?
Senator CLINTON. No, thank you.
Senator Sessions. Thank you very much. It was an excellent
hearing and we look forward to working with you as time goes by.
General Keane. Thank you.
Secretary Brownlee. Thank you.
Senator Sessions. We are adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Jeff Sessions
priorities
1, 2. Senator Sessions. Secretary Brownlee, we look to the Army's unfunded re-
quirements (UFR) list when we consider opportunities for increasing the Army's
modernization budget. Unfortunately, it is often difficult to understand Army prior-
ities as reflected in that UFR list. For example, while the Army has terminated so
many programs related to the modernization of the Counterattack Corps, it has in-
cluded an $88 million unfunded requirement for two battalions of Paladin howitzers
for a National Guard Strategic Reserve division. Does this accurately reflect Army
priorities? Where should we look to help the Army should we find additional re-
sources?
Secretary Brownlee. The Army's top priorities are funded in the President's
budget submission. While we would have liked to have funded all of our require-
ments, we took prudent risk in some areas. Our top five shortfalls reflect those
areas where we have taken the most risk, and if additional funding were available,
we would apply them to these areas first. Our number one shortfall is active duty
pay and allowances. This shortage is due to an unforeseeable short-term change in
the mix of officer and enlisted soldiers. Number two is in chemical weapon stockpile
and material storage/demilitarization site security. The additional funding allows us
to enhance security around chemical weapons storage and demilitarization. Number
three is anti-terrorism/force protection funding for security guards and equipment
on military installations. Number four is for ammunition and helps fund training
ammunition and replacement of expended war and operations ammunition. The last
item in our top five is Flight School XXI, enabling us to better and more rapidly
train our helicopter pilots.
Regarding Paladin howitzers, the Army National Guard (ARNG) has a critical re-
quirement to modernize their heavy division self-propelled howitzer systems from
M109A5 to M109A6 Paladins. The required $88 miUion will support the ARNG re-
quest for two battalion sets consisting of 36 M109A6 Paladins to modernize two di-
rect support 155SP artillery battahons in the 49th Armor Division (Texas ARNG).
The Paladin howitzer provides essential improvements in survivability and respon-
siveness through a self-locating capability. Most importantly, Paladin provides a
digitized system that is mandatory on today's battlefield. The 49th Armor Division,
due to its alignment with III Corps, is a high-priority unit in support of the counter-
attack mission.
OBJECTIVE FORCE
3. Senator SESSIONS. Secretary Brownlee and/or General Keane, fiscal years 2003
and 2004 are critical times for Army transformation. In partnership with the De-
fense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), the Army has focused its
41
science and technology (S&T) funding on identifying technologies which can be
quickly developed into combat capabilities. Over the past 3 years, the Army has
dedicated over 95 percent of its S&T funding to the Objective Force program. I un-
derstand that towards the end of May, the Army and DARPA will be evaluating
these technologies as you conduct a Future Combat Systems (FCS) Milestone B re-
view to determine which technologies will be ready to enter into System Develop-
ment and Demonstration (SDD). What else can be done to mitigate risk in the FCS
program? If, for some unknown reason, the FCS SDD is delayed, what alternatives
do you have?
Secretary Brownlee and General Keane. Risk mitigation within the family of
systems that comprise FCS is addressed using both technology alternatives for sub-
systems and capability alternatives to elements of the FCS family of systems. The
FCS program manager commissioned an assessment to identify the critical tech-
nologies required to achieve the first FCS capability increment. The assessment, en-
dorsed by the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Science and Technology), deter-
mined the technical maturity, the degree of criticality of the technology to FCS, and
the requirement for risk mitigation plan in the event the technology did not mature
as required. The Army subsequently developed risk management plans for all of the
medium- and high-risk critical technologies. Any significant delay in FCS SDD
would require the Army to revisit plans for legacy system recapitalization and mod-
ernization to keep those systems in use for longer periods of time.
experimentation
4. Senator Sessions. Secretary Brownlee and/or General Keane, Section 215 of
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 directed the Army to
provide a report on the experimentation program regarding the design of the Objec-
tive Force. Please describe the experimentation plan for the Objective Force, the role
of the SBCT in informing that experimentation, and the cost of that experimen-
tation for fiscal year 2004 and the FYDP.
Secretary Brownlee and General Keane. The report required by the Fiscal Year
2003 National Defense Authorization Act is currently under review and expected to
be approved for distribution in the near future. Present Army experimentation plan-
ning, the first to truly focus on the Objective Force, will support Office of the Sec-
retary of Defense guidance to transform America's national security institutions.
The plan establishes processes, responsibilities, and procedures to implement ag-
gressive, innovative concept development and experimentation. The plan also re-
duces risk and integrates Army concept development and experimentation into a co-
herent service/joint context to provide combatant commanders with sustained land
combat capabilities. The plan informs the Army leadership vision and concept for
the Objective Force and commits the Army to a transformation path to achieve Ob-
jective Force capabilities in 2010 and field operational SBCTs while maintaining the
current force as a strategic hedge.
The SBCTs will be incorporated into Objective Force experiments to the extent
practicable in order to ensure Objective Force unit of action/unit of employment de-
velopment. These experiments also will serve as an important link in developing re-
quirements for the Objective Force.
Experimentation, including that necessary for the battle laboratories, is funded at
$112 million for fiscal year 2004 and $772.6 million across the FYDP.
5. Senator Sessions. Secretary Brownlee and/or General Keane, what role did ex-
perimentation play, if any, in the design of the Objective Force unit of action?
Secretary BROWNLEE. Experimentation played a key role in the development of
the operational and organizational concepts that ultimately led to the design of the
Objective Force unit of action. Experimentation took the form of Army seminar war
games and battle lab concept experimentation program experiments, joint and sister
services battle lab experiments, and other Government agencies' experiments and
technology demonstrations.
Seminar war games led by the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command per-
mitted Army senior leaders to model and examine capabilities envisioned for the
Objective Force within an operational scenario. Insight gained from these war
games facilitated the definition of the unit of action and unit of emplo3Tnent oper-
ational and organizational concepts. Experimentation validated and refined con-
cepts; provided insights for metrics to incorporate in operational requirements docu-
ments; assessed impacts of FCS on tactical operations; examined the influence of fu-
ture tactical and technical capabilities; and explored the potential effects on com-
manders, staffs, and military operations. Experimentation also provided insights
42
into future information requirements, development of tactics, techniques, and proce-
dures and early insights into the warfighting capabilities derived from advanced
technologies.
6. Senator SESSIONS. Secretary Brownlee and/or GenerEil Keane, what experimen-
tation is being conducted with respect to the division- and corps-level unit of em-
ployment? When will that design be completed?
Secretary Brownlee and General Keane. Army Transformation War Games 2001
and 2002 examined echelons of command. During Unified Quest 2003, the Army will
examine alternatives to current echelons of command above brigade level. Unified
Quest 2003 will focus on the possibility of reducing the number of command eche-
lons, and will explore the impact of headquarters designed to provide joint and oper-
ational command and control using an advanced battle command system. The exer-
cise will allow the Army to look at alternative command design constructs using
emerging joint concepts and within the framework of major combat operations.
Insights obtained from this 2003 Army Transformation War Game will shape
forthcoming decisions on the number of echelons the Army will design as well as
identify their functions. We anticipate that the initial design of the Objective Force
units of employment, along with a more detailed operational concept for these units,
will be completed in the first quarter of fiscal year 2004.
7. Senator Sessions. Secretary Brownlee and/or General Keane, how was/is the
SBCT formally linked to that experimentation?
Secretary Brownlee. Objective Force 'excursions' will be executed during SBCT
exercises. As the Army proceeds with development and fielding of the two SBCTs
at Fort Lewis, lessons learned in SBCT exercises and evaluations will inform Objec-
tive Force concept development and experimentation.
Recently the Joint Forces Command conducted its first major experiment. Millen-
nium Challenge 2002, with the embedded Army experiment — Army Transformation
experiment 2002. Insights from SBCT participation in Millennium Challenge 2002
and future joint experimentation will inform Objective Force concept development
and experimentation.
BASIC RESEARCH
8. Senator SESSIONS. Secretary Brownlee and/or General Keane, your testimony
mentions the role that science and technology play in the development of the Objec-
tive Force. What role does "6.1" or basic research mostly performed at universities
play in that plan? Will investments in this fundamental research suffer as you seek
to accelerate transformation and focus on near-term technology issues?
Secretary Brownlee. The goal of university research funded by Army S&T is to
provide new capabilities beyond those that are currently in development for the Ob-
jective Force. We have a multifaceted strategy that takes advantage of the best and
brightest minds in our universities and develops state-of-the-art infrastructure nec-
essary to conduct basic research. The single investigator program identifies and
leverages the most significant research being done at universities in support of the
Army mission. University Affihated Research Centers (UARC) perform research in
areas that we believe will provide paradigm-shifting capabilities in support of the
Objective Force. As an example, the Institute for Soldier Nanotechnologies UARC
is focused on leveraging and exploiting advancements in nanotechnology to provide
revolutionary capabilities in soldier protection.
University Centers of Excellence focus the basic research program on enduring
needs, such as rotorcraft and automotive technology, in order to assure that the U.S.
Army maintains our 'overmatch' of capability in these areas. The Army's Multidisci-
plinary University Research Initiatives program, devolved from OSD in fiscal year
2004, funds university centers to investigate multidisciplinary, far-term trans-
formational topics critical to maintaining U.S. land combat technology superiority.
The Defense University Research Instrumentation Program, also devolved from
OSD in fiscal year 2004, builds and maintains the infrastructure needed to improve
the quality of defense research performed at universities. The program fulfills its
objective by supplying funds for university purchase of state-of-the-art instrumenta-
tion capable of meeting current and future research challenges.
As reflected in our past four budgets. Army investment in university programs
has not been skewed by the acceleration of transformation of near-term technology.
We continue to sustain a balanced portfoUo of investment in basic research efforts
for near-, mid-, and far-term science and technology excellence.
43
MANUFACTURING AND INDUSTRIAL BASE
9. Senator Sessions. Secretary Brownlee and/or General Keane, what investments
are you making to ensure that the Nation's industrial base can support the needs
of the Objective Force in the future?
Secretary Brownlee and General Keane. The preponderance of the Army's in-
vestments is currently directed toward those technologies that hold the greatest
promise for achieving the Army's transformation goals. The Future Combat Systems
Program Office and the Lead Systems Integrator are developing a list of those tech-
nologies critical to the Objective Force. The Army's strategy is to aggressively part-
ner with the commercial sector in developing dual-use technologies and to leverage
funding from multiple program managers to address a few specific manufacturing
technology objectives that promise maximum overall impact for both new and legacy
systems. Ongoing technology assessments and investments will form the basis for
future decisions on the technologies that will ultimately be incorporated into the
weapons and support systems of the Objective Force. Those assessments will also
provide focus for the manufacturing technologies that will be required within the
industrial base to produce and support the Objective Force.
10. Senator Sessions. Secretary Brownlee and/or General Keane, how are you de-
veloping the manufacturing technologies needed to produce the unmanned vehicles,
computer networks, and advanced sensors and electronics that are an integral part
of the force?
Secretary Brownlee and General Keane. The Army conducted a special study in
fiscal year 2000 through the National Center for Advanced Technologies to identify
the requirements from manufacturing technologies for the Future Combat Systems
and the Objective Force. The blue ribbon panel identified funding priorities for spe-
cific topic areas and priorities — including the areas you have listed in this question.
The Army's manufacturing technology effort has been increased over 50 percent
from fiscal year 2001 to fiscal year 2004, and will be over 100 percent higher by
fiscal year 2009. We view manufacturing technology as a critical element in the de-
livery of the right technology at the right time and at the right price.
FUTURE OF LABS AND RESEARCH DEVELOPMENT ENGINEERING CENTERS
11. Senator Sessions. Secretary Brownlee and/or General Keane, traditionally,
the Army laboratories and Research Development Engineering Centers (RDEC)
have played an important role in developing new technologies and translating Army
requirements into R&D programs. What role do these facilities play in the Army's
development of the Objective Force?
Secretary Brownlee and General Keane. The Army labs and RDECs continue
even more strongly in this role. The Army Materiel Command (AMC), which is the
primary developer of Army warfighting materiel, is undergoing major internal
changes to respond to Army transformation. The formation of the Research, Devel-
opment, and Engineering Command is part of the response to bring about Army
transformation. This will enable AMC to respond more efficiently to the system of
systems challenge of the FCS and the Objective Force by unifying multiple labs and
RDECs into one organization.
12. Senator Sessions. Secretary Brownlee and/or General Keane, in light of the
need to restructure the Army for transformation, are there specific areas that
should have more or less emphasis in the S&T and R&D infrastructure?
Secretary Brownlee. Since 1999, Army transformation has been driven by S&T
investments to bring forth new technologies that are addressing the goals of a light-
er, more lethal force. Over 98 percent of S&T investments are currently aligned
with the Objective Force. In terms of restructuring, the system of systems challenge
of FCS and the Objective Force has already resulted in the development of the Re-
search, Development, and Engineering Command. Since 70 percent of the S&T pro-
gram is executed by AMC, this response to the challenge has been both dramatic
and appropriate, moving away from the stovepipe mentality of developing the
"eaches" of the past to the integrated requirements of the future. This restructuring
will better enable the Army to develop and effectively exploit the system of systems
aspects of the Objective Force.
44
WORKFORCE
13. Senator Sessions. Secretary Brownlee and/or General Keane, Congress has
provided the Army with a number of personnel flexibilities in order to meet their
need for highly trained scientists and engineers to support technology development
programs. Specifically, Congress has tried to provide Army lab RDEC directors with
maximum flexibility to recruit and retain the appropriate workforce to meet their
specific missions. Does the current personnel system adequately address the specific
needs of your individual lab directors?
Secretary Brownlee and General Keane. No. While the laboratories have made
significant progress while using the authority provided by Congress in Section 345
of the fiscal year 1995 authorization language, a number of the other legislative ini-
tiatives have not yet been effective or fully implemented. In the case of Section 245
and 246, the Department of Defense Office of General Counsel has had serious prob-
lems with them. Section 1113 is about to be enacted. Section 1114 has also encoun-
tered challenges at the OSD level and has not yet been implemented. While Con-
gress has been interested in assisting the labs, the biggest hindrance to the lab
managers in implementing the original legislation has been local union veto over
laboratory managers' initiatives.
14. Senator Sessions. Secretary Brownlee and/or General Keane, what specific
authority and flexibility do these lab directors need to ensure that they have the
technical workforce they need?
Secretary Brownlee. The original Section 342 legislation included in the Fiscal
Year 1995 National Defense Authorization Act should be modified to allow Defense
laboratory directors to test certain initiatives with union consultation (as opposed
to union veto), and with a 3-year sunset clause. At the end of the 3-year period, the
Army should then make the changes permanent if they have proved effective. These
changes could be firmly established through additional legislation if that proves nec-
essary. The Army also would benefit greatly from legislative action that would en-
able hiring of scientists and engineers at market rates, rather than within the limi-
tations presently imposed by Government pay scales.
crusader reprogramming
15. Senator Sessions. Secretary Brownlee and/or General Keane, how much of the
reprogrammed Crusader funding was transferred into S&T accounts to support the
development of next generation weapons systems to replace Crusader?
Secretary Brownlee and General Keane. During fiscal year 2002, $32 million
was reprogrammed from Crusader to initiate the Future Combat System, non-line
of sight cannon (FCS NLOS-C) concept technology development (CTD) in fiscal year
2003. This action, along with the $368.5 million appropriated in fiscal year 2003 for
the CTD, reduced the Crusader program termination costs and benefited the FCS
program by transferring Crusader technology, engineering experience, vital informa-
tion, and facilities to the FCS NLOS cannon demonstration. The CTD is progi-essing
along a timeline to advance the cannon designs that support fielding the first unit
in the unit of action and building a demonstration vehicle that will execute test fir-
ing and mobility demonstrations starting in September 2003.
16. Senator Sessions. Secretary Brownlee and/or General Keane, will this money
be used to accelerate the programs being developed by the joint Army-DARPA FCS
program?
Secretary Brownlee. Yes, the reprogrammed fiscal year 2002 funding along with
the $368.5 million appropriated in fiscal year 2003 is dedicated for FCS NLOS CTD
work and will directly support a cannon demonstration vehicle. Another essential
aspect of the FCS NLOS CTD is the development of a design that supports initial
fielding with the first unit of action. Since the NLOS is an integral variant of the
FCS family of manned ground vehicles, the FCS NLOS is fully synchronized with
the FCS manned ground vehicle design process through the CTD program. This up-
front CTD design work simplifies meeting the FCS and NLOS requirements for com-
monality and interoperability. Additionally, a primary objective of the CTD dem-
onstrator is reducing the engineering risk to the NLOS and other FCS variant de-
sign and integration efforts, all of which will accelerate development of the joint
Army-DARPA FCS program.
45
STRYKER BRIGADE COMBAT TEAMS
17. Senator SESSIONS. General Keane, the Office of the Secretary of Defense re-
ported to Congress that the results of the Stryker-M113A3 operational comparison
indicate that neither vehicle was preferred for all of the criteria considered. The
Stryker was considered superior under some criteria, the M113A3 was superior on
others, and the vehicles were equal on yet others. There was, however, a consider-
able difference with respect to cost. Twenty-year operating costs are approximately
the same, Stryker being slightly cheaper because of fuel efficiency. However, Stryker
procurement costs are considerably higher. Why is the Army willing to spend sev-
eral billion dollars extra to procure the Stryker rather than using equipment cur-
rently in the inventory to field the Interim Brigade Combat Teams (IBCT)?
General Keane. The Army selected the family of Stryker vehicles to equip our In-
terim Force because it best fulfilled the Army's tactical and operational require-
ments. The results of the comparison evaluation validated the decision to choose
Stryker because the Stryker vehicle provided significant performance and
supportability advantages. These advantages outweighed the primary competitor's
submission advantages of a lower cost and a better delivery schedule.
Both the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Army Test and Evaluation
Command comparison evaluation reports note that the Stryker is superior in the
critical area of survivability. While the M113A3 does have better mobility in severe
terrain, the Stryker is faster, quicker, and more operationally mobile — capabilities
necessary to fight our new interim brigades as envisioned. The ongoing initial oper-
ational test and evaluation and the congressionally mandated operational evaluation
of the first Stryker Brigade Combat Team will address Stryker's ability to meet the
tactical and operational requirements. We remain confident that these tests will
demonstrate that the Stryker fully meets the requirements reflected in the organiza-
tional and operational concept and the vehicle specifications outlined in the Stryker
operational requirements document.
18. Senator Sessions. General Keane, the Department has asked the Army to
evaluate the SBCT capabilities and to make recommendations regarding areas
where the Army can improve the capabilities of the 5th and 6th Stryker Brigades.
The report is due in July 2003. Can you provide us some insights into what capabili-
ties will be added to the SBCTs? Do you see a need to increase organic aviation as-
sets?
General Keane. The Army is not complete with its analysis at this point, so any
discussion of recommendations at this time is premature. I can tell you that the
Army is looking at several SBCT enhancement options — to include enhanced sen-
sors, upgraded communications, more precision munitions, and the possibility of
adding Comanche, should those aircraft become available in the ftiture. Since
Stryker brigades are optimized for combat in complex and urban terrain, these en-
hancements could make each SBCT more lethal and better able to operate as part
of a joint force.
19. Senator Sessions. General Keane, will these capabilities be applied to the
first four Stryker brigades?
General Keane. As time and funding permit, the Army certainly will look at ret-
rofitting enhanced capabilities into the first four Stryker brigades. As a matter of
course, the Army looks at the feasibility of spiraling new technologies into its stand-
ing formations whenever possible. We always desire to provide our soldiers with as
much warfighting capability as possible. As you can appreciate, we must balance
this strong desire against constraints imposed by funding level limitations and other
competing operational and acquisition requirements.
20. Senator Sessions. General Keane, if aviation assets are to be added to the
brigades, will that change the acquisition objective for Comanche helicopters?
General Keane. If the decision to integrate the Comanche helicopter into Stryker
brigades is taken, then there would need to be a full review of the Comanche field-
ing plan. The Comanche helicopter is not sequenced or planned for the Stryker bri-
gades. The first five Stryker brigades are slated for fielding before completion of the
Comanche engineering, manufacturing, and development phase in fiscal year 2009.
The final Stryker brigade fielding for the Pennsylvania Army National Guard covers
an extended 5-year schedule from fiscal year 2005 to fiscal year 2010.
Presently, the Comanche is planned to be the Objective Force multirole aircraft.
If a decision were made to field the Comanche within Stryker brigades, we believe
that 12 additional low-rate initial production Comanches would be required at a cost
of $540 million per brigade. Absent a major change in schedule, presently unforecast
46
Stryker brigade fieldings would occur concurrently with Objective Force fieldings
and could delay Comanche fieldings to Objective Force units.
However, we are not yet sure that Comanche will be an appropriate addition to
the Stryker brigade. We continue to study options of embedding current aviation
platforms within the Stryker brigades. Developing a generic mix of aircraft to en-
hance the range of Stryker brigade missions is resource intensive in equipment and
personnel. Comanche's reduced supportability footprint is one significant attribute
that allows us to realize a habitual air-ground operational teaming in the Objective
Force.
From both a resource and operational perspective, our best outcome is to field an
appropriate and capable aviation force into a structure that is supportable,
deployable, but most of all, effective for the range of Stryker missions. At present,
our analysis shows we can best support Stryker brigades with a tailored, dedicated,
direct support aviation package designed to enhance Stryker brigade capabilities
and mission requirements. We must continue to study options in this area before
drawing any firm conclusions about whether to, and then how to, integrate Coman-
che within the Stryker brigade.
21. Senator SESSIONS. General Keane, how do you intend to fund these capabiU-
ties?
General Keane. The Army has made difficult decisions in the fiscal year 2004
budget proposal regarding which programs to fund. We killed 24 programs and re-
structured 24 others for over $22 billion to dedicate toward the Objective Force. We
would have to weigh carefully the capabilities gained versus the capabilities lost
from any additional program adjustments involved with Stryker brigade enhance-
ments. There are no easy financial offsets remaining, so we cannot presently advise
the subcommittee on precisely how SBCT enhancements might be funded. We will
work to keep the subcommittee informed of options being explored as our OSD-man-
dated study of this issue continues.
22. Senator Sessions. General Keane, given the delicate balance in the Army
budget request, how would you prioritize between greater capabilities for the first
four brigades against funding the procurement of the 5th and 6th Stryker brigades?
General Keane. After a thorough analysis of the security environment and antici-
pated operational requirements, the Army determined that at least six SBCTs were
required to fill the current capabilities gap. While enhancing one or more SBCTs
would improve overall force capabilities, we have determined that eliminating one
or more SBCTs to pay for enhancements to the remaining units would result in a
reduced overall capability. Consequently, we strongly advocate fielding of all six
Stryker Brigades, and request continuing Airland Subcommittee support for them
all.
certification exercise
23. Senator Sessions. Secretary Brownlee, the Fiscal Year 2002 Defense Author-
ization bill directed the Army to conduct an operational evaluation of an SBCT
against the full spectrum of anticipated threats prior to deplojrment and certify that
it is operationally suitable. Can you describe the exercise as currently envisioned
and provide us a status report on the planning for this evaluation?
Secretary Brownlee. Planning for the Operational Evaluation (OE) is complete.
We will start execution of the plan on April 1, 2003, at the National Training Center
(NTC). The commander's assessment will focus on brigade operations with joint as-
pects in a full spectrum environment against a full spectrum threat. The OE will
be conducted at two of the Army's Combat Training Centers (CTC): NTC from April
1 to 11, 2003, and the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) from May 17 to 27,
2003.
The NTC phase begins with battalion-level training and live-fire exercises and
evolves into a brigade-level field exercise. The brigade event will emphasize offen-
sive operations, force protection, and intra-theater lift and resupply against a world-
class opposing force (OPFOR) in a desert environment under mid- to high-intensity
combat operations.
The JRTC phase will commence with an early entry operation and a relief-in-
place mission that will involve Special Operations Forces. This phase will emphasize
maneuvers in restricted terrain and military operations in urban terrain (MOUT)
under low to medium intensity combat operations. The JRTC rotation will focus on
the complete range of military operations as a contingency mission against another
world-class OPFOR. Additionally, there will be a wide spectrum of as3rmmetrical
47
threats. Training and evaluations at both CTCs will be conducted in a free-play en-
vironment. This gives the OPFOR more latitude to challenge the operational suit-
ability of the Stryker Brigade.
Throughout the OE process, the Brigade will validate the ability of the SBCT to
deploy strategically by programming rail, sea, and air transportation of the Stryker
vehicle and SBCT equipment. This deplo3rment exercise includes a planned insertion
of combat elements by C-130 aircraft.
24. Senator SESSIONS. Secretary Brownlee, will the SBCTs conduct missions
across the spectrum of combat during this evaluation? Can you give examples of the
missions they will conduct?
Secretary Brownlee. The SBCT will conduct missions across the spectrum of
combat. Conducting the OE at two different CTCs will give us the opportunity to
evaluate the performance of the SBCT in a wide range of demanding and distinctly
different terrain. Additionally, the SBCT will be challenged by a continuous variety
of asymmetric threats, irregular forces, terrorists, civilian encounters, and coalition
forces.
The SBCT was designed as a full spectrum, early entry combat force. The brigade
has full utility, confirmed through extensive analysis, in all operational environ-
ments against all projected future threats, but it is optimized primarily for employ-
ment in complex and urban terrain, confronting low-end and mid-range I threats
that may employ both conventional and asymmetric capabilities. The SBCT will de-
ploy very rapidly, execute early entry, and conduct effective combat operations im-
mediately on arrival to prevent, contain, stabilize, or resolve a conflict. Missions at
NTC will focus on medium- to high-intensity conflicts conducted in a desert environ-
ment against a heavy mechanized and armored threat. The JRTC evaluation will
focus on a low to medium intensity conflict conducted in restricted and urban ter-
rain against both conventional and unconventional enemies. Asymmetric threats
will be incorporated into both scenarios. The SBCT will conduct both offensive and
defensive operations and will include live-fire exercises. Specific missions they will
execute are: early entry operations, distributed simultaneous offensive operations,
brigade attacks, defensive operations, area security operations, tunnel complex oper-
ations, and sustainment operations. The SBCT will also employ a full range of joint,
lethal, and non-lethal fires.
APACHE LONGBOW
25. Senator Sessions. Secretary Brownlee and/or General Keane, I understand
the Commander of the Army's Aviation Center approved the proposed Block III se-
ries of upgrades for the Apache Longbow AH-64D attack helicopter with the intent
to start the program in the fiscal year 2007 time frame. It is anticipated that the
Block III improvements to the Apache will enable network-centric operations, in-
crease sensor ranges, and improve platform lethality. There is some indication that
the Block III program will allow the Apache Longbow to become the heavy attack
helicopter for the Objective Force. Has the Block III helicopter been included as part
of the unit of employment analysis?
Secretary Brownlee and General Keane. The unit of employment analysis, al-
though still a work in progress, has included Longbow Block III. The analysis in-
cluded Longbow Block III teamed with both Comanche and unmanned aerial vehi-
cles. The Apache Longbow is the initial attack helicopter for the Objective Force.
The Block III initiative ensures the Longbow remains a valid and capable member
of the system of systems in the Objective Force until a future attack platform is de-
veloped and fielded.
26. Senator Sessions. Secretary Brownlee and/or General Keane, what is the im-
pact of the Block III Apache on the Comanche helicopter requirement? Can the
Block III Apache fulfill the attack helicopter requirement for the Objective Force,
obviating the necessity for additional Comanches?
Secretary Brownlee and General Keane. In fact, the case is just the opposite.
The initial Comanche procurement objective approved 650 airframes at a production
rate of 60 per year using spiral development through a Comanche Block III configu-
ration. The current funding levels restrict Comanche to the armed reconnaissance
configuration. The Comanche decision caused the Army to examine how to best en-
sure the Longbow Apache is relevant in the Objective Force. The Longbow Block III
program will meet all of the known Objective Force requirements and extend the
life of the airframe. However, the Army's position on Comanche as a multirole air-
craft remains constant.
48
27. Senator Sessions. Secretary Brownlee and/or General Keane, how will you
fund this initiative?
Secretary Brownlee. The Army will examine funding options for this program in
Program Objective Memorandum 2005-2009. The funding profile for the Longbow
Block III program begins in fiscal year 2005 with research, development, testing,
and engineering and non-recurring engineering requirements. Initial airfi"ame deliv-
eries would begin in fiscal year 2008.
CH-47 CHINOOK
28. Senator Sessions. General Keane, the Army has learned many lessons from
the ongoing war on terrorism, particularly from the operations in Afghanistan. One
of these lessons was the operational capability and desirability of the Chinook CH-
47F and the Special Operations Forces version, the MH-57G. To that end, during
the fiscal year 2004 budget review process, the Department directed the Army to
provide 24 additional MH-47G Chinook helicopters to Special Operations Forces by
reprioritizing current CH-47F remanufacture work. What is the economic and oper-
ational impact of this decision?
General Keane. Economically, adjusting the CH— 47F production schedule to com-
ply with the Department directive will add an estimated $132 million to the CH-
47F life-program cost, half of which, $63.6 million, will be realized in fiscal years
2005 to 2009. The primary reason for this cost increase stems from the results of
fi-ont-loading MH-47Gs in the production schedule. Formal cost increase estimates
are under review and will be refined by the Army Cost and Economic Analysis Cen-
ter. Additionally, if the Army elects to modify additional aircraft at the end of the
program to restore those Chinooks transferred to Special Operations Forces, the cost
to buy back the transferred CH-47D to CH^7F conversions is estimated at an ad-
ditional $444 million in base-year dollars. The buy-back would come fi:'om the
Army's 130 Chinooks that are not currently funded for the CH-47F conversion.
Operationally, we are already short of our total Chinook requirement. Trans-
formation requires 513 aircraft and we have a current inventory of 463 Chinooks.
Our emerging Objective Force requirement is 502 Chinooks with digital
connectivity. Yet due to competing priorities, we currently only have 333 remanufac-
tures funded: 272 CH^7Fs and 61 MH-47Gs. We have no new-build Chinooks
funded. In addition to these forecast aircraft shortages, our preliminary analysis of
the DOD directive indicates the Army will incur a reduction of aircrew experience
in the conventional aviation force for severed years. This reduced expertise will be
most noticeable in the CH-47 crew chief senior noncommissioned officer ranks. We
also anticipate that the Army's CH-47F first unit equipped will slip 21 months as
a result of the requirement to front-load MH-47Gs in the Chinook production line.
29. Senator Sessions. General Keane, it is my understanding that the "touch
hours", the time spent making an item, on a MH^7G is twice the "touch hours"
required to make a CH-47F. With a 2-year delay in the CH-47F program, has the
Army assessed the impact on the unit cost of the CH-47F Chinook and has the De-
partment provided any resources to cover these costs?
General Keane. There are two issues that must be addressed in response to this
question: man-hour costs and the costs incurred from CH-47F production delays.
First, there will not be any direct impact from man-hour costs to the anticipated
Army per-unit price for the CH-47F. It will require approximately 26,000 man-
hours to completed CH-47F and approximately 50,000 mgin-hours to complete a
MH-47G. Funding the difference in the labor hours is the responsibility of the U.S.
Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). USSOCOM has programmed funds to
pay for the additional labor hours required to manufacture the MH-47G. As a re-
sult, the increase in labor hours alone will not directly impact the unit cost of the
CH-47F to the Army.
The second issue — CH^7F production delays — will have an impact on unit cost.
Due to the pressing requirements of the global war on terrorism, most of the first
three production lots of the Chinook will be dedicated to the MH-47G. This initial
MH-47G focus will require the contractor to re-tool and re-configure the Chinook
production line from the MH-47G to the CH-47F after these initial lots have been
manufactured. Costs incurred from this industrial adaptation coupled with other
small inefficiencies anticipated from production transition will result in increased
unit costs to the Army for the CH^7F. Presently, we estimate that the per-unit
CH-47F cost increase will be less than 10 percent. The Army Cost and Economic
Analysis Center is working on a revised cost estimate for the CH^7F in light of
49
the DOD directive. We will have a better feel for additional program costs once this
analysis is complete.
BLACK HAWK HELICOPTER
30. Senator Sessions. Secretary Brownlee, I am concerned about the funding pro-
file for new Black Hawk helicopters. As currently configured, the budget funds 10
this year, 8 in fiscal year 2005, 28 in fiscal year 2006, 23 in fiscal year 2007, 5 in
fiscal year 2008, and 4 in fiscal year 2009, with 9 remaining to be procured in the
out-years. This kind of profile causes havoc for a manufacturer, and costs the Army
more in the long-run. What is the possibility that you can spread the quantities out
in a more even distribution, and complete the buy earlier to stabilize the program
and reap those savings?
Secretary Brownlee. There is currently a 5-year multi-year/multi-service produc-
tion contract with the Army and the Navy. The Navy's procurement quantities from
fiscal year 2002 to fiscal year 2006 are: 13, 15, 13, 15, and 26 respectively. The com-
bined Army and Navy procurements approximate the procurement Economic Order
Quantity. The yearly quantities are more evenly distributed when the Navy procure-
ments are added. The Army is procuring 80 aircraft and the Navy 82 aircraft during
the current 5-year multi-year/multi-service contract. Savings have been made by use
of this multi-year/multi-service contract. The Army is nearing its end strength re-
quirement of 1,680 Black Hawks. Quantities in fiscal year 2007 and beyond will be
reconsidered in following budgets.
31. Senator Sessions. Secretary Brownlee, it is my understanding that the Black
Hawk UH-60M recapitalization program may face a delay. What is the current sta-
tus of the Black Hawk recapitalization program?
Secretary Brownlee. The Army is projecting a $41.8 million cost overrun in the
Black Hawk UH-60M program in fiscal years 2003 to 2007. The cost growth is a
result of a combination of factors: Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation underestimation of
work and lack of cost controls; and Army configuration changes that add capability,
improve aircraft performance, and resolve safety issues. The Army has developed a
plan that mitigates the cost overrun internal to the UH-60M program while mini-
mizing delays to the program. The plan will cap the contractor's work on the UH-
60M program in fiscal year 2003 to the Army's current funding level. The plan will
mitigate cost growth in fiscal years 2004 to 2007 by reducing UH-60M production
by seven aircraft in those years. To minimize schedule delays, the Army plans to
build four additional prototypes in fiscal year 2004 that will help accelerate the de-
velopment and operational test requirements. All these changes will result in a 6-
month delay of the first unit equipped from the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2006
to the second quarter of fiscal year 2007.
reserve component aviation
32. Senator SESSIONS. General Keane, the Fiscal Year 2003 Defense Authorization
bill directed the Chief of the National Guard Bureau to provide a report on the im-
pact of the Army Aviation Modernization Plan on the Army National Guard. Could
you provide a synopsis of the report? Does the fiscal year 2004 Army budget request
address the shortfalls identified in the report?
General Keane. I am happy to report that the acting Chief of the National Guard
Bureau (CNGB) completed the report on January 21, 2003. Following the congres-
sionally-mandated review of the report by the Army Staff, the Chief of Staff of the
Army forwarded the report and accompan5dng Army Staff comments to Congress on
February 6.
This report indicates that while the Army and the Army National Guard are in
basic agreement on the additional aircraft and funding needed to achieve the in-
terim aviation transformation structure of the ARNG, progress toward attaining
this goal has been slowed by the unforecast impact of real-world operational contin-
gencies and funding level constraints. The Army has twice delayed the scheduled
cascade of modernized UH-60A and AH-64A aircraft ft-om the 101st Airborne Divi-
sion and other active duty units to the ARNG because of contingency operations in
Afghanistan and Iraq. These unfortunate, but we believe necessary, delays have
slowed the transfer of approximately one-third of the modernized aircraft needed for
the initial phases of the ARNG aviation modernization plan. We anticipate making
good on these transfers during fiscal year 2004. For the longer term. Army funding
levels through fiscal year 2009 remain insufficient to provide the full number of
modernized aircraft needed by the ARNG. In addition, many of the aircraft to be
50
provided to the AENG will not be the most current variant of the airframe series.
The fiscal year 2004 Army budget request only partially addresses these shortfalls
identified in the CNGB report.
Despite these challenges, the Army continues to work with the ARNG to complete
the Guard aviation modernization plan in as timely and comprehensive a manner
as possible. We also will continue to work with DOD and Congress to secure the
funding necessary to address identified shortfalls, consistent with the overall needs
for total Army force readiness and modernization.
COUNTERATTACK CORPS MODERNIZATION
33. Senator SESSIONS. Secretary Brownlee and/or General Keane, the heavy Coun-
terattack Corps remains the highest priority for Legacy Force recapitalization and
selected modernization. However, the Army funded the Objective Force by reallocat-
ing funding from the Counterattack Corps, reducing the recapitalization and se-
lected modernization program from three divisions and an armored cavalry regiment
as funded in the fiscal year 2003 budget request to only two divisions. With 48 pro-
gram terminations and restructures, the Anmy has again taken risk in the current
(Legacy) force. Over the past several years, the Airland Subcommittee has asked the
Army leadership how they would prioritize among the Objective, Interim, and Leg-
acy Forces. With 77 program terminations and/or restructures in the Legacy Force,
it is clear that the Army has set priorities and is willing to take risk in the current
force.
What are the implications for reconnaissance and security missions of not mod-
ernizing the Counterattack Corps' armored cavalry regiment? Please include in your
response what you can plan to do to that unit to enable it to fight along side the
divisions in the Corps.
Secretary Brownlee and General Keane. Balancing risk is integral to Army
transformation. The Army has accepted risk in selective modernization and recapi-
talization, and we continue to assess these risks as we balance current readiness,
the well-being of our people. Army transformation, the war on terrorism, and new
operational commitments.
The Army will continue to employ the armored cavalry regiment in support of
Counterattack Corps operations. A major area of concern will be command and con-
trol and information sharing between forces.
The Army is currently reviewing the modernization requirements of 3rd Armored
Calvary Regiment. Abrams tank options, based on available funding, will include
equipping the 3rd Army Calvary Regiment with MIA2 System Enhancement Pro-
gram (SEP) tanks and Bradley M3A2 ODS-D+ with Force XXI Battle Command
Battalion/Brigade and Below capability and the second generation forward looking
infrared thermal weapon sight system. These added capabilities would allow seam-
less, digital communications between the 3rd Army Calvary Regiment, the division,
and in the corps. It would also allow the 3rd Armored Calvary Regiment to acquire
targets at the same distances as those divisions. This digital capability is a long-
term investment and provides a digital bridge to the Future Combat Systems and
Objective Force.
34. Senator Sessions. Secretary Brownlee and/or General Keane, how much
would it cost to modernize the ACR?
Secretary Brownlee. The cost for modernizing the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regi-
ment is $726 million. This cost would include providing an additional 129 M1A2
SEPs and 144 M3A2 ODS-D+ Bradleys, and procuring other critical combat support
and combat service support systems for the unit. Providing funding in this amount
will ensure that 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment modernization meets the minimal
acceptable capabilities commensurate with the rest of the Counterattack Corps.
industrial base
35. Senator Sessions. Secretary Brownlee and/or General Keane, the cancellation
of current programs is certain to affect the industrial base. For example. United De-
fense, one of only two remaining armored vehicle manufacturers, has briefed sub-
committee staff that it will have to close three production facilities 2 years before
Future Combat Systems low-rate initial production begins. What are Army plans for
preserving the industrial base and ensuring that the requisite production facilities
will be available for meeting FCS production time lines?
Secretary Brownlee and General Keane. Army transformation required cancella-
tion of certain programs so we could afford FCS. We assessed the risks to the indus-
51
trial base from these program cancellations and, where we judged necessar>', we
have taken steps to mitigate adverse impacts. We saw two major risks to the indus-
trial base as a result of the decision to not modernize the Counterattack Corps. Both
of these risks involved maintaining viable armor system production capabilities at
two production facilities: the Lima Army Tank Plant in Ohio and the United De-
fense combat vehicle production facility in York, Pennsylvania.
The first risk involves General DjTiamics' combat vehicle fabrication capability at
the Lima Army Tank Plant. We judged that risk as unacceptable since Lima ini-
tially had an insufficient workload to remain \dable as a production facility for the
fabrication of the Marine Corps' Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle and the
Army's FCS ground vehicles. To mitigate this risk, the Army has restructured some
programs and now has sufficient work to sustain Lima in active production until
these new programs are brought into production.
The second risk involves maintaining United Defense's combat vehicle production
facility in Pennsylvania. We recognize that this facility would also be a likely can-
didate to manufacture FCS ground vehicles in the future. We expect that the pro-
duction facilities in Pennsylvania will remain viable and open through calendar year
2004 because of a continuation of their current fiscal year 2003 Bradley upgrade
work. With this expectation and acceptance of risk, we did not program fiscal year
2004 funding for Bradley upgrades to protect that portion of the industrial base.
While we cannot guarantee additional work from support for fielded systems, for-
eign sales, and reprocessing vehicles from operations in Iraq, the Army is looking
hard at workload projections after calendar year 2004 and identifying fiscal year
2005 options which might be needed to protect any United Defense combat vehicle
fabrication capability determined essential for future production. Those options will
consider United Defense work on development of manned FCS non-line of sight gun
system, unmanned ground systems, foreign sales, and other new non-traditional
business. All of the other industrial base risks from not funding the Counterattack
Corps are judged acceptable.
36. Senator Sessions. Secretary Brownlee and/or General Keane, how will the
Army cost-effectively support the tanks, Bradley Fighting Vehicles, tank recovery
vehicles, and self-propelled howitzers which will be in the inventory for many years
to come without a healthy industrial base?
Secretary Brownlee and General Keane. Given that final vehicle deliveries are
scheduled for June 2005, we expect fiscal year 2003 funding and other work to keep
essential skills active through the end of calendar year 2004. The program funding
for system sustainment and technical support will transition in fiscal year 2006
from the Army procurement to the operations and maintenance account. We believe
United Defense's engineering staff and the Army's own in-house staff will be able
to sustain the vehicles made by United Defense.
The shortage of Bradley upgrade funding is manageable, but there are two key
issues we must address. The first issue is how we will fund the required technical
support to the fielded fleet. During fiscal year 2003, the Army has had to fund vehi-
cle technical support from operations and maintenance accounts. This approach,
while necessary, presents us a challenge as we address both peacetime requirements
and operational requirements for the global war on terrorism and operations in
Iraq. Obviously, we continue to finance the highest priority operational require-
ments first and defer those that are of a lower priority. A second issue is whether
key suppliers will abandon the supplier network as we reduce requirements. This
is an ongoing challenge. In our efforts to mitigate risk in this area, the Army is con-
ducting additional analysis to enable appropriate decisions, for example, to either
stockpile components or find alternate suppliers.
ABRAMS TANK
37. Senator Sessions. Secretary Brownlee, I understand that the Army intends
to upgrade 588 M1A2 Abrams tanks to the System Enhancement Program configu-
ration. Subcommittee staff has been briefed that the current plan is to pull the re-
maining 586 MlA2s that will not be upgraded to the SEP configuration from the
units that currently have them and store them in a depot to be used for parts for
the SEPs. This would be a bitter pill for the Army and Congress to swallow — using
the Army's second most modem tanks for spare parts. Why is the Army contemplat-
ing such a drastic action?
Secretary Brownlee. The Army is currently funded to upgrade 588 Abrams tanks
to the M1A2 SEP configuration. The Army also desires, and is working to secure,
funding to upgrade an additional 129 MlA2s to the M1A2 SEP configuration for
52
modernization of 3rd ACR. This brings the total number of M1A2 SEP tanks pro-
duced to 717 for the Counterattack Corps. That leaves 457 MlA2s that would not
be upgraded.
By the end of fiscal year 2007, the Army expects to have a pure MlAl fleet for
the remaining active and Reserve component units, thereby reducing the logistical
burden of supporting numerous versions of Abrams. The Airny will also upgrade its
pre-positioned stock with versions of the MlAl tank allowing units to draw the
same model tank they will train on at home station. Finally, the Army will upgrade
a major portion of active component forces to Force XXI digital situational aware-
ness.
Since the M1A2 is a unique tank with several obsolete parts and limited second
and third tier vendor support, it has become increasingly difficult to support. The
M1A2 fleet is not digitally interoperable with digitized forces and would require ex-
tensive work to embed these capabilities into this platform. Our analysis shows this
approach to be uneconomical and unnecessary.
38. Senator Sessions. Secretary Brownlee, why would you not put those tanks in
the Counterattack Corps' armored cavalry regiment, another active division, or in
the National Guard?
Secretary Brownlee. Our intent is to put the M1A2 SEP into the Counterattack
Corps across the 4th Infantry Division, 1st Cavalry Division and the 3rd Armored
Cavalry Regiment. The Army National Guard has expressed a desire for a pure fleet
of the more supportable MlAl and MlAl heavy armor tanks. Significant funds
would be required to bring excess MlA2s back up to standard for refielding. Due
to the current Abrams plan to upgrade the active component with M1A2 SEP and
MlAl AIM tanks and cascade MlAls to the National Guard, we believe that the
funds to upgrade the MIA2 can be used for higher priority requirements.
PRE-POSITIONED STOCKS
39. Senator Sessions. General Keane, the Army has faced a challenge keeping
pre-positioned stocks modernized. I understand that the 3rd Infantry Division drew
equipment, such as Bradley Fighting Vehicles, which was less modem than their
own back in Georgia. That required them to "train down" to learn how to operate
with the less modem equipment, and means that they may fight with less capable
equipment while their more capable equipment sits in motor pools in Georgia. The
lack of modernized pre-positioned stocks also means that units which deploy quickly
and draw that less capable equipment may be the first to fight, while more modern-
ized forces come much later. It appears that may be the case in Iraq, with the 4th
Infantry Division, the most modem heavy division, yet to be deployed. Is the Army
considering alternatives to deal with this problem, which will only be exacerbated
in the future as the Army modernizes two divisions of the Counterattack Corps?
General Keane. The 3rd Infantry Division drew equipment from Army pre-posi-
tioned stocks (APS) that are not the most modem. However, this equipment was
well-maintained as evidenced by the readiness rate of the fleet when it was drawn
in Kuwait. Furthermore, the equipment used by the 3rd Infantry Division has prov-
en itself successful on the battlefield as exemplified during recent training exercises
in Kuwait.
The majority of the equipment within the APS program was built up from stocks
drawn down in Europe at the end of the Cold War. Concurrently, Army financial
constraints during the post-Cold War drawdown did not allow us to simultaneously
modernize all equipment throughout the Active Force, much less the equipment in
the APS. Difficult dollar-driven decisions had to be made, and the Army decided to
keep less modem equipment in the APS program and field its newest equipment
to high-priority operational units. The APS continues to be modernized with equip-
ment cascaded down from high-priority active units receiving new equipment. We
believe it remains most correct to assure the highest caliber equipment remains in
our active units. However, we continue to review various alternatives to the issue
of modernizing APS equipment, with an objective improving our ability to the APS
as modem as we possibly can.
40. General Keane, what are the Army's plans for reconstituting the Army pre-
positioned stocks after the current crisis with Iraq is resolved?
General Keane. The APS unit sets that are presently being used in Southwest
Asia are projected to remain in theater until at least fiscal year 2005. Consequently,
we plan to reconstitute this fleet in the theater with assets that will remain there.
The sustainment stocks and ammunition that were issued to units but not used will
53
be reloaded upon container ships and returned to the Diego Garcia region. The
sustainment stocks and ammunition that were used or consumed will be requi-
sitioned and uploaded on container ships when they become available.
FAMILY OF MEDIUM TACTICAL VEHICLES
41. Senator Sessions. Secretary Brownlee, in fiscal year 2002, the Army con-
ducted a competition for a replacement for the Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles
(FMTV) Al. In the Fiscal Year 2003 Defense Authorization Bill, Congress imposed
limitations on the Army's ability to award a contract for the FMTV competitive re-
buy without certifying a 10 percent cost savings of a multi-year contract over a con-
tract of 5 consecutive years. While the competition was underway. Senator Warner
received reports from Afghanistan that the FMTV AO dump truck was not perform-
ing up to specifications. Has the Army corrected deficiencies identified in Afghani-
stan?
Secretary Brownlee. Before the deployment of FMTV dump trucks to Afghani-
stan, the Army had embarked on an aggressive program to make improvements in
the dump configuration. The dump upgrade program began in the field in June 2002
and was accelerated to support deployments. The upgrade program includes 11
changes in all, including a 1/4 inch steel plate bed liner, new stronger tail gate,
maximization of the current hydraulic lift system, stronger suspension system, and
in-cab controls relocated for greater operator ease. A sideboard kit was added to the
upgrade program and addresses the only new issue coming from Afghanistan. To
date, all of the 448 dump trucks in the fleet are complete with the exception of 4
vehicles which are deployed, to be upgraded on their return, and 12 vehicles that
are located on the outer Hawaiian Islands, planned to be completed by the end of
April 2003.
42. Senator Sessions. Secretary Brownlee, will you be able to certify a 10 percent
cost savings using a multi-year procurement instrument? If not, why not? What sav-
ings do you expect to achieve?
Secretary Brownlee. The Army will not be able to certify a 10 percent cost sav-
ings for the FMTV Al competitive rebuy. A comparative, verifiable database for suc-
cessive single year versus multiyear acquisition savings for this program, sufficient
for certification, does not exist. The approved acquisition strategy did not require
binding single year and multi-year proposals, which would be the only way to verify
actual multi-year savings. The Army relies on cost estimating to compute reliable
savings estimates associated with multiyear procurement and these savings for the
FMTV Al competitive rebuy program are estimated to be 6.5 percent. Actual sav-
ings could approach, or even exceed 10 percent. Both cuirent FMTV Al competitive
rebuy contractors have expressed, orally or in writing, the claim that 10 percent
savings are realistic and achievable. These assertions, however, have not been ten-
dered in a binding proposal, and therefore, are not verifiable.
RESERVE component
43. Senator Sessions. Secretary Brownlee and/or General Keane, the Army Na-
tional Guard (ARNG) force structure includes eight divisions. The Army, with the
support of the ARNG, is in the process of converting two of these divisions into a
combat service support structure. It is my understanding that the Army National
Guard has agreed to restructure two-to-four divisions into multifunctional organiza-
tions. Has the Army made a decision with regards to the design and operational ca-
pabilities of the ARNG multifunctional divisions?
Secretary Brownlee and General Keane. There are two concepts you have men-
tioned. The first is ihe Army National Guard Division Redesign Study (ADRSi, the
second is the Army National Guard Restructuring Initiative (ANGRI).
In 1995, the ARNG combat structure consisted of 8 divisions and 18 separate bri-
gades, for a total of 42 combat brigades. Under the ADRS plan that was approved
in 1996, 12 combat brigades and slice elements from two division bases would con-
vert to required combat support/combat service support structure. At the end of
ADRS, the ARNG would have 8 divisions and 15 separate brigades, 9 of which
would be embedded in the divisions, for a total of 30 combat brigades. ANGRI will
adapt the ARNG to the new Defense Strategy while providing a bridge to the Objec-
tive Force. ANGRI will achieve these objectives by converting four of the eight divi-
sions to a more versatile design called the Multi-Functional Division (MFD). Embed-
ded within the MFD is the Mobile Light Brigade (MLB), an infantry-centric organi-
54
zation enhanced with systems that provide commanders with more versatile capa-
biHties than found in present ARNG divisional brigades.
We are currently staffing the designs for the MFD and MLB for final approval.
Our near-term focus is to get the MLB design approved and included in the Pro-
gram Objective Memorandum (POM) 2005-2009. However, we will continue to re-
fine the MFD design with a goal of addressing MFD requirements in POM 2006-
2011.
The MFD will perform operations in a variety of roles. We envision that it will
perform missions ranging from a post-hostilities role in a major combat operation,
to direct participation in small-scale contingency operation, to providing general
purpose capabilities for a homeland security operation supporting Northern Com-
mand (NORTHCOM).
After we implement ANGRI, the ARNG force structure will still consist of eight
divisions (four MFDs, two heavy, one medium, one light) and some number of sepa-
rate brigades (to be determined). These will be apportioned to Army missions. Total
Army Ajialysis 2006-2011, which will be completed later this year, will address the
specific number of MFDs and MLBs.
As we work through design issues associated with implementation of ANGRI, we
will continue to ensure the Army retains the operational capabilities required to
meet the National Security Strategy, the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, the Con-
tingency Planning Guidance, and other key documents.
44. Senator Sessions. Secretary Brownlee and/or General Keane, do you have an
estimate of the costs associated with the restructure and, if so, are these costs re-
flected in the fiscal year 2004 budget request?
Secretary Brownlee and General Keane. The designs for the MFD and the MLB
have not yet been finalized; therefore, we cannot provide a cost estimate at this
time. Our intent is to begin funding ANGRI in POM 05-09. Consequently, we envi-
sion no direct impact on the fiscal year 2004 budget.
45. Senator SESSIONS. Secretary Brownlee and/or General Keane, what is the im-
pact of this reorganization on Army National Guard aviation force structure?
Secretary Brownlee and General Keane. There is no direct impact to Army Na-
tional Guard aviation force structure as a result of the ANGRI initiative. ANGRI
and the ARNG aviation transformation are separate, but complimentary efforts of
the overall Army Transformation Campaign Plan — both efforts are intended to
bridge the ARNG to the Objective Force.
46. Senator SESSIONS. Secretary Brownlee and/or General Keane, will the contem-
plative changes solve the Army's problem with respect to military police, civil af-
fairs, and other units which are in extremely high demand in this new strategic en-
vironment?
General Keane. The full scope of operational requirements demanded by the new
strategic environment is not known at this time. We continue to assess Army re-
quirements for the global war on terrorism and the emerging strategic environment,
and have already planned and programmed a number of required changes into the
fiscal year 2004-2009 POM underpinning the Army fiscal year 2004 budget submis-
sion. In this initial wave of adaptation, over 19,500 spaces have been programmed
for change within the active, Guard, and Reserve force structure. These enhanced
force capabilities include some force restructuring to address evolving requirements
for military police, chemical specialties, special operations capabilities and civil af-
fairs forces.
The Army will continue to adjust its force structure based on the Secretary of De-
fense's "1-4-2-1" force-sizing construct. To stay within targeted end strength levels,
the Army anticipates that adding capabilities to the Active Force will require the
transfer of some mission capabilities between the Active and Reserve Forces. We are
exploring a number of options to reduce risk in achieving Army missions in the new
strategic environment. Some of these options under study include converting lower
demand structure inside the Active Force, converting key capabilities held in the
Reserve component but needed on a recurring basis for contingency operations, and
changing the Reserve personnel management system by enhancing volunteerism
and diminishing involuntary mobilization in order to increase access to Reserve-spe-
cific capabilities.
The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), in conjunction with the Joint Staff,
has undertaken a study to improve operational availability of all military forces. As
part of this undertaking, the active component/Reserve component mix is being
studied carefully in the context of short-notice, short-duration major combat oper-
ations. This study remains incomplete. However, we anticipate preliminary rec-
55
ommendations from it, including those that might necessitate force structure
changes, may be incorporated as part of Defense planning for fiscal year 2005 that
is anticipated fi-om OSD later in the year.
47. Senator Sessions. Secretary Brownlee and/or General Keane, are there any
other roles and functions that should migrate from active to Reserve or vice versa?
Secretary Brownlee and General Keane. OSD, in conjunction with the Joint
Staff, has undertaken a study to improve operational availability of all military
forces. As part of this undertaking, the active component/Reserve component mix is
being studied carefully in the context of short-notice, short-duration major combat
operations. This study remains incomplete. Once finished, we expect it to inform
Army decisions on which, if any, forces that should migi-ate from the Active to Re-
serve Force (or vice versa). The Arm/s active and Reserve component force mix is
the result of deliberate actions to balance risks and priorities in light of operational
requirements, resource constraints, emd the "1-4—2-1" force sizing construct. The
Army's force mix is designed to support the geographic combatant commauider's re-
quirements as determined by the Total Army Analysis process. To stay within con-
stant end-strength levels, we anticipate that adding capabilities to the Active Force
will require the transfer of some mission capabilities between the Active and Re-
serve Forces. Thus, while it remains uncertain precisely which roles or functions
might be best reallocated between Army active and Reserve components, we believe
that the OSD and Army processes now in place to address this issue will account
fully for the key factors in the new strategic environment mandating any such
change.
RAND ARROYO CENTER
48. Senator SESSIONS. Secretary Brownlee, how does the RAND Arroyo Center
support Army transformation efforts?
Secretary Brownlee. The RAND Arroyo Center conducts mid- to long-term policy
studies and analyses under the direction of the Arm/s Arroyo Center Policy Com-
mittee (ACPC) which is co-chaired by General Keane and the Assistant Secretary
of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics and Technology).
The Arroyo program supports Legacy, Interim, and Objective Force topics.
Arroyo's research addresses Army transformation efforts such as human resource
implications, leader development evaluation, the total Army school system, training
development for combat service support systems, managing the Future Combat Sys-
tems acquisition program, organizing and managing the Army science and tech-
nology community for transformational research and development, CSS trans-
formation (including rapid deployment of early entry forces), support to the Training
and Doctrine Command for Army transformational analysis. Objective Force band-
width requirements, and lessons learned fi"om recent Army employments, e.g., Af-
ghanistan lessons learned.
49. Senator Sessions. Secretary Brownlee, is Arroyo's legislatively-mandated cap
on funding adequate to support all of the Army taskings for the organization? What
would the appropriate ceiling level be?
Secretary Brownlee. Yes. The ceiling still allows for adequate support by the
Army's Federally Funded Research and Development Center (FFRDC). RAND
Arroyo's share of DOD's FFRDC ceiling for fiscal year 2003 is 99 staff-years of tech-
nical effort.
Questions Submitted by Senator Pat Roberts
efficient basing east and south initiatives
50. Senator ROBERTS. General Keane, are the Efficient Basing East and South Ini-
tiatives consistent with the overseas basing review ciirrently being conducted by the
EUCOM commander?
General Keane. The Secretary of Defense has given the Under Secretary of De-
fense for Pohcy and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, until July 1, 2003, to de-
velop a comprehensive and integrated presence and basing strategy looking out 10
years. The results will determine if the Efficient Basing East and South Initiatives
are consistent with the strategy and support for future presence in Europe.
56
51. Senator Roberts. General Keane, if the Efficient Basing East and South Ini-
tiatives are not approved, could the Army execute the fiscal year 2004 military con-
struction ftinds associated with those initiatives within the continental U.S.?
General Keane. In accordance with overall program priorities, the Army could
execute fiscal year 2004 construction fimds associated with these European efficient
basing initiatives in the continental United States. We would want to work closely
with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and Congress to assure that any re-focus-
ing of fiscal year 2004 military construction funds presently focused for Europe is
accomplished in accordance with an overall program that accounts for Army soldier
and family needs both within and outside the continental United States.
FAMILY OF MEDIUM TACTICAL VEHICLES
52. Senator Roberts. Secretary Brownlee, to help pay for transformation, the
Army has reduced funding for the Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles program.
Given the importance of FMTV to both the current force and the Objective Force,
does the Army require additional funding to sustain the FMTV program in fiscal
year 2004? How would additional funding continue truck modernization?
Secretary Brownlee. While the Army can sustain the FMTV program with the
fiscal year 2004 funding in the fiscal year 2004/2005 President's budget, additional
funds would be put to use to continue and accelerate modernization of the medium
fleet.
ADVANCED ALUMINUM AEROSTRUCTURES INITIATIVE
53. Senator Roberts. Secretary Brownlee, transforming the force hinges, in part,
on our ability to stimulate innovation and apply best business practices in the de-
sign-manufacturing paradigm. Along these lines, this committee has supported the
Advanced Aluminum Aerostructures Initiative in each of the past 3 years to iden-
tify, develop, and demonstrate design and manufacturing capabilities that will en-
able systems producers to provide aluminum aerostructures at a dramatically re-
duced cost. The program, which is managed by the Air Force Research Laboratory's
Air Vehicles Directorate, has targeted select components on a variety of platforms,
including the C-17, C-130, UCAV, JSF, F-22, and Global Hawk, and produced
some very impressive achievements in terms of part count reductions, weight reduc-
tions, and cost reductions.
As the Army continues its efforts to transform the force, it would seem that the
same principles and methodology demonstrated in the Advanced Aluminum
Aerostructures Initiative could be applied to ground systems modernization to sub-
stantially reduce the weight and costs of vehicle structures and, thereby, enhance
performance and affordability of future combat systems. Would you review the Air
Force's Advanced Aluminum Aerostructures program and provide me with your per-
spective on how we might apply this innovative design/manufacturing methodology
to our ground systems modernization program to enhance transformation and gen-
erate cost and weight reductions in military ground vehicle structures? I wovdd ap-
preciate your response as soon as possible so that your input can be factored into
the committee's deliberations on the fiscal year 2004 budget request.
Secretary Brownlee. The Army is familiar with the ALCOA/Air Force Advanced
Aluminum Aerostructures Initiative (AAAI) program. We are aware of this program
as a result of discussions conducted between Army Tank-Automotive Research De-
velopment and Engineering Center (TARDEC) engineers, the ALCOA Technical
Center in Pittsburgh, and the ALCOA Automotive Division (located in the vicinity
of TARDEC). At the summer 2001 annual Automotive Industry Aluminum Associa-
tion symposium, TARDEC engineers made presentations to the aluminum industry,
informing it about the Army's transformation challenges — and industry's opportuni-
ties— to reduce future ground vehicle size, weight, and cost without sacrificing
lethality and survivability. They encouraged the aluminum industry to take advan-
tage of the new opportunities to apply aerospace technologies to help meet the FCS
objectives.
Since that meeting, TARDEC has taken further steps to facilitate introductory re-
lationships between ALCOA and the Army's FCS Lead Systems Integrator and its
ground vehicle contractor team. As a result, we can report that, ground vehicle in-
dustrial base contractors with a stake in Army transformation are aware of, and
have indicated high interest in, the methodologies and technologies described by
ALCOA. We are confident that the best solutions and options available to incor-
porate aluminum in the Army's FCS are under active review and being incorporated
57
in the budgetary proposals underpinning the fiscal year 2004 and future fiscal year
Army budget submissions.
Questions Submitted by Senator Carl Levin
modular causeway systems
54. Senator Levin. General Keane, the Army has not fiinded the Modular Cause-
way Systems (MCS) in fiscal year 2004. After systems bought under current con-
tracts are delivered, the Army will still be critically short of MCS assets, including
4 roll-on/roll-off discharge facilities, 14 causeway ferries, 1 floating causeway, and
15 warping tugs. The decision to cease MCS procurement will have a devastating
impact on the industrial base and incur substantial costs to rebuild that base and
resume production in the future. How does the Army intend to meet the outstanding
requirement for MCS?
General Keane. The projected Army MCS shortfall after fiscal year 2003 produc-
tion buys is 2 roll-on/roll-off discharge facilities, 13 causeway ferries, 9 warping
tugs, and no floating causeways. This shortfall is less than previously projected as
the Army now plans to field three company sets rather than four. There is no addi-
tional program funding until fiscal year 2007. The Army's intent is to fully fund the
entire MCS requirement and has budgeted at least $12 million per year from fiscal
year 2007 to fiscal year 2013 for MCS production.
55. Senator Levin. General Keane, what would be the cost to procure the out-
standing requirement assuming a renewal of current contracts?
General Keane. Based on the unit costs in the current production contract's final
option period (ending in November 2004), the requirements shortfall is approxi-
mately $61 million.
56. Senator Levin. General Keane, what would be the cost to procure the out-
standing requirement assuming that the current contract is allowed to lapse?
General Keane. The estimated cost of the requirements shortfall assuming a new
contract action is $84.5 million.
57. Senator Levin. General Keane, what would be the cost of reopening current
production facilities in the future if allowed to close at the completion of current
contracts?
General Keane. Based upon non-recurring costs in the current contract, the esti-
mated non-recurring costs for these systems when program funding is next expected
to be available (fiscal year 2007) is $2.6 million.
Question Submitted by Senator Evan Bayh
58. Senator Bayh. Secretary Brownlee, I would like to know what the Army is
doing to ensure it maintains a viable industrial base to support current systems in
the interim as we move to the Objective Force. Specifically, what is the Army's plan
to sustain the transmission base for both the Abrams tank and the Ml 13 combat
vehicle fleets over the next 20 years?
The Army is working closely with Allison Transmission Division to maintain a
combat vehicle transmission support capability for heavy combat vehicles. Obvi-
ously, it is difficult to lay out specific plans for the next 20 years for a particular
supplier, but we will always take whatever actions are required to support indus-
trial capability that is defense-unique, critical, and endangered.
Specific actions by the Army to preserve the Allison Transmission base include
a near-term buy of 43 Ml 13 transmissions, to be awarded by mid-September 2003,
and the X200— 4 to X200-4a conversion program, beginning August 2004.
Other work includes the Abrams upgrade of XllOO-1 to X1100-3b transmissions,
part of the Abrams System Enhancement Program. This upgrade will be complete
by late calendar year 2003. The Defense Logistics Agency and the Army buy spare
parts from Allison Transmission Division that support the Army's overhaul program
at Anniston Army Depot. Systems technical support will require Allison to provide
engineering and logistics support. Finally, as combat vehicles return from Iraq, Alli-
son will likely get additional work.
Obviously, Allison has other work, such as foreign military sales that also helps
maintain this capability. As a prime example, Egypt may buy an additional 275
tanks. Depending on their terms, Allison may get the contract for the transmissions
58
and engineering support. That could begin in September 2005 and continue for 1
year.
[Whereupon, at 5:19 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION
FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2004
THURSDAY, APRIL 3, 2003
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Airland,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
NAVY, MARINE CORPS, AND AIR FORCE AVIATION AND
AIR-LAUNCHED WEAPONS PROGRAMS
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:50 p.m., in room
SR-232A, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Jeff Sessions
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators McCain, Sessions,
Chambliss, and Pryor.
Majority staff members present: Ambrose R. Hock, professional
staff member; Gregory T. Kiley, professional staff member; and
Thomas L. MacKenzie, professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: Creighton Greene, professional
staff member; and Maren R. Leed, professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Andrew W. Florell and Nicholas W.
West.
Committee members' assistants present: Christopher J. Paul, as-
sistant to Senator McCain; James Beauchamp, assistant to Senator
Roberts; James W. Irwin and Clyde A. Taylor IV, assistants to Sen-
ator Chambliss; Aaron Scholer, assistant to Senator Lieberman;
William Todd Houchins, assistant to Senator Dayton; and Terri
Glaze, assistant to Senator Pryor.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JEFF SESSIONS,
CHAIRMAN
Senator Sessions. Good afternoon. It is great to have Senator
Pryor here as our ranking member today, a new Senator but a fine
public servant. We served some time in the same office as attor-
neys general of different states. So it is great to have him in the
Senate.
Senator Pryor. Thank you.
Senator SESSIONS. I would like to welcome each of our witnesses
here and thank you for taking the time from your busy schedules
as the Airland Subcommittee meets to consider how the fiscal year
2004 budget request and the Future Years Defense Program
(59)
60
(FYDP) support aviation and air-launched weapons programs and
priorities.
Many of the platforms and systems we are going to be discussing
today are at this very moment being used by the young men and
women of our armed services who have been deployed in harm's
way. We owe all of them a debt of gratitude and pledge our support
to them.
I especially want to express my sympathy for the families of
those who have fallen or who have been wounded on the battlefield.
I will be at a funeral Saturday for Private First Class (PFC) How-
ard Johnson from my hometown of Mobile. I knew his father. He
is the pastor of Truevine Missionary Baptist Church with just a
fine family. He was out there doing what he could for his country
and gave his life for it.
Our predecessors on the Armed Services Committee over the last
40 years have made key and difficult investment decisions to au-
thorize the development and procurement of many of the aircraft
and weapons systems that are being used today around the world.
Many of those were criticized at the time. So it is now our respon-
sibility to ensure that the weapons systems that will be used in the
decades to come are developed and produced in an efficient man-
ner.
Today in the deserts of Iraq, our ground forces have the ability
to maneuver with the benefit of air dominance. We must have the
same goal today to provide the men and women of the armed serv-
ices with effective and suitable equipment with which to accom-
plish their missions. Domination of the airspace is an absolute re-
quirement.
I want to thank Senator Pryor for his willingness to act as rank-
ing member today. I am sure Senator Lieberman appreciates your
willingness to fill in for him.
Our panel of witnesses today should be able to give unique in-
sight into both the requirements and acquisition plans for the avia-
tion programs of the Navy and Air Force departments. From the
Department of the Navy we welcome Secretary John Young — there
he is — the Assistant Secretary of Navy for Research, Development,
and Acquisition. With him are Vice Admiral Nathman, the Deputy
Chief of Naval Operations for Warfare Requirements and Pro-
grams; Lieutenant General Hough, the Deputy Commandant of the
Marine Corps for Aviation; and from the Department of the Air
Force we have Secretary Marvin Sambur, the Assistant Secretary
of Air Force for Acquisition; and Lieutenant General Keys, the Dep-
uty Chief of Staff for Air and Space Operations.
A good panel. They can answer, I am sure, any questions that
we would have.
There have been numerous studies completed on the affordability
of projected aviations programs. In the area of tactical aviation, we
have the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet in full rate production, the FA-
22 Raptor in low rate production, and the Joint Strike Fighter
(JSF) in Systems Development and Demonstration (SDD) with pro-
duction scheduled later in the decade.
As the average age of our current tactical aircraft continues to
increase, it is clear that we have to recapitalize. The cost associated
with this recapitalization, however, makes it imperative that we
61
carefully examine the performance and numerical requirements for
these platforms.
The subcommittee is also interested in precision-guided muni-
tions. In Operation Desert Storm, only 10 percent of the air
dropped munitions were precision-guided. In our current conflicts,
the vast majority of our weapons have been precision-guided. This
has increased the survivability of our strike aircraft, decreased the
incidence of collateral damage, and provided a substantial force
multiplier effect.
I understand that the production of our laser-guided bombs is at
the maximum rate and that the production of the Joint Direct At-
tack Munition (^^JDAM) is scheduled to achieve maximum rate in
the near future. I have been concerned, however, that we do not
have a sufficient inventory of these weapons. I feel we must do all
we can to achieve necessary inventory objectives.
Another area of concern to the subcommittee is the Department's
plan for providing electronic attack. Since the current inventory of
EA-6B Prowlers used by all three Services is aging, I understand
that quite a few of our current fleet of EA-6s are either grounded
or have flight restrictions. We will talk about that.
This subcommittee is aware of ongoing negotiations between the
Air Force and industry for the potential lease of airborne refueling
aircraft. Although no proposal has been delivered to Congress for
this approach to recapitalization of the KC-135 fleet, the fiscal
year 2004 budget request does include a plan to retire 68 KC-135E
aircraft. This would have a significant impact on our ability to pro-
vide the required airborne refueling to our mobility, long-range
strike, and tactical aircraft.
Again, gentlemen, thank you for being here today. I look forward
to your testimony.
Senator Pryor, we would be delighted to have any opening state-
ments you would like to make.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR MARK PRYOR
Senator Pryor. Thank you, Mr Chairman. It is an honor to be
here with you today. The first thing I need to do is submit a state-
ment by Senator Lieberman for the record, if that is permissible.
Senator SESSIONS. It will be made a part of the record.
[The prepared statement of Senator Lieberman follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Joseph I. Lieberman
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would hke to take an opportunity to thank our wit-
nesses for appearing before this subcommittee today.
First, I think it's important to note the heroism and professionaUsm of the coah-
tion Armed Forces presently engaged in hostilities in Iraq. I would like to draw spe-
cial attention to those forces that undertook the daring and brilliantly executed res-
cue of PFC Jessica Lynch Tuesday night in the town of Nasiriya. All those involved
in that rescue mission, like all those men and women in uniform who are serving
their country in the Middle East right now, represent the best in word and in deed
that this country has to offer.
It is against that backdrop of continued bravery and exemplary performance that
we convene this session of the Airland Subcommittee to discuss the present status
and the future, of tactical aviation. It is a humbling backdrop indeed. It serves to
remind us of the importance of the issues raised in this subcommittee . . . that the
decisions made, in part, in these chambers, may result in lives saved months or
even years down the road in conflicts both prepared for and hardly imagined.
62
To this end, therefore, I would hke to raise a few issues with our witnesses —
issues that I hope this subcommittee will hear more about during its proceedings
and the witnesses' testimony today.
First, I note with no small amount of dismay that the testing of the F/A-22
Raptor has been delayed. Last year the Air Force was predicting that the F/A-22
program — a program essential to future U.S. air superiority — would start oper-
ational testing and evaluation this month. Since that announcement there have
been delays in two major areas: one, delayed aircraft deliveries have slowed the
progress of the development testing leading up to initial operational testing and
evaluation; and two, problems with the aircraft's software have proven harder to
correct than anticipated.
Production costs have also increased. In fiscal year 2003, Congress provided more
than $4.6 billion for the production of 23 F/A-22 aircraft. After negotiating the con-
tract for this year's aircraft, the Air Force has found that those funds will only buy
20 aircraft — a change caused by cost increases and the need to shift research and
development (R&D) funds to support additional development and testing efforts.
Now the Air Force intends to purchase only 22 of the aircraft in fiscal year 2004,
down from the 27 it planned to buy at this time last year.
Moving to the Joint Strike Fighter, I note with disappointment that this program
may also have hit a "snag." Reports indicate that a critical weight problem has de-
veloped which needs to be addressed sooner rather than later. I would urge the
Services and the contracting team to fix the problem now in such a way that will
not create a "bow wave" of further complications as we approach delivery dates.
Hasty weight reduction fixes have been responsible for substantial cost increases in
other aircraft developments late in the program, and neither I nor my colleagues
on this subcommittee want to see the same sort of mistakes be repeated to the JSF
program.
Moving fi-om platforms to capabilities, I would like to ask our witnesses what the
Marine Corps and the Air Force plan to do about replacing the EA-6B Prowler elec-
tronic warfare aircraft. As we all know, the EA-6B is the world's premier electronic
warfare aircraft and is vital for the suppression of enemy air defenses and the dis-
ruption of their communication capabilities. Precisely because of its superior abili-
ties to decimate the enemy's ability to utilize the electronic ether to its own ends,
the Prowler is a prominent member of the U.S. Armed Forces' "high demand, low
densitj^' asset community. The DOD sponsored an analysis to determine how to
modernize the aging EA-6B and increase the assets' availability to deployed forces.
As a result of this study the Navy has decided to develop an electronic warfare vari-
ant of the F/A-18. But it is much less clear what the Marine Corps and Air Force
plan to do. I hope to hear fi"om our representatives of the Air Force and Mai-ines
present today on their plans to fill this crucial operational niche in the near-to-mid-
dle distance future.
In addition to a substantial demand for airborne electronic warfare assets, the
U.S. military is also experiencing a high demand for air-to-air refueling tankers. I
was troubled to learn of press reports that carrier aircraft were literally stuck on
the deck because the Iraqi front line has receded inland so quickly, and there aren't
enough tankers to provide the required refueling stops. I would like to hear of the
Services' plans to rectify this capability gap. I would also like to hear more informa-
tion about the proposed leasing of 100 tanker aircraft from Boeing to replace 133
KC-135S.
The budget request includes retiring 43 of the KC-135s in fiscal year 2004, and
another 20 or so through the FYDP. Given the high utilization of the tankers them-
selves, it seems premature to do away with this many high demand assets when
their replacements are not yet identified. Indeed, although the Air Force has indi-
cated that it was close to obtaining approval from the administration for a tanker-
leasing plan, they have not yet submitted any plan to the Armed Services Commit-
tee. Senator Levin has already made it quite clear that he would argue against the
adoption of any plan until the full committee was given the opportunity to review
its details. I also know that Senator McCain has expressed strong reservations
about such a proposal.
I firmly believe that tactical air support is one of the most demanding air combat
roles a pilot can undertake. Indeed, flying extremely close to the ground while try-
ing to identify friend from foe at blistering speeds is a daunting enough task to give
anyone pause. However, on March 28 an American A-10 apparently attacked a
small convoy of British Chieftain tanks and Scimitar armored vehicles from the
Household Cavalry. Preliminary reports indicate that although the attack by the A-
10 took place in a British-controlled area, although the British armor had 'popped'
colored smoke to identify themselves to the aircraft, and although the tanks and ar-
63
mored vehicles had friendly markings applied to their exterior, the attack was
pressed.
In the end one British tanker was killed and four injured in the attack. Given
the importance of coalitions to our national security, and given that working with
coalition partners, especially the British, will increasingly become the rule rather
than the exception, I would like the witnesses to address the question of whether
or not our procedures or training need to be updated to prevent such unfortunate
accidents from recurring in the future.
Lastly, as the ranking member of this subcommittee which holds jurisdiction, in
part, over the Air Force, as a long-time supporter of the military, as a Senator who
has proudly nominated young women to our military academies, and as the father
of two daughters, I feel it necessary to address current events at the United States
Air Force Academy. I share my Armed Services Committee colleagues' deep concern
and dismay over the way that that institution has handled allegations of sexual as-
sault and misconduct at the Academy. While I support Secretary Roche's change of
the top Academy leadership, I too must wonder aloud if this is too little, too late.
The lives of scores of young cadets have been irreparably harmed so too has the
spirit and core of the Air Force which has now lost some of its best and brightest
through the wrong-doing of some of their classmates, and the failure of the leader-
ship to take their allegations seriously. Senator Collins and I have already called
for an independent investigation of the Academy. . . I am now proud to co-sponsor
Senator Allard's amendment to the Emergency Defense Supplemental to create an
independent board of inquiry to examine the decisions of the Academy leadership
specifically, and the Air Force leadership more generally, concerning the allegations
of sexual misconduct at the Academy. I await their findings.
Again, I would like to welcome the witnesses to this hearing, and thank you in
advance for your candor.
Senator Pryor. I want to thank our witnesses for being here,
and I certainly appreciate ever5^hing that you all do. I cannot say
another word without acknowledging the wonderful job our Armed
Forces are doing in Operation Iraqi Freedom. It has really been
amazing to watch the progress we have made in these last few
days.
One thing I am proud of about the Senate Armed Services Com-
mittee is this commitment we have to try the best we can to work
in a very bipartisan way. I think that there is a broad consensus
on the Armed Services Committee, and certainly on this sub-
committee as well, to enable the Department of Defense (DOD) to
respond to the changes of the uncertain world we face.
The challenges are many. We know that you are going through
a transformation process, a modernization process. We know that
we are living in an ever-changing and dangerous world. We appre-
ciate your commitment to the security of our Nation and the free-
dom of people all over the world.
One thing I would love to hear from each of you, as is appro-
priate, is testimony on the FA-22. I would like to get an update
on that. I would love to hear about the JSF. I would love to hear
about the replacement for the EA-6B and also the KC-135 lease
proposal. I know those are four issues that we are all familiar with
and I think this subcommittee would like to hear about them.
One thing I would like to emphasize is that this subcommittee
and the full committee in the Senate will give a lot of attention to
the Department of Defense and the needs of the Department of De-
fense. That attention is very appropriate considering all the chal-
lenges that you have. We are committed to maintaining our advan-
tages and improving upon those. So we also acknowledge that our
resources are limited. We are here to make sure that our resources
are utilized in the wisest fashion possible.
64
So I look forward to hearing from you today and look forward to
a frank and open discussion of whatever issues you have on your
mind.
Thank you.
Senator SESSIONS. Thank you, Senator Pryor. I appreciate that.
We are glad to have Senator McCain here. He is a national re-
source in a whole lot of ways. He has a vast history dealing with
many of these issues that he knows of personally. I value his in-
sight and counsel very much.
Do you have any comments to open with?
Senator McCain. After something like that, it is best to remain
silent. [Laughter.]
I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank you for holding the hearing.
I thank the witnesses for being here.
Senator Sessions. All right. Mr. Young, do you want to start? We
would be glad to hear your opening statements. I do not know if
we have a timeline, but I think 5 minutes would be a good goal.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN J. YOUNG, JR., ASSISTANT SEC-
RETARY OF THE NAVY FOR RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND
ACQUISITION
Mr. Young. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of
the subcommittee. I appreciate very much the opportunity to testify
on our fiscal year 2004 tactical aviation programs.
Recently, I visited our sailors and marines in the Persian Gulf
area. I am proud to report that the commitment that we made and
Congress' support in fiscal year 2003 to focus our taxpayers' dollars
towards improving current readiness has yielded strong dividends.
Today we have over 70 ships, 370 tactical aircraft, and more than
55,000 sailors and 60,000 marines in theater. They are trained,
equipped, and carrjdng out the Nation's will. Our prayers are with
them.
The fiscal year 2004 budget sustains the enormous strides we
have made in personnel and readiness and also attains a balanced
approach to procurement and modernization, cultivating promising
aircraft technologies, efficiently acquiring mature systems, and im-
proving the maintenance of our existing systems. Through these
steps, we have been able to increase the number of airplanes from
the 89 indicated in the fiscal year 2003 budget request to 100 in
the fiscal year 2004 budget request.
The fiscal year 2004 budget request proposes innovative and cre-
ative approaches to achieving greater combat air capability. First,
the Department's initiative to integrate Navy and Marine Corps
tactical aircraft will achieve significant reductions in procurement
and operating support costs while achieving combat requirements
and readiness levels.
Navy and Marine Corps tactical air (TACAIR) integration is en-
abled by improving the reliability and maintainability of current
and future systems, reducing the maintenance pipeline by properly
funding spares and depot maintenance, and enhancing the support
of our deployed systems.
In another innovative step, the Department of the Navy has
worked with the Air Force, the Office of the Secretary of Defense
(OSD), and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
65
(DARPA) to forge a joint unmanned combat air vehicle (UCAV) pro-
gram. Clearly, unmanned air vehicles (UAV) will play a significant
role in our future operations. We are developing a joint strategy
with the Air Force, DARPA, and OSD for a UCAV prograni that
meets our common requirements, while maintaining the flexibility
to support service-unique functions. We will structure this effort to
maintain competition among the UCAV contractors with the goal
of a JSF-like acquisition strategy that results in the selection of a
common platform with service-unique variants.
We are also continually advancing the current and future combat
value of our airplanes. The Multifunction Information Distribution
System (MIDS) provides the capability to share the airspace pic-
ture amongst all 16 linked ships and aircraft. The next step is
evolving Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) to provide an
enhanced, high-confidence air picture for systems like E-2C and
other participants. A CEC-equipped E-2C with our Radar Mod-
ernization Program upgrade and our Evolving Extended Range Ac-
tive Missile development will provide a transformational enabler
against current and future cruise missile targets, particularly those
operating over land.
The F/A-18E/F Super Hornet you mentioned is our principal tac-
tical aviation recapitalization aircraft in the near term. The budget
includes $3 billion for 42 airplanes, the final installment of a fiscal
year 2000 to 2004 multiyear procurement. Deliveries remain ahead
of schedule. Three Super Hornet squadrons are already deployed in
support of Operation Iraqi Freedom.
$228 million has been allocated to procure two E-2C Hawkeyes,
the first of a new 4-year multiyear procurement. This effort will
keep the line viable as we march towards the E-2C Advanced
Hawkeye with the Radar Modernization Program.
We are initiating the airborne electronic attack efforts on the F/
A-18E/F, calling it the EA-18G, as an evolutionary means to lever-
age existing capabilities and replace our aging, low-density, high-
demand EA-6B aircraft. Using the Super Hornet aircraft allows
the Department to streamline the acquisition process and field a
product sooner to the fleet.
Our partnership with the Air Force, Lockheed Martin, Pratt &
Whitney, and General Electric has made affordability the corner-
stone of the Joint Strike Fighter program. The fiscal year 2004
budget requests $2.2 billion for continuation of Systems Develop-
ment and Demonstration. The program is on track to deliver oper-
ational short takeoff, vertical landing (STOVL) variants to the Ma-
rine Corps in 2008 and the Navy variant in 2010. At Secretary
England and Secretary Aldridge's urging, we formed a Configura-
tion Steering Board for JSF. Secretary Sambur and I have a man-
date to reject changes in the core program in order to give JSF a
chance to deliver the initial system within the time and the dollars
available.
To further realize acquisition efficiencies, we recently signed with
the Air Force a contract to procure KC-130Js as part of a
multiyear procurement seeking 20 additional aircraft for the Ma-
rine Corps.
I believe we have crafted a balanced and properly focused budget
request that ensures our Nation will have an efficient infrastruc-
66
ture and an optimal force structure. The Navy and Marine Corps,
sir, are professional and capable, the best in the world. With your
assistance, we will continue to provide maximum capability for our
sailors and marines and maximum security for America.
I thank you for the opportunity to testify today.
Senator Sessions. Thank you. Secretary Young.
Secretary Sambur.
Dr. Sambur. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Since I would like to give you
the opportunity to ask the questions that you would like to ask and
since I have a written statement for the record, myself and General
Keys would like to forego our oral comments. If you can accept our
written remarks for the record, it would be appreciated.
Senator Sessions. We would be delighted to do that. I have re-
viewed your remarks. I appreciate those very much.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Sambur follows:]
Prepared Statement by Dr. Marvin Sambur
Chairman Sessions, Ranking Member Lieberman and members of the subcommit-
tee: Thank you for this opportunity to discuss with you the Air Force's 2004 budget
plan and to report to you on our efforts and progress on acquisition reform. Greneral
Keys and I are proud to come before you today and discuss our plan for maintaining
the United States Air Force as the dominant air force in the world. Your support
will be vital as we work together to ensure that we continue to deliver programs
that support warfighter capabilities, which are needed to ensure victory.
Over the last year, we have been very successful in implementing new changes
to the Air Force acquisition process and in providing increased capabilities to the
warfighter. My staff and I have been diligently working to develop processes and
enhance the culture within the Air Force acquisition workforce, so as to institu-
tionalize these changes and ensure our air dominance.
We will continue to leverage the technology of this Nation to create advantages
for our military forces and meet the challenges that we will face in the years ahead
as articulated by the Secretary of Defense.
CHANGING OUR ACQUISITION PROCESS
The Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Air Force gave us a mandate to change
the way we do business to deliver capability to the warfighter. From shpping devel-
opment times, to reduced deliveries, to increased costs, programs have not met es-
tablished baselines and goals. During this past year, I have been working to deter-
mine the root cause of these execution problems. The findings identify several fac-
tors that lead to poor program execution including: unstable reqxiirements, faulty
cost estimates, lack of test community buy-in, inadequate systems engineering, and
unstable funding. For the Air Force, these program execution problems result in the
average cost growth of 30 percent for acquisition programs and the doubling of the
average procurement times.
Given the problems noted above and the resulting increases in program costs and
delays in program schedules, I have formulated a series of policies to address the
underlying causes.
First, in order to overcome our unstable requirements process, I have imple-
mented an Agile Acquisition Policy that demands collaboration: that is active, coop-
erative dialogue between the warfighter, acquirer, and tester working as one team
at the outset and throughout the requirements and development process. This will
ensure that warfighter requirements are clearly articulated, the acquirers commu-
nicate what can be delivered and the testers understand what needs to be verified.
Surprises are kept in check when the user provides a concept of operations up front
and a consistent, continuous dialogue between all stakeholders provides a robust
definition of a requirement, which the acquisition community can deliver and the
tester can verify.
These changes set the goal of institutionaUzing collaboration throughout the Air
Force and DOD acquisition to include our operations, test and sustainment commu-
nities. Collaboration must start well before a product is delivered in order to control
costs and to provide the user with the required capability. When the acquisition en-
terprise, consisting of the warfighter, acquisition, test, and sustainment commu-
nities, starts working together a better product is produced.
67
Second, I have addressed the issue of faulty cost estimates by instituting policy
changes that will foster credibility within the acquisition community. Credibility
means delivering what we promise, on time and on budget. In the past, we have
designed our programs with a 60-70 percent confidence level of meeting cost, sched-
ule, and performance goals. In order to be credible both to the warfighters and Con-
gress, I have implemented a 90 percent confidence level in meeting our require-
ments.
By demanding collaboration between all the parties, we can ensure the right
trade-offs are made throughout the acquisition process to meet the required goals.
It is imperative that both the warfighting and acquisition communities work to-
gether to make tradeoffs of non-critical elements within programs to buy down risk
throughout the acquisition cycle. Bottom line: credibility means delivering what we
promise, on time and on budget.
Third, not having test community buy-in created problems further along in the
acquisition process. As such, we have started to work with the test community on
processes to reduce the number of serial events for testing. This is different from
the current process of serial and overlapping development and operational testing,
which can take several years. We are developing a seamless verification process to
ensure that both the developmental test and operation test occur in a single process,
not fragmented as it has been in the past. If the operational testers are involved
early in the process, then they can assess the operational value of developmental
testing and reduce duplication of effort.
Again, collaboration is a vital part of this process change. By involving all mem-
bers of the acquisition enterprise early and continuously, we can all come to agree-
ments on what are the operational requirements, what can be delivered and how
we will verify the systems being built meet those needs.
Fourth, we need to instill an adequate systems engineering foundation within the
acquisition process. Systems engineering is one of the bedrocks of sound manage-
ment for acquisition programs as it ensures that contractor-proposed solutions are
consistent with sound engineering principals. Decisions based on a solid systems en-
gineering approach will ensure that our program managers will be better prepared
to assess their programs' health and will help to keep programs on budget and
schedule. As such, I am implementing a process by which all future Milestone Deci-
sion Authorities will not sign out any future acquisition strategy plans that lack the
necessary attention to systems engineering. Additionally, I am demanding system
engineering performance be linked to the contract award fee or incentive fee struc-
tures. This link will help ensure the industry will also follow a sound systems engi-
neering approach.
Additionally, we are rebuilding our organic system engineering foundation to pro-
vide the necessary expertise throughout the Air Force acquisition community. Re-
cently, the Center of Excellence for Systems Engineering has been opened at the Air
Force Institute of Technology. Our goal is to create a reservoir of knowledge and
source of best practices, which can be applied to our current and future acquisition
programs.
Fifth, unstable funding is a constant problem, one that can be better managed by
a more disciplined program-priority process while leveraging spiral development
methods. Through our complementary processes to review warfighting capabilities
and the associated execution of the programs comprising the capabilities, I firmly
believe that we will have in place the ability to better manage funding instability.
As funding perturbations, both external and internal, arise within our programs,
our reviews will ensure that a disciplined process of flexing resources to programs
that contribute the most to warfighting capabilities exists. This in effect will mini-
mize the overall perturbation to programs that provide the most "bang for the buck"
and eliminating our time-honored process of applying a "peanut-butter spread" to
all.
SPIRAL DEVELOPMENT IS OUR PREFERRED ACQUISITION PROCESS
The Air Force has identified the spiral development methodology of acquisition as
the preferred approach to acquiring systems. As the pace of technology has quick-
ened, so must the pace of our acquisition process. Spiral development allows the Air
Force to incrementally deliver weapon system capability quickly — providing the
warfighter technology as it matures within acceptable program risk. As each spiral
is more clearly defined and shorter in duration, schedules are better managed due
to the shorter time exposure of the development process to internal and external
change. Mutual expectations on spiral content, cost, and schedule are also commonly
understood and agreed to up-front between all stakeholders, as collaborative prac-
tices are paramount to the spiral development process.
68
Spiral development will also assist in mitigating funding instability by allowing
the service to compartmentalize each individual spiral such that a funding cut in
the far term won't compromise a capability that is complete and ready to go to the
field today. In the past our "big bang" theory of releasing weapon system capability
to the field held all aspects of the weapon system hostage to any perturbation in
the process. With spirals we release smaller, more tightly focused capability sooner,
and minimize the risk of a long drawn-out development process being affected by
funding instability in either the mid- or far-term.
Another beneficial spin-off of spiral development acquisition is the flexibility to in-
sert the latest technology into the development and production lines. This is where
the importance of a robust science and technology (S&T) capacity is crucial in truly
reaping the benefits of a spiral release process.
CAPITALIZING ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
Providing the warfighter solutions rests in large measure with research and devel-
opment. Through robust investment and deliberate focus in S&T, the Air Force in-
vigorates our core competency of providing technology-to-warfighting. Combined
with innovative vision, S&T opens the direct route towards transforming air and
space capabilities. Therefore we continue long-term, stable investment in S&T to en-
sure we realize future capabilities, as well as those that may immediately affect ex-
isting systems.
Some of these new technologies — UAV systems, laser-based communications,
space-based radar, and others — show clear promise for near-term, joint warfighting
applications. Others present opportunities we can only begin to imagine. We are ex-
ploring each of these technologies, and our investment will deliver the required ca-
pabilities to our seven Air Force concepts of operations (CONOPs).
ACQUISITION SUCCESS THROUGH NEW BUSINESS PRACTICES
The Air Force has also enacted new business practices from an integrated enter-
prise perspective, examining every process and process link. I have expressly given
our people the latitude to make the right decisions by relaxing our past prescriptive
policies. My implementation of a reality-based acquisition policy, which replaced the
highly prescriptive Air Force Instruction (AFPD 63-1/AFI 63-101), provided guid-
ance emphasizing innovation and risk management and will delegate decision au-
thority to appropriate levels. Additionally, I have empowered our people through the
use of high powered teaming with the warfighters, to deliver initial capability to
warfighters more quickly, and add capability increments in future spirals.
Our transformation of acquisition practices are only the beginning of a com-
prehensive and aggressive approach to reforming business practices. Our efforts
today will have a direct effect on efficient and effective air and space capability ac-
quisition both immediately, and in the future.
INITL\TIVES SHOW RESULTS
During the last year we have had several successes based on these principles out-
lined above. One such example is the Passive Attack Weapon. This weapon was de-
veloped as a result of a 180-day Quick Reaction Program at Air Combat Command,
and was available to the warfighter at the 98-day mark. To date, we have delivered
58 weapons and completed all aircraft integration. Support elements have been de-
livered, and our seamless verification of the system is complete. Production was
completed on time, with 15 percent more weapons delivered than originally pro-
posed as we completed the program under budget.
WEAPON SYSTEM MODERNIZATION
FIA-22
The F/A-22, with its revolutionary combination of stealth, supercruise (i.e. super-
sonic cruise without afterburner), maneuverability, and integrated avionics, will
dominate the skies. The F/A-22 will ensure U.S. air dominance against all projected
future threats. In addition, when outfitted with the Small Diameter Bomb, the F/
A-22's ability to penetrate an adversary's anti-access airspace and destroy his most
critical air defense capabilities, will enable 24-hour stealth operations and freedom
of movement for all follow-on forces — fully leveraging our Nation's asymmetric tech-
nological advantages. In 2001, flight-testing continued to demonstrate the revolu-
tionary capabilities. Specifically, the F/A-22 successfully completed an AIM-120
guided missile launch, and initial radar detection range measurements (met speci-
fication requirements the first time out). On 14 Aug 2001, the Defense Acquisition
Board approved the F/A-22's entry into low-rate initial production (LRIP). Entering
69
operational service in 2005, this transformational leap in technology is the linchpin
to preserving the Nation's most important military advantage for the warfighter: the
capability to rapidly obtain and maintain air and space dominance. The program
continues to proceed toward full rate production. LRIP aircraft are well into the
manufacturing process; contracts already awarded include Lot 1 (10), Lot 2 (13), Lot
3 (20), and advance buy for Lot 4 (-22).
The EMD program has been restructured to resolve the EMD shortfall within the
overall F/A-22 budget. Funding was re-phased from modernization and production
in fiscal year 2003 and from production in fiscal year 2004-fiscal year 2006. The
modernization program was re-planned in concert with the warfighter to account for
these changes while ensuring critical capabilities are brought on board when re-
quired. While the EMD shortfall and higher than anticipated Lot 3 aircraft costs
did result in a revised estimate of 276 aircraft, it did not impact the Air Force's com-
mitment to the "Buy-to-Budget" strategy. The Air Force is focused on successfully
completing F/A-22 development and initiating Dedicated Initial Operational Test
and Evaluation (DIOT&E). While currently scheduled to start in October 2003,
DIOT&E remains event-based and we will not begin until we are assured of success.
Our greatest remaining development challenge is avionics stability, yet we remain
confident we will successfully resolve this issue.
Despite the issues above, F/A-22 program has made great strides in the past 6-
9 months. Not only has the flight test program increased the test point bum down
rate to the point where envelope expansion is back on track, but also the vertical
fin buffet challenge has been resolved, and the cause of canopy howl has been iden-
tified and a repair plan developed. The program recently crossed the 3,000 hour cu-
mulative flight hour milestone and has seven aircraft flying at Edwards and one at
Nellis. Testing has also included 16 live missile launches (4 guided) and successful
firing of the gun. Production processes during final assembly at Marietta continue
to show improvement. Out of station work has been reduced significantly, part
shortfalls are down 70 percent, and tool validation has been completed.
F-35
Acting in concert with the F/A-22 will be the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. The F/
A-22/F-35 force mix will balance affordability, capability and force structure — criti-
cal capabilities for the global strike concept of operations — to ensure sufficient quan-
tities of advanced fighter aircraft to give the U.S. dominant force across the full
spectrum of conflicts. The F-35 program will develop and field a highly common
family of next-generation strike fighter aircraft for the Air Force, Navy, Marine
Corps and our allies. The Air Force conventional takeoff" and landing (CTOL) vari-
ant will be a multi-role, primary air-to-ground aircraft to replace the F-16 and A-
10 and complement the F/A-22. While the F/A-22 will establish air dominance, the
F-35 — with its combination of stealth, large internal payloads and multi-spectral
avionics — will provide persistent stealth and precision engagement to the future
battlespace. The F-35 will carry a wide array of weapons, including J-series,
AMRAAM and AJM-9X. It will be optimized for all-weather, air-to-ground employ-
ment, including direct attack on the most lethal surface-to-air missile systems. F-
35 planned reliability and maintainability will enable an increase in sortie genera-
tion rate and mission reliability, and will reduce the logistics footprint as compared
to legacy aircraft.
The F-35 program is in the second year of the SDD phase. The SDD program is
employing a block upgrade approach, based upon an open system architecture, to
provide early delivery of a basic combat capability followed by integration of addi-
tional avionics and weapons capabilities to support the services' initial operational
capability (IOC) requirements in the 2010-2012 timeframe. Over the past year, the
program has achieved several SDD technical milestones, including the Air System
Requirements Review, the Integrated Baseline Reviews, the Propulsion Preliminary
Design Reviews and, most recently, the Air System Preliminary Design Review for
all three F-35 variants. The program is currently expected to meet or exceed all key
performance parameter thresholds.
The F-35 program is on track to supply 1,763 CTOL aircraft to the Air Force and
to meet the Air Force's IOC goal in fiscal year 2011. Maintaining this schedule will
ensure the optimal balance between affbrdably replacing aging aircraft and provid-
ing the warfighter the required force structure.
The F-35 is the DOD's largest cooperative development program. In fiscal year
2002, the F-35 program successfully concluded SDD cooperation agreements with
seven additional international partners: Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, Nor-
way, Italy, Turkey, and Australia. These countries, along with the United Kingdom,
are contributing over $4 billion to the SDD program. The Department is also nego-
tiating with Israel and Singapore regarding their participation as security coopera-
70
tion participants. International participation in the F-35 program wall help ensure
maintenance of economies of scale, which will keep the F-35 affordable both in
flyaway and support costs over the life of the program. Additionally, international
participation in the F-35 program will promote appropriate U.S. -foreign technology
sharing and bring the U.S. and our allies closer to the goal of full joint/combined
warfare capability.
Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle (UCAV)
The UCAV vision is to develop an affordable weapon system that expands tactical,
and perhaps strategic, mission options and provide a revolutionary new element in
the air power arsenal. The UCAV weapon system will exploit the design and oper-
ational freedoms of relocating the pilot outside of the vehicle while maintaining the
rationale, judgment, and moral qualities of the human operator.
The ongoing X-^5 UCAV program is a joint Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency/US. Air Force effort being conducted in multiple overlapping spirals of in-
creasing capability towards the UCAV vision. Spiral 0 consisting of X-45A air vehi-
cle demonstrators, mission control system, and simulators are performing well at
the NASA-Dryden Flight Research Center in CA today. Spiral 1, planned for deliv-
ery in fiscal year 2005, will integrate the intelligent multiple-vehicle coordinated op-
erations demonstrated in Spiral 0 with a robust air vehicle design that offers in-
creased range and payload. Future spirals will provide increasing capability to meet
warfighter needs and enhance the effectiveness of integrated operations of manned
and unmanned aircraft.
F-15 Program
The F-15 Eagle remains the USAF's lead air superiority and only all-weather
deep interdiction aircraft well into this century. The deep interdiction version, the
F-15E, provides night/through the weather air-to-surface attack, employing all
USAF precision-guided munitions, including J-series weapons. The F-15 is heavily
involved in Operations Enduring Freedom, Noble Eagle, and Iraqi Freedom.
The Air Force must maintain the F-15A-Ds' and F-15Es' abilities to fulfill their
roles in light of the evolving threat and world situation. Several of the current modi-
fications to the F-15 are an upgrade to the radar (the APG-63(V)1 radar upgrade)
to address significant reliability obsolescence problems; an upgrade to the engine
(the F100-220E engine upgrade) to address significant reliability problems; addition
of a new mission computer (the Advanced Display Core Processor) to provide com-
puting power to support future capability growth; an upgrade of the armament con-
trol system (the Programmable Armament Control Set upgrade) to support employ-
ment of J-series weapons; and addition of high-off-boresight targeting of^ sensors and
air-to-air weapons (the Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing System) to improve surviv-
ability in within-visual-range air combat.
A recent success story of the program is the fielding of Litening ER pods to sup-
port current operations. Following the Chief of Staff's direction, the Air Force com-
pleted a 90-day evaluation of the Litening pod in December 2002 on F-15E aircraft.
Positive evaluation results led to direction to procure and field 24 pods. Funding re-
allocation and congressional approval were accomplished within 2 months, and pod
deliveries began in January 2003. There are currently 16 pods in-country supporting
Operation Iraqi Freedom, and the balance will be delivered to the Air Force by 31
March 2003.
F-16
The F-16 is the Air Force's principal multi-role fighter and is the largest Air
Force and international sales procurement program with over 4,000 produced for
service, encompassing 23 countries. It is currently operating within the Active, Re-
serve, and Air National Guard Forces. The F-16 is a single-engine, multi-role, tac-
tical fighter, with full air-to-air and air-to-ground combat capabilities. The F-16
comprises over 50 percent of the precision engagement fighter force and is the Air
Force's primary Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD) platform. It is exten-
sively deployed with various ongoing operations to include Operations Noble Eagle,
Enduring Freedom, and Iraqi Freedom.
The F-16 is currently projected to be in service beyond 2020. Several key modi-
fications are underway to ensure the Fighting Falcon remains a key combat enabler.
The Falcon Structural Augmentation Roadmap (Falcon STAR) is a structural modi-
fication for achieving an 8,000-hour component service life. Installation is pro-
grammed for fiscal year 2004 through fiscal year 2014. The Common Configuration
Implementation Program (CCIP) modification will improve the avionics commonality
between the Block 40 and 50 aircraft. It combines five modifications into one modi-
fication; thereby reducing the number of times a jet is opened and maximizing con-
figuration control. Further, it combines the Block 40 and 50 Operational Flight Pro-
71
grams (OFPs) into common OFPs. The CCIP modification is timed with the Air Ex-
pedition Force schedule with installations running through fiscal year 2010. Lastly,
the Combat Upgrade Plan Integration Details (CXJPID) modification will incorporate
GPS, data link, night vision, and countermeasures into Block 25 through 32 aircraft.
We expect to complete CUPID in fiscal year 2003.
Small Diameter Bomb (SDB)
SDB will provide the following capabilities to the warfighter: Increased number
of kills per pass; combat effective in adverse weather; minimized collateral damage;
autonomous target attack; enhanced (>40nm) weapon standoff range; reduced logis-
tic footprints and aircraft generation times. SDB will be compatible with the follow-
ing current platforms (F-15E, F-16, F-117, A-10, B-1, B-2, B-52), and is planned
for next generation platforms (F/A-22, F-35, UCAV, Predator B). Boeing and Lock-
heed Martin are currently competing in the 2-year computer-assisted design (CAD)
phase with a downselect expected to occur in September 2003. LRIP will start in
fiscal year 2005 with a planned RAA on the F-15E in fiscal year 2006. The SDB
Threshold Platform is the F-15E, although F/A-22 is a major focus item in support
of the global strike CONOPS. SDB will be a pilot program for seamless verification,
which is intended to maximize development, operational, and contractor test re-
sources in conducting an effective test program in support of warfighter require-
ments, while minimizing test-related cost and schedule.
Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW)
The Joint Standoff Weapon is a joint Air Force-Navy program, with the Navy as
the lead service. JSOWA, INS/GPS precision glide weapon that the Air Force is pro-
curing, is designed to attack a variety of area targets — fixed, relocatable, and mobile
targets — during day, night and adverse weather conditions. JSOW enhances aircraft
survivability as compared to current interdiction weapon systems by providing the
capability for launch aircraft to stand off outside the range of enemy point defenses.
The F-16, B-52, and F-15E are now capable of delivering JSOWA and the B-2 will
again be capable of carrying the weapons by mid- April 2003. The weapon will also
be integrated on the B— 1 and F-35.
Last year the Air Force decided to withdraw from the JSOWB program to service
armored targets and begin development of an Extended Range Wind Corrected Mu-
nitions Dispenser (WCMD). The decision to add a wing kit and GPS to WCMD en-
hances the weapon's capability and leverages the existing inventory of tactical muni-
tions dispensers. The new weapon will significantly contribute to the Air Force's
warfighting capability. The new area attack munitions mix is based on the accelera-
tion of JSOWA, the Sensor Fuzed Weapon and the WCMD-ER. Joint Air-to-Surface
Standoff Missile (JASSM).
The JASSM is a "kick down the door" tjrpe weapon to be used in the early stages
of a war to neutralize enemy's defenses and war infrastructure by targeting high
value, fiixed and relocatable targets. JASSM's standoff range is greater than 200
NM. It is a conventional, precision, autonomous, low observable missile with a 1,000
lb penetrator and blast/fragment warhead. JASSM is all weather capable using
GPS/INS guidance and an Imaging Inft-a-Red (IIR) terminal seeker.
JASSM began LRIP in fiscal year 2002 with a buy of 76 missiles. Deliveries will
begin in April 2003. The B-52 will be the first aircraft to reach RAA (required as-
sets available) in September 2003. B-2, B-1, and F-16 will follow in fiscal year
2004. The JASSM test program was recently stopped after two ft-ee flight anomalies.
Those issues have been addressed and the USAF is confident they are fixed. The
final JASSM DT test is scheduled for late March; OT will be resumed if that test
is successful. The test program will be complete in July allowing JASSM to have
a full-rate production milestone decision in November 2003.
JASSM-Extended Range (ER) is a spiral development program that will increase
the range capability to greater than 500 NM. JASSM-ER will start development in
late fiscal year 2003 with congressional plus-up funds. Development will end in fis-
cal year 2007 when the program will enter production with the first deliveries in
fiscal year 2008.
MC2A
The MC2A will provide rapid machine-to-machine integration of information from
manned, unmanned and space-based sensors. The MC2A is the next generation wide
area surveillance platform designed to provide a near real-time, horizontally inte-
grated view of the air and surface battlespace through the use of advanced sensors,
network centric systems and high-speed, wide-band communications systems. The
platform will be a key enabler to engage time sensitive targets with precision accu-
racy.
72
Spiral 1 capability is funded to include next generation Ground Moving Target In-
dicator (GMTI) for counterland mission capability, focused Air Moving Target Indi-
cator (AMTI) supporting Cruise Missile Defense (CMD), an open system architecture
for the Battle Management, Command and Control (BMC2) mission suite subsystem
and growth potential for UAV control, space-based radar interface and intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) management functions.
Future spirals are envisioned to incorporate transformational horizontal integra-
tion and C2 Constellation battle management functions, an advanced AMTI sensor,
UAV control, space-based radar integration and laser communications. Available
technology will determine if combining GMTI and a 360-degree AMTI sensor on a
single aircraft is possible, or whether the 360-degree AMTI sensor will be hosted
on a second MC2A configuration.
CONCLUSION
The Air Force remains focused on providing the necessary capabilities to the
warfighter in order to win America's wars. These capabilities can only be achieved
through effective and efficient management during the development, production,
and fielding of systems. By incorporating a strong collaborative process, re-establish-
ing our credibility, implementing spiral development, and infiLising systems engi-
neering in our acquisition process, we can overcome the tough challenges ahead.
Through our new business practices, we are providing our workforce with the
tools to make decisions and changes, but this is not enough. The Air Force must
provide strong support to program managers and the necessary latitude to manage
systems development, production, and sustainment with limited interference. Omy
then can we meet the agile acquisition needs of our warfighters.
Given the limited budget and increasing needs, this is a challenge that must be
met head on. We are committed to pursuing those actions necessary to make trans-
formation work.
I appreciate the support provided by Congress and look forward to working with
this subcommittee to best satisfy our warfighter needs in the future.
Thank you for the opportunity to provide this statement for the record.
Senator Sessions. Admiral Nathman?
STATEMENT OF VICE ADM. JOHN B. NATHMAN, DEPUTY CHIEF
OF NAVAL OPERATIONS FOR WARFARE REQUIREMENTS
AND PROGRAMS
Admiral Nathman. Senator Sessions, distinguished members.
I will take a few minutes to talk about some maybe obvious
things. The current conflicts with Iraq and Afghanistan, I think,
are pointing out some clear attributes that the naval service needs
to be focused on. Those would be: What can we do to improve our
range and our access to the battlefield? What t3^e of multi-mission
capability are we going to bring in our aircraft, weapons systems,
and weapons to cover the target sets that are required to be cov-
ered from, as you saw today, close air support for British coalition
maneuver. Marine maneuver. Army maneuver? Then what can we
do to make sure that we are on the right path to provide persistent
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance of that battle space
so it can be shaped properly? Then as you would expect, can we
do it in the most affordable and efficient manner that we can?
I think you will see in the program of record at least a validation
that that is the right path for us to be on. The Super Hornet, the
E/F, is currently in combat today on the U.S.S. Lincoln. Two squad-
rons are also closing — two squadrons of Super Hornets, the E and
the F, are embarked on the U.S.S. Nimitz, which chopped into the
U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility (AOR)
today and soon will be into the Persian Gulf.
That aircraft brings with it the affordability of a multiyear pro-
curement. It brings with it significant combat reach. It is better
shaped for access. It has the ability to grow the right stuff in it,
73
advanced electronically scanned radar, which gives it simultaneous
air-to-ground and air-to-air capability.
The other thing the aircraft is going to bring with it is that it
puts a mission tanker back on our flight decks. We have been miss-
ing that for some time. Since we stood down the A-6 and the KA-
6, our tanking now is done primarily with the support of the
United States Air Force. What we are doing in Iraq, particularly
in northern Iraq, would be impossible without the tanker bridge
that we have with the Air Force. So it is important for the Navy
to put a mission tanker back on its flight deck. Super Hornet
brings us that mission tanking capability.
The other thing I think you are seeing is the affordability. The
Joint Strike Fighter was designed with affordability in mind. Not
only is it a system of airplanes for the Air Force, the Marine Corps,
and the Navy, in terms of common avionics and common weapon
systems, but there soon will be common training, I assume, and a
common training place for the Joint Strike Fighter in the future.
We have recently integrated the tactical aircraft squadrons with
the Marine Corps. We did that for several reasons. One was afford-
ability, the ability to generate additional funds for the future. You
will see that in our reduced multiyear procurement of F-18E/Fs
along with Joint Strike Fighters, giving us the capability to invest
in other aircraft, specifically the F-18G, the Growler, the electronic
attack version, which is important to the Navy and the naval serv-
ice in terms of having the right electronic attack shaping the battle
space for the concept of operations that we fly in our embarked air
wings.
So I appreciate your time and look forward to your questions, sir.
Senator Sessions. Thank you.
Lieutenant General Hough.
STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. MICHAEL A. HOUGH, USMC, DEPUTY
COMMANDANT FOR AVIATION
General Hough. Thank you, sir. Good afternoon, Chairman Ses-
sions, distinguished members of the subcommittee. It is a privilege
and honor to speak to you today about tactical aviation in the Ma-
rine Corps.
On behalf of all marines and their families, I want to thank you
for your continued support to Marine aviation and the Corps as a
whole. The commitment to increase the warfighting crisis response
capability of our Nation's Armed Forces and improving the quality
of life of our men and women in uniform is central to the strength
of the Marine Corps and has contributed immeasurably to our ac-
complishments on the global war on terrorism.
Marine Corps aviation provides the Marine Air-Ground Task
Force (MAGTF) and the joint force commander with the aviation
combat element capable of conducting air operations as part of a
naval expeditionary force throughout the six functions of Marine
aviation. The unique expeditionary and adaptable nature of Marine
aviation is an integral part of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force
and allows us to operate efficiently and effectively across the full
spectrum of basing operations and makes us an adaptable, highly
responsible and lethal force, and we are proving it every day in Op-
eration Iraqi Freedom.
74
Today, nearly 85 percent of Marine aviation is deployed or com-
mitted worldwide. 59 percent of Marine TACAIR and 58 percent of
our rotary wing aircraft are committed to the Central Command for
operations in Iraq or Afghanistan with 84 Hornets, 88 Harriers, 10
Prowlers, and 259 helicopters. Three FA-18 squadrons are de-
ployed with carrier air wings. One additional FA-18 squadron is in
the work-up cycle preparing to deploy very shortly.
Since the commencement of the operation in Iraq, which has not
been too long. Marine aviation from the sea base and from land has
flown over 2,800 fixed wing sorties and over 900 rotary wing sor-
ties. It has dropped almost every type of air-to-ground munition in
the naval aviation inventory.
Our 6 Harriers in Bagram Airbase, Afghanistan, which have
been there since October, are equipped with a litening targeting
pod, which has been performing absolutely magnificently. It has
flown over 600 sorties and over 1,800 hours, supporting special ops
forces for Operation Enduring Freedom. It has also demonstrated
extra flexibility with short takeoff/vertical landing on that busted-
up runway.
Our 76 Harriers in Iraq are also performing magnificently. De-
ployed in the sea base and on land, they are moving forward from
base to base, closer to Baghdad, closer to the sound of guns, and
will provide increased time on station, faster response times, in
support of our joint and coalition ground forces. Also equipped with
a litening pod, the Harriers became the platform of choice for
urban, close air support in Iraq.
Marine aviation is healthy. I could not be prouder of the job our
aviation marines are doing. Currently, though, we are facing a pe-
riod of great change over the course of the next 10 to 15 years, as
you well know. Everything we have in Marine aviation, absolutely
ever)^hing we have, is going to be turned over or changed. One
thing is certain: Marine aviation is transforming and transitioning,
but the thing that will not change is the professionalism of our ex-
peditionary culture.
This change includes TACAIR integration, aircraft trans-
formation and transition. Marine air command and control, mod-
ernization, and implementation of the simulator master plan. We
are making every effort to increase our efficiencies and effective-
ness as we go through this transformation and do it as a naval
team partner.
You have read about TACAIR integration and heard a lot about
it. It retains our culture. It is not a new concept. We have been
doing it for a long time, but on a smaller scale. It is a more capable
and a more affordable force. It ensures TACAIR support to the
MAGTF while allowing global sourcing to all TACAIR assets, in-
creased combat capability forward in concert with the sea basing
concept, and reinforced expeditionary.
Naval TACAIR with a smaller, more efficient force will continue
to provide combatant commanders and joint force commanders with
a flexible, scalable, full spectrum response capability fi'om the sea.
We are working together all the time in such a way that the
whole is much greater than the sum of the parts. It is about S5nii-
ergy and getting more bang for the buck.
75
Aircraft transformation transition: We have been working for al-
most 30 years to do this. We are finally there. We went from 30
to 23 to now 7 platforms. We continue to modernize our existing
aircraft to ensure readiness and warfighting relevance. Our key to
success will be the careful balancing of people and equipment that
allows us to maintain combat readiness throughout the trans-
formation. The overarching intent is to maintain relevant forces
while reducing the logistics burden on the commander.
Marine air command and control system modernization, that is
the key to it all. It links it all up, ties it together operationally.
Aviation command and control continues to be decisively engaged
in support of coalition, joint, and MAGTF operations. The Corps
has embraced a bold vision for the convergence of capabilities, or-
ganization, doctrinal training, and personnel. The integration of
this 21st century capability will exponentially increase our capabil-
ity to fight jointly and with our coalition partners.
The Marine Corps simulation master plan is 21st century. It is
the way everyone else does it. It is the way we are going to do it.
It is more efficient, more effective. It saves big money. It is not
about money; it is all about money.
The Marine Corps and Marine aviation as a partner in the naval
team has clearly lived up to the reputation of "first to the fight and
first to fight." We remain ready for combat when and where the
need arises. Marine aviation has been and will continue to be ready
to deploy a scalable, highly trained, task organized expeditionary
aviation combat element, capable of conducting missions across the
continuum of conflict in support of the Marine air-ground team. It
supports also the joint force or combatant commander.
In a world of diminishing host nation support, basing options and
sovereignty, the ability to provide the Nation with self-contained
MAGTFs capable of executing a wide range of missions at a mo-
ment's notice from a variety of locations will remain the Marine
Corps hallmark.
For all that and more, I thank each and every one of you for your
continued support for Marine aviation. It has been an honor to ad-
dress you today. Sir, I look forward to your questions.
Senator SESSIONS. Thank you. Very well said, and we appreciate
your comments.
[The joint prepared statement of Mr. Young, Admiral Nathman,
and General Hough follows:]
Prepared Joint Statement by Hon. John J. Young, Jr., Vice Adm. John B.
Nathman, USN, and Lt. Gen. Michael A. Hough, USMC
Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for this op-
portunity to appear before you to discuss the Department of the Navy's fiscal year
2004 budget request for tactical aviation. VADM Nathman, LtGen Hough, and I are
proud to come before you today to outline our most recent efforts to enable the De-
partment of the Navy to field the most capable and lethal tactical air force in the
world.
I recently visited our sailors and marines in the Persian Gulf area, including Ku-
wait and Bahrain, and we can rest assured that our sailors and marines guard our
freedom with a dedication bom from a voluntary commitment to defend the ideals
of our founding fathers. It is my pleasure to outline the contribution that we in the
Navy and Marine Corps acquisition community are making to enable the Depart-
ment of the Navy to field the most capable, mobile and lethal force since its incep-
tion over 225 years ago.
76
The global war on terrorism has fundamentally changed the national debate on
defense. To meet this challenge, difficult decisions were required to find the optimal
mix within the portfolio of naval responsibilities, and within that, tactical aviation
requirements of the Department. We have been good stewards for the taxpayer by
demonstrating creative thinking such as utilizing the inherent growth capabilities
of the F/A-18E/F to meet the airborne electronic attack requirement; making sound
fiscal decisions including integrating Navy and Marine Corps tactical aviation assets
to achieve significant reductions in procurement and operating support costs; re-
viewing the need for some of our legacy systems; and leveraging these actions to
increase the number of aircraft being requested in the fiscal year 2004 budget. By
addressing key issues such as the cultivation of promising aircraft technologies, cost
effective acquisition of mature systems, and improved maintenance of existing sys-
tems, we have been able to increase the number of aircraft fi-om 89 in last year's
budget request to 100 in the fiscal year 2004 budget request.
In striving to provide the warfighter with the latest capabilities, we have adopted
the tenets of Naval Vision 21 and Naval Transformation Roadmap 21. In doing this,
we have engaged in a full assessment of naval S&T funding to ensure we have ad-
dressed all technology needs to support these transformation mandates. To this end,
technology demonstrations are planned using Future Years Defense Program funds
that aim to meet the needs of our forces — stretching fi-om the ocean floor to the edge
of space, and from facilities in the United States to the tip of the spear throughout
the world.
Our actions to get the best value reach beyond the Department of the Navy. For
example, the Department has worked in partnership with the Air Force on the JSF
program to deliver an affordable and supportable strike fighter. Recently, we have
also developed a joint strategy with the Air Force to develop an UCAV. UCAV will
be a critical part of our future tactical aviation force structure.
ENHANCING WARFIGHTING CAPABILITIES
The Navy and Marine Corps team is the greatest maritime force in the world, but
it is imperative that we transform our tactical aviation warfighting capabilities to
meet the emerging challenges of the 21st century. We are changing and initiating
programs to improve the warfighting capability of current and future forces. Fur-
thermore, we are seeking joint opportunities and options wherever possible in tak-
ing these steps.
Our plan capitalizes on ideas that facilitate our recapitedization goals. An excel-
lent example is the JSF, a stealthy, multi-role fighter aircraft designed to be an en-
abler for Naval Power 21. JSF replaces the Navy's F-18A/C variants and the Ma-
rine Corps' AV-8B Harrier and F/A-18A/C/D aircraft while complementing the
Navy's F/A-18E/F Super Hornet. JSF offers dramatic improvements in affbrdability
and supportability. The JSF program has partnered with Lockheed Martin, Pratt
and Whitney and General Electric to make affordability the cornerstone of the pro-
gram by reducing development, production and total ownership costs. Furthermore,
we have imposed a discipline on ourselves that limits change during the critical
phases of our major aviation procurement programs. This disciplined approach has
been implemented in the JSF program through a Configuration Steering Board. By
controlling the scope and timing of change in a planned manner, we know what
changes will cost, and how we will pursue them in the most economical manner.
Through these transformational business initiatives, the Department will emerge
with an optimal force structure, a healthy industrial base and an efficient and ap-
propriately sized infrastructure.
A critical enabler of transformational intelligence, surveillance and reconnaiis-
sance, the E-2C Advanced Hawkeye Program will provide a robust overland capabil-
ity against current and future cruise missile-type targets.
The KC-130J Hercules will also be a critical enabler of the Department and the
joint warfighter. The KC-130J's increased range, payload, and survivability will pro-
vide an enhanced aerial refueling capability and subsequently greater strategic agil-
ity, operational reach and tactical flexibility.
As the global war on terrorism has demonstrated, unmanned technology will play
an ever-increasing role on the 21st century battlefield. The Department is commit-
ted to fielding an array of UAV programs, including tactical UAVs, maritime sur-
veillance UAVs and an UCAV initiative, developed in partnership with the Air
Force. The Navy and the Air Force have been able to define a common set of science
and technology requirements while also recognizing the unique needs of each Serv-
ice. This work will support a competitive acquisition strategy for UCAV. UCAV is
a critical tool for providing persistent surveillance and combat capability for sea
based Navy platforms.
77
CHANGING OUR BUSINESS PRACTICES
The Department of the Navy remains committed to simpHfying the acquisition
system, streamhning the bureaucratic decision making process, and promoting inno-
vation. We are streamhning our regulations and instructions to remove unnecessary
impediments and provide the maximum flexibihty to our acquisition workforce con-
sistent with law and higher regulation. We are also continuing to take advantage
of numerous acquisition initiatives to shorten cycle times, leverage com^mercial prod-
ucts and capabilities, and improve the quality of equipment being provided to our
warfighters.
In an environment where competition is limited, the structure of contracts is criti-
cal to providing tools for the program manager to use in delivering aircraft and
weapons on schedule and within budget. The Department is appljdng new contract
strategies in an effort to focus greater attention on cost and schedule. We are imple-
menting broken or stepped profit share lines to ensure that the Navy and industry
are very focused on the cost target and that industry is rewarded for beating the
target and penalized for exceeding the cost target. Further, we are shifting greater
portions of fee to be awarded on an incentive basis upon accomplishment of critical
path tasks. Finally, we are weighting fee towards the critical events at the end of
a program that result in the desired goal — delivery of aircraft and weapons.
Evolutionary acquisition techniques show promise in programs such as the F/A-
18E/F Program. Recognizing the requirement to replace our aging low density/high
demand EA-6B aircraft with a platform that best accommodates the airborne elec-
tronic attack mission, the Navy identified the Super Hornet as the most viable can-
didate with which to leverage existing capabilities inherent in naval aviation in
order to streamline the acquisition process and field a product sooner to the fleet.
We leverage industry involvement in our acquisition programs to reduce our re-
search and development costs and gain economies in production. The Department
is also actively improving its internal business practices, including integrating com-
mercial best practices where feasible. By improving these practices, we expect to be
able to shift more dollars into combat capability and quality of service.
We believe that better information makes for better decision making, both on the
battlefield and at the budget table. We have four pilot programs in place utilizing
enterprise resource planning (ERP) which aim to improve the quality of information
available to our decision makers. These pilot projects will eliminate dozens of incom-
patible computer databases and the business processes that once supported those
databases. ERP should produce financial and managerial information that is more
complete, accurate and timely. ERP will allow greater efficiency in our ship mainte-
nance processes that should in turn deliver more ship availabihty for training or de-
ployment. Our recent focus has been on converging the pilot programs to achieve
even greater synergy of management information across a broader spectrum of the
Department, and working with the DOD Comptroller to ensure these efforts are ad-
vancing the uniform business management architecture under development.
In addition to better information, we need flexible and innovative tools to help
manage the Department. Some of these tools, such as strategic sourcing, are being
used already. Furthermore, competition helps achieve the best quality support to
the sailor and marine at the lowest possible cost by introducing the discipline of the
marketplace. Another approach we are taking to improve logistics support to the
warfighter and reduce total life cycle system costs is through Performance Based Lo-
gistics (PBL). This year, all ACAT I & II fielded programs and all new programs
submitted PBL implementation plans with milestones. PBL has been successfully
implemented on numerous weapon system components (improving capability and
lowering costs) and the intention is to expand these successes to major weapon sys-
tems and subsystems. We are also continuing to pursue depot maintenance partner-
ships between the private and public sector. These partnerships provide increased
capability to our depots while simultaneously reducing cost and improving
warfighter capability.
The Department of Navy has experienced success with the Lead Systems Integra-
tor (LSI) concept. An example of the LSI concept is the F/A-18 and Boeing. As the
LSI, Boeing brings with it visibility, knowledge and responsibility at the weapon
systems level, which is much broader than that of its subcontractors. Even though
there may be additional "upfi-ont cost" in the form of pass-through costs associated
with this approach, the benefits of efficiencies and effectiveness over the full life of
the weapon system, makes the LSI approach a very attractive tool.
We are working hard to ensure that our sailors and marines get needed tech-
nology in their hands today, not tomorrow. In areas ranging from Forward Looking
Infrared (FLIR) upgrades for Marine Corps tanks, to ISR tools, to active anti-air
warfare missiles, we are seeking greater jointness and taking advantage of prior
78
DOD investments in order to reduce risk, lower cost, accelerate delivery, and pro-
vide greater interoperability.
FOCUSING ON OUR PEOPLE AND ORGANIZATION
To enable development of new capabilities and facilitate the adoption of new busi-
ness practices, a number of organizational changes have been made. I reorganized
my business process owners by combining the Director of Acquisition and Business
Management with the Acquisition Reform Office into a single Deputy for Acquisition
Management. This new office focuses on business policy and implementation and in-
fuses it with the innovative thinking and ideas of the office dedicated to reforming
the way we do business. One of the primary goals of this reorganization is to short-
en the time it takes new ideas to find their way into our acquisition business prac-
tices. The Deputy for Acquisition Management is directly supporting the DOD effort
to streamline the Office of the Secretary of Defense policy and processes for major
weapon systems embodied in the new DOD 5000 series directives.
In order to improve logistics support to the warfighter, I established a Deputy for
Logistics. The logistics office will coordinate efforts to insert logistics considerations
early in the acquisition process where over 60 percent of the total life cycle costs
are determined. Equally important, logistical support of our current systems is a
costly and complex part of today's acquisition management task. Finally, the Deputy
for Logistics will play an important role in guiding the implementation of ERP
across the Department.
In today's environment, many technologies and systems cut across program, plat-
form and systems command boundaries. To leverage the expertise within our sys-
tems commands and ensure consideration and coordination of concepts that cross
program boundaries, we created a virtual systems command. Each of the command-
ers will now work together to avoid duplication of capability and ensure that we
achieve integration and interoperability benefits wherever possible within the Navy
and Marine Corps.
Equally important, we are reshaping the acquisition workforce to concentrate on
mission critical functions. These human resource plans call for an analysis of key
characteristics of the acquisition workforce, an assessment and projection of changes
in the workforce into 2008, and the identification of human resource process short-
falls that inhibit the ability to effectively manage this workforce. With the advent
of civilian personnel "demonstration" programs with pay banding and the increase
in outsourcing of commercial functions, we are seeing an emerging workforce that
will be compensated based on their level of responsibility and contribution. Through
enhancements to our career development program, which include continuous learn-
ing activities that augment minimum education, training, and experience require-
ments, we are developing our acquisition professionals to be better managers and
leaders.
NEW OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS
Beyond incorporating new capabilities that technology advances allow, we exam-
ined methods for achieving greater utility out of our existing assets. The result of
this effort is the Department's initiative to integrate Navy and Marine Corps tac-
tical aviation capabilities. This integration represents one of the most sweeping
changes in years. A comprehensive study of overhead requirements was performed
as an integral part of a Tactical Aircraft or TACAIR Integration initiative that led
to significant reductions in overhead. Substantive efficiencies will be realized
through increased reliability and maintainability, commitment to properly fund
readiness, spares, depot maintenance and modernization, improved simulation
training, and a lower historical attrition than were programmed in the fiscal year
2003 program of record. Navy and Marine Corps TACAIR Integration will maximize
forward deployed combat power and optimize the core capability of naval aviation
forces. Its positive impact will be felt across the Department's entire tactical avia-
tion enterprise, from leaner, more capable fighting formations to streamlined pro-
curement requirements (tactical and training) and manpower savings.
This initiative will integrate one Marine Corps strike fighter squadron into each
Navy carrier air wing and three Navy strike fighter squadrons into the Marine
Corps Unit Deployment Program (UDP) rotation. These actions will allow three ac-
tive Navy squadrons to be disestablished and two Reserve squadrons (one Navy and
one Marine Corps) to be disestablished. Our plan will reduce procurement objectives
for F/A-18E/F from 548 to 460 aircraft and the JSF ft-om 1,089 to 680 aircraft. In
total, this innovative program promises to save $975 million over the fiscal year
2004 — fiscal year 2009 program, and provide approximately $19 billion in cost avoid-
ance from fiscal year 2007-fiscal year 2012. Through increased modernization and
79
readiness an integrated Navy — Marine Corps aviation force will provide increased
flexibility of employment and surge capability to combatant commanders that the
Department cannot approach today.
TACTICAL AVIATION ACQUISITION PROGRAMS
The Department's fiscal year 2004 budget will utihze multiyear procurement
(MYP) arrangements for the F/A-18E/F (both airframe and engine), and the E-2C
to maximize the return on our tactical aviation investment. Our proposed plan will
procure 44 tactical, fixed wing aircraft (42 F/A-18E/F, and two E-2C), continue the
development of the F-35 emd E-2C Advanced Hawkeye and initiate an airborne
electronic attack (AEA) aircraft follow-on effort with the EA-18G.
FIA-18AICID
The fiscal year 2004 budget request contains $27 million for the upgrade of our
F/A-18As. The Marine Corps has initiated the upgrade of 46 F/A-18As (with a pro-
gram objective of 76) to Lot XVII F/A-18C aircraft capability as well as digital com-
munications and tactical data hnk. The Marine Corps anticipates programmed up-
grades to enhance the current capabilities of the F/A-18C/D with digital commu-
nications, tactical data link, and tactical reconnaissance systems. This upgrade en-
sures that our F/A-18s remain viable and relevant in support of TACAIR Integra-
tion and Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare until replaced by the STOVL JSF. The
Marine Corps expects the F/A-18A to remain in the active inventory vmtil 2015 and
is exploring the feasibility of placing litening targeting pods on our F/A-18D air-
craft. This new capability can provide real time video to the ground commander via
the Pioneer UAV Transmitter and Man-Portable Receiving Station.
FIA-18EIF
The fiscal year 2004 President's budget requests $3.03 bilUon for 42 F/A-18E/F
aircraft for the fifth year of a 5-year MYP contract (fiscal year 2000-fiscal year
2004). The Super Hornet has used a spiral development approach to incorporate
new technologies, such as the Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing System, Advance Tac-
tical Forward Looking Infrared System, Shared Reconnaissance Pod System, and
Multifunctional Information Distribution System data link. The Super Hornet pro-
vides a 40-percent increase in combat radius; a 50-percent increase in endurance
and 25-percent increase in weapons payload over our older Hornets. Three Super
Hornet squadrons are already deployed in support of current operations. The F/A-
18E/F is a significant step forward in improving the survivability and strike capabil-
ity of the carrier air wing.
F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)
The fiscal year 2004 budget request contziins $2.2 billion for continuation of SDD
on the JSF. The JSF will enhance our Navy precision with unprecedented stealth
and range. The JSF program commenced SDD in October 2001 and is on track to
deliver operational STOVL variants to the Marine Corps in 2008 and the Navy vari-
ant in 2010. The STOVL JSF combines the multi-role versatility of the F/A-18 and
the basing flexibility of the AV-8B, resulting in a stealthy, lethal, state-of-the-art
aircraft. The commonality designed into the JSF program, along with advantageous
procurement quantities will reduce acquisition and operating costs of Navy and Ma-
rine Corps tactical aircraft and allow enhanced interoperability with our allies and
sister services. To maintain affordability, the Department will manage requirement
growth using a senior oversight group as well as other methods.
AV-8B
The AV-8B that we fly today is not the same aircraft that we flew 10 years ago.
Over the last decade, the Harrier has gone from a day VFR air-grovmd attack air-
craft to a night-adverse weather precision strike platform. The AV-8B remanufac-
ture program has updated the Harrier into a more capable and more reliable air-
craft. The wing and many original items are retained, but a new fuselage, a night-
attack avionics suite (NAVFLIR, digital moving map, color displays, NVG lighting),
APG-65 multi-mode radar, and the more powerful and reliable Pegasus (408) engine
have been added. In addition to the AV-8B being one of the newest airframes in
the fleet (average fleet age is approximately 8 years old), the remanufacture pro-
gram provides an additional 6,000 hours of airframe life for 80 percent of the cost
of a new aircraft. The remanufacture of 74 aircraft is programmed through fiscal
year 2003 with the last delivery scheduled for September 2003. Our AV-8B Harriers
at Bagram Airbase, Afghanistan, have flown over 500 sorties and over 1,500 flight
hours supporting Special Operations Forces for Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)
and have demonstrated the expeditionary flexibility of STOVL aircraft while becom-
80
ing the most forward deployed tactical aircraft in theater. From their austere base
located over 5,000 feet above sea level, the Harriers provide close air support, armed
escort of aircraft and vehicle convoys, and air cover during helicopter insertions and
extractions. Approximately 90 percent of our Marine Harrier gun squadrons are cur-
rently deployed and either in action or on watch around the world. The Harriers
are equipped with the litening targeting pod, a targeting system with real-time
video capability that gives the pilots the ability to laser designate targets for preci-
sion munitions and mark spots on the ground with infrared energy. The precision
capability to spot targets and self-designate for precision weapons has put the Har-
riers in Afghanistan in high demand — joint and coalition forces regularly request
the litening targeting pod capability in order to accurately locate and identify enemy
positions. The enhanced AV-8B will continue to be a relevant platform until
TACAIR Integration and the transformational JSF are fully implemented.
KC-130J
The KC-130J Hercules will provide the MAGTF and Joint Task Force Com-
mander with a technologically advanced weapons platform featuring a state-of-the-
art flight station. Enhancements in survivability and night vision capabilities will
provide MAGTF Commanders with a superior force multiplier to project combat
power. Operationally, the KC-130J will support an increase of 5,000 feet in refuel-
ing altitude while increasing fixed wing refueling speed by 30 knots. Rapid ground
refueling enhancements include refueling pod improvements that enable a 300-gal-
lon per minute off-load to air assets and tactical vehicles. Aircraft speed and range
will increase 21 percent and 35 percent respectively, significantly extending the
MAGTF Commander's capabilities. The KC-130J will replace all active duty KC-
130F/Rs. The Marine Corps, along with the Air Force, has recently signed a MYP
contract. The Marine Corps has taken delivery of nine KC-130Js and will have pro-
cured a total of 38 KC-130Js at the end of the FYDP.
E-2C
The fiscal year 2004 President's budget requests $228.5 million to procure one E-
2C and one TE-2C as the first year of a 4-year MYP. This effort will keep the pro-
duction line viable while the E-2 Advanced Hawkeye (AHE), formerly known as the
Radar Modernization Program, continues spiral development toward an Initial
Operational Capability in fiscal year 2011. The Advanced Hawkeye program will
modernize the E-2 weapons system by replacing the current radar and other system
components to maintain open ocean capability while adding transformational sur-
veillance and theater air and missile defense capabilities. The AHE program is
scheduled to enter the SDD phase in fiscal year 2003. Further, CEC is being inte-
grated into our E-2C aircraft and FOT&E of this added capability is ongoing.
EA-18G
The Navy is initiating AEA efforts on the F/A-18F air vehicle and has included
initial funding in the fiscal year 2004 budget. The EA-18G will replace the aging
EA-6B Prowler, and will be part of the F/A-18E/F MYP. As a result of congres-
sional funding in fiscal year 2003, EA-6B follow-on activities have already com-
menced. Fiscal year 2004 efforts will focus on risk reduction and development activi-
ties concerning the integration of EA-6B Improved Capabilities (ICAP III) electronic
attack technologies into a proven air vehicle. Initial Operational Capability is cur-
rently planned for fiscal year 2009. The Marine Corps expects to fly the EA-6B
(ICAP III) until approximately 2014 to 2015 before transitioning to a new electronic
attack aircraft yet to be determined.
Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft (MMA)
The fiscal year 2004 President's budget requests $76 million to begin the SDD
phase on the MMA. A down select to a final system integrator/provider is planned
for the second quarter of fiscal year 2004. P-3 aircraft are flying in excess of 150
hours per month in support of Operation Enduring Freedom and the global war on
terrorism. This flight regimen requires a special inspection program to allow contin-
ued operation to as much as 150 percent of fatigue life given the age of the aircraft.
To acldress this critical warfighting capability the Navy is procuring a MMA with
a planned IOC of 2012. The program is currently in the Component Advanced De-
velopment Phase with two competitors, Boeing with their 737 commercial-derivative
aircraft and Lockheed-Martin with their modernized P-3C concept.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
The global war on terrorism has emphasized the importance of UAVs. The fiscal
year 2004 budget reflects our increased commitment to a focused array of UAVs
that will support and enhance both surveillance and strike missions with persistent.
81
distributed, netted sensors. The Navy's tactical UAV programs are focused on two
areas.
Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle — Navy
The fiscal year 2004 President's budget requests $116 million for UCAV S&T
demonstration efforts, and $5 million for establishment of the Joint UCAV Program
Office. Leveraging our demonstration efforts, the Department will seek to improve
the sensors and payloads to produce a penetrating surveillance UCAV-N with
multi-mission capability as well as work towards a JSF-like joint acquisition strat-
egy that results in the selection of a common platform capable of meeting service-
unique mission requirements.
Precision Munitions
Joint Standoff Weapon
The development of the Joint Standoff Weapon "C" has been a success with the
first test achieving accuracy objectives. The dispenser variant production has been
accelerated and JSOW is being delivered to deployed combat units. The fiscal year
2004 budget request for JSOW is $138.5 million for 429 weapons.
Joint Direct Attack Munitions and Laser Guided Bombs
The production capacity for manufacturing Joint Direct Attack Munitions and
Laser Guided Bombs (LGBs) has been increased, largely through the expenditure
of supplemental funds appropriated by Congress. The fiscal year 2004 request of
$277.3 milUon for JDAM and $81.3 million for LGBs will purchase 12,326 JDAM
and 5,288 LGB weapons respectively at rates that take advantage of the expanded
capacity.
Tactical Tomahawk
The Tactical Tomahawk missile begins full rate production in fiscal year 2004.
Tactical Tomahawk significantly improves performance through an improved war-
head, fuzing, and navigation improvements. This is accomplished at almost half the
cost by using innovative manufacturing and production techniques. The Tactical
Tomahawk completed successful developmental test shots from a simulated ground
launcher in August 2002 and an imderwater launcher in December 2002. The pro-
gram subsequently awarded a Low Rate Initial Production Contract in October
2002, and exercised an option for additional missiles in January 2003, for a total
of 192 missiles. The fiscal year 2004 budget requests authority for a fiscal year
2004-fiscal year 2008 MYP.
AIM-9X
The AIM-9X Sidewinder, a fifth generation infrared, launch and leave, air-to-air
missile capable of countering current and emerging countermeasures, is currently
in OPEVAL. The fiscal year 2004 budget requests $2.7 million RDT&E for continued
testing and $104.9 million WPN to purchase 531 AIM-9X missiles (167 for Navy
and 364 Air Force). Low rate initial production missiles are currently being deliv-
ered to the field and fleet. The program is progressing toward a MS III 4th quarter
fiscal year 2003.
AVTATION READINESS
Our proposed plan continues investment in key operational readiness accounts
and reflects an increase in aviation depot maintenance funding and sustained fund-
ing for our flying hours accounts.
Flying Hour Program
The fiscal year 2004 budget request reflects an additional $137 milUon this year
to sustain the investment level we established in support of last year's budget. This
level of flying hours will maintain the combat readiness of our Marine Air-Ground
Task Forces, enable our airwings to achieve required readiness 6 months prior to
deplo5rment, sustain readiness during deplo3Tnent and increase our ability to surge
in crisis and mitigate the risk of a smaller strike fighter force.
Aviation Maintenance
Last year, we reduced our aircraft depot level repair back orders by 17 percent;
maintained a steady "mission capable" rate in deployed aircraft; and fully funded
aviation initial outfitting. The fiscal year 2004 budget request reflects an increase
of over $210 million to fiscal year 2003's investment, and will increase the number
of engine spares, improve the availability of non-deployed aircraft, and meet our 100
percent deployed airframe goals.
82
SUMMARY
The Navy acquisition team has taken many positive steps during the past year.
From moving forward with deliveries of the F/A-18E/F to continued progress on the
JSF and V-22 programs, the support and direction of Congress have been essential
to our progress. Through the use of innovative acquisition initiatives, our Nation is
maintaining a healthy naval aviation industrial base and an efficient and an appro-
priately sized infrastructure to support an optimal force structure. I am most grate-
ful for the assistance of this subcommittee for the entire Department of the Navy's
efforts.
In the end, our tactical aviation assets are a tool of our sailors and marines.
Today, the Navy and Marine Corps have used all of the aircraft in that fleet to full-
est degree possible, putting combat capability exactly where the Nation needs as
part of the joint force. Naval forces are also forward deployed, providing clear pres-
ence and protecting the United States' strategic interests. We have the finest naval
force in the world. With your assistance, we will continue to improve every aspect
of our business to provide the maximum capability for our sailors and marines and
the maximum security for America.
Senator Sessions. I would just repeat once again that I salute
those who came before me. Many of you were involved in develop-
ing the systems and aircraft and platforms that we have today that
are allowing us to dominate the battlefield in Iraq. We owe it to
the next generation to make sure we do the same.
I yield my time to Senator McCain to start.
Senator McCain. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I appreciate the opportunity to talk to the Air Force. I notice,
Secretary Sambur, that there is no mention in your statement of
your plans as far as tanker assets are concerned. Do you have any
reason for that?
Dr. Sambur. Well, we are in the process of getting three approval
cycles.
Senator McCain. Getting what?
Dr. Sambur. Approval cycles. The Secretary of the Air Force
promised this committee, the staff, that we would go through an
exhaustive analysis first in front of the DOD, then the Office of
Management Budget (OMB), and then bring it back for your ap-
proval. So before we got that approval, we did not think it was pru-
dent to put that in our budgets.
Senator McCain. By approval, do you mean authorization in the
defense authorization bill?
Dr. Sambur. No. By approval, we will seek approval from all four
defense committees.
Senator McCain. You are familiar with the Institute for Defense
Analysis (IDA) study that was recently completed.
Dr. Sambur. Yes, I am.
Senator McCain. Would you care to tell us about that study?
Dr. Sambur. Yes. That was a study commissioned by OSD to de-
termine how well we did in negotiating with Boeing. We made the
point that there were three factors that were missing by IDA in
that evaluation. For example, they did not consider the Federal
Aviation Agency's (FAA) more stringent safety requirements that
were apparent in many things. They did not understand the re-
quirements.
For example, there is a refuelable requirement on the auxiliary
tanks that was not considered in their estimate. There was a re-
quirement for a combi space that was not considered. By combi, I
mean that the space that was not being used for fuel could be used
83
either for passengers, cargo, or a combination of both passengers
and cargo. That was not accurately reflected.
As a result of our concerns, we met with the Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
(AT&L). They have arranged for a series of meetings with IDA and
Boeing, so that we can explain to IDA some of these factors that
were missed in their analysis. As we speak right now, we are in
the process of working with IDA to give them a better understand-
ing of both the requirements from the Air Force and some of the
requirements for safety that the FAA has imposed upon us that
were not considered in their analysis.
Senator McCain. Well, I am entertained to hear that the Insti-
tute for Defense Analysis did not understand the parameters of the
study they were asked to conduct.
Dr. Sambur. Their study took approximately 2 weeks; whereas
our examination with Boeing was over 7 months. So there is a rea-
son that they might have not understood the full extent of the re-
quirements, because of the short duration of their study.
Senator McCain. I understand that Air Force Colonel Frantz
DeWillis described in great detail to the press how the Boeing
Company wants to sell bonds through a special purpose entity to
finance construction of 100 Boeing 767 aircraft leased to the Air
Force as refueling tankers. He said, "There will be a three-way con-
tract that says Boeing will build the planes. It will be sold to a spe-
cial purpose entity that leases them to us after it gets financing to
pay Boeing for the airplanes."
Is that still the contemplated method of leasing these tankers?
Dr. Sambur. It is through the special purpose entity, yes.
Senator McCain. Do you have anybody in the Air Force who has
had any experience with dealing with special purpose entities?
Dr. Sambur. Well, we had certain consultants who have that ex-
perience.
Senator McCain. Consultants fi'om Boeing?
Dr. Sambur. No, consultants from the economic world. The
standards that this special purpose entity is adhering to are the
new financial standards that have been imposed post-Enron, so we
know that the special purpose entity has the latest up-to-date
standards that were issued in January.
Senator McCain. So you would not use the same procedures that
Enron did, is that
Dr. Sambur. These are the latest financial standards that have
been imposed for special purpose entities to avoid Enron's situa-
tions.
Senator McCain. Well, how long has this process been going on
now, Mr. Secretary?
Dr. Sambur. The process of developing a proposal for the lease?
Senator McCain. Yes.
Dr. Sambur. Ever since Congress gave us the authorization to go
look at the feasibility of a lease.
Senator McCain. You mean ever since it was in an appropria-
tions bill.
Dr. Sambur. Well, you know
Senator McCain. It was a line item in an appropriations bill. It
was never authorized through the Senate Armed Services Commit-
84
tee, to my knowledge. Well, I hope that you will keep Congress,
this committee, and the subcommittee in particular briefed on this
issue.
Dr. Sambur. We committed to give you a good deal.
Senator McCain. Pardon me?
Dr. Sambur. We committed that the Air Force would bring for-
ward for the American public a good deal. That is our commitment
and we intend to maintain that throughout. We will show you, as
we go through the steps I mentioned before, through the DOD,
through 0MB, and back to the various committees, all of the data
that supports the fact that we have a good deal.
Senator McCain. Well, I hope so. Your initial proposals that
were made were probably the best deal ever achieved in the history
of the military industrial complex. I do not know why we cannot
just purchase them as we do other assets in the military. So far,
you have not made the case, as far as I am concerned. There has
been obfuscation. There has been delay. There is withholding of in-
formation from me and this committee.
I want to assure you again: You have not made the case. You cer-
tainly have not been open in sharing with us information concern-
ing this decisionmaking process. You may win. The military indus-
trial complex has won before in my experience of many years on
this committee. But I will tell you, the American people and the
American taxpayers are going to know about it if you try to pull
off this scam, which is exactly what it is.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator SESSIONS. Thank you. Senator McCain.
Did I understand that you would be conducting an analysis of al-
ternatives (AOA)? Is that the formal process?
Dr. Sambur. No, I did not say that. No.
Senator SESSIONS. Will you be doing that?
Dr. Sambur. No.
Senator SESSIONS. You will not.
Dr. Sambur. We will not.
Senator Sessions. Why not?
Dr. Sambur. Well, for a number of reasons. First of all, we
have — you said we never made a compelling case as to "Why
lease?" Earlier in your testimony, Mr. Chairman, you talked about
the fact that we were retiring Es. One of the reasons that we are
retiring those Es is because we are concerned about the safety,
about the corrosion.
I know there was an Air Force report study a couple years ago
that seems to indicate that there is a life expectancy of these Es
that is far greater than we are now telling you. But what we are
finding is that the corrosion of the Es is very serious. It is much
more serious than the study ever anticipated. Air Force Materiel
Command has determined that it would be unsafe to go forward
unless we retired those Es.
So one of the reasons we are going forward with the lease is be-
cause it is the most affordable way of getting needed assets to our
Air Force and Navy in the shortest possible time. It gives us a 5-
year advantage over any other mechanism for doing that.
85
Senator McCain. That is a very interesting statement. It has
nothing to do with the question. Why do you not do an AOA, just
as we do whenever we examine any new weapon system?
Dr. Sambur. Well, we did an analysis of alternatives in a short-
ened fashion. We determined, for example
Senator McCain. You did an AOA?
Dr. Sambur. We did not do a formal AOA, as you-
Senator McCain. Oh, I see. You did not do a formal AOA.
Dr. Sambur. No. But we
Senator McCain. Please. Please, Mr. Secretary. You either did
an AOA or you did not. There is no such thing as an informal AOA.
Okay? I do not know how long you have been in your job, but I
have been here a lot longer than you have been doing what you are
doing. I can tell you an AOA is an AOA. You have not done one.
It is disgraceful that you have not done one.
Dr. Sambur. Well, we presented our analysis of alternatives in
an informal sense to the DOD. We looked at reengining. We looked
at various other aircraft for refueling. We actually made, as a sug-
gestion from your part, an effort to determine if we were getting
the best possible price. We looked at the Airbus configuration. We
looked at the buy-per-hour alternatives that a company in Ireland
is offering.
We have looked at all of those issues. We have presented those
facts to the OSD that is evaluating this.
Senator McCain. You have not done an AOA.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Sessions. Senator Pryor.
Senator Pryor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
If I may. Secretary Young, you indicated in your prepared testi-
mony that you plan to replace the Navy's EA-6Bs, which are four-
seat aircraft, with a variant, I guess, of the F/A-18E/F, or some I
think call it the EA-18G, which is a two-seat aircraft. Even with
all the advances in technology, do you feel comfortable, do you feel
confident, that we can go from a four-seater to a two-seater and
still accomplish what we need to do?
Mr. Young. Well, I believe we are working those details. I visited
Cherry Point recently and talked to the operators of EA-6Bs. We
are adapting the existing ICAP-III systems from the EA-6B to the
EA-18G. I do indeed believe we can, with appropriate crew train-
ing and systems automation put in these systems, have them per-
form the mission and do so successfully. As we look through the de-
tails of this, we are using the crews to help define the two-man
cockpit. I feel that we can accomplish the mission.
Senator Pryor. That is good to know. Because I know that, for
example, in the C-130 with the new J, we are actually losing seats
there, which again makes sense, given technology and ever3rthing.
Let me ask the Marine Corps about the EA-18G. Is that part of
your plan, or do you have another proposal to replace the EA-6B?
General HouGH. Sir, we currently have 20 EA-6Bs down at
Cherry Point. They provide a great service. However, no matter if
you are a Navy airplane or a Marine airplane, they are all getting
old. We know that. We also know that the Growler is going to come
in. They are going to replace the Navy airplanes first. They ought
86
to, because they have to go aboard the boats. They take the great-
est pounding.
We are on the tail end. With DOD, with Mr. Aldridge, the Navy,
Air Force, and Marine Corps, we got together and we said, "How
are we going to solve this problem?" The way we came about it and
we presented to Mr. Aldridge was to step back and say, "I will take
the EA-6Bs, and we will figure out a way to be on the tail end of
these and keep them longer than anybody else and let the Navy get
their Growlers."
The Air Force is going for a system-of-systems approach, to fold
together all of us and take a look at how we are going to do busi-
ness in the future, say in the 2012 to 2015 time frame, not knowing
exactly how long the EA-6Bs are going to last. There are two stud-
ies that we will fund this year to look at this problem.
One is: How long, how much, and what do you have to do to keep
the EA-6B going? What is the bottom line? The second one is tak-
ing a look at the EF-35. It showed great promise in the demonstra-
tion phase, great promise in the avionics capability, what it can do,
what it cannot do, with its stealth, its capabilities, interoperability
and its avionics package. Take a look at that and, of course, de-
pending on when it comes in, to take a look and see what the busi-
ness case reads as to where it does come in and when you can put
money against it and to see just where we stand.
Those two studies over the next 2 years, as Mr. Aldridge said,
will take a look at that, and by 2005, 2006 we will have a plan.
That is what we are doing, sir.
Senator Pryor. Okay.
General Keys, what about the Air Force?
General Keys. We believe that the system-of-systems is the right
approach. It is much like we do today. We have the F-16CJs, the
EA-6Bs. We have self-protection jamming and a blend of capabili-
ties. Now as we see the time line move further out, now we have
UAVs that can provide us some close-in jamming. We will have the
Growlers out there providing that type of jamming.
We are looking at the B-52, for example, with a pod for standoff
jamming, miniature air launch decoys. Then as you bring on the
FA-22 and the F-35, you have the airborne electronic steerable
array, which then allows you, actually within your fire control
radar, to timeshare and do things to active radars. And we believe
that is the best combination of systems to go against the array that
we will face in the time line that we are talking about.
Senator Pryor. Okay. Let me turn my attention, if I can, to the
FA-22, which, as I understand it, is supposed to enter initial oper-
ational testing (lOT) — is it October of this year?
Dr. Sambur. Dedicated lOT will be in October of this year, cor-
rect.
Senator Pryor. Okay. Do we feel confident we are going to make
that time frame?
Dr. Sambur. Well, we feel there is an 80 percent probability that
we will get there. Let me explain to you what I mean by 80 percent
probability. Basically, 7 months ago, when we marched our way to
dedicated initial operation test and evaluation (lOT&E), we have
had several issues that were confronting us.
87
I am not sure if you are familiar with some of the data. We had
an issue with the tailfin buffet. We had issues with canopy howl-
ing. We had issues with the brakes. Systematically, we have been
facing those and solving those problems. We also had a problem in
flight science testing. We have basically gotten our curve down.
The one remaining problem we have right now is avionics insta-
bility, which I am sure you are aware of. One of the things we were
concerned about is whether or not we had an architecture that in-
herently we would never be able to get stability in. We have gotten
some of the best minds in the world. We have gotten two blue rib-
bon panels to look at this. They have ascertained that the architec-
ture is fundamentally sound and could be stabilized.
So now there is a question of software debugging because when
you are in a situation in which you have an error every couple of
hours, obviously that is a much more significant problem to figure
out.
Again, what we have done there is to augment the quality of the
staff. We have put in more test vehicles for doing this. We have put
in not only the instruments for testing, but also the labs. We have
focused attention on that with a systems engineering approach that
we have also gotten outside committees to look at.
So they feel reasonably sure that we will get there. Whether we
will get there at the end of October or not may not be the case.
But I would like to tell you, when we made our budget estimates,
we assumed that we would not finish in October. We actually gave
ourselves several months of contingency. So there is time beyond
October where we will not have any impact on both budget and ini-
tial operational capability date. So there is
Senator Pryor. That was my next question.
Dr. Sambur. That will not affect that. So I cannot give you abso-
lute assurance that we will complete this in October, but I will give
you absolute assurance that we put contingency in our budget so
it will not affect that from a financial point of view, and we have
scheduled a contingency to do this. We have the best team in place
to solve the problem, and it is a solvable problem.
Senator Pryor. Good.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Sessions. Thank you. I guess it is my time, unless Sen-
ator Chambliss has a time problem. You can go ahead of me.
Senator Chambliss. No.
Senator Sessions. Following up on the FA-22, at this time last
year, the FA-22 was scheduled to start initial operational test and
evaluation this month, April 2003. That was later changed to start
in August 2003 and now in your written testimony you state the
testing will not start until October 2003.
It seems a major issue there is software stability. It has been re-
ported that the latest software load to be delivered is not meeting
its objectives of 10 hours run time. You mentioned that, I think.
The software load required to commence operational testing has a
stability objective that calls for 20 hours of run time.
In a briefing by a team established by the Director of Defense for
Research and Engineering just this past December, it was stated,
"Run time stability remains severely problematic. Time and effort
88
needed to resolve the issue is unknown. Effectiveness of the cur-
rent strategy to resolve the issue is uncertain."
How would you respond to those concerns, Mr. Secretary?
Dr. Sambur. Well, Mr. Chairman, I would like to go back to the
answer that I gave to Senator Pry or. First of all, it is not an
unsolvable problem. It is not mission impossible. We have had
teams come back that have told us the architecture can fundamen-
tally be stabilized. So it is not a question, again, of mission impos-
sible.
As for your data points on April to now, you are absolutely cor-
rect. We have had schedule slips. But we have instituted new pro-
cedures into this program, more of a system-oriented nature so that
we are solving these problems in a very structured manner. As I
tried to indicate to Senator Pryor, we have solved many problems
since April, many of those problems this committee or previous
committees thought were unsolvable. I mentioned the fin buffet as
being one of those. Just the other day we had a problem with the
landing gear. I am happy to tell you we solved that in a very expe-
dited manner. In a matter of 3 days, we found out what the prob-
lem was.
Senator Sessions. You are satisfied that the fin buffet is — you
have actually worked that out?
Dr. Sambur. Yes. We have actually tested that on our flight
science aircraft. We are solving a number of these problems be-
cause we now have the right approach, we have the right man-
power, and we have the right attention from industry. They recog-
nize how critical this program is, to get it solved.
So those three ingredients should bring a success, coupled with
the fact, the overarching fact, that this is a solvable problem.
Senator Sessions. Well, production is a second concern to me.
According to the contract schedule provided to the committee last
year, it seemed we would have taken delivery of aircraft through
tail number 4019. Yet I believe the latest aircraft delivery was tail
number 4012 this past January. According to the latest production
delivery schedule delivered by the Air Force just last month, tail
number 4019 will not be delivered until the end of September.
The contract calls for aircraft through tail number 4025 through
September. It appears even by the Air Force's plan that through
the end of fiscal year 2003, production deliveries will be behind by
6 months and six aircraft.
So can you tell us what the reasons are for these production de-
liveries running so far behind?
Dr. Sambur. Well, you are right. There are problems with pro-
duction. What we did is we attacked it the same way that we are
attacking some of these issues with stability. We brought in a focus
team. Basically, we had no metrics to view things on in terms of
parts shortages, in terms of metrics for evaluating how long things
took.
So we have a metric in process so we can evaluate ourselves. The
management there has been elevated. We brought experts from
some of the more successful programs that Lockheed Martin has
run. They have even put one of their executive vice presidents in
charge of the program, an individual who has a proven track
89
record. The result of this is that we are starting to see deUveries
come out ahead of the projected schedule.
So I cannot tell you that we are going to catch up. All I can tell
you is that I apologize for the delay. But I can tell you going for-
ward we are starting to meet our commitment. As a matter of fact,
the last jet was delivered almost a week ahead of schedule. We are
starting to see the metrics improve substantially. So there is a
change for the better here.
At the end of the program we will be delayed, as you correctly
indicated. But there is movement in a positive sense.
Senator Sessions. Well, you gave us in your statement, I think,
a real mouth-watering description of the value of this aircraft. I
think it is truly a leap forward. It is a very important aircraft.
Dr. Sambur. Thank you.
Senator SESSIONS. I think we need to move it forward.
Dr. Sambur. We were privileged to give you a special session on
Friday, where you got some inside information on the surface-to-
air missiles that are proliferating throughout the world, to give you
a better appreciation of what we need.
Senator SESSIONS. But with this software problem, you are not
able to complete your operational test, as you would normally be
doing with these initial production aircraft?
Dr. Sambur. Let me explain to you what the issue is. First of all,
it has nothing to do with safety of flight. That is a different set of
software. This is the actual sensors. When it goes down, you basi-
cally, as you do on your computer at home, you restart or control/
alt/delete, and you get the things back in order.
So the impact is on how long it takes you to actually do the test-
ing. It is very wasteful for every time you start to do a test, as soon
as you go along, to do this control/alt/delete. So we obviously have
to fix that to get through testing. Then there is a test that you
need the stability for of 20 hours.
So it is not a case of any safety issues with the actual avionics,
but it is an issue in getting through this test. It is certainly some-
thing we have to fix to get through this testing in an expedited
fashion and to even prove the value of the jet.
Senator SESSIONS. Well, we are concerned about it. This aircraft
has extraordinary capabilities. We need to ensure that we are first
in the world in these kind of aircraft and this would take us there,
I have no doubt.
Senator Chambliss.
Senator Chambliss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I will come back to the F-22 in a minute. I have a couple ques-
tions there.
But I want to start out with you. Admiral, with respect the F/
A-18 and particularly the squadrons, the Carrier Air Reserve Wing
20, which is headquartered at NAS Atlanta. Only two of those
squadrons are funded in the Navy's 2004 budget. I note that VFA
203 from Naval Air Station Atlanta has been deployed several
times just in the last year alone in support of military operations
around the globe. I have two questions relative to that.
First, can you talk about the Navy's tactical air integration effort
and why the Navy and Marine Corps Reserve are paying the price
90
for efficiency and modernization, since it appears that it is the Re-
serve squadrons that are being targeted for closure?
Second, can you give me some feedback on the logic of closing a
squadron that is constantly deployed or constantly preparing to be
deployed in support of operations around the world?
Admiral Nathman. Yes, sir. Most of our Reserve strike fighter
squadrons, the ones in Atlanta, have been providing training sup-
port primarily to Navy and Marine Corps tactical squadrons, oper-
ational squadrons, active duty squadrons that are deployed. So
they have been deployed in terms of detachments to support train-
ing for those particular squadrons.
The war, particularly Operation Enduring Freedom, and then in
preparation for the amount of carriers that we needed to have for-
ward for Operation Iraqi Freedom, resulted in a — we matched the
air wing to the carrier. We try and do that about 18 to 24 months
before the next deployment, to make sure that things like the
maintenance support are stabilized.
The war basically caught us in a transitioning period with the
accelerated decommissioning of F-14s. So this is a little bit of a
longer answer, but we tried to rush in the EF. But we can only buy
the Super Hornets so fast to replace those squadrons. Because we
could not do it rapidly enough and meet the support requirements
for those aircraft, we had to basically bring a Reserve squadron
into an active duty air wing to provide the full warfighting capabil-
ity of that air wing.
So we stood up, as it were, and activated that Reserve squadron
to flesh out that air wing for deployment. That typically is not part
of our plan. What we are doing right now is studying a total force
requirement with the Reserves to find out what is the best way to
do several things. What is the best way to make the people in those
Reserve squadrons part of the warfighting wholeness answer that
we need? Right now you are seeing an example of that, where that
squadron is activated in an air wing to go to war.
But there are other ways of doing that. There is a tremendous
amount of contingency support that we need in terms of additional
pilots, maintenance, and crews. So we are studying those efforts
right now to find out: What is the best way to integrate the total
force of those people in the squadron?
We need to look at the recapitalization of our Reserve squadrons
as a tremendous challenge to the Navy in terms of affordability.
One of the reasons why we made the decision in the integration ef-
forts was we believe that we are bringing a much more capable
force with the aircraft that we are purchasing, the Super Hornet
and joint strike fighter and F-18G. With that improved capability,
we can take the risk in coming down on the total numbers of fight-
ers.
So it makes sense to us, in terms of understanding where we are
going to go with the Reserve force structure, that we look at — be-
cause the study will come out before the decision is made to actu-
ally decommission those particular squadrons. We will have the
study completed. We will know the best way to integrate our people
and to look at the total recapitalization challenge.
91
So that is where we are headed right now, sir, to figure out and
make sure we are making the right decisions about those Reserve
strike fighter squadrons.
Senator Chambliss. Now when is that study going to be coming
out?
Admiral Nathman. We are in the middle of it right now. I expect
the study will be completed in less than a year. The Navy will have
a position on its total force, and particularly those squadrons. That
will lead the decision before we make the decommissioning decision
or the disestablishment decision for those Reserve strike fighter
squadrons.
Senator CHAMBLISS. What about when you start bringing assets
back from the Middle East, assuming this conflict is over within
the next several weeks, months, whatever? What effect is that
going to have on these Reserve squadrons?
Admiral Nathman. We are trying to understand that right now.
One of the challenges of the current war is we have a certain
amount of force structure, obviously. We have five carriers, with a
sixth that just entered the AOR, the U.S.S. Nimitz. So we have six
carrier flight decks, basically, in this war. We also deployed Carl
Vinson to backfill Kitty Hawk in the Pacific Theater.
So one of the things we do not know yet is in the reconstitution
of our force, what is the force structure we have to leave behind?
In other words, what will CENTCOM want? When the war ends,
what will they want in terms of presence? The United States Navy
has provided anjrwhere from one to two aircraft carriers full time
since 1990 in the Persian Gulf. We do not know what the reconsti-
tuted force structure is going to be, what the requirement will be.
When v/e understand that, we will understand our reconstitution
challenges.
So I do not have a complete answer for you, because we do not
know what force structure we will have to leave in the area to re-
constitute the force when it comes back. That will give us a real
good answer of what our trades are. I can assure you the Reserve
force structure will be part of that equation, to understand how to
reconstitute our active force, sir.
Senator Chambliss. Rather than me bugging you and Admiral
Clark down the road, if you all will stay in touch with us and keep
us posted on that, I would appreciate it.
Admiral Nathman. Yes, sir.
Senator Sessions. All right. Thank you, Senator Chambliss.
We will do another round.
Precision weapons are a critical component of what we are doing
in Iraq today and what we utilized in Afghanistan. The ratio of
guided to unguided munitions has continued to increase in each
conflict. Production rates of laser-guided bombs and JDAMs are ei-
ther at maximum production rates or on a ramp to reach maximum
production rates.
Admiral Nathman, General Hough, and General Keys, I will ask
you this: Are all of our strike aircraft modified to employ these pre-
cision munitions? Are there any modifications needed by the air-
craft in your service to achieve emplojnnent capability?
Admiral NATHMAN. I will start. I will tell you that our aircraft
are modified to carry all precision weapons that we feel like they
92
need to carry right now. As an example, we just finished the inte-
gration test and the approval of the F-14 to carry JDAM, which
is an important piece for us, because the airplane is carrying it
right now, I believe. The Navy, to my knowledge, is not
Senator SESSIONS. It is carrjdng it now, but you need to do fur-
ther modification?
Admiral Nathman. No, sir. We have completed the test and the
modification on the F-14 to drop JDAM. We did that the last cou-
ple of years. We were going through a process of making sure that
all the integration tests were appropriate, and the approval proc-
ess, we accelerated that for the war. So we have approved the drop-
ping and the carriage of JDAM onto F-14s for the war. It was an
acceleration of a decision we made, I believe, back in 1998 to inte-
grate JDAM onto the F-14.
Senator SESSIONS. Are all those so configured today?
Admiral Nathman. I will have to get back to you with the total
numbers of airplanes that are. But to my knowledge, all the cur-
rent operational F-14s will have that capability.
[The information referred to follows:]
All 64 F-14B and all 47 F-14D aircraft are JDAM-capable. None of the 37 F-
14A aircraft are JDAM-capable. (See table below.)
JDAM Variant
GBU-31(v)2/B
Mk84
(2000 lb)
GBU-31(v)4/B
BLU-109
(2000 lb penetrating)
GBU-32(v)2/B
Mk83
(10001b)
Platform
# of aircraft
F-14A
37
F-14B
64
X
F-14D
47
X
X = JDAM Capable
Senator Sessions. General Hough.
General HoUGH. Yes, sir. Thank you. Our F-18s can drop them,
but our AV-8s cannot. They are undergoing, and have been for the
last few years, an open architecture software infusion, if you will,
to be modern with 21st century airplanes, to do anything anybody
else does.
Right now we are testing JDAM at China Lake. With the comple-
tion of those tests and the funding and completion of the OSCAR
program, which is the Open Architecture Program, we will be able
to drop everything we have in the inventory. That will be by 2005.
Senator SESSIONS. General Keys?
General Keys. Ours can all drop either laser or JDAM, including
the bombers.
Senator Sessions. I would just say to Admiral Nathman and
General Hough: This is a big deal. To me it is so plainly obvious
that the JDAM is just a magnificent weapon of choice in so many
circumstances that we need plenty of them. We do not need to run
out of them. If we have to start a new assembly line to have
them — and everybody said we are going to have plenty, and I hope
we have plenty — we need to make sure our aircraft, whatever it
costs in terms of the overall budget — we buy ships, we buy air-
93
planes — it seems to me, we need to be sure that we are configuring
our aircraft to carry them.
General Hough, is it a question of just money that you all have
made that decision to go until 2005? Why would it take that long?
General HoUGH. No, sir. It is undergoing testing. And it has to
be able to drop the works. In fact, within about 3 to 6 months, the
ability to be able to drop the 500 pound JDAM may be over. To
drop each one of these 500, 1,000, or 2,000-pound bombs, it does
take a little while. There were a couple hundred sorties that were
put against this.
It was not a matter of the money. We fund this every year. It
is just a matter of funding OSCAR. I have been assured, and the
testing is going fine, that when I say 2005, in about a year to
maybe a little bit more than a year, these tests ought to be com-
plete.
Admiral Nathman. Mr. Chairman, could I do a follow-up?
Senator Sessions. Yes.
Admiral Nathman. One area we need help — and this is just a
case of timing; this is not because we were overtly bad about
things. We had a plan to decommission or disestablish the F-14
and transition to Super Hornet. We accelerated that plan 2 years
ago to make sure that we could get out of the very high operations
and support costs of the F-14.
Now on top of that we had an acceleration of that particular
plan. The F-18 multiyear supported that transition. But the war
accelerated the deployment of our force. We have surged a signifi-
cant amount of carriers and air wings above what we normally do,
when we did the President's requirement for the Global Naval
Presence Plan. So that acceleration has led to a very practical prob-
lem for us.
We purposely scaled the amount of ancillary equipment that we
bought for Super Hornet and weapons integration to meet this kind
of paced disestablishment of the F-14 and transition to the F-18
Super Hornet. So one area we dearly need your help on is addi-
tional funds for ancillary equipment for the Super Hornet, addi-
tional weapons, and accelerated weapons integration, which we did
not originally program for because of the pace of the war.
So that is a very practical area that you could help us on. I be-
lieve that if we have a significant reconstitution effort where the
war is going to go, those are the type of investments we should ac-
celerate, because we have the opportunity to accelerate those in-
vestments. We would appreciate your help on that, sir.
Senator Sessions. Well, I certainly will. You can count on that.
The authorization bill will be coming forward, and we will be look-
ing at that.
Just briefly. Secretaries Young and Sambur, are we doing all we
can do to maximize production of precision-guided munitions at
this time, to your knowledge?
Dr. Sambur. Well, as you said at the beginning, we have given
additional money for facilitation of the JDAMs to 3,000 a month,
which we will hit in July. We are presently at, I think, 2,400 a
month. We are looking at all sources to make sure that there are
no sole source issues that could cause us issues. We are actively
94
seeking to look if there are any other alternatives. But right now
we are meeting all of the requirements for JDAMs.
Mr. Young. Mr. Chairman, I think the Navy has looked for some
resources and worked with the Air Force on JDAM to pull back
that 3,000 a month a little earlier. So we are doing exactly, as the
Secretary said, everything that can be done. Laser-guided bombs
are at 1,500 a month with 2 providers. That is the msiximum rate
there. So we, in both of those areas, are doing the best we can.
Then in the supplemental, there is serious consideration of facili-
ties monies for Tactical Tomahawk, so we can raise the anticipated
production rate of that missile to a higher level and do so sooner
and within that created space. Clearly we would like to use some
supplemental funds to buy Tactical Tomahawks sooner. That is an
urgent need that is coming before us.
Senator Sessions. Well, we will maybe talk about it later. The
Tomahawks are so much more expensive, and I am sure there are
reasons. We have used an awful lot of them, it seems. The JDAMs
have tremendous capability for reasonable cost.
Senator Pryor.
Senator Pryor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I think I agree with you. The JDAM is a very interesting and
positive development for our military. I think it is a very common-
sense approach to a challenge that we have. I am glad that you all
had the foresight to develop that. I may not understand anything
about the technology involved in JDAM, but there is something I
do understand and that is being overweight. So I want to ask about
an airplane that is overweight here and I want to find out how se-
rious this problem is.
Secretary Young, if I can ask you: As I understand it, the JSF,
at least one version of it or maybe all, I am not sure, is overweight.
Six thousand pounds overweight is what I have in my notes here.
Could you talk about that and tell me how that is going? Also, why
is it overweight? What makes it overweight?
Mr. Young. I will take two approaches to answering the ques-
tion, if I could. One is, we are still in the early design stage of the
program. We are 16 months into the new System Development and
Demonstration. So at this point, some weights are still being esti-
mated, as we design the airplane based on historical information
and experience, parametric data, if you will. That analysis says
that the plane is something on the order of about 1,000-plus
pounds overweight, the engine and the airplane together. Then
they took another view of this, which is a bottom-up estimate of the
weight with different tools that produced a number like you quoted,
sir, about 5,000 pounds.
What I would say to you is: In both those cases, the JSF program
is one of the best planned programs in the Department of Defense.
It has a weight curve leading all the way out to what they want
the plane to weigh at IOC. So what we are talking about is what
the plane weighs here at the preliminary design review stage. We
are above the target that was set.
Even at those weights, we are still not, I think, above the IOC
weight of the airplane. But we are clearly above where we should
be at this early stage of the program. Through the application of
management tools, the number one focus of the program is to bring
95
the aircraft weight back down to the prehminary design review tar-
get. This will give us a more than adequate margin to develop the
plane and meet the IOC weight.
There is a risk. I would tell you it is probably the preeminent
management concern before the program right now, particularly on
the STOVL version. But, the program has the tools and has identi-
fied the issue and is working it aggi'essively.
Relative to the bottom-up review, it was done to allocate areas
where people need to go in and attack the weight and bring it
down. Those allocations have been made and the team is working
in each area to bring those weights back down.
Senator Pryor. What is causing it to be overweight? What is it?
Mr. Young. The engine is a factor. It is one of the more mature
components. It is an engine derived from the F-22. It is a sophisti-
cated engine. There is about 172 pounds of weight challenge, I be-
lieve, on the engine.
The airplane, likewise, particularly the STOVL configuration
with its ability to lift vertically, has a lift fan and a complicated
propulsion system that has a substantial weight contribution.
So I would not single out any factor now as a real long pole in
the tent. It is just that overall the estimates are getting refined
and will be further refined as the program progresses. We antici-
pated the plane would grow along the way to the IOC weight. It
has grown faster than necessary and we have to implement a
weight reduction program.
The other places that they are looking at is the empennage area
where the wings join the body. We may have allocated more mar-
gin than necessary for the structural joints and other areas, be-
cause we wanted to be prudent in avoiding cracking and fatigue,
early fatigue, problems in the plane. So we are going in and refin-
ing whether we can lighten up those structures and still have ade-
quate structural life.
Senator Pryor. The STOVL aircraft, is it heavier than the others
by necessity, given the variation on it?
Mr. Young. I would like to give you the weights for the record.
My memory is that it is slightly heavier at this point than the car-
rier variant, and both of which are, I believe, a little heavier than
the conventional takeoff and landing variant for the Air Force.
[The information referred to follows:!
96
CTOL STOVL CV
Mar 2003 Wt est 26,582 30,401 29,935
PDRWtest 26,286 29,726 29,747
lOCWt 27,100 30,500 30,700
NTEwt 27,728 30,958 31,324
STOVL = Short Takeoff, Vertical Land
CTOL = Conventional Takeoff and Land
CV ^ Carrier-based Platform
PDR = Preliminary Design Review
IOC = Initial Operational Capability
NTE = Not To Exceed
Senator Pryor. I think that is right, too.
With regard to the — and I am changing gears here — C-130 pro-
gram, Secretary Sambur, what is the current status of that? I be-
Ueve you mentioned in your testimony a few moments ago that it
is the C-130Es that have the corrosion problem. Is that right?
Dr. Sambur. You mean the KC-135s?
Senator Pryor. Yes — I am sorry. I was talking about the C-130s.
Dr. Sambur. The C-130Js.
Senator Pryor. Yes, C-130Js.
Dr. Sambur. Right.
Senator Pryor. Is it not the C-130E that has the corrosion prob-
lem? Do you know?
Dr. Sambur. I am not sure. I do not know. I will take that for
the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
Yes. Fifty-seven C-130Es were affected by corrosion. To date, 10 have been
cleared through inspection, 32 aircraft have been identified for early retirement and
the status of the final 13 will be determined pending ftirther inspections. While
some of the aircraft are being retired earlier than originally scheduled, the long-
term impact to C-130 force structure is minimal.
Senator Pryor. All right. I think that is right. I notice that the
Air Force has slightly increased its procurement goals for that. I
believe it went from maybe 40 to 42 planes or something like that.
I did not know if that was in response to the C-130E problem or
if that is just part of the general plan and the general needs of the
Air Force.
Dr. Sambur. It is my understanding that it is part of the require-
ments that we are satisfying.
Senator Pryor. That is all I have. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Sessions. Senator Chambliss.
Senator Chambliss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
97
We are in a multiyear procurement program for the C-130J for
the Air Force, based on our C-17 model. I think you all will agree,
it is one of the best decisions the Air Force has made.
I do have a question about the C-130 multiyear procurement for
the Navy and Marine Corps. I think we finally have jumped
through the last hoop in the last couple of weeks. That is now
signed, sealed, and on track. I want to just make sure I confirm
that. Gentlemen, is that right?
Dr. Sambur. My understanding is the contract is signed. It was
signed a couple weeks ago. The planes are on contract. Air Force
and Marine Corps.
Senator Chambliss. Okay. General Hough, my Marine Corps in-
stallation is a logistics base. It is not a parochial issue when I say
to you that I think the Marine Corps has been shortchanged from
a TACAIR standpoint. I know you all made some sacrifices early
on. When the Joint Strike Fighter comes on — this committee needs
to look after the Marine Corps, make sure that your guys get the
equipment they need to do their job. I think you did make a sac-
rifice. We all need to remember that when we start procuring the
JSF for you.
Mr. Secretary and General, I want to ask you all again about the
F-22. This avionics software has been a problem time and time
again. Are we getting to the end of the road on this now with re-
spect to the F-22?
Dr. Sambur. Well, we hope. We have a plan in place, as I men-
tioned before. Two blue-ribbon panels have determined that this is
not mission impossible, that we can solve the problem. Software de-
bugging, when there are problems of this nature, take some time.
But we are systematically going through that.
Chairman Sessions mentioned the last software load. It is not
really a load in the sense that this is a complete package. These
are basically issues in which we have put fixes into the existing
software package and tested it. The good news is that the start-up
performance is now 100 percent. When we first started a couple of
weeks ago, it was in the 60 percent range. So we have made a sig-
nificant improvement on this.
It is not just a software problem. It is a combination of software
and hardware issues. For example, there is an application specific
integrated circuit (ASIC) that was faulty that we have corrected. It
is not an architecture issue. It is a component within that architec-
ture.
There is an ultrahigh-frequency tactical air navigation (TACAN)
system that is giving us some problems that we are in the process
of fixing. So we share your concern. But we think we will have it
fixed. We cannot tell you the exact date, but it is not a lot after
October 31.
Senator Chambliss. We have a $43 billion cap on this program.
We keep coming down and down. Currently, we are still looking at
339 airplanes technically. But obviously, we cannot buy that many
with $43 billion.
Dr. Sambur. Yes, that is right.
Senator Chambliss. Now how are we going to approach the long-
term expeditionary force issue with respect to the actual number
98
of F-22s that we are going to be able to buy? What is that going
to do to us?
Dr. Sambur. Well, we are at, as you probably know, a buy-to-
budget. Right now with the existing numbers we think it is about
276, as opposed to the 339. But one of the issues that we have been
talking about for a long time is stability in the program. We also
mentioned the C-17, which is a program, I think, you are very
much aware of. Once that program had stability, that the problems
were behind it, the cost curve, the learning curve associated with
production went down dramatically and the costs improved.
We are hoping that once we get this stability in the program, we
will be beyond some of these problems, and we can focus on the
production costs and use some of the improvements that we are
seeing from the program we have in place to get cost improve-
ments. We will get that number up beyond the 275.
Senator Chambliss. All right. The testing we are doing now at
Edwards, is everything going well? Have we had any recent prob-
lems? I have not read about any. I have been scared to get a phone
call from Lockheed. But is everything going well?
Dr. Sambur. Everything has been amazingly successful outside
of the software issues. We have had missile tests that have worked
very well. The flight science tests are going along, according to the
revised plan, which was a very steep slope in terms of getting those
resolved. I talked about some of the issues with the fin buffet. We
have proven that those things have been fixed. So the flight science
is doing very well.
The logistics issues are going in place. The only mountain that
we have is now this avionics software. We had actually five moun-
tains, if you looked at it 7 or 8 months ago. We have been able to
climb four of the five.
Senator Chambliss. I go back to the fact that on every new
weapon system we have had as many problems as we have had
with the F-22. It still is comparable from a problem standpoint
with every single other weapon system that we have procured.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Sessions. On the precision munitions, the JASSM
sounds to me to have great potential. It would be an alternative to
a Tomahawk in that it would likewise avoid flying over heavily de-
fended areas. You have a 220-mile, 200-nautical-mile standoff. How
is that doing? I think at the beginning of April we are supposed
to have some deliveries. Do you expect to use anything in Iraq?
Dr. Sambur. A few months ago we had some issues with testing,
and we corrected those problems. On March 26 we actually had a
successful developmental test. We are back — beginning in April we
have started the operational testing. So we are very encouraged
about that plan for JASSM. Things seem to have turned the comer
and we are doing much better. We are on track.
Senator SESSIONS. The Joint Standoff Weapon, JSOW, I guess
you would call it
Dr. Sambur. JSOW.
Senator Sessions. — appears to be considerably more expensive.
Is that correct? Did I read that in one of your reports?
Dr. Sambur. I believe it is.
99
Senator SESSIONS. What advantage does it have over the
JASSM?
Dr. Sambur. I will let my expert, General Keys answer that.
General Keys. Basically, on the type of weapon that it carries,
the sub-munitions is what tends to make the JSOW much more ex-
pensive than the JASSM, which is a unitary or a blast frag war-
head that is selectable. So as you get to more sophisticated filling,
if you will, for it, it starts to drive some of the costs up.
Senator SESSIONS. Back on the KC-135, I notice you are awfully
adamant about the KC-135E not being able to be refurbished.
Right?
Dr. Sambur. Right.
Senator SESSIONS. But we are doing it now. We have been doing
it. How come today all of a sudden none of them are capable of
being refurbished? Do you know the cost of bringing one of those
up to current standards?
Dr. Sambur. Well, the question is not whether or not it is capa-
ble of being fixed. The problem is that we are finding areas of cor-
rosion that are in areas that we had never seen before. There is
a question, because of the design of the plane — the wings go up and
water accumulates. It was a design that was not really well-suited
for protection against the aging effects. It has dissimilar metals
and all sorts of very poorly designed things for protection against
corrosion. What is happening is, when the maintainors get in there
and start looking at it, they are seeing areas of corrosion that are
causing alarm to them, areas that they had not seen before. They
are concerned about the wide-spreading nature of this.
So what they would rather do is to basically start retiring these
things before catastrophic things occur.
Senator SESSIONS. We certainly do not need to take risk. But do
you know whether in examining a KC-135E, taking it through for
rehab, you can identify those that do have serious corrosion prob-
lems that may be unfixable? Can you identify those that do not and
could be reused?
Dr. Sambur. Well, the first 68 that Air Mobility Command
(AMC) has pointed out for retirement are those that they feel have
significant issues, and that is the reason why they chose those to
retire. They are looking at the potential of retiring even more Es
in the future.
Senator Sessions. Well, that puts you in a fix, when you retire
them. You have to have something for replacement, because we
pretty much — that is a high-demand aircraft, I know.
Dr. Sambur. What AMC has done is that they have used the
crews for the Es and started to put them on the Rs. Rs are now
fl3dng more with the additional crews. AMC has decided that that
is worth doing, to use the Rs more than to use the Es, because they
assume that the risks associated with using the Es is far greater
than using the Rs more than they anticipated.
So the actual tanker utilization has only gone down a small de-
gree, because they are able to use the extra crews from the Es,
what is taken from the Es, and they are actually flying the Rs
more, because they have more confidence in the Rs.
100
Senator Sessions. Does it appear that in the upgraded Rs you
are not — is it not true that you are not having these problems with
corrosion? Does that indicate that we can fix it by upgrading them?
Dr. Sambur. I think the issue is that the Rs are younger than
the Es. We are not seeing those problems.
Senator Sessions. The aircraft itself is a new aircraft.
Dr. Sambur. The aircraft itself is younger. The Es are the oldest
version of the tankers. The Rs are younger. We have not seen those
problems. But I would assume that in the near future we will start
to see those problems. That is why we are so anxious to have this
recapitalization with leasing, because we think that the 5 years
that you gain from leasing because of the affordability is something
that we need to do now. We need to start this recapitalization now,
because we are concerned of the unknowns, that these Rs may
start to show problems that the Es are now experiencing.
Senator SESSIONS. Well, it is something I think I will be examin-
ing or asking questions about, because it is a lot of money. It is $17
billion to recapitalize or add 100 KC-767s. It is a big pile of money.
For a fraction of that, if you could continue to use existing aircraft,
that would be a huge savings, particularly when you have spent all
the things necessary to keep the Air Force going, and then you
come in with $17 billion for a program. If you could avoid it, that
would be a lot of money that could be used for other things.
Dr. Sambur. Well, you recognize, of course, that this amount of
money is over a long period of time. One of the issues that we did
in terms of evaluating this lease is, first of all, we wanted to make
sure that we really needed it, that time was critical to have it done.
Second, we wanted to make sure it was affordable.
So one of the questions that OSD asked us in the lease was to
say: Could you afford to do this? We made some very tough deci-
sions to show them that this was affordable in our plan, because
this is becoming a very important and critical issue for us.
Senator SESSIONS. Well, I thank you, all of you.
Secretary Young?
Mr. Young. Could I revisit precision munitions for just one sec-
ond?
Senator SESSIONS. Yes.
Mr. Young. With the benefit of some time, I was able to pull
some information. The JSOW has an average procurement unit
cost of about $200,000 per weapon. We worked with the Air Force
on this, because the Navy has an interest here. JASSM has the
benefit, like Tactical Tomahawk, of a good proposal from the com-
panies. It is a $400,000 class weapon. Lastly Tactical Tomahawk,
where we likewise have a fixed price proposal from the companies,
is about a $600,000 class weapon.
Each weapon steps up in terms of range and capability. I think
to one of the points you made, there have been some situations in
Operation Iraqi Freedom where the TACAIR could not get to cer-
tain locations. We have shot Tomahawks that we might not have
expected to shoot, because that weapon can go in, even in the sand-
storms and other adverse conditions.
The whole toolkit of weapons provides a lot of flexibility. But,
there is a gradual step-up in the cost of each one, somewhat com-
mensurate with the capability.
101
Senator Sessions. So the JSOW is more expensive than the
JASSM?
Mr. Young. No, sir. It is less expensive. The procurement, the
acquisition procurement unit cost, the current estimate is
Senator Sessions. JSOW is $200,000 and the JASSM is
$400,000.
Mr. Young. Yes, sir.
Senator SESSIONS. Okay. I had it backwards. Thank you for cor-
recting me there. The Tomahawk is not $1 milUon; it is $600,000.
Mr. Young. Well, the original Tomahawks were. But the new
Tactical Tomahawk, we have a priced agreement with Raytheon to
get those weapons for about $600,000. That is part of why we went
to Tactical Tomahawk, to reengineer it and bring the cost down.
Senator SESSIONS. Very good. That is good progress.
Anything else?
General Keys. I apologize for that. I thought when we were dis-
cussing that, it was a comparison between JDAM and JSOW. So
I misheard your question.
Senator SESSIONS. All right. Thank you very much. We appre-
ciate that. That is very helpful. You are laying the foundation for
the future of our defense. We appreciate you very much.
We are adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe
joint direct attack munition critical components production
1. Senator Inhofe. Secretai-y Young and Secretary Sambur, I recently read a
magazine article that stated a Chinese company had acquired significant control
over the production of critical components for the JDAM. Specifically, rare earth
magnets that are essential to the servos in the JDAM kit. According to the article,
a Chinese consortium purchased the Indiana factory where the critical parts are
produced. Is the United States allowing China to produce critical components for
our JDAM kits? Are there other U.S. suppliers of these rare earth magnets?
Secretary Young. Yes, rare earth magnets that are used in our JDAM
servomotors are being procured from Magnequench, Incorporated, of Indianapolis,
Indiana. In 1995, Magnequench, Incorporated was purchased by a consortium of
Chinese companies.
Eighty percent of the servomotors used in JDAM are produced by SL-Montevideo
Technology, Incorporated (SL-MTI) of Montevideo, Minnesota. SL-MTI obtains rare
earth magnets for its servomotors from Magnequench, Incorporated.
The remaining 20 percent of servomotors for the JDAM program are produced by
Kollmorgon Corporation of Radford, Virginia, which obtains its rare earth magnets
from Magnetic Corporation of Torrance, California.
Numerous manufacturers exist in the United States that can produce rare earth
magnets suitable for JDAM production. However, 75 percent of the raw materials
used to make rare earth magnets are supplied by China. Although other sources
and mines exist around the world, including the United States, China remains the
most cost-effective source at this time.
Secretary Sambur. Yes, a consortium of Chinese companies purchased
Magnequench, Inc., the company that owns the Indiana factory in question.
Magnequench is a fourth tier supplier providing rare earth magnets to SL-Monte-
video Technology, Inc. (SL-MTI), one of two servomotor manufacturers supporting
the JDAM program. SL-MTI produces 80 percent of the servomotors used on the
JDAM program. Kollmorgon (Radford, VA) produces the remaining 20 percent of the
servomotors on the JDAM program. Kollmorgon's rare earth magnet supplier is
Magnetic Corp (Torrance, CA).
Rare earth magnets are widely used by the automotive and computer industry.
Numerous manufactures exist in the U.S. that can produce rare earth magnets suit-
able for JDAM production. However, 75 percent of the raw material used to make
rare earth magnets is supplied by China. Although other sources and mines exist
102
around the world (including the U.S.), China remains the most cost-effective source
at this time.
TANKER LEASE/KC-135 CORROSION
2. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Sambur, during the hearing you stated the reason
the Air Force was pursuing the 767 lease was the corrosion in the KC-135 E-mod-
els, and a safety report issued by the Air Force Materiel Comm.and. Don't the KC-
135 E-models and R-models have the same corrosion problem?
Secretary Sambur. The corrosion problems found on the majority of the aircraft
structure (wings, body, tail structure) are basically the same on both the KC-135E
and KC-135R models. All 540+ remaining KC-135 tankers were built and delivered
to the U.S. Air Force within a 10-year span. Although the KC-135Es are slightly
older, on average, than the KC-135Rs, the minor difference in age is insignificant
relative to aircraft corrosion. The KC-135E tankers do have one corrosion problem
not found on the KC-135Rs. The engine struts are suffering from widespread mod-
erate to severe corrosion damage that had degraded the strength to the point where
the struts may not be able to carry worst case design loads.
3. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Sambur, you stated the Air Force Materiel Com-
mand report indicated the KC-135 E-models were "unsafe" due to the corrosion.
Can you elaborate on that comment and provide a copy of that report?
Secretary Sambur. The word "unsafe" might have been too strong. Our concern
stems from the need to stay ahead of the growing corrosion issue. Aside from the
increasing effects this has had on the Air Force budget, the corrosion problems im-
pact operational capability.
The KC-135 engine struts are suffering fi-om widespread moderate to severe cor-
rosion damage that has degraded the strength to the point where the struts may
not be able to carry worst-case design loads. Operational restrictions have been
placed on KC-135Es with unrepaired struts to ensure safety of flight. Additionally,
the C/KC-135 SPO and Boeing identified an interim repair that should maintain
the structural integrity of the struts for up to 3 to 5 years. KC-135E aircraft have
been receiving the interim repair during periodic depot maintenance since May
2001, with the remainder expected to be repaired by September 2004. Within 3 to
5 years after the interim repair, a much more expensive strut replacement/overhaul
will be required.
Because of these corrosion issues and the associated costs, the Air Force intends
to begin retiring those aircraft that pose the greatest concerns.
[The Air Force Materiel Command report follows:]
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Questions Submitted by Senator Pat Roberts
joint primary aircrew training system
4. Senator ROBERTS. Secretary Sambur, how has the Navy's decision to postpone
participation in the Joint Primary Aircrew Training System (JPATS) program af-
fected Air Force costs for the program? What other impacts, if any, has the Navy
decision had on the Air Force's JPATS program?
Secretary Sambur. The Navy deferred acquisition of 72 total JPATS aircraft
through the FYDP including all aircraft from fiscal year 2002 through fiscal year
2006. At the time of the deferral, the Air Force used the program's joint cost model
and calculated the impact to be $44.9 million across the FYDP, with an average cost
increase of $0.2 million per Air Force aircraft.
121
However, since that calculation was made, the Air Force accelerated its procure-
ment by 18 aircraft within the FYDP and negotiated a new follow-on contract for
fiscal year 2002 through fiscal year 2006 with revised rates. These actions have par-
tially mitigated the impact of the Navy's procurement deferral.
The biggest operational impact of the deferral is to delay full implementation of
Joint Specialized Undergraduate Pilot Training (JSPUT). Currently, some USAF pi-
lots are trained by the U.S. Navy through a shared training agreement. These
USAF pilots are trained in the Navy's older T-34 without modem digital avionics,
instead of the more modern T-6 like their USAF trained counterparts.
5. Senator Roberts. Secretary Young, the Navy continues to postpone its partici-
pation in the JPATS procurement program, and does not plan to reenter the pro-
gram until 2007. Wouldn't Navy participation in the program reduce overall pro-
gram costs and benefit the Navy?
Secretary Young. In preparation for the fiscal year 2002 budget cycle, the Navy
conducted a prioritized review of Navy programs, including JPATS procurement pro-
files. The Navy's decision to defer procurement of JPATS was based on competing
budget priorities and the significant service life remaining on the T-34C.
6. Senator Roberts. Secretary Young, doesn't the increased safety in initial pilot
training resulting from use of JPATS aircraft justify the Navy's participation in the
program before 2007?
Secretary Young. The T-34C has an excellent safety record. The mishap rate for
the past 5 years is below the training command average, and less than half the
overall average for naval aviation. Although the JPATS air vehicle incorporates sev-
eral important safety features, the T-34C is a safe and capable platform expected
to train future naval aviators through the end of its service life.
Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Dole
navy and marine corps tactical air integration
7. Senator Dole. Secretary Young, Admiral Nathman, and General Hough, the in-
tegration of Navy and Marine Corps tactical air operations has been under discus-
sion for several years. It is my understanding that as a part of such integration two
Navy squadrons have already moved to the Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Beau-
fort in South Carolina. What is the principal goal and what are the benefits of inte-
grating tactical air operations?
Secretary Young and Admiral Nathman. Four Marine Corps F/A-18 squadrons
have been integrated into USN Carrier Air Wings (CVWs) since the early 1990s.
The current TACAIR Integration plan is much broader in scope and will integrate
a Marine Corps F/A-18 squadron into each of the 10 USN CVWs. as well as inte-
grating 3 USN F/A-18 squadrons into the USMC Unit Deployment Program. The
basing of 2 USN F/A-18 squadrons at MCAS Beaufort was not part of the TACAIR
Integration plan. It resulted from the BRAC decision to close NAS Cecil Field in
Florida. The BRAC closure of Cecil Field required the F/A-18s based there to move
to NAS Oceana, Virginia. The aircraft loading at NAS Oceana would not accommo-
date all the squadrons needing relocation, resulting in 2 USN F/A-18 squadrons
moving to MCAS Beaufort. Air operations at MCAS Beaufort are similar to those
at USN sites, although operational profiles may vary somewhat. The aircraft are
maintained in a similar manner, and logistics for both services are supported appro-
priately. The principal goals of the TACAIR Integration plan were to reduce over-
head and operating costs, reduce total inventory, retire legacy aircraft, reduce the
procurement bow wave, and increase warfighting capability. This is an affordable
solution for the future of DON TACAIR and will 3deld a smaller, more capable, more
reliable force.
General HoUGH. The goal of TACAIR integration is simple — Navy and Marine
strike fighter squadrons training, deploying and fighting side-by-side as part of car-
rier air wings and land-based expeditionary units. This merging of service assets
and capabilities will greatly improve our cross training, coordination and
warfighting capabilities to create a truly interchangeable strike fighter force.
The creation of an interchangeable strike fighter force will optimize forward de-
ployed naval air power and those aircraft available for surge operations; moreover,
the TAI plan will reduce overhead costs through efficiencies realized in air wing
training and emplo3Tnent as well as the revised reqmrements for new aircraft pro-
curement.
122
By further integrating strike fighter forces, the Department of the Navy will more
efficiently and effectively serve the Nation's national security requirements from the
sea with a realistic and affordable integration plan.
8. Senator Dole. Secretary Young, Admiral Nathman, and General Hough, would
you describe how this has worked at MCAS Beaufort and how you see this concept
working in the future?
Secretary YouNG and Admiral Nathman. The arrangement has worked very well,
with a high degree of cooperation between the two Services. One operational advan-
tage is that the three F/A-18 squadrons assigned to CVW-1 (2 USN, 1 USMC) are
all based at MCAS Beaufort, allowing air wing training with colocated units. The
continued integration of Navy and Marine squadrons will reap similar benefits.
General HouGH. The placement of two Navy F/A-18 squadrons in Marine Corps
Air Station Beaufort was a facilities and basing initiative and not the result of the
current TACAIR integration plan. However, it is safe to say that many benefits have
resulted from colocating the strike fighters of Carrier Air Wing 1 with Marine Air-
craft Group-31.
Cross training between units becomes much more effective when they operate off"
the same base and follow similar training plans. Separate service techniques, tactics
and procedures are more easily integrated. As a result, training is more effective
and efficient. The Navy squadrons based at MCAS Beaufort have integrated into the
Marine Corps' Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron (MALS) and the Intermediate
Maintenance Activities (IMA). To date, this integration has worked well for aU par-
ticipants. The Marine Corps plans to continue this level of integration until the in-
troduction of the JSF when another opportunity to integrate wiU occur.
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR .JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN
F-22 SOFTWARE TESTING PROCEDURES
9. Senator Lieberman. Secretary Sambur, software instability has been causing
delays in the developmental testing, which has translated into delays in the planned
start of operational testing. I understand that the Air Force is using a flying test
bed (FTB) aircraft to test software before installing that software in the F/A-22
flight test aircraft. Are you still conducting rigorous testing of the software in the
FTB aircraft before installing the software on the flight test aircraft?
Secretary Sambur. Yes, we are still using the FTB. In addition, we have fun-
damentally changed our software approach based on recommendations from the
OSD Avionics Advisory Team. The FTB is configured for correcting instabilities in
the Communications Navigations Identification (CNI) system, the most challenging
component of the avionics. We have also dedicated aircraft #4006 as an additional
FTB. Aircraft #4006 is being used to determine, correct, and verify root causes of
the software instability events. We are confident that the continuation of a rigorous
software engineering approach, new data capturing methods, and the use of aircraft
#4006 in combination with the FTB will allow us to resolve the software instabil-
ities.
CONTINUED EROSION IN THE F-22 PRODUCTION COSTS
10. Senator Lieberman. Secretary Sambur, I understand that you are not buying
as many F/A-22 aircraft in fiscal year 2003 as were authorized and appropriated
by Congress. In part this reflects shifting resources to cover additional research and
development effort, but it also reflects production cost increases. Have we seen the
last of the production cost increases, assuming that we do not find other problems
during operational testing?
Secretary Sambur. Yes. With program stability, we are confident there will be ad-
ditional cost increases. Production costs continue to decrease. For example. Lot 3
aircraft costs are 11 percent less than Lot 2, and 46 percent less than the initial
production lot. The current estimate is based on realistic assumptions, actual nego-
tiated lots on contract, and conservative return multiple for future cost reduction
initiatives.
11. Senator Lieberman. Secretary Sambur, one of the methods you mentioned in
your prepared remarks is "stability of requirements" as a mechanism for precluding
future cost increases. How is the goal of "stability of requirements" consistent with
adding air-to-groimd capability to the original F-22 program?
123
Secretary Sambur. In the case of the F/A-22, the baseUne requirements have
been stable. The F/A-22 program has had an inherent air-to-ground capabiUty (i.e.,
JDAM) in the EMD program since 1993.
JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER ALTERNATE ENGINE PROGRAM
12. Senator Lieberman. Secretary Young, I understand that the JSF program has
made a sizeable reduction in the effort planned for fiscal year 2004 on the alternate
engine. I understand this reduction represents a disproportionate share of an infla-
tion adjustment assessed against the overall program. What is your assessment of
the effect of this reduction?
Secretary YoUNG. The JSF Program Office is analyzing ways to limit the impacts
of the GE F136 funding reductions in fiscal year 2004 and out (the inflation reduc-
tion was not applied to GE F136 fiscal year 2003 effort), but the production engine
competition likely will be delayed. The Department will reevaluate GE F136 funding
and schedule as part of the fiscal year 2005 budget development process.
13. Senator LlEBERMAN. Secretary Young, are there any steps you can take to
mitigate any potential delay in introducing the alternate engine to the program?
Secretary Young. The JSF Program Office is analyzing ways to limit the impacts
of the GE F136 funding reductions in fiscal year 2004 and out (the inflation reduc-
tion was not applied to GE F136 fiscal year 2003 effort). The Department will re-
evaluate GE F136 funding and schedule as part of the fiscal year 2005 budget devel-
opment process.
post-operation anaconda process IMPROVEMENTS
14. Senator Lieberman. General Keys, the subcommittee heard testimony from
General Keane, the Army Vice Chief of Staff, several weeks ago. During those dis-
cussions, we asked General Keane about the Army and Air Force efforts to improve
the ability to manage close air support operations, based on the concerns that came
from Operation Anaconda. I was encouraged by his comments on the progiess that
the senior Air Force and Army leadership have made in dealing with these concerns.
Would you like to comment on the Air Force's perspective on these discussions?
General Keys. Air-ground operations are the key to success for the joint force. As
a result, we have met several times at the 4-star level subsequent to our operations
in Operation Enduring Freedom. Our joint doctrine and close air support procedures
developed over 50+ years and tweaked during Korea, Vietnam, and Operation
Desert Storm are sound. As a result of the lessons learned in Anaconda, we have
had great success in Afghanistan with operations that were potentially just as haz-
ardous as that situation, but with none of the problems experienced. We believe this
is because we learned our lessons well and carried that knowledge into subsequent
Operation Enduring Freedom operations. This knowledge in-tum became precursor
to the successes we've had in Operation Iraqi Freedom.
We continue to learn it is critical for the air component to know and understand
the ground component commander's scheme of maneuver and for the ground com-
mander to know and understand the air component's scheme of aerial maneuver
and capabilities. We continue to actively support the Joint Close Air Support (CAS)
Executive Steering Committee's efforts to improve joint close air support operations,
training, equipment and interoperability. Finally, my staff is working closely with
their Army counterparts to accelerate the revision of our Memorandum of Under-
standing on Liaison Support. This revision will provide improved two-way liaison
support between the Services and improve our inter-service working relationship.
15. Senator Lieberman. General Keys, are we seeing concrete evidence of the
fruits of those discussions in Operation Iraqi Freedom?
General Keys. A lesson learned from Operation Enduring Freedom is the need to
better integrate and coordinate oxir operation from strategic through tactical levels.
I detailed Major General Leaf from my staff to head up a senior air component co-
ordination element (ACCE) representation to the land component commander and
more importantly, to provide the land component commander the critical "Airman's
perspective" at the strategic and operational level of war. We also provided ACCE
teams to other major head force entities. Accordingly, we made every attempt to so-
lidify our joint integration in planning and conducting joint combat ops through
every echelon. We wanted to ensure our liaisons were properly trained, manned,
and equipped for their tasks. My staff also expended a tremendous amount of effort
to ensure we had trained and equipped special tactics teams and tactical air control
124
parties in place to meet the land component commander's requirements. At the tac-
tical level this meant ensuring Air Support Operations Centers and Tactical Air
Control Parties were in place in sufficient quantities to support the Armys V Corps
as well as special operations forces and that they had the newest, most interoper-
able equipment. Every indication we have received so far says the air-ground inte-
gration we have seen and continue to see is remarkable, and is a critical factor in
the resounding success of the overall operation.
PASSIVE ATTACK WEAPON
16. Senator Lieberman. Secretary Sambur, your prepared statement highlights
the shortened development you were able to achieve in a program you called the
Passive Attack Weapon (PAW). What is the PAW?
Secretary Sambur. PAW consists of non-explosive kinetic energy penetrators
packaged in a tactical dispenser and guided with the Wind Corrected Munitions Dis-
penser (WCMD) tail guidance kit. The weapon is integrated on the F-16 and B-
52, with future integration planned for the F-15E.
17. Senator Lieberman. Secretary Sambur, what extraordinary steps did the Air
Force have to take in order to get this weapon to the field so quickly?
Secretary Sambur. Delivering a new capability in less than 6 months did not
allow "business as usual" thinking, strategies, or execution. The PAW team con-
structed a program that demonstrated success in emplojing "Best Practice" initia-
tives. Using extensive cross-functional teaming as advocated in the Department's
Section 912(c) Report of the Commercial Business Environment Study Group, a
multi-command team was created to plan and execute the program. Team members
were colocated within the program office and guided by a single goal of delivering
a unique new combat capability by December 31, 2002. No military specifications
were mandatory on PAW contracts and performance-based requirements were
used — requirements were stated in less than one-half page in each contract.
Technical data was exchanged using a web-based electronic transfer database,
making information available and enabling rapid decisionmaking. Another initiative
of great benefit was establishing and executing a seamless verification program. All
information was shared with the extended team. In particular, the Operational Test
Agency was given complete access to the program office's decisionmaking process.
Ultimately, the effectiveness of the seamless verification approach is shown in
AFOTEC's Operational Utility Evaluation making use of data fi-om each of four
weapons delivered during the flight test program, and traditional developmental
and operational test activities were invisible.
Finally, the Program Director was completely empowered to make all decisions on
the program. As a result, decision timelines were extremely short, and the official
with program accountability was vested with complete authority to ensure its suc-
cess.
18. Senator Lieberman. Secretary Sambur, which of these steps might be applica-
ble to a broader set of acquisition programs?
Secretary Sambur. All of these steps can be applicable to a broader set of acquisi-
tion programs. Implementation of a focused, cross-functional team all reporting to
a Program Manager empowered to make decisions can significantly reduce time
ft^om program initiation to fielding. Also, acceptance of seamless verification tech-
niques promotes efficient and effective use of test resources, while reducing overall
time to conduct required development and operational test activities. Lastly, under-
standing the capabilities required by the warfighter, and measuring against the
readiness of available technologies, will allow better decisionmaking and risk assess-
ment by the Program Manager and the acquisition-warfighter team.
"friendly fire" issues
19. Senator Lieberman. Admiral Nathman, General Hough, and General Keys, I
know that fl3ring extremely close to the ground while trying to identify friend fi-om
foe at high speeds is a daunting task. However, on March 28 an American A-10
apparently attacked a small convoy of British Chieftain tanks and Scimitar armored
vehicles from the Household Cavalry. Preliminary reports indicate that the A-10
aircraft pressed the attack despite the fact that: (1) the attack took place in a Brit-
ish-controlled area; (2) the British armor had used colored smoke to identify them-
selves to the aircraft; and (3) the tanks and armored vehicles had friendly markings
125
applied to their exterior. In the end one British tanker was killed and four were
injured in the attack.
Given the importance of coalitions to our national security, working with coalition
partners, especially the British, will increasingly become the rule rather than the
exception. How can we address the question of whether or not our procedures or
training need to be updated to prevent such unfortunate accidents from recurring
in the future?
Admiral Nathman. The Navy recognizes the criticality of discerning friend from
foe prior to engagement of any force. The Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center
(NSAWC) in Fallon, Nevada, is responsible for training and evaluating each carrier
air wing during the Inter Deployment Training Cycle (IDTC). Joint close air sup-
port, as governed by the JCAS Manual 3-09.3, and Rules of Engagement (ROE) are
integral parts of friendly fire deconfliction training. Aviators, ground support and
battlegroup leadership are briefed on carrier, air wing performance in friendly fire
and ROE training missions. The JCAS Executive Steering Committee and NSAWC
fi"equently review exercises to ensure curriculum satisfies current fleet training re-
quirements and properly simulates the challenges faced in actual theatre oper-
ations. The Navy has incorporated lessons learned fi'om the unique air-to-ground
missions recently conducted in Afghanistan and will closely examine friendly fire in-
cidents that occur during Operation Iraqi Freedom.
General Hough. The Department of Defense devotes a tremendous amount of en-
ergy to prevent "Friendly Fire" mishaps from occurring. Joint Publication 3-09.3
outlines the "Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP) for Joint Close Air Sup-
port." The Joint Staff just completed a review and revision of this publication and
the recommendations and procedural changes made appear to be working well in
Operation Iraqi Freedom according to initial feedback from the Marine Corps As-
sessment Team. The General Accounting Office has completed a study on training
issues and is preparing to release their report. The Marine Corps awaits the results
of this study and anticipates incorporating GAO recommendations.
General Keys. We have tactics, techniques, and procedures designed to minimize
the likelihood of such mishaps. An investigation will examine procedures and train-
ing as well as other pertinent factors. These will include the location of the convoy,
the control measures in effect, the identification measures established for air-to-
ground operations in the area, lighting conditions, weather, and similar potential
relevant facts.
While this incident is under investigation, any premature comment as to the
cause of this tragedy could jeopardize the integrity of that investigation and con-
sequently reduce the effectiveness of the remedies that investigation may rec-
ommend. It would therefore be particularly inappropriate to comment on "prelimi-
nary reports" whether they originate from official of press sources. We will look for-
ward to informing you of the results of the investigation when that process is com-
plete.
QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR EVAN BAYH
JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER
20. Senator Bayh. Secretary Young, the original fiscal year 2004 budget request
included $2,172 billion for the Navy's portion of the pre-System Development and
Demonstration phase of the JSF program. Of this amount, $156 million was des-
ignated for continued development of the F136 engine as an interchangeable propul-
sion system with first flight in fiscal year 2008.
I was recently informed of a post-budget adjustment, which would reduce F136
funding by $56 million in fiscal year 2004, a total reduction of $442 million through
the current FYDP. Last year. Congress added funding to the JSF program specifi-
cally to ensure that the F136 would be ready for initial production as early as pos-
sible. This recent budget adjustment jeopardizes congressional intent and I will con-
tinue to work with the committee and the Department to return the F136 to its
original schedule.
I would like to know why such a large portion of a routine consumer price index
adjustment was disproportionately distributed to a single element of the JSF pro-
gram (F136), and what steps will be taken to ensure that any adjustment is more
equitably allocated? In addition, I would Uke to know if this cut by the Program
Office was intended to set back F136 production? I support returning the F136 to
its original schedule and seek your concurrence that the Program Office shares this
sentiment.
126
Secretary YouNG. The Office of Management and Budget issued revised inflation
indices in January 2003. This required the JSF Program Office to reevaluate fund-
ing allocations within the program in fiscal year 2003 and out. To hold schedule to
first flight, production start, and fielding, and meet the services' Initial Operational
Capability dates, funding was first applied to the Lockheed Martin Air System and
the Pratt- Whitney propulsion contracts. The remainder of the funding was then allo-
cated to the General Electric F136 engine contract and the Government support por-
tions of the program. The JSF Program Office is analyzing ways to limit the impacts
of the GE F136 funding reductions in fiscal year 2004 and out (the inflation reduc-
tion was not applied to GE F136 fiscal year 2003 effort), but the production engine
competition likely will be delayed. The Department will reevaluate GE F136 funding
and schedule as part of the fiscal year 2005 budget development process.
[Whereupon, at 4:15 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]
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